THE CYPRUS ISSUE AFTER THE ANNAN PLAN

THE CYPRUS ISSUE AFTER THE ANNAN PLAN

 

The recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General on his good offices for the resolution of the Cyprus problem1 which he submitted to the Security Council of the organization, with the aim of informing the Security Council on the one hand and adopting it on the other, unfortunately, does not constitute a balanced and objective text, as its author claims. The Secretary-General clearly expresses his disappointment at the negative result during the process of the simultaneous referendums in Cyprus, something that was expected at least on the Greek and Greek-Cypriot sides, while he does not fail to emphasize that after almost 4,5 years of his full involvement in the effort to resolve the political Cyprus problem, he does not expect any new significant efforts of mediation and assistance from his side.

Unfortunately, however, the offer of good offices by the Secretary-General to Cyprus, as expressed through his latest report, does not reflect reality, but only the image that the Secretary-General wants to see and to portray in his report. The Secretary-General of the United Nations places an extremely high degree of responsibility on the Greek-Cypriot side for the failure of both the talks in Burgenstock, Switzerland, and during the previous process between the leaders of the two communities. He does not fail to emphasize the indifferent to negative and unconstructive, in his opinion, attitude that the Greek-Cypriot side maintained during the talks. He accuses the Greek Cypriot side of leaking to the press and other media the discussions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and between the leaders of the two communities and the representatives of the United Nations, including himself, with the result that negative circumstances and impressions were created, which further hindered the progress of the talks. The leak of confidential information to the press reinforced the suspicions of the Greek Cypriot side as well as Greece that the United Nations, with the tolerance and pressure of the United States, Britain, Turkey and other international mediators, such as the European Union, were trying to impose an agreement on the Greek Cypriots that was not in their interest.

Furthermore, he accuses the Greek Cypriot side of not presenting proposals, counter-proposals, comments, observations, etc. frequently and at regular intervals, as it should have done, and of generally being slow to propose and categorize its own views, thus hindering the consultation process. Finally, when the Greek Cypriot side proceeded to submit counter-proposals and observations, as it should have done, it did not do so in the form that he would have liked. The most serious of all the accusations he accuses the Greek Cypriot side is the one directly linked to the Cypriot President's statement calling on the Cypriot people to unequivocally reject the Annan plan. At this point, the Secretary-General of the United Nations personally accuses the President of Cyprus of essentially misleading the Cypriot people and himself when in previous contacts with him the Cypriot President had expressed his great desire to assist the Secretary-General's effort to resolve the Cyprus problem before May 1, 2004. Undoubtedly, the Cypriot President would advocate and assist the effort of the United Nations and the other international mediators, but would not agree to any solution the United Nations proposed. Elsewhere in the Secretary General's report, the latter alludes to the fact that the Republic of Cyprus did not offer, as it should have, the opportunity to highlight the advantages and positive points of the Annan Plan and there was no correspondingly extensive presentation of it that would have allowed for a broad explanation of the points of the plan that concerned the Greek Cypriots. The result of this, according to the Secretary General, was that the Greek Cypriot side remained under the mistaken impression that the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey in general were gaining much more and immediate rights, while on the contrary any advantages that the Greek Cypriot side would have would be less in substance and in number and would come at a much later time, while it maintained the suspicion that it was uncertain whether Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would ultimately keep their promises. Furthermore, Mr. Kofi Annan also refers to the fact that his Special Envoy did not manage to achieve a television presentation, which would have helped to dispel the myths about the difficulties, uncertainties and injustices inflicted on Greek Cypriots by the Annan Plan.

On the contrary, Mr. Kofi Annan welcomes with relief the clear and decisive adoption of his plan by the Turkish Cypriot community and states that its acceptance, even by one side, makes this plan the only and binding one on which the two sides can negotiate. Furthermore, its partial acceptance proves that the Annan plan was balanced and fair, while according to the Secretary-General, its rejection by the Greek Cypriot side makes it untimely for the United Nations to undertake any new mediation effort, until “the Greek Cypriots decide to resolve the Cyprus problem through a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation”.2 The implication is clear. The Secretary-General believes, wrongly, that the Greek Cypriots do not want the problem to be resolved or do not want it in the above manner. And in this context, Mr. Kofi Annan makes his most blatant accusation, that "what was rejected was the solution and not just a plan."3 Of course, at this point, Mr. Kofi Annan's written word is completely wrong. The Greek Cypriots have been trying and will continue to try for 30 consecutive years for a fair, sustainable and functional solution on the basis of U.N. resolutions and achieving a bizonal, bicommunal federation. This does not mean in any way that they will accept any solution that is offered to them just to resolve quickly and without any consideration a problem that has been troubling them for many years, because certain international actors are ardently seeking the upgrading of Turkey and its future accession to the European Union.

Continuing, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and wanting to reward the cooperation of the Turkish Cypriots for their act of accepting the Annan plan, makes an unacceptable proposal to the U.N. Security Council and the member states of the organization, urging them to take all actions to eliminate the injustice suffered by the Turkish Cypriots by ending and lifting all restrictions - economic and commercial mainly - that have been imposed on them with the aim of achieving their development. Mr. Kofi Annan stops one step short of the full recognition of the Turkish Cypriots as an independent state, reminding the Security Council of its resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) which prohibit precisely this, the recognition and any support and facilitation of the pseudo-state. However, with his previous call for an end to what he considers unnecessary prohibitions and restrictions that limit and isolate the Turkish Cypriots, he proceeds with exactly the opposite, namely, the annulment of these two resolutions that prohibit any contact with the pseudo-state and in this way not only destroys the international value of the U.N. resolutions but also encourages each U.N. member state to interpret this incitement as they wish and to take actions that are illegal and contrary to the above resolutions. Of course, Mr. Kofi Annan is extremely careful not to blatantly provoke the Greek Cypriot and generally international community by artfully requesting the cooperation of the member states of the organization both at a bilateral and multilateral level for the strengthening and development of the Turkish Cypriots and certainly not of the pseudo-state which he knows very well that it is an illegal entity. That is why he does not use this term but the term of the recognized Turkish Cypriot community, thus avoiding the pitfall of international outcry, urging the international community to support the Turkish Cypriots.

Of course, one cannot be achieved without the other. Because any support for the Turkish Cypriots also presupposes some form of cooperation with the pseudo-state, even without the necessary formal recognition of it. After all, the second above-mentioned UN resolution, 550 (1984), prohibits any contact with the pseudo-state, regardless of whether there is formal recognition of it or not. With the above act of Mr. Kofi Annan, international lawlessness is strengthened and the international community of law, the guardian of which is the UN and in particular the Security Council, is destroyed. Also, with this act, Mr. Kofi Annan abolishes the legally binding value of the previous UN Security Council resolutions for the member states of the organization, indirectly but clearly achieving the recognition of the pseudo-state and strengthening it politically, economically and commercially. At the time of writing, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which only includes Islamic states and Muslim communities such as the Turkish Cypriots, met in Istanbul between 14-16 June 2004 and decided, assisted by the aforementioned report of the Secretary General and pressure from Turkey, to upgrade the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in it, calling on all its member states to actively assist, on the one hand, in ending the exclusion/isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and on the other hand, in developing bilateral contacts with a view to strengthening the sister community politically and economically. Furthermore, in the texts adopted during the aforementioned conference, there is an explicit reference to the term "Turkish Cypriot State"4» copying the terms provided for in the Annan Plan. Undoubtedly, such a development will strengthen the Turkish-Cypriot position and their negotiating ability and will open the doors of Aeolus for other similar future developments.

Another adverse development may be the development of many bilateral relations between the Turkish Cypriot community and other states which may, for formal reasons, fall short of international recognition, but strengthen the economy and trade of this community and thereby increase the future intransigence of this side and, respectively, its unwillingness to consult with the Greek Cypriot side with a view to ending the Cyprus impasse. If the Turkish Cypriot entity develops into a Taiwan of the Eastern Mediterranean with full and rich economic and trade relations with the rest of the world, its interest in resuming talks with the Greek Cypriot side will likely decrease, its intransigence and unwillingness to yield will increase, and its negotiating power will be strengthened. Turkey, which for a long time was and remains the almost exclusive economic and commercial partner of the Turkish Cypriots5 , as this artificial entity relied on the former for its survival, will strengthen its own intransigence in relation to the pending bilateral disputes with Greece and will feel justified in its choices, increasing the pressures on Greece and Cyprus for all the remaining disputes. Moreover, Turkey will be economically relieved if the Turkish Cypriots, through the development of bilateral and multilateral relations, begin to participate actively and to a large extent in the operating costs of this illegal entity and in the occupation of the Turkish army. However, these two paragraphs in the Secretary-General's report may in the future pose a great danger to the international community, as states that have territorial and other differences with their neighbors may imitate the Turkish aggression of 1974, hoping for future forgiveness of sins, as is now happening with the Turkish Cypriots.

That is why the Secretary-General's report should not be adopted by the UN Security Council in its current form, as it constitutes a threat both to the Greek-Cypriot side and to the general development of the Cyprus problem, as well as to the other states of the international community, in the form of a res judicata.
It is undeniable that both Nicosia and Athens have been seeking for 30 years the resolution of the political problem of Cyprus through a lasting, viable, just solution that would bring about the reunification of the island. The Greek Cypriots and Greece will continue to move towards such a form of resolution that is based on the resolutions of the UN and that ensures rights and obligations for both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. But at no point in this long journey will the Greek Cypriot side renounce its values, achievements and rights, just to sign an agreement that will essentially dismantle and contradict the resolutions of the UN while creating far more problems than it is supposed to solve.

1See United Nations document S/2400/437, dated 28/5/04
2as above p. 1, Summary.
3as above p. 20
4See the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr, sub-page, OIC. There was also a reference to the Muslim community of Western Thrace expressing the Organization's solidarity and requesting the annulment of the court decision against the elected Mufti in Xanthi.
5According to European Commission data, in 2001 exports from the pseudo-state were worth approximately $46 million, of which 62% of this amount was agricultural products (23% citrus fruits and 25% processed agricultural products). In previous years, approximately 50% of exports were mainly destined for Turkey, 30% for Great Britain and approximately 15% for the remaining EU member states.

By Evangelos Tempos, PhD in History, full member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (IISS) and Strategic Analyst of the Hellenic Society for Strategic Studies (EL.E.S.M.E.)