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Why the new frigates are not enough – The “fluid extension” of the islands

Why the new frigates are not enough – The “fluid extension” of the islands

  

 

Grivas Costas

As is known, the debate on defense issues in Greece has been dominated by the issue of what the new frigates of the Navy will be in the last year. We hope that a realistic reading of reality will prevail and that the political leadership will decide on the acquisition of ships based on operational criteria and not on the basis of dangerous pseudo-geopolitical fantasies, or rather on the basis of dependencies.

However, in any case, it is now a fact that large surface units are not enough for a modern naval force. Things have changed and one of the first to seem to have realized this is the pre-eminent maritime power, the United States. Their Navy is considering transforming itself into a more network-centric and less platform-centric force. In fact, it is considering expanding the use of robotic platforms.

As the author has mentioned in many of his previous articles on SLpress, the development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) networks by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, etc., which endanger US large surface ships, is forcing the US to seek other methodologies for maritime power projection. One of the solutions being considered is investing in robotic systems.

Thus, the US Navy's ships must move away from the logic that their primary role is to protect aircraft carriers and acquire offensive capabilities. At the same time, the logic of investing in large, complex, expensive and difficult-to-defend platforms, such as the Arleigh Burke destroyers, is being questioned. The development of smaller and cheaper vessels with greater offensive capabilities is being considered.

“Dispersed lethality” 

Within this philosophy, the development of offensive robotic platforms is being studied. Among other things, the US Navy is investing in “distributed lethality”, that is, in the development of network structures that will unify individual “imperfect” platforms into a single multi-platform combat unit. Based on the same logic, the Navy wants to equip “anything that sails the sea” with missiles and other weapons in order to saturate China’s counter-access and area denial capabilities. According to previous statements by Rear Admiral Ron Boxall (then director of surface warfare in the office of the Chief of the US Navy), human crews will initially be placed on the unmanned vessels that the US Navy is developing.

 

According to the Naval Sea Systems Command, the US Navy is developing the following categories of robotic sea systems:

  • A large unmanned surface vessel (USV), which will carry and deploy large sensors and be armed with missiles and other weapons.
  • Medium-sized robotic surface vessels that will be able to carry smaller sensors and possibly electronic warfare equipment.
  • Small robotic surface vessels that will be able to tow mine-hunting equipment, as well as act as communications relays for manned ships.
  • Even smaller robotic vessels that will function as telecommunications links, as well as reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence-gathering platforms.

According to Rear Admiral Boxall, the investment in robotic systems is part of a broader US Navy capability development philosophy that emphasizes small platforms to reduce costs and increase survivability against weapons such as Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) like the infamous DF21D and the newer and much more advanced DF26.

Anti-submarine Robot

For the American admiral, the fundamental question with which ship design should begin is ""how small can my platform be so that it can have on it what it needs to have." It is obvious that a robotic platform that does not require space for the crew will have smaller dimensions and consequently require less cost and construction time than a conventional manned ship.

The "core" system on which the US Navy is building the specifications of its future robotic vessels is the Sea Hunter platform.
Sea Hunter is an evolution of the ACTUV (Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel) system, which began as a program of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency in 2013.

The ACTUV was designed to cost-effectively enhance the detection capabilities of conventionally powered submarines (SSKs), the number and capabilities of which are constantly increasing around the world. It will be able to track submarines, operating autonomously for periods of weeks or even months, but its design and available space may allow for additional uses. SAIC and Oregon Iron Works were involved in its construction.

 

The prototype trimaran vessel is 40 meters long and is made of synthetic materials. It has a displacement of 130 tons and its design emphasizes stealth features.
Sea Hunter sea trials began on June 22, 2016, according to Scott Littlefield, ACTUV program manager in the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency's "Tactical Technologies Office."

The example of the USA

It is therefore understandable that since the US itself thinks this way, Greece, which has to defend a complex archipelagic structure within a small sea, in addition to the Navy of "large ships" also needs a complementary naval force of many small vessels, robotic and manned, that will function as a "fluid extension" of the islands.

These will confront the Turkish reconnaissance-strike grids and will compose a “grid of grids” of counter-access and area denial, in combination with land and air assets, transforming the Aegean into a space of undisputed and uncontested Greek sovereignty. And this effort cannot but be based primarily on Greek solutions.

The basis for this effort is the development of the theoretical framework, the philosophy of action of similar systems and the “theory of victory” that they serve, that is, domestic military thinking. And this military thinking cannot come to us “ready-made” from outside, because the specificities of Greece (geographical, operational and others) are many. Therefore, this one in particular must be Greek and ethnocentric. “By us, for us”.


This article is based on material cited in the book by Costas Grivas “The New Military Revolution and the Greek Defense Strategy” published by Livanis Publications.

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