Imia 26 years ago: Excerpts from the book under publication by the then Commander of the 80th Airborne Division
Imia 26 years ago: Excerpts from the book under publication by the then Commander of the 80th Airborne Division
A. Nikolodimos, Lieutenant General of the 80th Airborne Division on the warpath
The last-minute signal from the National Defense General Staff that left the western islet without a military guard unit
By Georgios D. Drosos
They are being filled today Sunday January 30 2022, 26 years from her evening January 30/31, 1996, when the peak of "crisis of Imia"».
Much has been written, various things have been heard, several books have been published about that period.
The kalymnos–news.gr, presents, as every year, a tribute to the much-discussed issue that took place in our region.
This year, 26 years later, Our presentation will be a little different.
We will present excerpts from the book in publication “THUNDERSTORM IN THE AEGEAN: The Chronicle of the Imia Crisis - The 80th ADTEA on the Path of War” written by Lieutenant General ea Athanasios Nikolodimos, the then Commander (Brigadier General at the time) of the 80th ADTEA to which ZE belong the Imia microislands and which is soon to be released.
As Lieutenant General E.A. states in the preface to his book: Athanasios Nikolodimos, decided to write it, with the belief that it will be able to present valuable additional information and constructive analyses and opinions without any disposition to criticize and certainly without any disposition to assign responsibilities, which will help in a better understanding of the very serious "Imia Crisis" from a military perspective and in drawing useful conclusions.
The presentation of actions is limited to the echelons of the Unit Levels and the Staff of the 80th ADTEA. In some cases, actions of smaller echelons or even individuals are also described, if they played a particular role in the context of the broader phases of the crisis.
The compilation of the book, in addition to the sources mentioned in the bibliography, was based mainly on the personal knowledge of the author, then Commander of the 80th Airborne Division, and of the actions of its Staff and Administrations.
Athanasios Nikolodimos dedicates the 140-page book to the Staff, Commanders, Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Hoplites and National Guardsmen of the Units of the 80th ADTEA.
From this book we will limit ourselves and quote excerpts from what mainly took place from a military perspective on January 30 and 31, 1996 in our region and which concern and highlight initiatives and proposals of the 80 ADTEA to its superiors for handling specific situations, but also the last-minute signal from the National Maritime Police Agency, which changed the original location of the commando group's installation, which was the Western islet of Imia, and to transfer and install it in Kalolimnos.
Lieutenant General Athanasios Nikolodimosς
Before we begin quoting these excerpts, a few words about the Lieutenant General Athanasios Nikolodimos author of the book:
Athanasios Nikolodimos was born in the village of Gardiki, Omilaion, in the Prefecture of Phthiotis.
He entered the Military Cadet School in 1962 and graduated in 1966 as a Second Lieutenant of Artillery.
He studied at all the Schools of his weapon, as well as other Schools of the Greek Armed Forces. He is a graduate of the Higher War College, the National Defense College of Greece and the War Academy of Germany.
During his military career, he served in many important positions as a Staff Officer and Commander in Staffs, Units, Groups, Formations and in the General Staff of the Army and the General Staff (Cyprus).
He served as Commander of the 80th National Guard, Commander of the 95th National Guard (Rhodes), Commander of the Hellenic Navy, First Deputy Chief of General Staff, Commander of the National Guard and from 2002 to 2006 Chief of the General Staff of the National Guard (GHG) in Cyprus. He was honored with many decorations and distinctions.
EXCERPTS FROM THE BOOK UNDER PUBLISHING
Data for 80 ADTEA
The 80th National Guard and Police Division Command (ADTEA) is a continuation of the 125th National Guard and Gendarmerie Division Command (ADTEX), which was formed in 1964. It is a Brigade-level formation and is administratively subordinate to the ASDEN (Supreme Military Command of the Interior and Islands).
The 80th ADTEA, after successive reorganizations, additions and reinforcements, took on its current form and became a flexible, self-sufficient and dynamic Formation, which fully responds to the execution of its mission, which is the defense in its ZE (Northern Dodecanese Complex).
ZE 80 ADTEA
The Northern Group of the Dodecanese islands constitutes the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the 80th ATF.
In this geographical complex there are:
– Eleven (11) main inhabited islands (Kos, Nisyros, Astypalaia, Pserimos, Kalymnos, Telendos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsi, Arki, Agathonisi).
– Seven (7) micro-islands (Farmakonisi, Plati, Giali, Syrna. Kalolimnos, Levitha, Kinaros).
– Forty-five (45) uninhabited islet complexes comprising a total of sixty-seven (67) microislets, including the microislets of Limnia (Imia).
– In addition to the above, there are approximately fifty (50) rocks – reefs – shoals of no particular importance due to their size, from a military point of view.
The distance of the islets - microislets varies from the corresponding inhabited islands.
Specifically for the Limnia (Imia) complex, the following is mentioned:
– These are two (2) micro-islets, “Eastern” (small) and “Western” (large), located east of N. Kalymnos. Close to the sea borders with Turkey.
– Their official name is N. LIMNIA and not IMIA as they are commonly called today.
–They are rocky and both have an area of 30.000 sq.m. (30 acres, 12 the small one and 18 the large one). They do not have boat access bays or air force landing fields. They are 300 meters apart. Due to their size and topography, they are of no particular economic importance (dry islets). Despite this, there was a small herd of goats, owned by a private individual from Pserimos (Vezyropoulos Antonis).
Command-Staff of 80 ADTEA during the Imia crisis
Before listing the events in chronological order, we mention the composition of Administration – Staff of the 80th ADTEA of that era:
1.Commander 80 ADTEA: Brigadier Athanasios Nikolodimos – after the 80th ADTEA he served in key positions and rose to the highest echelons of the military hierarchy, Lieutenant General in the 95th ADTE (Rhodes), Commander of ASDEN, First Deputy Chief of General Staff, Commander of the Hellenic National Guard, Chief of the General Staff of the National Guard in Cyprus
2. Deputy Commander 80 ADTEA: Colonel (T.T.) George Chronopoulos He then served as Commander of the 23rd Military District (Alexandroupolis) and returned to Kos as Commander of the 80th Military District, Commander in the XNUMXst Division)
3. Chief of Staff 80 ADTEA: Colonel (PZ) Ioannis Hasakiolis
4. Artillery Commander: Colonel (Army) Panagiotis Veliziotis,
5. Director of 3rd EG-Operations Officer: Lieutenant Colonel (Army) George Drosos
- 3rd Class Officer : Major (PZ) Athanasios Zachos
6. Director of the 1st Division: Major (PZ) Andreas Iakovou ,from Cyprus.
7. Director of 2nd-7th Grade: Anchis (Northern Greece) Nikolaos Fourtounis
8. Director of the 4st Division: Anchis (TT) Konstantinos Avramopoulos
Of course, apart from the above officers, both the Staff and the Units were staffed with Officers and personnel, who faced the Imia crisis with professionalism and responsibility.
The photo is from the visit of the President of the Republic, Kostis Stefanopoulos, to the Headquarters of the 80th Infantry Division. 5 months after the crisis, he was welcomed by the then Brigadier General, Commander of the 80th Infantry Division, Athanasios Nikolodimos, and the Staff. Also visible are the Deputy Commander of the 80th Infantry Division, Colonel Georgios Chronopoulos, the Nursing Colonel Kalliopi Vraka, the Chief of Staff Georgios Drosos, the Staff Officers Dimitrios Sifnaios and Andreas Iakovou.
Crisis history
The "Crisis of Imia" as a whole, based on its time scale, can be divided into three stages or periods:
- The period before the Great Crisis, that is, from December 1995 to January 28, 1996. (1st period)
- The period of the peak of the Crisis, that is, from January 28 to January 31, 1996. (2nd period)
- The period after the Great Crisis, that is, from February 1, 1996 until the beginning of March 1996. (3rd period)
The presentation of excerpts will be limited to the period of the peak of the Crisis and more specifically to the two-day period January 30 and 31 1996
January 30, 1996 (Tuesday)
1. The tension and preparations in the area begin in the morning hours. At (4.00 am) ) was ordered by the Hellenic National Defense General Staff "General alert of the Staff and Units of the 80th ADTEA"" from at 6.00am
2. A plan is made public according to which the Turks claim all of the rocky islets located near the Turkish coast.
3. By order the readiness of air and naval means of the ADTEA with a time scale of "proportions of weapons on standby" that ranged from 10 minutes to three hours.
4. With initiative of the Commander of the 80th Air Defense Command, all A/C assets were placed on standby for 10 minutes which practically meant that the personnel were at arms. This measure was applied throughout the 80 ADTEA ZE Kos, Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, Astypalaia.
5. On 7.00 am UH-1H helicopter carrying a staff member of the 80th Airborne Division flew on the route Kos– Pserimos-Kalolimnos-Imia–Farmakonisi-Agathonisi and return for surveillance-recognition and reporting of results.
6. On 8.30 am An order was given by the National Defense General Staff-ASDEN to Commando Team from his staff 5th ETEA to be on standby for 15 minute commute. This required the Group's materials and ammunition to be loaded onto the helicopters and the group to be near them for boarding and immediate departure as soon as ordered. The formation, organization and control of readiness was personally handled by the Commander of the 80th ADTE, Brigadier General Athanasios Nikolodimos who together with the Director of the 3rd Infantry Division (PB) George Drosos and the 3rd Infantry Regiment Major General Athanasios Zachos They inspected the team on the helicopter and gave the lead Captain and his assistant Lieutenant, as well as the helicopter captains, detailed instructions for their mission.
7. On 8.45 am ο Chief of General Staff Konstantinos Voulgaris contact the Commander 80 ADTEA and requested information on the manning of the Units.
8.In 10.00 am requested by the National Assembly and personally from the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense Staff, Admiral Christos Lymberis full information on the tactical naval situation and the disposition in the area (friendly and hostile) and even noted the time of issuance of the order, The Commander of 80 ADTEA immediately submitted the "depiction" of the tactical situation on paper and followed by a detailed written report, For this rapid reaction of 80 ADTEA, the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense Staff issued a congratulatory order (SIMA)
9. On 10.45 am time was assigned by ASDEN to 80 ADTEA the operational control of the Commando Unit (5th ETEA)
10. At the same time it was updated the ATTEA from the ETHKEPICH-ASDEN for the mood two APATCHE attack helicopters
11.In 2.00 pm an order (SIGNAL) was given by the National Security Council-ASDEN for the design, transport and installation of the Commando Team (from the 5th ETEA) which was on standby for 15 minutes on the western islet of Imia. Departure time from Kos at 3.00 pm
12. Directly from the 80 ADTEA issued a written order for the team to board the two UH-1H helicopters and move at 3.00 pm and install on the Western islet of Imia (Limnia). In aThe eastern islet would be the seven-man U.K. Team. The written order was received by the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major General (PZ) Athanasios Zachos who went to the Heliport handed it over to the Commando Team Leader and Helicopter Captains
13. On 2.45 pm Major (PZ) Athanasios Zachos reported by telephone to the Operations Room of the 80th ADTEA, readiness for departure of the two helicopters with the commando team to carry out the mission. He was instructed that departure would take place with a new verbal order at 3.00:XNUMX p.m.
THE LAST-MINUTE SIGNAL THAT LEFT THE WESTERN ISLAND WITHOUT A MILITARY GUARD DEPARTMENT.
At 2.50 pm the Deputy Chief of the Hellenic National Defense Staff, Lieutenant General Nikolaos Stamboulis communicates by telephone with the Business Hall of 80 ADTE and asks for it Commander of the 80th ADTE. He talks to the person in charge of the Operations room, Director of the 3rd EG Anchi (PB) Georgios Drosos who informs him that both the Commander and the Deputy Commander are outside Headquarters for an inspection of Units.
The following dialogue follows. It should be noted that the Deputy Commander knew George Drosos from previous service in Kos when he was Brigadier General Commander of the 80th Hellenic Air Defense Brigade in 1991.
Deputy Leader: George, what about the commando team?
3rd Grade Teacher: Mr. Deputy Leader has boarded the helicopters and at 3.00:XNUMX the order for departure will be given.
Deputy Leader: He contacted immediately and informed them not to depart the helicopters because the mission was changing regarding the location of the Team's installation. Instead of Imia, it will be settled in Kalolimnos, in Faros. Do you want a written order or is a verbal one enough?
3rd Grade Teacher: Mr. Deputy Commander, we definitely want this order in writing, this is a significant change and modification of the mission.
Deputy Leader: You will receive it shortly. Inform the Brigadier General to contact me.
The Director of the 3rd Infantry Division immediately contacts the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major (PZ) Athanasios Zachos at the heliport and informs him that The helicopters will not depart and will await further orders.
Also informs the Governor 80 ADTE which immediately returns to Headquarters.
In the meantime, the Deputy Commander communicates by telephone with the Commander of the 80th ADTEA and the following dialogue is exchanged:
Deputy Leader: Thanasis, the Department you have ready should go to Kalolimnos instead of Imia.
Commander 80 ADTEA: Hang up and I will call you for telephone confirmation-recognition.
The Commander of the 80th Air Defense Squadron communicates with the Deputy Commander.
Deputy Chief of the National Defense General Staff:Himself. Act as I told you before.
Commander 80 ADTEA: I want written confirmation.
Deputy Leader: A modifying order (SIGNAL) immediately follows.
At 3.20pm local time (13.20 GMT) The signal is received from the National Maritime Administration (NMEA) stating:
"Ordered and formed with a relevant 5th ETEA Team, transported and installed island" Kalolimno.
Mission to prevent-intercept the landing of foreigners on the island.
Transport with two UH-1H helicopters
Special care was taken of the DM (Ammunition, food, water) for 4 days.
Reported execution"
The new order to the Commando Group has already been drafted by the 3rd Infantry Division. The Executive Messenger, Lieutenant Colonel Athanasios Zachos, delivered the new order with the final destination of the Team in Kalolimnos instead of Imia.
At 3.45 pm the 2 helicopters depart for Kalolimnos Lighthouse where the Group is located. At 5.15 the 12-man team was reported to have been deployed to Kalolimnos.
The crucial question
This was the third critical point of the Judgment:
What were the factors and data that influenced the decision of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff to proceed with this important a last-minute mission modification and the Western Isles not being set up with a military unit for guarding and not being manned as originally planned?
It was an action that resulted in the Turkish commandos escaping the attention of the Navy ships that were monitoring the area on the night of the peak of the crisis. and climb to the one where there was no military unit
It is the reasonable and crucial question that has been put forward all these years, but is being ignored.
We believe that the then leaderships of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense are responsible for providing an answer to this crucial question.
Of course, in the 26 years that have passed, some answers have been given that may seem logical, but the final result proves that the decision does not justify those who made and designed it.
It was said that according to the plan the Uninhabited western islet would be monitored and would be guarded by the Naval Department located on the Eastern islet and the HN ships who were operating in the area, while there was also visual contact and surveillance from the Department that was transferred and installed at the Lighthouse of Kalolimnos.
The excuse was also formulated that information reached the National Council of the Hellenic Republic and the political leadership from diplomatic sources that the Turks were planning a landing of a division in N. Kalolimnos.
Of course, the counterargument to this information could be the following: our difference or dispute is about Imia and not about any other island or microisland. If this happens, we will have every right to immediately demand its immediate withdrawal. Besides, this could also happen to any other microisland out of the 125 that exist in ZE/80 ADEEA or the 3000 in the entire Aegean. The two microislands of West - East Imia constitute the same complex, in essence they are a single space. Whatever led to this decision in the end, this design turned out to be wrong, since the darkness, zero visibility, and adverse weather conditions prevailing in the area made remote surveillance impossible.
THE CRISIS IS CURING - THE 80 ADEA ON THE FOOT OF WAR
Due to the apparent escalation of the situation from 12.00 noon, the 80th ADTEA also took the following actions on its own initiative:
-He deployed one battalion of Field Artillery (105 mm), Medium (155 mm) and Heavy (8 inch) initially. Then the entire Squadrons in the intended combat positions advanced by a 155 mm and 8 inch Artillery Battalion so that they can cover the wider area and if possible and Imia using "improved missiles"
-3 Multiple Rocket Launchers (MLRs) of the 80th Infantry Division, as well as 8” Self-Propelled Artillery Guns of the 148th Infantry Division, which had targeted the two islets of Imia, were moved to advanced positions.
-It deployed all of its Units' heavy weapons to combat positions as well as its anti-aircraft weapons.
-Manned the already deployed anti-aircraft guns on the coast.
-He advanced to Kalymnos by private ferry personnel (Officers and Privates), vehicles and ammunition to activate the 105 mm Artillery there in the Hali area, on the easternmost cape, so that with its maximum range it could cover the sea area of Imia with fire.
-Reinforced with officers the Kalymnos Technical University to fulfill its mission.
For the above actions, ADTEA requested the approval of ASDEN, which was granted. at 6.00 pm after its actions had already been completed.
At 4.15 pm An order was given by the National Maritime Administration and the National Maritime Administration to monitor the microislands. KOUNELONISI (Agathonis regional) and PIE(Kalolimnos regional) from Agathonisi Outpost and Commando Team from Kalolimnos respectively
On 9.00 1 was ordered by the Hellenic National Defense General Staff-ASDEN "the Units to be placed under two (2) hours notice for movement to the final destination areas"
At 11.00 pm, an order was given for all Units to move to their final destination areas.Already almost the whole of the ADTEA Units were in combat positions since noon.
At 11.15 pm, the mobilization of the local reserve of all units and the mobilization of the National Guard Battalions was ordered,
Η 80 ADTEA issued immediately conscription order . They were invited to the Business Room. Director of the Kos Police Department, the Mayor of Kos, the Harbormaster of Kos and other stakeholders, who were informed by the Brigadier General Commander Athanasios Nikolodimos and by the Deputy Commander Colonel (TT) George Chronopoulos and instructions were given for coordinating and facilitating mobilization.
The performance of the Individual Invitation Sheets (FAP) to the reservists and the National Guard
The work of the ADTEA was very difficult in this area for two reasons:
First because at the same time the movement of Units to the battle positions was in progress. The timely exit of the Units, the order of heavy weapons, anti-aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons, the timely activation of the Command Stations and the headquarters facilitated the task of mobilizing the Units.
Secondly ,the weather conditions on the night of January 30/31, 1996 were extremely unfavorable, torrential rain, strong winds, stormy seas and most importantly, almost zero visibility. Phenomena that prevailed throughout the night.
Nevertheless The arrival of the Reservists and National Guardsmen was spontaneous, immediate, and moving.
In fact, minor problems arose in some units and there were some complaints from Reservists and National Guardsmen during the classification, which took place under torrential rain.
Another problem that arose and should be mentioned was the presence of Athenian television media crews in Kos who were operating in an unorthodox way, setting up cameras in hotel rooms opposite the 80th Anti-Terrorism Unit Headquarters in Kos town, to record movements, creating security problems. The reaction of the Deputy Commander of the 80th Anti-Terrorism Unit was immediate Colonel (Retd.) Georgios Chronopoulos who, as soon as he realized what was happening, went up to the Hotel and isolated the crew. Of course, the problem was more general and bigger, when television media in Athens broadcasted the fleet's exit from the Naval Station directly. Unfortunately, these phenomena continued after the crisis, when television media crews from Athens "camped" in Kos and Kalymnos and they even reached the point to set up “various scenes” which had nothing to do with reality
THE NAVAL SITUATION IN THE AREA
-The escalation continued throughout the day of January 30, 1996, and by the afternoon, both the Greek and Turkish naval forces were at full readiness and in combat formation in the wider area of IMION.
On the side Navy ,were in the area, a frigate (Navarino) which was also the flagship and had the coordination of naval forces, 1 destroyer (Themistocles), 2 gunboats (Firefighter, Warrior), 3 Rocket Launchers (Mykonos, Xenos, Starakis), 3 patrol cars (Antoniou, Panagopoulos II, Panagopoulos III).
On the Turkish side there were 11 ships
There was a concentration of warships from both sides in the wider sea area of Imia that posed risks of engagement, even from an accidental collision.
Although numerically the Turkish ships were one more, Our Navy possessed superiority and superior combat power.
Among the Turkish vessels there were also coastguards that did not have the means and armament to confront the Greek warships.
It is worth noting that in the early hours of January 31, 1996. 2.04 in the morning, the Chief of the General Staff, Vice Admiral John Stagkas sent a signal to all units of the Fleet that read as follows: "I am absolutely certain that if necessary, all of you will prove worthy of the glorious history of the Navy. Good luck and God be with you"….
NIGHT OF 30 / 31 JANUARY 1996
The weather conditions are unfavorable. Continuous and heavy rainfall and visibility is literally zero. The 24:00 time, the Hellenic National Defense General Staff – ASDEN ordered the manning of the defense site with the 1/3 of the forces. However, all the Units were already in the defense positions from very early on and were ready to repel any enemy action.
On 01:30 time the A/GES and then the ASDEN Commander informed the ADTEA Commander that "an enemy attack is imminent in one (1) hour" without specifying the ANSK. The Commander of the 80th ADTEA reported that on the main islands of his area there is no such indication nor information about other enemy forces, except those who were around the Imia and that a Turkish tanker that moved early in the evening from north to south (Chios - Samos - Kos) docked in the Gulf of Halicarnassus (Bodrum) opposite Kos and was as a "target" within the range of the Artillery and in its Fire Plan.
On 02:00 By this time, the dispersal of all Units, the manning of defense positions, the order and manning of all Weapons, the manning and operation of the EDs and the War Headquarters, the development of communications, and readiness to implement the fire plan and repel any enemy action were fully completed. The mobilization and ranking of the Reserves and National Guards continued normally.
Previously on 01:30 At 20:25 a.m., two (2) enemy UAVs flew for approximately XNUMX-XNUMX minutes in the area above the Imia islets. The incident was immediately reported by the Commander of the ADTEA to the General Staff and the Commander of the ASDEN, with the information that they were “BLACK HAWK” type UAVs. When the General Staff asked how the type of UAVs was determined, the answer was that at night and in these extreme weather conditions, only these UAVs can fly. Later, it was also verified by the ETHKEPICH that they were indeed BLACK HAWK UAVs, which the General Staff informed the Commander of the ADTEA.
But what was the purpose of the S/P's flight at this time? Reconnaissance? Deception? At the same time, the Turkish F/G YAVOUZ, which was also in the same area of Imia, opposite the Greek F/G NAVARINO, made a maneuver and covered the small islands from the South with the vessel. It is assumed that at that time the operation to land the Turkish Commandos in Western Imia was beginning.
Finally, as it turned out later, Turkish commandos in an inflatable boat escaped the attention of the Greek Navy ships that were monitoring the LIMNIA (IMIA) microislands and disembarked. on the western islet of Imia which is not manned by Greek units.
Meanwhile, information began to arrive, also transmitted by foreign media, that Turkish commandos had landed in West Imia. In continuous and persistent questions to N. Klimakio Kos and through him to the ships in the area and in particular to the F/G NAVARINO which was the flagship in the area, the Governors categorically rejected this information as vague and non-existent.
The 80th ADTEA assessment was that "It is possible that Turkish U.K. troops have landed in Western (small) Imia" which was not unmanned" and informed the Commander of ASDEN. This assessment - information was transmitted to the National Security Council and the military - political leadership.
Really ten minutes (10΄) later confirmed by the Governor of the Greek Navy ANTONIOU that he "saw the Turkish flag on the islet" without being allowed to use weaponsThe information was immediately reported to the Director of ASDEN and from there to the National Institute of Public Health.
The helicopter crash
At 04.30 am, after confirming this unpleasant information, an order was given by the National Maritime Administration to the F/G NAVARINO to disembark. the E/P 21 of the F/G to fly over the island and with its searchlight to detect the presence of personnel on it.
The weather prevailing in the area at that time was very bad, rain - strong winds, stormy seas, in other words, if not prohibitive, very dangerous for a flight of this type of aircraft.
Nevertheless, the mission was accomplished and the E/P was dismounted and headed towards its target. The ADTE Commander was in constant communication with the 5Ο The Air Force RADAR in Kos was monitoring the flight and listening to the conversation between the Captain and the pilot.
At 04:50 am the helicopter crew reported that they had spotted about 10 Turkish commandos with their flag. They were ordered to return to their base and while flying between the islets of Pita and Kalolimnos they reported that they had turned on the "Master Goatiun" (emergency light). After a while they disappeared from radar. The helicopter crashed into the sea NW of the islet of Kalolimnos. The epilogue of the "Crisis" and the tragedy had unfortunately already been written with the loss of the three officers. of HH Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlachakou and Hector Gialopsos, Helicopter crew
The Commander of the 80th ADTEA who is in constant communication with the 5th SA (Reporting Station) of the Air Force in Kos is informed of the tragic incident, the crash of the Helicopter. Possible causes of the crash include its low flight, approximately 30 feet above the sea, bad weather conditions, and limited visibility.
There is no case of the helicopter being shot down. and the rumors that were cultivated after its recovery about alleged gunshot wounds are unfounded. The "holes" in the fuselage come from detached rivets
It is inconceivable that the officers who conducted the relevant investigation, if they had even the slightest idea that the helicopter was hit by gunfire, would have covered it up. At any price or with any criminal guidance from wherever it came, they would never have committed such a dishonorable act against their dead colleagues.
The incorrect formulation of "perforated" shaft
When the helicopter fuselage was recovered, it was said that it was "perforated". This wording was incorrect as it was conveyed and reproduced, creating false impressions.
There were indeed holes, but not from gunfire. The parts of a helicopter's fuselage are joined with rivets and not with oxygen welding, to ensure elasticity, due to the constant vibrations it has,
The initial statement that the fuselage was "perforated" without the clarification that this was from the detachment of the sheets, gave the opportunity to some, unintentionally or intentionally, to misunderstand the cause of the incident or to exploit the event and create unfounded stories about the helicopter being shot down by firearms. The above information and clarifications are also included in the experts' conclusion.
The Epilogue of the Crisis
The KYSEA meets in the Parliament and not in its natural space, which in similar situations was the National Assembly and after a marathon meeting, rejects the possibility of recapturing the western islet of IMION or its bombardment as suggested the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense Staff Admiral Lymberis since something like that would lead to a military conflict.
At 06:10 in the morning the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs G. Arsenis and Th. Pangalos announce the agreement reached between Athens and Ankara with the mediation of America. At the political and diplomatic level between the two countries Greece and Turkey and with the decisive contribution of the American factor, an agreement had been reached to end the crisis, disengagement, disengagement and withdrawal of forces known as: “ No ships, no troops, no flags” no ships, no soldiers, no flags
The epilogue of the Crisis and the tragedy had already been written.
At 06:00 an order was given:
– Stop the mobilization.
– The already enlisted Reservists and National Guards should be dismissed.
– The Units should return to their headquarters (to their camps).
At the political and diplomatic level between the two countries of Greece and Turkey, and with the decisive contribution of the American factor, an agreement had been reached to end the Crisis and to disarm and withdraw the forces with the well-known simple decision "No ships, no forces, no flags".
The Commander of the 80th Airborne Division immediately informed the Headquarters and the Units to implement the order and the reverse movement, demobilization, return to the Camps began as if nothing had happened.
But most importantly, upon hearing this development, it was the sharp decline in the morale of the Personnel (Axes, Hoplites, Generals, National Guards).
He could not believe that the personnel, with such enthusiasm, making superhuman efforts in adverse conditions and after reaching full operational readiness without any accidents or other side effects, would return to the Camps with the feeling of "defeat".
This reverse action was carried out with absolute order and discipline and by 12:00 noon everything was safely in place. At 14:00 the ADA reported "the return of all Units to their Camps and the dismissal of the National Guard Reserves".
The 12 Commando Group, which had been transferred on January 30, 1996, was ordered to remain in N. Kalolimnos until further orders from the National Security and Defense Council.
For the implementation of the Plan for the retake of Western Imia which had been discussed in the NEC as an action and which was ultimately not adopted but a diplomatic solution was preferred, the ADTEA did not receive any orders. However, there was a readiness to implement it for the part that was appropriate to it.
THE DISAPPOINTMENT
Concluding the presentation of this chapter, we must quote a small but important statement about the climate prevailing at that time:
Η Administration and staff of 80 ADTEA which had reached highest readiness to successfully confront any hostile plot, upon hearing of this development he was troubled and disappointed. Η morale decline of personnel (Officers, privates, reservists, national guards) it was obvious.
The staff who, with such enthusiasm, with superhuman efforts under adverse conditions and after full operational readiness, He couldn't believe that he would return to the camps feeling like a "defeated" person.
The sacrifice of three officers of the RN Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlachakou and Hector Gialopsos, during the execution of the supreme duty in the deep blue waters of the Aegean, in combination with the agreement decision taken at the political and diplomatic level, despite any objections from the then military leadership, is It is certain that they troubled and disturbed the officers and personnel of the Armed Forces, especially those who experienced the events firsthand.
In closing, we thank the Lieutenant General Athanasios Nikolodimos for granting us excerpts from his upcoming book, so that we can publish them.