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The collapse of ISIS today, three full years after its rapid and sudden spread, is accompanied by considerably less publicity. Although some areas still remain under the control of the organization in Iraq and Syria, interest is now focused on the actions of the forces that make up the heterogeneous anti-ISIS coalition. As is known, nature abhors “gaps” and the retreat of ISIS jihadists pushes the Syrian and Iraqi government forces to restore their power while at the same time other players, governmental and non-governmental, intensify their efforts to consolidate their gains. Despite the apparent military defeat of ISIS, the nuclei of Islamist terrorism remain active and capable – like cancer cells – of metamorphosing or attacking other areas. Unfortunately, the deepest causes of the strengthening of Islamist extremism not only remain present but also show a worrying ability to spread to the East and West, with an emphasis on the African continent.
The recent experiment in creating an “Islamic State”, this time based on a strategy of blind violence and terrorism, seems to be failing. The strategy of terrorism initially caused paralysis and inability to react in local societies but eventually led to the rallying of local and international forces to confront it. Behind ISIS’s successes were the arrogant and revanchist policy of Baghdad and the indescribable cruelty of the Assad regime, both directed mainly against the Sunni population. However, the rise of the “Islamic State” would have been impossible without the reckless and diverse external support of the various jihadist organizations from a multitude of states in the region and beyond. Possibly the maximalist tendencies of all these organizations, combined with the export of terrorism and the expansion of the refugee problem in the West, led to the undertaking of international efforts to contain the phenomenon called “Islamic State”. Once again, the course of the “Islamic State” demonstrated the difficulty of the transition to the final phase of the revolutionary struggle (according to Mao), that is, that of controlling and maintaining territory while simultaneously confronting the opponent’s regular army. Soon, the unexpected successes of the jihadists terrified even the external supporters of the organization. At the same time, the initial feelings of relief and tolerance of the “liberated” populations were replaced by fear and uncertainty, while the chronic corruption now took on an Islamist mantle. 
Today, ISIS and some other extremist organizations are retreating on all fronts. However, their retreat is not part of a broader plan to stabilize the region. The looming defeat of the “Islamic State” is the result of the more or less combined actions of various forces with different ultimate goals and conflicting aspirations. The ongoing defeat of ISIS forces brings the irreconcilable differences of its opponents back to the forefront, and frictions and conflicts have begun to resurface worryingly. The absence of understanding and a holistic plan for the future of the region is obvious but also inevitable, due to the multitude of parties involved and the different goals. Any choice on the part of the major powers will certainly cause discomfort among some of their local “allies” with unpredictable results for their interests and plans.
Washington seems to be in the most complicated position, having to balance the ambitions of temporary "allies" and sworn rivals with zero inclinations for mutual concessions. On the other hand, Tehran can celebrate the cancellation of Sunni plans and the gradual establishment of a new Hezbollah (Popular Mobilization Forces) on Iraqi soil. However, these unstable successes have come at a huge cost and have caused an overextension of this still relatively isolated country. However, even friendly factions in Baghdad view the Iranian increase in influence in their country with distrust. At the same time, the Kurdish problem brings long-standing regional rivals (Turkey, Iran, Iraq) closer together, even if only temporarily, while the Kurds themselves are trying to navigate the complexities and consolidate the gains they have made from the bloody three years. However, the dream of creating a fully independent Kurdish state remains distant and they will probably be forced to settle for more modest aspirations. The redrawing of borders, anywhere, naturally causes concern in most powers and creates reactionary groups among those affected.
In this chaos of the enigmatic and quite incomprehensible Middle East for Westerners, it is practically impossible to form and implement a coherent stabilization plan. Those involved have long accepted the treatment of immediate dangers and the attempt to create favorable conditions, often letting developments determine their next steps. Of course, such a strategy has little chance of success, as any successful action by one party causes the temporary rallying of the others while there is a lack of long-term targeting. Adventurous and opportunistic alliance formations simply add to the complexity of the region's problems and limit the chances of finding solutions.
In this environment, it is natural for extremist Islamist organizations to maintain their hopes of survival and a quick resurgence. A Foreign Policy article, titled ISIS 2.0 on the way, states very clearly that "ISIS is dead and we welcome the new ISIS"!
Once again, American foreign policy is called upon to play the most critical role by restraining its loose allies and setting clear limits on the other sides. The difficulty lies in convincing all sides to demonstrate mutual restraint as there is a false (and probably justified) impression that Washington has several limitations on the extent of its possible involvement in the region. At the same time, it seems that the “bridges” of communication with Moscow, which seems, despite the cost, to be upgrading its role in the Middle East, have been significantly lost. However, it also does not seem that there are willing donors who will take on the costs of rebuilding the region, a move that could potentially create rays of hope, development and peace. Therefore, for the coming period, we will necessarily be content to observe "firefighting" - perhaps even hesitant - moves on the part of Washington, adventurism by the other parties involved and, I fear, a complete absence of the European Union. The exhaustion of the conflicts has not yet affected all the local players and several of them consider that the circumstances favor their goals. Under these circumstances, the risk of an outbreak will continue to lurk while the desperate living conditions and the multifaceted oppression will prepare the new version of ISIS 2.0.