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KOSTARAKOS-ANALYSIS OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

PRESIDENT PUTIN: THE ATTEMPT TO REVISION THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD, “DOMINANCE IN SCALATION” AND “STRATEGIC ARGHITY”.

The crisis in Ukraine seems to be prolonging and intensifying, as long as a compromise diplomatic solution is not achieved that will leave Russia, the West and Ukraine at least relatively “satisfied”. The crisis is not going to defuse unless some “strategic balance” of mutual gains and concessions is restored, something that is not certain if President Putin’s “strategic arrogance” allows him to understand. Russia has made it clear that it will not continue to negotiate indefinitely. A limited purpose and scale military action is also possible and likely. But how feasible and useful is such a thing for President Putin’s purposes? 

It is clear from the beginning that this crisis is not just about Ukraine, nor is it just about blocking the possibility of this country joining NATO and the EU. It is about revising and upgrading Russia's position in the European security architecture and the European and global order. After the end of the Cold War, the US and its European allies designed for Europe and the West in general, a security architecture that ignored the Russian presence, its political positions, its security requirements and its sphere of influence, as it had been shaped and imposed by the once powerful Soviet Union, of which Putin considers Russia to be the successor. 

In an unofficial draft agreement given to an American diplomat in Moscow last December, the Russian government demanded (a) a permanent end to NATO’s eastward expansion, (b) a permanent freeze on the expansion of NATO’s military capabilities (bases, weapons systems, etc.) in the former countries under the influence of the USSR (Warsaw Pact), (c) an end to Western military aid to Ukraine, and (d) a ban on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The message was clear: If these threats are not resolved diplomatically, the Kremlin will be forced to resort to military solutions. The West had one month to resolve the dispute, thus ruling out long and fruitless negotiations. It was clear to everyone that Russia does not want NATO or the EU through Ukraine on its borders for security reasons, nor does it want comparisons with a prosperous, democratic and ethnically related neighboring Ukraine, which could instill ideas of “color unrest” (orange revolution) in Russian citizens. Ukraine must remain in the Russian sphere of influence, without NATO membership and forces or EU funds and facilities. 

Naturally, neither Washington, nor Europe, nor Ukraine was likely to agree to the Russian demands, nor even to the possibility of a US-Russia agreement that would leave Europe on the sidelines. No American or European government is going to give Russia decision-making power in its domestic and international relations, and no international organization will cede a veto of its decisions to Moscow. The US will not let the dispute with Russia in Ukraine break the transatlantic bond and NATO or become a model for a future crisis with China over Taiwan or with Iran over the Middle East. President Biden proceeded to execute the new ISIS leader to overcome the shameful images in Afghanistan and expects to reap political benefits from containing the Russians while most European governments face “nationalist offshoots” at home, often funded by Putin himself. Nevertheless, the US has declared that it will not get involved militarily in Ukraine, NATO does not intervene in non-member countries such as Ukraine, and the Europeans have declared that they will limit their reactions to economic sanctions. Putin has maintained the “upper hand”, deployed his military forces on the borders and reestablished clear and absolute “escalation dominance”. This may have given him a sense of “strategic arrogance” that can lead him to misjudge and misjudge decisions. It is certainly understandable, although perhaps not legitimate or acceptable, his attempt to review and upgrade his country's global position, its status as a Global Nuclear Superpower, and its global political and economic influence. But not at the expense of neighboring countries.

Putin believes that the West is currently weak. He has faced four waves of NATO expansion, five American presidents and the US withdrawal from all treaties controlling all kinds of missiles and forces in Europe. He considers the US and Europe to be unreliable interlocutors, believes that he can instrumentalize energy and absorb any economic sanctions from the US and the EU in cooperation with his “new best friend”, China. In 2008, he vigorously confronted the West’s expansion into Georgia. For him, Ukraine is the end of the retreats and he has the support of Russian public opinion for the restoration of the Russian role in the traditional zone of influence of the Russian Empire and the USSR, but also in global geopolitical and geoeconomic events. Is the deployment of military forces an indication of an instrumental display of power (i.e. a show) or an indication of a clear decision to resort to military force, if required?

However, if Russia carries out even a limited-scale or targeted military action, the “next day” will be difficult, whatever its development. Military, political and economic sanctions against the Russian economy, technology, his personal property, the property of his close political and governmental circle, as well as the “oligarchs” who are “close to him” and who operate on a global scale, will hit Russia as a whole. At the same time, Russia’s global prestige and influence will be significantly undermined, and a difficult situation will be created internationally for him and his country. Although, like all authoritarian leaders, he believes and invests only in Hard Power, the Russian narrative will find itself in an extremely difficult position, especially against the EU’s Soft Power against countries outside Europe. He may believe that he can manage all of this successfully. Can it really be or is this another example of its strategic “arrogance”? The war will be transferred to the shelves of supermarkets, to the production lines of its industries, to its banking transactions and to the balance of payments. With an army of a regional power and an economy the size of Italy, it cannot pretend to be the same as the mighty USSR that openly challenged the West. Russia is certainly a nuclear superpower, with powerful Armed Forces and has the initiative and “sovereignty in escalation” in the current crisis and an excess, partly ungrounded in my opinion, “strategic arrogance”. And here lies his potential strategic error: The underestimation and miscalculation of the capabilities of the West and the states that constitute it, with a strong core of the USA, the United Kingdom, France and now Germany, Italy and Spain, did not benefit Prussia in 1914-18, nor Hitler in World War II, nor the USSR in the Cold War, nor Saddam Hussein in the Gulf Wars.  

The Chinese assistance on which it relies for hydrocarbons, trade and the financial system, the economy and high technology will not be free. China is just as authoritarian as Russia but also just as (albeit by different methods) determined and ambitious to climb the global scale. The position reserved for it by the rising and aggressive China is without a doubt that of the second regional position. 

The coming days will show whether President Putin’s “strategic arrogance” will lead him to a dynamic form of conflict on the ground, from which I believe he cannot ultimately emerge victorious in the long run, or whether he will succeed, at least to some significant extent, in regaining what he believes his country lost in 1990 when the Cold War ended. In any case, whether by military engagement or by mutual concessions and agreements of expediency, nothing will be the same and the day after the Ukrainian crisis will be a “different day” for everyone.