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GENERAL
Russia and Turkey are the two most powerful countries in the Eastern Europe and Mediterranean region. Their power is not only economic or military, but a combination of the two. At the same time, their participation in various groups, such as the UN Security Council or NATO and the G-20, gives particular importance to both their presence in the wider region and their relations with each other. In recent years, there has been an intense background in the field of defense cooperation between them, as well as in how this can shape or even change the geopolitical balance of the region. It is interesting to see, therefore, how things are currently developing in the Southeastern Mediterranean, as the attention of the International Community is focused on Turkey and its relationship with the West, how Russia has (historically) dealt with and how it deals with the Turkish state. Can two countries with conflicts in their historical past become “friends and allies”? Are economic interests (sale of F35, construction of a nuclear plant in Turkey) capable of changing Russian policy towards Europe, or is Russia using all of this to continue its "hegemonic doctrine" in the region of Eastern Europe and Asia? A historical report will enlighten us and provide answers to many of today's issues.

HISTORICAL DATA

Russia:
The history of Russia begins with the history of the East Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes. The state of Gardariki ("the kingdom of cities"), which was in the Novgorod region, was founded in 862 AD and traditionally marks the beginning of Russian history. The Kievan Rus', which was the first united East Slavic state, was founded in 882 AD. The state adopted Christianity in 988 AD and, influenced by the Byzantine state, developed an amalgam of Byzantine and Slavic culture, which defined Russian tradition for the next millennium. After the 13th century, Moscow became the new cultural center of Russian civilization.
By the 18th century, the Kingdom of Russia had become the vast Russian Empire, stretching from the borders with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the West to the Pacific Ocean in the East. The westward expansion and contact with Western culture sharpened Russia's "perception" of isolation, backwardness, and separation from the rest of Europe. The regimes of the 18th and 19th centuries proceeded with processes of modernization and social progress despite the reluctance of the ruling class to reform. The protagonists in this effort to modernize and lift isolation were the tsars Peter I (Peter the Great, 1672–1725) and Catherine II (Catherine the Great, 1729–1796).
Peter I traveled to Western Europe accompanied by a small staff (Grand Embassy). The initial goal of the trip was to secure support from the European courts in order to attack the Crimean Tatar Khanate and the Ottoman Empire, which were blocking his access to the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Catherine II's foreign policy aimed to strengthen Russia's role in the world and expand its territory. The motto of her diplomacy was: "we should be friends with all the Powers, in order to always retain the ability to stand on the side of the weaker ... to leave our hands open ... and not to drag ourselves by anyone's tail." However, this motto was neglected many times.
Both rulers aimed at strengthening Russia's hegemonic role and reaching "warm" seas. Their main rival was the Ottoman Empire. This situation changed with the Crimean campaign of 1919 and after the conclusion of the Treaties of Moscow and Kars (1921).

Turkey:

In the 11th century, the Seljuk Turks moved into the region of Asia Minor, a movement that intensified after the Seljuk victory over the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. The Seljuk Sultanate ruled Asia Minor until the Mongol invasion of 1243, when it was broken up. Beginning in the late 13th century, the Ottomans unified Asia Minor and created an Empire that included most of Southeastern Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa.
In Asia Minor, many population groups adopted the Turkish language and the Muslim religion. The gradual spread of both the new language and the religion in the region began to increasingly influence the various Asia Minor regions of the Byzantine Empire culturally, resulting in the gradual dominance of Islam and the Turkish language among the populations of Christian and Greek-speaking Asia Minor. In 1453, the Ottomans completed the conquest of the Byzantine Empire, occupying its capital, Constantinople. The power and glory of the Ottoman Empire peaked in the 16th and 17th centuries AD, especially during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent.
From the early 19th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire began to decline. As its size, military power and wealth gradually shrank, many Balkan Muslims migrated to the heart of the Empire in Asia Minor, along with Circassians who had fled to that territory after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. The decline of the Ottoman Empire led to a flare-up of nationalist sentiments among the various subject peoples, which in turn led to increased ethnic tensions.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the 1919 Peace Treaty, parts of it were occupied by the victorious Allies (ANTAD). The occupation of Constantinople and Smyrna by Allied troops led to the creation of the Neo-Turkish movement. The Turkish War of Independence, initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his associates, resulted in the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923, with Atatürk as its first President.
In 1945, Turkey became a member of the United Nations. The USSR's demands for military bases in the Straits prompted the United States to declare the Truman Doctrine in 1947. The doctrine stated American intentions to guarantee the security of Turkey and Greece, resulting in the sending of American military and economic support to both countries. Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, becoming a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean. Gradually, the Turkish state joined the OECD, the OSCE, and the G-20 (the 20 largest economies). Turkey began negotiations for full membership with the European Union in 2005, having been an associate member of the European Economic Community since 1963 and having joined the European Customs Union in 1995. Turkey is also a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Economic Cooperation Organization (founded in 1995). Turkey's increasing diplomatic and economic initiatives have led to its recognition as a regional power.
Turks constitute 70–75% of the population. Minorities include Kurds (around 18–25% of the population) and other ethnicities, without official registration (around 7–12% of the population). The vast majority of the population adheres to the Sunni Islamic doctrine. The most important problem facing Turkey today is the armed uprising of the Kurds of the PKK that began in 1984. At the same time, its relations with neighboring states are characterized by the expansionist aspirations of its president (Erdogan). Turkey borders eight countries: Greece to the west, Bulgaria to the northwest, Georgia, Armenia, Iran and the Nakhichevan enclave of Azerbaijan to the east, and Iraq and Syria to the southeast. To the south by the Mediterranean Sea, to the west by the Aegean Sea and to the north by the Black Sea. The Sea of ​​Marmara, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont delimit the border between Thrace and Asia Minor, while also separating Europe from Asia. Turkey's position at the crossroads of Europe and Asia makes it a country of significant geostrategic importance.
For centuries, relations between Russia and Turkey were characterized by geopolitical competition, suspicion and conflict. Until the 20th century and the October Revolution, there were a total of twelve Russo-Turkish conflicts with Turkey always losing (the first began in 1568 and the last ended in 1918). Recently, however, they have moved from a total conflict to a large-scale cooperation. In essence, however, their relationship remains unstable and it is uncertain how long the current “honeymoon” will continue. Fifteen months after the downing of the Russian SU-24 on the Syrian-Turkish border by the Turkish armed forces, relations between Russia and Turkey have gone from nadir to zenith. The spectacular turn of the Turkish government in the Syrian crisis has largely allowed the two countries to upgrade their cooperation at all levels and now for it to acquire a strategic character.

ANALYSIS

Russia and Turkey are in favor of maintaining the status quo in the Black Sea region. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, Turkey maintained a neutral stance and restricted access to the Black Sea for American ships within its jurisdiction under the Montreux Convention. It attempted to play a mediating role in easing tensions and promoting stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus region by establishing the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform with the participation of itself, Russia, and the three South Caucasus states.

Areas of Russia-Turkey defense cooperation
Since the 1980s, Turkey has purchased quantities of Russian military equipment for use by its armed forces. This includes weapons mainly for the army and the military gendarmerie. Such systems include small arms (e.g. AK-47, AKM, SVD rifles), anti-tank missiles such as the 9M113 Konkurs (or NATO AT-5 Spandrel), 9M133 Kornet (or NATO AT-14 Spriggan), and RPG-7 rockets.
There are also major systems such as the BTR-80 armored personnel carriers (of which more than 500 are in service) and BTR-60 (of which more than 300 are in service). Finally, there are Mi-17 personnel carriers (of which 18 are in service). For the latter, there is an intention to modernize and upgrade them as agreed at the last meeting of the presidents of the two countries (Putin - Erdogan) on March 10, 2017. The upgrade is estimated to include all 18 Mil M-17 IV/IV Hip-H transport helicopters and the modernization of more than 240 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers of the Turkish Military Gendarmerie.
In the same context, the procurement of the anti-aircraft system is moving, for two batteries of which a supply contract has been signed, worth 2,2 billion dollars, and which are to be acquired within 2019. This procurement has resulted, in addition to Turkey's unstable policy, in the increase in mistrust and skepticism with which it is treated both within NATO in general and by the US. We see a similar situation in its relations with Israel (mainly at the level of political leadership). A consequence of this is the threat by the US to implement the "embargo" (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)) due to the procurement of the S-400 system.
At the same time, there are several other programs that Turkey wants to focus on in industrial cooperation with Russia but also for exports to third countries (mainly Arab ones), as exports generate a significant part of the revenue of the Turkish defense industry, which provides thousands of jobs. Such programs concern the production or creation of a (tailored) version of TOMA for the Turkish army, such as the heavy TOMA Kurganets-25 and the airborne TOMA BMD-4.
Correspondingly, Turkey aims to export BORA-type ballistic missile systems and rockets or to cooperate in exporting Aselsan's new quadruple anti-tank missile launcher which can also fire Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) missiles. At the same time, they want to expand cooperation in the supply and export of anti-tank systems and in the air defense sector.
Turkey has already built some drones and is preparing to launch a fighter jet production program. This observation leads us to three other very important, potential areas of defense cooperation between the two countries: the aerospace technology sector in the context of Turkey's intention to become self-sufficient in the construction of the 5th generation "national aircraft", the effort to promote the "national ship" and the acquisition of nuclear technology and corresponding weapons. The latter in particular is the most accessible goal for Turkey given that Russian companies will build at least one of the four nuclear power plants that Turkey will build in Akkuyu.
In May 2010, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement under which a subsidiary of Rosatom will build a power plant in Akkuyu consisting of four 1.200 MW VVER units. Main construction began in March 2018, and the first unit is expected to be operational in 2023. The other three units are expected to be completed by 2025. The remaining nuclear fuel can be used to produce a sufficient amount of material for nuclear weapons. It is noteworthy, as Greek expert Pantelis Economou, a former senior official at the International Atomic Energy Agency, states in his note, that in Ankara’s nuclear agreements with Moscow and Tokyo regarding the nuclear plants in Akkuyu and Sinop respectively, there is a “controversial provision” regarding the “acquisition of capacity for the production and processing of nuclear fuel” (uranium enrichment and plutonium production). This provision “was included in the agreements at the personal insistence of President Erdogan. The process may be quite slow (it will take about ten years from the start of operation of the plant to produce a sufficient quantity to manufacture a bomb) but in the future it enables Turkey to join the very closed group of countries that possess nuclear weapons.
However, apart from the agreements we see for the material itself, there are also agreements (either written or informal/oral) that concern the stance and response, mainly by Turkey, to the actions of the other country towards the implementation of their aspirations in the region. We have such examples with the war in Georgia in 2008, Russia's actions in Abkhazia - South Ossetia, but also the response to each other in the region of Syria. We distinguish the existence of joint peace missions in Syria, through the tripartite process in Astana together with Iran, but also the existence of dialogue between the armed forces. The Russians withdrew their forces from Afrin and ensured from the Assad regime that the Turkish air force will fly over Afrin without problems.
Russia, with the agreement with Turkey, appears to have a dual goal. First, to expand the market for arms exports to countries that traditionally bought from the West. And second, to create rifts within NATO. However, it would be wrong to talk about a military alliance between Turkey and Russia. Turkey remains closely linked to NATO. Of course, this does not mean that Erdogan will not use it to gain major profits and concessions from the West. At the same time, there is great distrust between the two.

Foreign Policy Issues
After the end of World War II, the issues concerning foreign policy in the region were the Cyprus issue, relations between the Middle Eastern states, relations between Southern and Northern countries as well as with the USA. In recent years, the energy sectors have also emerged, specifically the reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean and the development/sovereignty in the wider region. Turkey tried to exploit the vacuum created by the collapse of the USSR in 1991 as well as the developments in the Middle East region (Iraq – Saddam Hussein, civil war in Syria, Israel – Palestine, Libya) in order to become a regional superpower. The main objective of the foreign policy of both Russia and Turkey is to gain prestige and power both in this specific geographical area and more broadly. Putin argues that the international environment has changed significantly and speaks of "multi-polarity" with the emergence and rise of new "players", who must come to a mutual understanding in order to achieve cooperation between them. The Russian President argues that the internal life of a state is inextricably linked to foreign policy; and a tool for achieving it are defense agreements.
The collapse of the Soviet Union with the Fall of Communism resulted in the weakening of the Russian state and its disintegration as a geopolitical unit. Russia's path as a global superpower was suddenly interrupted. A decade of stagnation and isolation passed, until the country's role and foreign policy were redefined. To a large extent, the shaping of Russian foreign policy is due to the actions of V. Putin.
The changes taking place in the Black Sea region with the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the potential increase in the power of the Russian Navy that this entails undoubtedly strengthen the Russian ability to project power not only in the Black Sea region but also in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia and Turkey share common positions and interests on regional issues and have established a stable course of cooperation over the past decade. Russia is concerned about the penetration of the EU and the US into areas of its traditional sphere of influence, while Turkey is concerned about the destabilization of its southeastern borders and the consequent consequences for its territorial integrity. Turkey recognizes the vital interests of the regional hegemon and follows a policy of mitigating secondary conflicting interests in the wider Black Sea region.
However, the shooting down of the Russian fighter jet on November 24, 2015, during a bombing mission in the Syrian theater of operations by Turkish fighters, created a serious crisis in the diplomatic relations of the two states and led to a rapid deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations. Russia's military intervention and the escalating involvement of its armed forces since September 30, 2015 in operations against the various opposition forces fighting the Assad regime, as well as against forces of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, changed the balance of power that had been formed in the military conflict in Syria. Russia's strong presence negatively affects Turkish plans in a region that is considered crucial for Turkey's security. The deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations suggests that Turkey is willing to advance its interests in the Middle East region despite the major economic and diplomatic impact that a policy of conflict with Russian plans for the region will have.
Regional relations: Europe – Turkey – Russia
The Black Sea region was considered a part of the empire with increased geopolitical and economic importance since the time of Tsarist Russia. The proximity to the Ottomans and the latter's control of the Straits was always a cause of friction and often war conflicts. The Soviet Union, in agreement with the Young Turks and limited economically to the narrow limits of its state economy, showed renewed interest in the Cold War era, mainly for military reasons, since Turkey was a member of NATO. In more recent years, after the collapse of the USSR, the wider Black Sea region became a field of interest, conflict and competition for many "players" at a regional level. NATO, the European Union, Russia, as well as the states (that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union) that belong to this region immediately showed their interest in the region. NATO promotes its political ideology in contrast to that of Russia in the region. We can say that we are dealing with the Euro-Atlantic ideology against the Russian one. For Europe, after its major enlargement (2004) and later with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the Black Sea region is now part of the European Union, which wants to promote democracy, European values ​​and consolidate stability, as well as to be active in security issues (frozen conflicts), economy and energy.
Regarding Russia and Greece and their relationship in the Black Sea region, Russia is the largest coastal state in the Black Sea region both economically and militarily. Its goal is to continue to have control over the region, exercising policy both at a bilateral level with the newly independent states (after the fall of the Soviet Union) and at a regional level, promoting its energy and defense policy. While for Greece, beyond its status as a European country, which is why it is in line with European policy in the region, it is connected by historical ties with the peoples of the Black Sea region. At the same time, for reasonable reasons, Russia continues to be in a "prominent position" of the Greek political and diplomatic agenda.
Russia's political presence and action in the internal affairs of its neighboring countries has gradually increased since 2000. In the region of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Russia lists a large number of interventions either by military or political means. Russia's geopolitical and ideological motives regarding the near region have been coordinated with both its domestic and foreign policies. Russia, with these interventions, aims to strengthen its power and role both at the regional level and in the international political scene. For Turkey, this Russian intervention is not a big issue unless these challenges cross the line and affect its territorial integrity and interests. Of course, it has expressed its dissatisfaction in some cases (Georgia, 2008 – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Crimea, 2017). On the other hand, for Europe, Russian-Turkish cooperation is a major issue, because there is a conflict of interests.
Thus we see that Europe is being challenged by Russian intervention on the eastern side, as Russia greatly influences the relations of the countries in the region with the European Union, a typical example of this is its relationship with Turkey. More specifically, Russian policy has had significant negative consequences for Turkey in its relationship with Europe in three areas. Initially, the continuation of the war in Syria and the presence of Russia capable of opposing NATO forces there in order to prevent Assad from falling, has resulted in a large flow of refugees, causing instability on Turkey's southern borders and intensifying its pressure in relation to the refugee agreements with Europe. Also, with the annexation of Crimea, Russia now has control of the Ukrainian naval bases in Sevastopol, resulting in a change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean Sea, as the Russian navy currently exercises complete control, causing significant consequences for Turkey. Turkey sees Russia in two ways: first as an enemy/competitor as there is competition between Russia and the West/NATO, of which Turkey is a member, and second as a partner in trade and energy. Turkey tries to play a neutral role between the two sides (EU-Russia) and to gain as many benefits as possible. Although they were separated by several geopolitical differences, the two states have come to a common decision to develop cooperation in the economic and trade spheres.
Regarding the relations between the European Union and Turkey, these are considered of great importance mainly in the field of energy, but also in the field of security. Of course, it should be mentioned that Turkey is trying to play a neutral role and to share its relations with Europe and Russia respectively with the aim of obtaining as many benefits as possible and consolidating itself on the energy map by becoming a transit country. At the same time, Turkey is a country of initial destination / transit hub in the effort of large populations of refugees from Arab / Muslim countries to be processed in the West. With this in mind and in order to be able to control the flow of these masses, the West wants Turkey to be a defensive barrier in the region that will limit and / or control the threat from the East.

CONCLUSIONS
The defense cooperation agreements mentioned above are expected to play an important role in geopolitical relations in the region. In particular, the transfer of know-how to Turkey for the construction of advanced systems such as 5th generation aircraft and nuclear weapons. At the same time, Turkey's corresponding cooperation with Western countries in the respective fields, and especially with the USA and Israel, is a crucial factor.
Of course, it should be noted that Turkey, due to its geostrategic position, is under great pressure from both sides (West and Russia) and moves according to its interpretation of international circumstances. This confirms the established policy of Turkey, which, although an ally of the West, follows a foreign policy aimed at obtaining as many benefits as possible. From a political point of view, Turkey appears at this time to be expressing a strong polarization with the West regarding the upgraded position that its President wants to give it. And defense cooperation with Russia is a bargaining chip. Of course, relations between Turkey and Russia have not ceased to be tense. We should not, however, overlook that after the latest developments in which the Turkish state is intensifying the escalation in the Southeastern Mediterranean, issuing NAVTEX and seizing areas that belong to European territory, while at the same time preventing the continuation of drilling by European companies in Cypriot plots with its drilling rigs, we observe that Russia is maintaining a "fishy silence" that can be interpreted at present, that it is awaiting developments in order to react, possibly also against Turkey. And this is because, the Russian state as a "player" has perceived Erdogan's bipolarity. Relations between Russia and Turkey will be judged, on the one hand, by the way the new Commissioner of the European Commission will handle Euro-Turkish issues (primarily immigration) and, on the other hand, by the stance that Trump will continue to take towards the Turkish President (let's not forget that the US is currently in an election period).

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*Lieutenant Commander Theodoros Katsougiannopoulos, RN, was born in Thessaloniki in 1974. He graduated from the Naval Academy in 1998 as an Ensign RN. During his career, he served on a Destroyer, Submarine and Frigate, as a Staff Officer and Director of Operations. From 2015 to 2016, he served as Commander of the F/S KOUNTOURIOTIS and from 2016 to 2017, Commander of the F/S KRATEOS. He has participated in six NATO Response Force missions. Between 2010 – 2015 and 2017 – 2018 he served in the Fleet Headquarters in the Operations, Tactics and Exercises Directorate as Staff Officer, Head of the Current Operations Planning Department and Head of the Exercises and Operational Training Department as well as its Director. He attended all the schools provided for his rank, specializing in Submarine Detector (S/N) and has been honored with all the decorations, medals and memoranda provided for his rank. He holds a Master's Degree in Information Systems from the Hellenic Open University, a Master's student at the Law School of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki - Department of International Studies with a specialization in International and European Legal Studies. He knows the English and French languages. He has three daughters.
Contact info:
Phone: 6943482831
e-mail: katsou_theogr@yahoo.gr
Residential address: Sostratous 26 - Neos Kosmos Attica, ZIP Code 11743