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NAVTEXES, COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

With the two recent Turkish NAVTEXs, of permanent validity, Turkey points out that from now on, for maritime activities within the "Blue Homeland", Greece should be licensed by Turkey. At the same time, 23 Greek islands in the Eastern Aegean are not only required to be demilitarized, but any military activity within their territorial waters is prohibited. Turkey warns that any relevant violation will be dealt with in accordance with Turkish national interests. These positions are not formulated for the first time, but nevertheless they trample on the Athens Declaration and the "calm waters", while the choice of time prejudges the range of issues that Turkey will raise during the upcoming bilateral summit.

The harmful actions of the past force the Greeks to no longer approach Imia and the Turks to invoke their “vital interests” in the Aegean (Madrid 1997). The newer Turkish claims began in 1973, gradually expanded and today they constitute an existential national threat. Essentially, Turkey raises the issue of Thrace, Cyprus and the total overthrow of the Aegean regime, while in its strategy against Greece and Cyprus, among other things, it exerts influence on neighboring countries and involves them in its planning.

In a demographically shrinking Greece, Turkey is penetrating in various ways (e.g. land purchase, infrastructure and businesses, permanent settlement of Turkish and controlled Muslim immigrants, constant approach of the Muslim minority of Thrace, etc.), especially in sparsely populated border areas with which it often “twins” and willingly provides services. The frequent threatening statements, military and hybrid provocations, the strong Turkish defense industry, the size of the Turkish armed forces, their development and exercises as well as their prospects, indicate the clear intention to implement their revisionist plans. Until Turkey’s expansionist practices are revoked, relations between the two countries will be zero-sum, that is, one's loss will be the other's gain. Different domestic approaches such as "give something before he takes us away with war" or "give something before Trump provides a solution" or "Turkey is exporting internal problems" or "an honest negotiation with mutually beneficial results is possible" or "act with the ideal that peace is the supreme good", are judged to be expressed either by the naive or the deceitful.

The above-mentioned are occurring in a period of retreat of international law in the face of power practices, amidst a significant test of Euro-Atlantic relations and an upgrade of the regional role of Turkey, whose political leadership maintains interpersonal relations with that of the USA. In any case, the self-evident Western orientation of Greece (convergence of interests) is different from the identification with the US policy which prohibits a potential conflict between Greece and Turkey at any possible sacrifice. It is known that in these cases the most indecisive, weak and unprepared side is pressured or sacrificed, which bases its strategy on external “saviors”. If Euro-Atlantic relations deteriorate further, Greece’s choices should not be influenced by emotions or “childish” perceptions but should be guided purely by national vital interests. The same approach applies to selecting local allies and deepening relationships with them.

With all the Turkish demands on the table, it would be utopian to believe that the resolution of the only legal dispute concerning the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf would be possible within the framework of a bilateral political “dialogue”. This fact is confirmed by the 65 fruitless bilateral meetings at the highest level so far. Open channels of communication are a self-evident goal, but summit meetings require the maturation of common positions, following hard-fought cooperation between the two sides, which the top leaders ratify. Otherwise, the revisionist side puts forward all its claims, exerting pressure and at the same time enjoying the good testimony from the outside of a state that discusses, negotiates and seeks “zero problems” with its neighbors. With this advantage, the revisionist country gains legitimacy either for penetration and access to technological, economic, defense, energy and diplomatic benefits or for the growth of its regional ambitions and the acquisition of a role. The practice of continuous long-term "dialogue", without preconditions, "red lines" and self-evident strategy led, for example, to a slide of national positions on the Cyprus issue from an international issue of illegal foreign invasion and occupation to an intercommunal political negotiation (manipulated by Turkey) with the greatest ambition of our time the stillborn "bizonal bicommunal Federation with political equality".

As a result, the threat of an occupying and revisionist Turkey is judged not to have been systematically and to the required extent within the country's alliances since our partners are exhausting their sensitivity exclusively to Russian expansionist policy. The deconstruction of Turkey remains ineffective despite the fact that Greece currently exercises reduced national sovereignty (e.g. expansion of territorial waters) and sovereign rights. Furthermore, Cyprus, although an EU member state, is groaning and being blackmailed by the Turkish occupying boot.

The indefinite postponement and reservation of the exercise of rights deriving from International Law (over 50 years ago) weakens national foundations and creates "acquired" and "special regimes". The perpetual, general and indefinite "reservations" of the exercise of national rights "when deemed appropriate" cause embarrassment to third parties and lead to disrespect. The respective postponements must be accompanied by a national implementation timetable (even if not communicable) which precisely describes the methodology and steps (legal, diplomatic, military, economic, energy, alliance, preparation of public opinion, etc.) which will lead to the strengthening of national power indicators. The maximization of these indicators, their harmonization and the political will to utilize them will yield the result that will allow our country to take the next nationally imposed major step of full exercise of sovereignty and sovereign rights.

Reasoned boldness and credible deterrence do not necessarily lead to war, as appeasement does, which at best creates relations of a dependent satellite state. Alliances and International Law must be pursued, but national autonomy in material and moral terms is what makes a country respected abroad and offers a national vision. The management of the everyday life of the citizen, although useful, does not mobilize, does not inspire, does not create active citizens and does not address critical and vital national aspirations. National strength and the convincing political will and ability to utilize it should form the basis of our national cross-party strategy and a basic criterion for choosing political leadership for Greek citizens.

February 01 2026

Vice Admiral (retd) V. Martzoukos PN

Honorary Commander of the Hellenic Navy

Vice President ELISM.