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 Does Ukraine really have the upper hand, or are we simply watching the pending movement of public debate?

Ilmari Käihkö, assistant professor of military sciences 20.9.2026:

Last year, Ukraine seemed to be losing the war; today, Russia's defeat is being predicted. However, a real turning point in a war often becomes visible only in retrospect, writes Käihkö.

The war year 2025 was difficult for Ukraine. The country, waging a defensive war, was still able to resist with the help of its supporters, but analysts believed that it would lose the war.

Ukraine failed to liberate the territories occupied by Russia. Worse, there were fears that Ukrainian resistance would simply weaken its negotiating position in the inevitable peace talks with Russia.

This year we hear something completely different: the war is said to have passed a critical turning point. Ukraine is said to have the "upper hand ." Time has turned against Russia. Ukraine's victory is considered certain.

"The complete reversal of predictions prompts me to reflect on the turning points of wars."

Initially, these views, which came from politicians , were reinforced by statements from many analysts following the war. They emphasized that Russia's losses and the costs of the war are increasing, while achievements and support for the war are decreasing.

This complete reversal of predictions prompts me to reflect on the turning points of wars.

A turning point is a moment or event that irrevocably changes the course of a war. Often it is a major battle, the opening of a new front, or the entry of a new party into the war that decisively changes the balance of power.

Perhaps the most common example of a turning point is the Battle of Stalingrad during World War II.

Turning points are often only recognized in retrospect. Perhaps that is why they are easier to spot at the beginning of a war, the moment when the aggressor's advance is first halted.

In World War II, such a moment occurred before Stalingrad, already on the outskirts of Moscow in the winter of 1941. In the Ukrainian war, it occurred at the gates of Kiev in the spring of 2022, when Russian forces began to retreat.

“Turning points are often only recognized in retrospect”

Like the concepts of victory and defeat, turning points are a central element of war propaganda. In the Afghan war, which lasted two decades and ultimately resulted in the defeat of Western coalition forces, repeated claims of turning points ultimately led to the bitter realization : “we twisted so much that we made a 360-degree turn.”

More than 200.000 German and allied soldiers were captured at Stalingrad. It is difficult to see that anything similar has happened in Ukraine — or, more generally, that any factor has changed with a direct impact on the outcome of the war.

Although Ukraine has managed to significantly improve its position in the war, it is still necessary to speak with caution about any significant turning point.

Russian forces are still slowly advancing in a situation on the front that has been described as relatively unchanged for almost four years. Ukraine has begun evacuating the last fortified towns of Donetsk.

“Talk about turning points is also part of war propaganda.”

According to a recent statement from the presidential administration, Ukraine needs to recruit 30.000 soldiers every month. This number is only a third less than the estimated losses of the more populous Russia. This calls into question the most optimistic estimates of the ratio of casualties, according to which Russia is losing up to eight soldiers for every Ukrainian.

While attack on the ground is more difficult than defense, the opposite is true in the air. In air warfare, a cycle of escalation is underway, in which both sides attempt to force political concessions from the adversary.

We know, however, from history that it is difficult to win wars solely through bombing. Therefore, a collapse somehow caused by air warfare seems unlikely.

“The public debate about the war in Ukraine is characterized by a constant oscillation between two extremes.”

Historical experience, however, does not automatically mean that a collapse could not be possible — for example, because of a new weapons technology. But the claims of the first half of the year about a turning point in the war also recall the pendulum swing from one extreme to the other that has characterized the public debate about the war in Ukraine from the beginning. In a war that has in practice proven relatively balanced, changes tend to be gradual and painfully slow.

It is, of course, possible that the statements of political leaders about a turning point are actually addressed to the United States , so that the country can mobilize against the plight of Ukraine. The crucial question, in this case, is whether the decision-makers themselves believe what they are saying.

This, of course, is difficult to evaluate from an external perspective.

In terms of air warfare, the upcoming winter in Ukraine is predicted to be the most difficult yet. Russian ballistic missiles in particular pose a serious threat. There is a risk of a mass exodus of Ukrainian civilians.

The recruitment problems of Ukraine, which is facing an acute budget deficit , also do not bode well if Russia, as expected , proceeds with new recruitment after the elections for the lower house of parliament.

It is alarmingly easy to become accustomed to a war that has already been going on for years and may continue for many more. Perhaps Europe should continue to take into account that, while sudden reversals are unlikely, they remain possible.

Ilmari Käihkö​​

The author is a scholar of military science, who expects a quick peace, but prepares for the possibility that the war will continue for a long time.

Source: Yle.fi