Iran has enough plutonium to build more than 200 nuclear bombs.
Iran has enough plutonium to make over 200 nuclear bombs
Experts warn Trump administration: Any deal with Iran must exclude the use of plutonium for nuclear bombs
Nuclear weapons experts warn of urgent need to Trump administration to include in every new agreement explicit prohibition of Iran's efforts to use plutonium from its facilities to build an atomic bomb.
So far, the US government and nuclear counter-proliferation experts have focused mainly on the Islamic Republic's facilities that use uranium as a feedstock.
Tehran, however, could exploit this "blind spot" and secretly build a plutonium-based nuclear weapon.
Ο Jason Brontsky, policy director of the organization United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), told Fox News Digital:
“I firmly believe that any proposed agreement with Iran must address the plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons.
»Israel struck the heavy water reactor at Arak twice in the last year, in June 2025 and March 2026.
"Information indicates that Iran repeatedly attempted to reconstruct the facility even after the bombings, so any agreement must also cover this passage."
According to Henry Sokolsky, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and former deputy director for nonproliferation policy at the Department of Defense (1989–1993), the Iranian regime could use plutonium from the spent fuel of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr to build a nuclear device.
In an article last month on the website Real Clear Defense, Sokolsky noted:
“Washington must ensure that Iran does not remove Bushehr’s spent fuel to extract plutonium.
"This can and must be done without bombing the factory."
Sokolsky added that the Pentagon should closely monitor movements in Bushehr, using satellite imagery or drones, as it did in 2012.
Furthermore, he stressed that any "peace" agreement that President Trump concludes with Tehran should impose near-real-time monitoring of the reactor and spent fuel pools, similar to that implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for enrichment activities.
In another article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in April, Sokolsky argued that Iran already has enough plutonium for more than 200 bombs.
"The last time IAEA inspectors visited Bushehr was on August 27, 2025.
"Even when the Organization had regular access, visits were made every 90 days, more than enough time for the fuel to be extracted and potentially converted into a weapon," he said, adding that the President Obama had not insisted on such monitoring, despite the IAEA's request, which Tehran rejected.
Recent IAEA reports have not examined the plutonium pathway with specific data.
A State Department spokesperson told Fox News Digital that "Iran's nuclear program poses a threat to the United States and the entire world," adding that Tehran is violating its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and must engage in serious diplomatic negotiations.
From his side, David Albright, physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, appeared particularly skeptical.
The former weapons inspector argued that Iran lacks the necessary design for a plutonium weapon, while such a move would be immediately noticeable, leading Russia to cut off the supply of enriched uranium and causing the collapse of a billion-dollar investment.
At the same time, he noted that the plutonium at Bushehr is "reactor-grade" and not "weapon-grade", which makes the construction of an effective weapon extremely complicated.
Despite the reservations, concerns about Iran's intentions remain, with many calling for a complete ban on plutonium reprocessing and strict oversight of related infrastructure.
Η Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the nonproliferation program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), emphasized:
“The United States must insist on a permanent and verified ban.
"Even Russia recognized the danger, insisting on the return of inspectors after the June 2025 strikes."
Stricker concluded that, although there are significant technical obstacles for Tehran, the IAEA could mitigate the risk by increasing inspections to a monthly basis, while Russia could remove the accumulated spent fuel from the site.