ABOUT CABLES, CONNECTIONS AND CONFLICT
ABOUT CABLES AND CONNECTIONS - HOW GREECE SUCCEEDS TO TURKISH BLACKMAIL
07 MAR 2025.
While the "mother of all battles" is taking place in Parliament on March 06th, following the motion of no confidence by opposition parties against the government, on the occasion of the Tempi tragedy, we are informed about the rather negative developments in the vital project of the electrical interconnection between Greece-Cyprus-Israel. Specifically, reports indicate that the Italian research vessel Ievoli Relume which was in Crete departed for Messina, Italy, while IPTO froze payments to the French company Nexans due to uncertainty about the electrical interconnection ("Great Sea Interconnector").
Obviously, the Greek hesitation is due to the expected dynamic Turkish reaction. As is known, the latter, through methods and threats, is blackmailing for the indirect acceptance of the Turkish positions so that it itself can proceed with the approval of the surveys and the issuance of the required relevant NAVTEX in areas that, according to Ankara, are included in its own maritime zones. Of course, there can be no Greek acceptance of the Turkish objections as this would seriously undermine the Greek positions.
The above impasse had become visible since last spring with the low-key but extremely threatening presence of Turkish frigates and the prevention of the research vessel from moving outside Greek territorial waters. A brief -potential- crisis that, according to the government, ended through bilateral contacts but without the substantial continuation of the work. This incident led the Republic of Cyprus to have serious doubts about the completion of the project and appeared reluctant to take on the financial risk of a risky endeavor.
Greece appeared (and rightly so) certain of the completion of the project and assumed a significant part of the financial risk of the project. It may have also received “guarantees” regarding external interventions and mediations vis-à-vis Ankara in order to demonstrate a compromising stance. Somewhat difficult, but not entirely improbable, Ankara itself may have given a similar glimmer of optimism, for its own reasons, apparently. Of course, it is very possible that those who gave - if they did - the guarantees no longer participate in shaping American policy (Biden administration) or even that the new American Secretary of State requested (demanded) the avoidance of any action that could destabilize the calm climate. It is also possible that Israel’s will - perhaps in conjunction with some European countries - to move forward with this project at all costs and to provide security guarantees themselves was overestimated.
You will rightly observe that states cannot rely on the intentions and security guarantees of third parties to achieve their national goals. However, the theory is far from reality. Greece has paid dearly for its involvement in high-risk moves without having calculated the consequences and without having the capabilities and will to escalate beyond the corresponding intentions and capabilities of the adversary. So once again, as we do with the expansion of national territorial waters, we will suffice to state that the project will be carried out when the country deems that the appropriate conditions exist. However, with regard to the cable, financing will probably not wait and energy needs will certainly discover other avenues.
Realism, of course, says that it is not in our interest - at least at this moment - to get involved in a military conflict where even if we prevail, our problems will not be solved but rather we will be led to a war of attrition with the work of interconnection not being implemented even in the next hundred years. Realism, however, at the same time says that continuous appeasements (because our continuous retreats constitute appeasing actions) will certainly lead to war and even under worse conditions. In fact, realism, while being such a reliable methodology for approaching international problems, is structurally pessimistic and sometimes does not offer solutions!
Of course, there will be parties that will accuse the government of its submissive policy. All of them, when they came to power, handled national problems with the same restraint and hesitation, not excluding the military dictatorship (except for the Ioannides regime with the criminal moves it made recklessly). However, all of them failed to diagnose the nature and stability of the Turkish threat and to prepare the country appropriately. It is possible, however, that there will also be parties that consider it a national duty to decisively confront the adversary - here and now -. We experienced this in the distant past and unfortunately, whenever emotion prevailed over reason, there were no happy results. Of course, dozens of examples from history could be cited where the Greek soul performed great feats against cold calculations, but we cannot "gamble" based on heroism, supernatural actions, interventions or "machine-made saviors."
There is always the approach of "we go wherever we come out" and if necessary with the appropriate "adjustments" of the skills of our sailors with our outdated ships we will prevail. We can also hope that the Rafale with the Meteor will be our own Game Changer with the opponent watching with folded arms its destruction!
Nor can we rely on favorable support from third parties. A desperate Europe - including France - obviously does not intend to open a front against the geopolitically strengthened Turkey, whose military assistance it is beginning to seek. Neither does Israel seem willing after the exhausting war effort of almost 2 years and with its eyes fixed on Iran. The American stance, however, will probably be indifferent, perhaps proposing a win-win (sic) sharing (before or after the conflict)! I do not know if President Trump would even want to take the risk of collecting 50% of Greek underwater resources as he seems to be doing with Ukraine in return for security guarantees unknown to us (perhaps even to Ukraine).
However, until now we have chosen to postpone the adoption of critical national decisions that may produce conflicting results for the indefinite future. That is, in the final analysis, we believe that the time factor is working in our favor at the level of relative power (military, economic, diplomatic, technological) while moderation and the desire to find peaceful solutions are gaining ground on the side of the opponent. Both views are clearly wrong. Especially for our weak long-term empowerment, we, the rulers and those who choose our rulers, are solely responsible.
Under these circumstances, is there a solution? There is no one-word answer or certainty. Aligning with the interests of third parties, even in exchange for unequal exchange, seems the only way out. However, what matters is the weight of the guarantees of third parties and their willingness to actively engage - against their expected profits, of course - if required. International relations are now purely transactional (perhaps they always were, but a discretion and hypocritical reference to international law prevailed).
But to achieve a good deal, you have to have good "papers," the host clearly told his guest in the Oval Office. At the very least, we have to rush there (and) with good "papers" in our hands (probably in a suit). And our "papers" must have many "figures", defensive, diplomatic, economic, political will and credibility, national cohesion. If all of these exist, to a satisfactory degree against the opponent, you can make demands or even bluff, if not, you leave badly and come back (if) with your "tail in your legs". Of course, we must not forget that Trump's term is four years and non-renewable, without however ruling out the long-term nature of this peculiar isolationism.
The above does not apply only to Washington. There is Europe, which, as much as it disappoints us, cannot let the upgraded Ankara play alone in this area. There are certainly other regional players, who may not shout in dramatic tones, but they have influence, money and means. Everyone is approached according to the estimated and correctly projected common interests. But everyone also considers you according to the power (especially military) that you carry with you. Nevertheless, it would be good not to expect miracles and saviors.
The most likely scenario is that at the end of the day we will be left alone on the battlefield against our long-standing adversary. No one can guarantee the form and intensity of the conflict, which to me seems inevitable due to Turkey's unlimited claims. Nor can the outcome be guaranteed, although the betting offices would probably not characterize us (today) as "favorites" for victory. We, in any case, must seriously strengthen our power and deterrence. And the best deterrence is the certainty that both of us will go back many decades with third parties taking advantage of our significant mutual weakening. If we convince our neighbors of our ability and our will to change both decades (backwards), then our deterrence will have worked.
As for the cable, we will probably continue to walk a tightrope "playing with delays", hoping that third parties will propose a middle ground for both (Greece-Turkey) solution that, with "creative ambiguity", saves the pretense without weakening our established anti-diametric positions and postpones the conflict for later. It would probably be the best solution under the current circumstances. Of course, for us the greatest danger is always a "head-on" conflict between us.
HIPPOKRATIS DASKALAKIS - Lieutenant General (retd.)
- PhD in International Relations at Panteion University
- Member of the Board of Directors of the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (ELISME)