Blog

The Islamic Republic of Iran, after its isolation from the West, is left with a small number of allies, with whom it has developed important partnership and strategic relations. Iran's foreign policy focuses on the country's neighboring regions, in which there are important political and geostrategic developments. One of these regions is the Caucasus, and there Iran has a small but important ally, Armenia.

Iran has built a strategic relationship with Armenia since its independence in 1991. During the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iran indirectly supported Armenia and to this day supports its survival[1]. Despite the fact that Iran is in favor of maintaining the status quo in the region, as it has various ethnic minorities with irredentist tendencies in its border areas, it has not actively supported Shiite Azerbaijan. This is due to three main reasons: First, Tehran and Baku have competing interests in the Caspian Sea, regarding oil and gas production. Second, the northern part of Iran is home to a large Azerbaijani minority[2], which worries the Iranian leadership due to the nationalist policy used by the Azerbaijani regime within the country. Third and most importantly, Azerbaijan has developed relations with two of Iran's most important strategic adversaries, the US[3] and Israel[4].

Therefore, Iran prefers to strengthen its rival Azerbaijan, with which it has historically good relations and common strategic interests, rather than supporting a state in which the US and Israel have an indirect or direct presence. In the wake of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey and Azerbaijan have closed their borders with Armenia, so the relationship with Iran is vital. The cooperation that has developed between the two countries concerns trade, energy security and military equipment[5]. Despite Iran’s isolation from the West through new sanctions, Armenia, as the smaller and most dependent partner, seeks to strengthen cooperation between the two states[6] mainly in the energy sector[7].

Moreover, beyond common interests, Armenia is the most suitable mediator for further rapprochement between Iran and Russia. This is, after all, the pursuit of the newly elected Pashinyan government in Armenia, which continues the foreign policy of the previous leadership, despite the differences between them on issues of legitimacy, democracy and political power. Thus, the permanent position of Armenian foreign policy is consolidated, which, realistically, accepts the inability of the small state to act independently at the regional level and understands the need to cooperate with Iran, but also with Russia, for its survival, as well as the continuation of the good relationship between the two main players in the Caucasus. For this reason, Armenia had undertaken actions for cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran[8] which ultimately led to an agreement for the creation of a free trade zone[9].

In conclusion, It is appropriate to make a more general assessment of the strategic importance of the Caucasus for Iran, in order to understand the policy that Tehran follows in the region. Iran, due to its geographical proximity, has been active in the region since ancient times. In modern times, especially after 1979, the Caucasus and specifically Transcaucasia constitute an important part of Iran's energy security, while at the same time the region strengthens the export of Iranian products and investments. Furthermore, the existence of the large Azerbaijani minority on the borders with Transcaucasia, where Azerbaijan is located, adds an additional reason for Iran's activity in the region[10].

Bibliography:
Claude Moniquet & William Racimora, “The Armenian-Iran Relationship, Strategic implication for security in the South Caucasus Region”, European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, January 17 2013. [Online] at: http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/the-armenian-iran-relationship/Armenian-Iran%20relationship.pdf ]
Ali M. Koknar, “Iranian Azeris: A Giant Minority”, The Washington Institute, June 6 2006. [ Online at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-azeris-a-giant-minority ]
Samuel Ramani, “Three reasons the S. won't break with Azerbaijan over its violations of human rights and democratic freedoms”, The Washington Post, January 20 2016. [Online] at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/20/3-reasons-the-u-s-wont-break-with-azerbaijan-over-its-violations-of-human-rights-and-democratic-freedoms/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8ac5a111c9ae ]
Maayan Hoffman, “DRIVING A WEDGE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AZERBAIJAN”, The Jerusalem Post, June 30 2018. [Online] at: https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Driving-a-wedge-between-Israel-and-Azerbaijan-561226 ]
Pashinian Says He Made “Clear” To S. That Armenia Will Maintain Ties With Iran”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 2 2018. [Online] at: https://www.rferl.org/a/pashinian-says-made-clear-to-us-bolton-armenia-will-maintain-ties-with-iran/29578365.html ]
“Armenia set to import more gasfrom Iran”, PanArmenian Net, December 19 2018. [Online at: http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/263692/ ]
Armenia Ready to Act as Platform for Closer EEU – Iran Economic Relations”, Financial Tribune, October 22 2018. [Online] at: https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/94637/armenia-ready-to-act-as-platform-for-closer-eeu-iran ]
"Eurasian Economic Union Finalizes FTZ Agreement With Iran", Financial Tribune, December 7 2018. [Online] at: https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/95464/eurasian-economic-union-finalizes-ftz-agreement-with-iran ]
Shaffer, Brenda. "Iran's Role in the South Caucasus and Caspian Region: Diverging Views of the S. and Europe." In Iran and Its Neighbors: Diverging Views on a Strategic Region, SWP Berlin, July 2003. [Online at: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/shaffer.pdf]