Blog

THE CRITICAL CROSSROADS OF THE CYPRIOT

It is historically established that Turkey sets strategic goals and acts methodically to fulfill them, knowing how to wait for favorable circumstances. The control of Cyprus has been a permanent Turkish strategic choice since the end of World War II. Taking advantage of the British policy of "divide and rule", the Turks gradually managed to exclude the union of Cyprus with Greece (Treaty of Zurich - London 1959), created compact geographical groups of Turkish Cypriots (enclaves since 1963), constantly alter the population composition with settlers, destroy Greek cultural monuments in the occupied part, violate the sovereign rights of Cyprus and maintain a large military force of occupation troops (since 1974). The final strategic objective of total control of Cyprus remains.

According to several indications, significant developments are currently underway on the Cyprus issue. The Greek and Cypriot sides are ready to negotiate within the framework of UN resolutions and on the basis of a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation with political equality (as described by the UN), while Turkey is dynamically seeking to change the framework of negotiations from the basis of two sovereign states to a loose Confederation.

The federal model of state structure and power has proven to be functional and effective throughout the world. A prerequisite is the independent will of the citizens (one person, one vote) who elect the best leaders at each time and do not vote on religious, national, racial, etc. grounds. Given Turkey's long-standing expansionist ambitions, the catalytic influence that Turkey exerts on the occupied part of Cyprus, its subversive practices and its lack of respect for International Law, this model is considered unable to offer a sustainable solution. According to the most recent experience, the Federal bizonal, bicommunal model degenerated into the famous "Annan" plan, which would essentially dissolve the Republic of Cyprus and turn Cyprus into a kind of protectorate and the Greek Cypriots into a community. Despite the pressure of the International Factor and the consent or tolerance of a large part of the political, academic and diplomatic circles of Greece and Cyprus towards the said plan, the Cypriot people, with the national stance and encouragement of the then President, the late Tassos Papadopoulou (2004), rejected, in the relevant Referendum, the plan with an overwhelming majority. 

The possible prospects for resolving the Cyprus problem lead to the following cases:

1. Bizonal Bicommunal "Federation" (DDO), with "political equality".

The most likely outcome is a ostensibly Federation whose operation will be governed by some variation of the "Annan" plan. In this case, the faits accomplis of 1974 are legitimized and International Law and the European acquis are violated. The Republic of Cyprus is gradually undermined, Turkey becomes a legal partner in Cyprus and its threat to Greece increases. The inherent difficulty of decision-making at the level of a "Federal Government" leads to lack of governance, with the most likely result of resorting to the provision of "good services" by the International Agent and mainly by the United Kingdom, which maintains its own interests in the region. The strategic partnerships that Cyprus has entered into with states in the region are being undermined, while from now on its voice in the EU will vary depending on Turkish will. Ultimately, a gradual hostage-taking of the Greek Cypriots by Turkey is expected.

A solution within the framework of the PLO, with elements of sustainability, should be based on a series of non-negotiable "red lines", such as the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus before the start of negotiations, the implementation of the EU institutional and legal framework as well as the acquis communautaire, the President of the federal government to always be a Greek Cypriot, a strong federal government (one international personality, one sovereignty, one citizenship) and a strong federal Constitution, no alteration of the initial population ratio, the establishment of Cypriot territorial integrity and their integration into the EU's CEDAW and NATO, the immediate withdrawal of the occupying forces, the abolition of the guarantee regime, the withdrawal of the majority of the settlers, the return of Famagusta and Morphou, the exploitation of energy deposits by the federal government. government, non-justification of maritime zones for British bases, etc.

The above principles/"red lines" are strongly described in all international decisions on the Cyprus issue, despite the fact that Hellenism has occasionally made concessions, either as a sign of goodwill (a wrong choice in the end) or under the pressure of the imbalance of military power over Cyprus.

1. The “non-solution”

In this case, the Greek side seeks to maintain the situation in Cyprus as it is, in the hope that more favorable circumstances will arise in the future for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The case of “no solution” is not unacceptable if it is the product of a conscious political choice in order for Hellenism, while gaining valuable time, to prepare in the best possible way (diplomatically, militarily, economically, socially, etc.). This preparation provides an advantage in future negotiations, having ensured a more favorable international environment, a possibly less powerful Turkey, as well as the required national deterrence and balance of power. Any sluggish national preparation invalidates the choice of “no solution”. The weak point of the "non-solution" is that its observance does not depend only on one side, if the opponent has already initiated developments (e.g. friction, provocations, drilling, strengthening of its military presence, further population alteration, faits accomplis such as in Famagusta, immigrants, etc.) unfavorable to Hellenism.

1. Two sovereign states in a loose Confederation.

The loss of the northern part of Cyprus is confirmed, which henceforth acquires complete dependence on Turkey. Loss of sovereign rights at sea. Dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus. Possible population growth of the Turkish Cypriot part. The Confederation regime is used by Turkey to infiltrate, destabilize and control the Greek Cypriot part, as well as its indirect participation in EU decision-making. The United Kingdom assumes the well-known role of "mediator". It is probably the most dangerous development that Turkey is fraudulently looking forward to, as in this way control of Cyprus and by extension the Eastern Mediterranean will be gradually achieved. There is a risk that such a development will be promoted appropriately and accepted, covered under the title of a falsified SLA and under the false illusion (even if with pure intentions) of a "last chance" for the reunification of Cyprus. 

1. Declaration of "independence" of an occupied part.

This is a dichotomy solution with loss of sovereignty in the northern part of Cyprus and sovereign rights in the sea. The loss of Famagusta and Morphou is final. First step towards the integration of the Turkish Cypriots into the "motherland", with a possible corresponding union of the Greek Cypriots with Greece (double union). Dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus. Distinct and fully separated sovereignty in the two parts. Possible population growth of the Turkish Cypriot part as well as future instability.

After the brief description of the possible impacts of the four above perspectives, which clearly affect vital national interests of Greece and Cyprus, there remains one more perspective that can be called "liberation of Cyprus". This version is considered the only one that serves national interests and can be based on the following arguments:

1. Greece, as a guarantor power, has the obligation to intervene within the framework of International Law, in order to remove the illegal results caused by the Turkish invasion and occupation in 1974, in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions.
2. Geopolitically, it is consistent with Western interests, given that any indirect or direct control of Cyprus by an autonomous and ambitious Turkey destabilizes the wider Eastern Mediterranean region, further affecting the vital interests of Western-oriented states in the region such as Israel and Egypt.
3. Greece and Cyprus, as independent and law-abiding states, must defend their vital national interests, especially when these are violated in a provocative, arbitrary manner and completely contrary to fundamental rules of International Law.

The solution "liberation of Cyprus" is not simple. Territories that have been conquered militarily are not recovered by academic, legal or internationalist invocation of paragraphs and clauses of International Law and UN resolutions, but only by a military response. Historical experience teaches that no foreign state or International Organization is going to provide military assistance (at least in the early stages) to this national project, which should be based entirely on self-help.

The above solution is not based on utopian, war-loving hyper-patriotism accompanied by our own military initiative, but on the observation that based on Turkish expansionist aspirations outside International Law (Cyprus, Thrace, Aegean, Blue Homeland, Gray Zones, maritime zones, etc.), Greek-Turkish relations are clearly characterized as a zero-sum game (one's loss becomes another's gain) with no win-win solutions. As long as Turkey's revisionism remains unchanged, the possibility of a military confrontation is not negligible, unless Hellenism has chosen appeasement in advance, with a bloodless gradual surrender of sovereignty and sovereign rights (appeasement simply postpones the conflict or reinforces satelliteization). This reality must be internalized by Greek and Cypriot society and the possibility of a military conflict must be accepted as an unpleasant but possible development. This conflict may take place in the context of confronting an expansionist Turkish action in Cyprus or a Turkish attempt to create faits accomplis throughout Greek territory. Such a situation should find Greece and Cyprus militarily ready, otherwise the desired "liberation of Cyprus" may have the opposite and fatal results.

The "liberation of Cyprus" requires the following military capabilities, which must be in place simultaneously:

1. The Cypriot and Greek forces on the island can successfully confront the respective enemy forces.
2. The aeronautical power of Greece and Cyprus can prohibit the reinforcement of Cyprus with enemy military personnel and material.
3. The Greek Armed Forces successfully confront the Turkish Armed Forces throughout the territory and neutralize their plan.
4. The Greek Armed Forces reliably monitor the country's northern borders and successfully address any relevant security issues.

The above conditions also constitute an accurate self-test criterion of the required capabilities of the Greek and Cypriot Armed Forces (quantitative and qualitative adequacy in units, systems, material, personnel, support, Command Structure, technology, trained reserves, etc.), in order to avoid "convenient" vagueness (e.g. we have strong Armed Forces, we have deterrent Armed Forces, etc.) which simply conceal serious political omissions and perceptions of years. It is noted that even the relative fulfillment of these conditions does not guarantee victory in advance but lays the basis for a victory with an acceptable degree of risk. The rapid implementation of the above military conditions, which requires special analysis, requires bold and intelligent interventions (for operations of tomorrow and not of yesterday) and requires close cooperation between Greece and Cyprus, reactivation at the appropriate time of the Unified Defense Doctrine of Greece and Cyprus, appropriate shaping of public opinion, technological defense utilization of allies, etc.

Based on these conditions/criteria, it becomes difficult to justify the reduction of the service in Cyprus (instead of women also joining the military) or the purchase of a few patrol boats (almost 50 years after the invasion) or just a few UAVs, etc. Correspondingly, Greece, with its problematic defense industry, should have made defense technology a fundamental pillar of development and not followed the events by still looking for the Frigates that will replace the very old "HELLI" type Frigates at the end of the decade. Expressions such as "we will risk it" (or correspondingly in Cyprus "fortunately we are not equipped") unfortunately demonstrate the distance that separates political will from geopolitical reality.

Until the above military conditions are fulfilled with rapid procedures, Greece, by buying time, can avoid the international "blame game" by remaining in the IDF solution - under the faint hope of a Turkish compliance with International Law - but under the non-negotiable and legal "red lines" mentioned above and which are certainly expected to be rejected by the Turkish side.

External balancing through a network of strategic partnerships and alliances particularly strengthens the Hellenism of Greece and Cyprus. In this context, the strategic level relations between Greece and the USA, the strategic partnerships between Greece and Cyprus with France, Israel, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, etc. are considered to be absolutely positive. These relations and partnerships should be further expanded with an emphasis on defense technology, know-how, defense industry and, if possible, mutual defense assistance. In this direction, the Greek diaspora should, among other things, be appropriately utilized. At the same time, Greece and Cyprus should make the most of their status as members of the EU by demanding its active participation in the relevant negotiations and linking the Cyprus issue to the Euro-Turkish agenda. In addition, Greece should be dynamically involved in the developments in Libya and the Balkans. In any case, the limits of assistance from allies and international partners should be known. Historical experience does not allow excessive and precarious hopes to be invested in "machine-made Gods", to the detriment of self-help. Moreover, as much defense autonomy as possible gives the country special weight within the framework of its alliances and influences the attitude of allies accordingly.

It should be clarified that the proposed solution "liberation of Cyprus" does not adopt a military conflict at all costs but military readiness so that when and if a conflict situation arises (a strong possibility), Greece can safeguard its national interests and not continue the practice of commemorating "lost homelands", since it no longer has the luxury of further national shrinkage. Moreover, the military conditions of possibility set out above simultaneously act as a deterrent, removing a military conflict and giving credibility and parity to our diplomacy so that it can negotiate without pressure. Greece will always look forward to a truly viable solution to the Cyprus problem, as a result of good-faith negotiations, but at the same time it must have the diplomatic readiness, the military capability and, above all, the political will to exploit the respective "strategic windows of opportunity".

The geopolitical value of Cyprus is of decisive importance for Greece. The obligation to defend Cyprus has a patriotic, moral, legal and realistic dimension. The political-military developments in Cyprus bind all developments in the Greek space. The direct or indirect loss of Cyprus is equivalent to a second Asia Minor catastrophe. If Greece and Cyprus desire a favorable solution to the Cyprus problem, fulfilling the national vital interests, the political leaderships, inspired by the saying "He who governs, foresees", should agree cross-party on "what must be done", thus bypassing any political cost. This solution involves fulfilling the aforementioned military conditions which geography and modern technology make possible. Any other version of options, free from embellishments, unfortunately leads to ominous prospects which at best result in temporary high-risk viability and at worst in national shrinkage. The decisions belong to the political leaderships but also to the Greek and Cypriot people.

                                                              14 – June – 2021

                                                Vice Admiral (retd) V. Martzoukos PN

                                                           Honorary Commander of the Hellenic Navy

                                                            Vice President of EL.I.S.M.E.