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conmpalo@gmail.on

Political Scientist – Internationalist

Former General Manager – General Directorate

National Defense Policy and International Relations (GDPEADS)

Ministry of National Defense (MIND)

On July 24, 2025, the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Nikos Dendias, announced the Phase II of the "Agenda 2030" reform, presenting a series of extensive interventions in the Structure and Organization of the Armed Forces, with the ultimate goal of their modernization.

These changes, as the Minister emphasized, aim to creating a more flexible and modern administration model, reducing bureaucracy, saving resources, as well as improving infrastructure and conditions for Armed Forces personnel.

In this context, The 1st Army and intermediate levels of command are abolished., with the argument of simplifying the administrative pyramid and enhancing flexibility.

Of particular importance is the abolition of the ASDEN (Supreme Military Command for the Interior and Islands), which, although not an intermediate level, had an independent operational mission in the defense of the island area of the Eastern Aegean. Its role is transferred to the Supreme Military Command for the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (ASDAM), which is being established, without the new administrative and

To strengthen the autonomy of the major formations, four Supreme Military Commands are established.: Thrace (renamed 4th Army Corps), Epirus and Macedonia, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (replaces ASDEN), as well as ASDYS, which maintains its existing role. Above them is the Army General Staff, with responsibility for strategic planning, coordination and supervision. At the same time, the General Inspectorate of the Army is strengthened and Unmanned Vehicles Commands are established in all Arms and Corps.

Furthermore, The closure of dozens of camps and military courts continues, while from 2026 the classification of conscripts will be done exclusively in the Land Army. A program of fortification works is also planned for the Aegean islands and Evros, within the framework of the doctrine. "autonomous islands", which aims at maximum operational autonomy of defense units in conditions of crisis or isolation.

The narrative of the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Nikos Dendias in support of this "reform" relies on the the need to adapt to growing geopolitical challenges, the lessons of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the technological developments that are changing modern warfare.

The aim of the reform is to building a more flexible, technologically modernized and effective defense mechanism, with an emphasis on the front line and care for personnel.

Behind the rhetoric of modernization and flexibility, however, Serious questions are raised about the impact of the changes on the country's cross-sectoral, strategic coherence and deterrent capacity.

Despite the lessons from Ukraine, These interventions lack a coherent strategic plan, undermine operational efficiency and alter the institutional architecture of administration., at a time when the country should be strengthening, not dismantling, its deterrent power.

The announced changes embody a strategic error: while citing lessons from Ukraine, they ignore the specific characteristics of the real opponent. The business environment is not neutral, but specific and geographically defined.

Greece It is facing neither a static, predictable conflict like Ukraine, nor a war through proxies like Israel in the Middle East.

It faces a revisionist force with landing capability and a declared political will for aggression, in an archipelagic theater of operations with exposed islands and the need to prevent a first strike..

Uncritically adopting foreign models, without focusing on the nature of the Turkish threat, leads to false lessons and a strategic vacuum.

It must be understood that Greece does not have the luxury of planning a "general-standard" defense. The threat is specific, the geography is relentless, and the cost of a first strike is likely irreparable.

The proposed "reform" emphasizes technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence, but Technology is no substitute for territorial sovereignty. The effective defense of critical areas (e.g. Samos or Kastelorizo), It requires a physical military presence, strong command structures, and proximity to the local population and geographical terrain.

The concepts of "compact force", "technological upgrading" and "strengthening the front line" are more like slogans rather than with a documented strategy.

The concept of "autonomous islands" and the emphasis on fortifications is more associated with static defense doctrines of the 17th and 18th centuries, when siege was the dominant form of warfare.

In today's dynamic and cross-sectoral business environment, where reaction time is measured in minutes and sovereignty depends on rapid concentration and coordination of power, "autonomy" does not ensure deterrenceOn the contrary, it leads to fragmentation of forces and loss of strategic control. National military power is not based on isolated “islands of resistance,” but on network-centric command, reserves, and combined power. The concept of the "isolated island", especially when supported by fortifications without a unified doctrine, without cross-sectoral support and flexibility, already indicates strategic failure.

The abolition of the 1st Army and the ASDEN, under the guise of creating a more flexible and modern management model, reducing bureaucracy, saving resources and digital transformation, It removes the necessary strategic background for the effective use of technological means, jeopardizing the country's deterrent capacity.

Instead of signaling rationalization, they disrupt administrative continuity, weaken operational capacity and alter the nature of deterrence. Technology without structures does not deter, just as flexibility without depth does not protect.

A country under immediate threat cannot afford to experiment with abstract doctrines. It needs command, reserves, local power, and a clear message of deterrence. Not slogans.

The decision to abolish the 1st Army is presented as a step towards rationalization and flexibility, but in reality it constitutes a serious degradation of the operational structure of the Land Army.

The 1st Army, as the highest administrative formation and sole Operational Headquarters of the Greek Army, constitutes the backbone of Greece's Land Defense, the necessary intermediate link between the General Staff and the Army Corps, ensuring strategic coherence, coordinated action on a wide geographical scale (Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly) and immediate and coordinated response to large-scale crises on the land front.

Its abolition cancels a level of command that is necessary in conditions of tension, crisis or war, creating a Command and Control (C2) vacuum at the level of strategic operational command. (at a time when the country must maintain strategic depth and unified leadership of its forces), It undermines the cohesion of land forces and causes disorganization of operational planning at both the strategic and tactical levels.

It is a strategic mistake to assume that the only threat comes from the east, that is, only from Turkey, in a hybrid operational environment with multidimensional challenges.

The fact that Albania maintains irredentist aspirations and close military cooperation with Turkey, which creates new security conditions on our borders, cannot be overlooked. In this context, The maintenance and transformation of the 1st Army into a Land Forces Headquarters is necessary for the holistic management of the multiple threats facing the country, enhancing the coordination and flexibility of the land forces at the national level.

Without the 1st Army, however, the burden of operational command is transferred excessively to the Army General Staff, reducing its ability to exercise strategic guidance and planning, as it would simultaneously have to directly assume operational command — a practice that is considered unrealistic in the event of a major crisis or war.

Furthermore, The attempted reorganization risks transforming the Hellenic National Defense General Staff from a strategic guidance body into a centralized structure with operational responsibilities, without however possessing the necessary command mechanism and the required flexibility for direct command in conditions of crisis or conflict.

This over-concentration, instead of strengthening inter-sectorality, undermines it, as it cancels the intermediate management links that ensured the alignment of the Sectors under a single strategic framework. Inter-sectorality requires interconnection and cooperation, not absorption and deregulation.
The "new structure" is not accompanied by a clear inter-sectoral framework, leaving the process of cooperation and interoperability between Sectors unclear. The abolition of critical land commands disrupts the balance of inter-branch cooperation, disproportionately weakening the Army, without corresponding reinforcement in the other Branches.

The 1st Army is also recognized by NATO as an Army-level headquarters (Field Army HQ), with a strategic reserve role in Southeastern Europe. In the event of conflict, he can assume command of allied land forces in the SACEUR area of responsibility, especially in the Balkans-Black Sea axis. He has participated in major exercises, providing Command & Control capabilities for Corps or Division-sized forces.

Furthermore, due to its geographical location, it functions as a critical headquarters connecting the Aegean, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, supporting the flow of reinforcements to Bulgaria, Romania and the South-Eastern wing of the Alliance.

Its abolition, in addition to the loss of an important national tool, will also mean the weakening of the NATO administrative architecture in a critical area for collective defense.

The abolition of ASDEN It also constitutes another unfortunate and dangerous decision, as it nullifies a tested operational structure with proven competence in surveillance and deterrence in the Aegean.

The Hellenic Navy is not just an administrative structure of the Army. It is the institutional body for operational readiness, deterrence and coordination of national defense in the Aegean islands.

It constitutes a unified headquarters for controlling the archipelago, ensures the administrative and operational unification of the islands, supports the flow of reinforcements and reserves in crisis conditions and functions as a critical intermediate link between the tactical formations and the General Staff.

Its abolition, with the intention of integrating its responsibilities into a new broader Supreme Military Command of the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (SMC), disbands a critical specialized command, degrades the interdisciplinary function and undermines the strategic coherence of deterrence in the most geopolitically sensitive area of the country.

This choice does not strengthen, but rather weakens, the ability for immediate and coordinated response in its area of responsibility, creating dangerous administrative gaps and disrupting operational continuity in the complex geographical environment of the Aegean.

Furthermore, The abolition of the ASDEN disrupts the necessary balance of command between the Branches, since it disproportionately weakens the land component of deterrence, without correspondingly strengthening any functional inter-branch structure. Instead of promoting inter-branch cooperation, a dangerous ambiguity is established. The ASDEN is a guarantor of the operational cohesion of the eastern area. Its dissolution constitutes a rupture in this cohesion.

Furthermore, the added value of ASDEN lies in its deep familiarity with the operational logic of the island environment. It is not simply a staff, but an organization with integrated knowledge of the particular characteristics of each island, each unit and each formation that function as Lighthouses of National Deterrence.

This valuable, long-standing experience and local expertise cannot be automatically transferred to a new, unspecialized regional administration. The attempted reorganization, with the conversion of ASDEN into ASDAM, threatens to alter its specific deterrent role, removing depth and clarity from the country's strategic message in the Eastern Mediterranean.

And all of this is not taking place in a time of stability and peace. On the contrary, the realignment is being attempted in an international environment of uncertainty, instability and geopolitical rearrangements, and at a time when Turkey is seeking a hegemonic role in the region. At a time when it is investing in its extreme nationalist rhetoric, systematically strengthening the aggressive projection of its military power and instrumentalizing every crisis as a means of strategic pressure and blackmail.

Within this framework, the choice to abolish the two fundamental pillars of national defense (1st Army and ASDEN), constitutes a strategic mistake, with direct implications for operational coherence, readiness and credibility of national deterrence.

The Force Structure cannot be designed in a strategic vacuum, nor regardless of the capabilities and intentions of the adversary. In particular, when Turkey maintains a clearly aggressively oriented military configuration, with the ability to rapidly project power in the Aegean, Evros and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Specifically, the 4th Army (Aegean Army), headquartered in Izmir, constitutes Turkey's main amphibious force, while the 1st Army in Eastern Thrace has three Army Corps capable of rapid action in Evros. Both formations constitute an inter-branch system of amphibious and land power, supported by special forces, army aviation and naval units.

When the adversary organizes itself with increased offensive capabilities, the dismantling of critical structures and the merging of fundamental formations do not constitute modernization, but a strategic error, which undermines deterrence and grants the initiative of movements to the one who maintains the advantage of offensive choice.

End, All of Mr. Dendias' announcements regarding the change in the Force Structure of the Greek Army are placed in an institutional vacuum.

Since there is no updated National Defense Policy (NDP), how is it possible for the Minister of National Defense to proceed with structural interventions that affect the entire operational arrangement and defense architecture of the country?

In the Ministry of National Defense, the only institutional text that exists and is related to National Security is the National Defense Policy (NDP), which is a top secret document and derives from the National Security Strategy.

The P.E.A. constitutes the foundation from which all the statutory texts that govern the operation of the Armed Forces originate [Military Situation Assessment (S.A.K.), National Military Strategy (NMS), General National Defense Planning (GNDP), Force Structure (F.S.), etc.

 Therefore, Since there is no updated Strategic Plan approved by the KYSEA and no clear strategic and operational objectives for the Armed Forces have been formulated and recorded in the said institutional text, with what strategic background is the implementation of the "AGENDA 2030" attempted?

What problem is it attempting to solve and with what implications for national security?

In conclusion, it should be understood that The Force Structure and National Defense in general are not a paper exercise, nor are they a communication firework that is exploited for reasons of personal impression and petty political expediency.

It cannot be subjected to sketchy plans, piecemeal reforms, or superficial announcements.

The "new Force Structure" does not result from a documented strategic analysis, nor is it part of an institutionally established planning hierarchy that serves the national interest.

On the contrary, it seems to constitute an exercise in administrative experimentation without clear doctrine, without operational documentation, without threat assessment and without institutional consistency.

The modernization of the Armed Forces is necessary. But to be effective and institutionally legitimate, it must start from strategic guidance, end in operational logic, and be based on a realistic assessment of the threat.

Under this prism, those who are unaware of the consequences of their experimentation to the cohesion and effectiveness of the Armed Forces, They assume full responsibility for the operational vacuum that will arise when the crisis is not a scenario on paper, but a reality.