Armed Forces command structure: The “elephant in the room”.
Armed Forces Command Structure: The “elephant in the room”
GARTZONIKAS PANAGIOTISThe command structure of the Armed Forces, although a matter of fundamental importance, remains undervalued in the public debate. Military strength, however, depends on the effectiveness of the command. That is why we will examine the echelons of the new command structure.
After the necessity of establishing a unified Aegean Command, the second most serious issue concerning the command structure is the Special Warfare Command (SWCC) — the real “elephant in the room.” Its establishment in 2021 did not stem from an operational requirement, but from a window of opportunity found by its supporters, from the allure that elite forces exert on politicians and public opinion, as well as from the deficit of military education.
Supporters of the DEP, especially those who have served there, do not present a clear operational advantage from its creation. Instead, they attribute the criticism of it to the supposed envy of those who oppose it. However, the issue is serious enough for coffeehouse discussions.
Special Warfare
The existence of the DEP leads to confusion of concepts, creates two parallel land administrations, unnecessarily complicates command and control, encourages the “tacticalization” and fragmentation of military actions and ultimately does not promote the offensive effort. Specifically:
First, the term “Special Warfare” has not been adopted by NATO. In American doctrine, it is defined as “the execution of activities involving a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions by a specially trained and educated force, with a deep understanding of cultures and foreign languages, the ability to operate in small teams, and the ability to train and fight alongside indigenous forces in a friendly, uncertain, or hostile environment" (ADP 3-05, Army Special Operations, 2019).
What is the relationship between the Greek “Special Warfare” and the above definition, as these are completely different concepts. The assessment is that, having already established a Special Operations Command and looking for a term for a new super-command, the title “Special Warfare” was arbitrarily chosen, regardless of its real content. There is a latent perception that invoking an American or NATO term automatically confers prestige and credibility!
Secondly, the function that is burdened the most — without reason — is that of administration and control, and in three different ways:
- With the establishment of the DEP, two land forces administrations are in practice created, as both the General Staff and the DEP are directly subordinate to the GEETHAThe bulk of the forces of the DEP are not those of Special Operations, but the formations of elite infantry, namely marines, paratroopers and commandos. Before the establishment of the DEP, these formations were anyway subordinate to one formation, the 1st Division.
- The new administration that is being established takes over two formations that were under the National Defense General Staff anyway. The Interbranch Special Operations Command was under the National Defense General Staff since its establishment in 2013, and the 1st Division, with the marines, commandos and paratroopers, was used by the National Defense General Staff. In other words, where we had two administrations directly under the National Defense General Staff, now we are inserting a new administration between them and the National Defense General Staff! A new level of administration means an increase in bureaucratic procedures and an extension of the time for making decisions, but also for their implementation. The Interbranch Special Operations Command is particularly degraded, whose commander does not have direct access to the Chief of the National Defense General Staff.
- The new structure does not address the serious problem of command and control in the Aegean, which is still not treated as a single area of operations. Instead, it adds another commander (of the DEP), exacerbating an already problematic situation (see article 18/1/2026).
Thirdly, for the part of the DEP that concerns the forces of the 1st Division (infantrymen, paratroopers, commandos), two critical observations:
- The concentration of disparate forces in a single tank does not bring about a substantial change as long as the way they are used does not change. Despite the weighty title, the problem is simply sidestepped. If these brigades are used piecemeal and consecutively, then we are led to the “tacticalization” of operations. This logic reflects the concept of limited or controlled use of force, which Evangelos Venizelos described as a “point crisis”. In other words, the logic of “point crises” enters through the back door even if we do not have such an intention.
- As Turkey’s capabilities grow, so does the need for us to conduct offensive actions at the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, the challenge for all the “special” brigades, which are elite forces with superior training, morale, and capabilities, is not to marginalize them. It is to use them offensively in a way that maximizes their potential. These forces must be used collectively, in combination with other capabilities, so that the total result is greater than the sum of the parts. That is, to achieve operational-level objectives with strategic results.
Land Command and Army Corps
The abolition of the Army simplifies command and control and shortens the decision-making process. After all, the General Staff in the period 1940-41 waged two wars with two distinct structures, the General Staff and the General Staff level. In addition, Papagos exercised a strategic role. Despite the weaknesses and criticism that has been leveled at it, this particular arrangement worked effectively.
Israel, often held up as a model, does not have a unified land command. It has three geographical commands at the Army Corps level. In contrast, Egypt created a Land Forces Command before the Six-Day War in 1967, which is believed to have contributed to its crushing defeat. Of course, an Interior Command (not the IDF) is needed, a role that could be assumed in wartime by the Inspector General.
The renaming of the 3rd and 4th Army Corps to the Supreme Military Command of Epirus-Macedonia (ASDIM) and the Supreme Military Command of Thrace (ASDITH) respectively, constitutes an insult and a disregard for military traditions. These Army Corps have a history of over a hundred years and thousands of dead have fallen defending their flags.
Similarly incomprehensible is the renaming of the ASDEN to the Supreme Military Command of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (ASDAAM). The operational capabilities of the ASDEN in the Eastern Mediterranean are non-existent. Instead of creating a real inter-branch Aegean Command, which would unify the Fleet and the ASDEN and would also have the capabilities to act in the Eastern Mediterranean, the renaming is simply chosen!
Finally, the characterization of the Hellenic Air Defense Command, the Fourth Army Corps, the Fleet Headquarters and the Tactical Air Force Headquarters (ATA) as “Major Commands of Interbranch Operations” reveals a complete misunderstanding of interbranch nature. An administration becomes interbranch when it has forces from other branches and not when it is simply staffed by officers from different branches, or when it is called interbranch. We are repeating the same mistake as in 2003.
NATO and EU Headquarters
Greece has headquarters in both NATO and the EU, which directly affect the national command structure. In 2003, we offered NATO the 3rd Army Corps as a Rapid Reaction Corps, on the one hand because it sought this, and on the other hand because Turkey had a corresponding headquarters. However, since 2003, NATO headquarters do not have a specific area of responsibility. At the same time, Turkey has had one or two headquarters in the NATO command structure since 1952. Turkey also had the political will to develop its corresponding headquarters where NATO requested it and assumed the command of ISAF in Afghanistan three times.
Similar headquarters are located in countries with much greater economic and military capabilities than Greece. The Netherlands, for example, participates in a joint headquarters with Germany. In Greece, the argument is made that the participation of third countries in the operational budget of the headquarters offsets the costs. However, given that the total cost is rarely calculated here, and that this is not limited to operating expenses, a serious study of the real cost of maintaining such a headquarters would be interesting.
The most serious problem, however, is the undermining of our credibility. While we state that we have an Army Corps headquarters capable of conducting operations anywhere in the Alliance, there is no political will to deploy it to an international mission. This is petty arrogance, which everyone understands. We have not deployed the headquarters in Afghanistan and we probably will not do so in the future.
In a similar spirit, when Greece ceded a second headquarters, this time to the EU. This is the 1st Army, which functions as an Operational Headquarters (Operation Headquarters – OHQ), strategic level. Only France, Germany, Italy and Spain have similar headquarters. The same reservations apply here.
Alliances —especially military ones— are necessary for Greece and its active participation is imperative. However, the country must reconsider the offer of two top-level headquarters in NATO and the EU. The crucial issue is the harmonization of ends, means and methods, that is, the contribution to an alliance should be proportional to the country’s position, capabilities and aspirations. What is observed today is the opposite: a disharmony of ends, means and methods, that is, a strategic irrationality.
The problems remain
Since 1990, various “new structures” have been presented, most of which have not been effective. Their main concern was usually limited to two questions: which units will be abolished and which format will be chosen for the “special” formations. The 2nd Army Corps was established in 1998 as a Rapid Reaction Force, it was properly abolished in 2013, and in 2021 the Special Warfare Command was established. The same ideas are recycled without comprehensive-coherent reform. One of the main causes of stagnation is the poverty of military thinking and the degradation of military education.
The new structure, which is not so new, is not going to solve pressing and chronic organizational problems. It is striking that 75 years after our accession to NATO, we are unable to follow the developments in the armies of more advanced countries and are repeating the same mistakes. Besides, no organizational reform touches the number one problem of the Army: the low manning of the units. A problem that can only be solved by increasing military service.