Or when or on the
REFLECTIONS ON ANOTHER ANNIVERSARY OF "ATTILA" AT THE BARRIERS.
For many decades, Turkey has consistently and openly claimed sovereignty and sovereign rights from Greece and Cyprus, in terms of power (blue homeland, gray islands, maritime zones, airspace, control of Cyprus, Thrace, etc.). These claims are implemented through a policy of coercion that includes intimidation (e.g. casus belli), a huge variety of constant provocations to which the Greek side is addicted and compromised, hybrid tactics (e.g. illegal immigrants, fires, illegal fishing, cybersecurity), as well as faits accomplis (occupation of 37% of Cyprus). The credibility of the Turkish threat is based on its powerful armed forces (TAF), as well as its significant defense industry, which collaborates with corresponding industries in advanced countries and exports high-tech defense equipment. In addition, it attempts a strategic encirclement of Greece with military access to the Balkans and Libya.
The support of our country's traditional allies (EU - NATO) has limits and is mainly manifested in the diplomatic field. The US's condemnations and measures against Turkey are not directly related to Greek-Turkish issues. For the US, stability in the wider region and Turkey's continued presence in the West are paramount. The EU verbally covers Greece and Cyprus, but the need for a positive agenda with Turkey is constantly being highlighted, while the bilateral relations of many EU states with this country continue unhindered. In terms of convergence of interests, the most favorable country is France. The strategic regional axes of cooperation of our country with Israel and many Arab states are appropriate, their expansion is desirable and useful, but their direct assistance against the Turkish threat is not expected.
Specifically on the Cyprus issue, Turkey has not only not moved from its strategic goal, which is the control of Cyprus, but is creating, with the long-standing tolerance of Hellenism, the conditions that will make its pursuits inevitable (e.g. complete dependence of the occupied part on Turkey, occupation troops, increase in settlers, military bases, opening of Famagusta, research and drilling in the Cyprus EEZ, non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, support for "equal sovereignty", etc.). Turkey and the pseudo-state constitute a united front, with the former declaring, as the "motherland" and guarantor power, that if the slightest interest of the Turkish Cypriots is affected, the whole of Turkey will immediately rise up.
On the other hand, the Greece-Cyprus front does not send a clear political message of indissoluble unity. For example, there is no Greek statement (with the moral right of the motherland, the legal right of the guarantor power and the realistic right of the national interest) that any security challenge in Cyprus will be perceived as a challenge against Greek territory. The Doctrine “Cyprus decides and Greece stands by” places the isolated, weak and pressured Cyprus before its responsibilities and provides a convenient “allothi” for any Greek political inaction and evasion.
The negotiating basis of the Bizonal Bicommunal Federation, which Greece and Cyprus unreservedly support, is by no means certain to ensure a viable solution to the Cyprus problem. Possible nuggets of viability would only emerge following Greece's strong and legitimate insistence on a series of non-negotiable "red lines" in order to initiate negotiations (e.g. full implementation of the acquis communautaire, a Greek Cypriot President always, immediate withdrawal of occupying troops and most of the settlers, return of Famagusta and Morphou, recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, a very strong form of Federation, no alteration of the population ratio, etc.). The lack of these conditions in the upcoming negotiations is going to drag Hellenism, at best, into "Annan plan"-type solutions.
The only solution that is consistent with the interests of Hellenism is the liberation from "Attila" and the liberation of the island from the suffering it has accumulated, but the solution in question will not be offered by allies or international organizations, but only by the capable military power of Greece and Cyprus (what was lost with blood cannot be recovered by invoking International Law). This type of solution is completely absent from the intentions, statements, planning and goals of the governments of Greece and Cyprus.
For decades, the Greek and Cypriot governments have been devaluing military power and its usefulness as a foreign policy tool, while simultaneously sinking the defense industry, shipyards and development investment in high defense technology into a tailspin. Self-evident practices throughout the world are still treated ideologically, with the assistance of a “toxic” guided unionism. For example, the connection of the market with the research of universities and research institutes (especially in defense technology) or the establishment of private tertiary institutions (Greek-speaking or even foreign-speaking), which in addition to the financial profit would offer important security services in border areas, is prohibited. The occasional reinforcement of the ED is not a product of a comprehensive National Strategy but of a forced reflexive reaction after every hostile initiative of the threat.
The Greek political system in general does not consciously invest in self-help, which defensively shields the country, boosts national deterrence, strengthens national negotiating capacity and increases our country's specific weight within its alliances. The drastic cuts in defense are the only ones voted for by all parties. Self-help is treated convulsively and as a necessary evil (according to the former Minister), as it includes long-term planning and long-term benefits (it has no pre-election horizon) and involves partisan costs (e.g., increased tenure, armament programs, reserve training, research expenses, removing inadequate "old men" from positions of responsibility in the defense industry, adherence to ethics and the abolition of swindling in the Armed Forces, dealing with ideologically powerful unions, nurturing conscientious Greek citizens in education and not "politically correct citizens of the world", etc.). It would be fortunate to refute these findings, but there are so many relevant political statements, actions and omissions to the contrary that they unfortunately emphatically confirm them.
Greece perpetuates a vicious cycle in which the asymmetry of military power and the lack of political will to use the military when required, lead to an appeasement policy in peacetime, while in critical moments of tension and crisis, they lead to political retreat, damaging Agreements, the unreliability of our deterrent reputation and to resorting, like a beggar, to external "protectors". The latter, understanding which is the weak side, know who to pressure for solutions "convenient" for them and certainly not fair. After national crises with an unfortunate outcome, there follows a short-term and incomplete resort to self-help and the vicious cycle repeats itself with its renewed discrediting. The popular proverb "suffering becomes a lesson" does not apply here.
For those who rush to raise the well-known dilemma of "butter or guns", it would be good to take as an example states with similar populations such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Israel, Finland, etc., in which their powerful and export-oriented defense industry did not prevent them from having a very high social welfare index, but on the contrary helped them.
The personnel of the ED are reliable, properly nurtured and capable of exceeding, but they are not a panacea. On the other hand, the countries that, in critical moments, cover up the gaps they have accumulated in the ED, placing national hopes in heroes, in exceeding and in mechanical Gods, deserve their fate. In order for the "experts" at each time not to be vague, the required equipment (quantitative - qualitative), its support, the numerical size of the trained personnel with high morale and their leaderships in Greece and Cyprus, should ensure at the same time the following possibilities, with an acceptable degree of risk:
- The Cypriot and Greek forces on Cyprus are successfully confronting the corresponding enemy forces on the island.
- The aeronautical forces of Greece and Cyprus prohibit the reinforcement of Cyprus with enemy military personnel and material.
- The Greek Armed Forces are successfully confronting the terrorist organizations throughout the territory and neutralizing their planning.
- The Greek Armed Forces successfully address every security issue on the country's northern borders.
Alliances are purposeful and should be pursued, but history and national experience prove that they are not sufficient. As long as the above criteria are insufficiently met and with an unacceptable degree of risk, the aforementioned vicious circle will persist and the nation's fortunes will be thrown into the game of Russian roulette. As long as the above criteria are not met, Greece will continue its appeasement policy, undermining the future of unborn generations of Greeks, with the gradual ceding of national sovereignty and sovereign rights, under the cheers of the allies, for our "strategic composure" and our "decisive contribution to the stability of the region". If this is what we deserve, let us collectively accept the fate (with the decisive assistance of the demographic and immigration issue). If not, fellow citizens must overcome the difficult everyday life and democratically but decisively show the way to their hesitant leaderships. In a country with political leaderships bound by opinion polls, reducing political costs, at the initiative of voters, is perhaps the last hope for revising the country's strategic choices and priorities.
13 – July – 2021
Vice Admiral (retd) V. Martzoukos PN
Honorary Commander of the Hellenic National Guard
Vice President of EL.I.S.M.E.