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These reactions reveal how little public/society influence is in government and how the “shell” of the state may have hardened. The significant “emergency legislation” (urgent bills), passed within a single parliamentary day, especially after 2013, can be seen as additional evidence of the limited consultation with civil society (at least at the level of parliamentary committees).

It is worth noting that very few representatives from the most powerful organizations (OEB, CCCI and the Pancyprian Association of Planning and Construction Entrepreneurs) expressed their satisfaction with the social dialogue that took place during the critical years of the Memorandum. These same organizations also expressed their satisfaction with the way in which the current President consults with organized interests. This is partly due to the way in which they were treated by the previous government (Christofias), which was in their opinion more hostile to business interests. On the other hand, organizations such as the Association of Small and Medium Enterprises (POVEK), the Union of Cypriot Pensioners (EKYSY) criticized the Anastasiades government and praised the Christofias government, stating that social dialogue in Cyprus suffered after the 2013 presidential elections.

Therefore, a distinction can be made between “insiders” and “outsiders” in terms of state consultation with organized interests, with the former groups being informally linked to the party or government political space. Thus, once again, we see that during the crisis the left-wing split – and political alliances, in particular – remain very important in the connections with society and go hand in hand with the general orientation of the all-party approach and for exerting behind-the-scenes political pressure.

Benefits are also distributed ad hoc to specific groups, since each ministry as well as the central government itself (i.e. the Presidency) have funds available for “special financial assistance” (in kind financial assistance), which until 2013 have never been reduced and whose recipients have not yet been made public. Since each government and ministry has full authority to distribute this special financial assistance as it wishes, the phenomenon of financial organizations affiliated with the party or parties of the respective government shortly before each upcoming election is a frequent occurrence.

At the same time, there are signs that the socially entrenched bipolar divergence is diminishing. This is most evident when looking beyond the corridors of power, and at groups that are either marginalized or politically less important and powerful. Farmers’ organizations and unions, for example, are among the very few groups that have openly protested government policies. In contrast to the representatives of POVEK, OEB and CCCI, who have openly praised either the Christofias or Anastasiades governments, farmers’ organizations have criticized both the previous and current governments and have seemed more prepared to protest, if necessary.

Despite this general dissatisfaction with the nature and effectiveness of social dialogue, almost all social partners and trade unions explicitly stated that during the crisis they tried to influence all the main parties, either in the context of consultations in parliamentary committees or through direct meetings with party leaders or representatives. In most cases, parties reach out to civil society and not the other way around – except in the context of election campaigns. Most social partner representatives are themselves members of the parties in the political system.

This point confirms our previous finding that civil society tends not to pursue non-institutional ways of mobilizing, but prefers to use established channels of communication. Thus, we see again that to a considerable extent partisanship has not decreased despite the decline in the popularity of the parties due to the Memorandum and the policies followed during its implementation. The political weight of the parties has remained relatively intact, although their social capital has declined significantly.

In other words, at the level of the political system, nothing has been overturned and the dynamics between political parties, as well as their sphere of power, have not changed, despite the fact that their influence in society and their ability to represent interests and embody social identities have been seriously weakened. This weakening is reflected mainly in public opinion rather than in daily political practice or in the communication strategies of the parties.

All parties have tried to compensate for the weakened labor movement (and therefore their affiliated unions) by focusing on charitable and solidarity activities during the crisis. These efforts may also compensate for the parties’ reduced ability (due to austerity) to control their supporters through direct material transfers. The parties do not cooperate in providing food and clothing to people in need. Instead, each uses its own organizational mechanism to help those who are somehow connected to them, although officially its charitable activities are open to all citizens in need.

Peculiarities of each party’s supporters naturally apply in terms of the way in which people are mobilized and in terms of charitable activities. While DISY, as a government party, cooperates with the Commissioner for Volunteerism and provides assistance through NGOs, municipalities and the Church, AKEL presents a multifaceted network of activities, which resembles its organizational penetration into society and its strict discipline. The initiative of AKEL and its auxiliary organizations to create a “Social Solidarity Network” with eight programs covering a range of social activities and including education and health can be interpreted as a continuation, in the years of crisis, of the socially established bipolarity on the island. Because, in a sense, this initiative can be seen as the Left's response to the fact that the social markets (social grocery stores), which operate throughout the country, are mostly an initiative of right-wing or conservative forces.

Another area of ​​party-society relations, which concerns the direct interaction between political parties and the state, and is therefore relevant to the broader and currently important issue of transparency, is party financing. Limited initiatives are also observed in this area. So far, there is agreement among the main parties so that there are very limited legislative initiatives to amend the current financing legislation. The Council of Europe’s GRECO report describes the measures taken by Cyprus, and in particular the new Law on the Financing of Political Parties (PPL) adopted in December 2012.

The new legislation introduced an explicit obligation for political parties to keep accounting books in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards and to incorporate information on income, expenditure, assets and liabilities, including local branches and affiliated organizations, as well as income and expenses related to their election campaigns.

The financial statements of political parties are now subject to independent audit and external supervision by the Auditor General of the Republic. However, the GRECO report also identified a number of other problems: the lack of a coherent format for political party accounts, the lack of external supervision of income and expenditure in relation to election campaigns, as well as the exemption from publication of any party accounts and individual donations exceeding a certain threshold.

Recent developments, including many directly related to issues arising from the crisis, have sparked a state-level debate on corruption and transparency. Things appear to be moving forward, but with cautious steps.

In addition to harmonizing the legislation on party finances with GRECO guidelines (the issue is currently in the Parliamentary Committee on Institutions), Anastasiades proposed a series of anti-corruption measures. However, most of them have not yet been implemented or finalized. 1) Limiting the term of office to two for the President and mayors and to three for MPs and municipal councilors, which was also discussed in parliament in 2015 (it has not yet been discussed in parliament). 2) The statutory obligation for civil servants in the public and semi-public sectors to disclose their financial assets (the issue is now in an ad hoc subcommittee in view of disagreements on the issue of publication) 3) Institutionalization of the liability of the President, ministers and state officials for civil and criminal cases for which they may be indicted (two bills have been sent to parliament in November 2013, but the issue has not been voted on). 4) The definition of the crimes for which the President can be indicted (nothing of this kind has yet been presented by the government). 5) The modernization of the laws on criminal investigators and inquiry committees (this is the only relevant law passed in April 2013). 6) opening bank accounts and removing classified banking information for the purpose of investigating corruption phenomena (still pending in parliament / not yet submitted to the Legal Affairs Committee).