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THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND APRIL 16

By Lieutenant General G. KORAKIS

The article was written on April 10, 2003

The recent war in Iraq put aside the Cyprus issue for several days. While the attention of international public opinion was focused on the events in Iraq, an orgy unfolded around the Cyprus issue when Turkey tried to "upgrade" the Cyprus issue and bring it to its own standards. The coordinated diplomatic moves of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Dektas fit into this context. Turkey proposed a five-party meeting with the three guarantor powers and the two communities, a move that is outside the UN framework, as do the announcements of the Turkish Cypriot leader, proposals that prove that the Turkish side is moving at the wrong time. There is no doubt that the intense activity on the part of Turkey is aimed at creating impressions in view of the signing of the accession treaty of 16 April 2003 and in particular at the more active involvement of the superpower in favor of Turkish interests. US-Turkish relations have been and will be a factor that will influence the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Turkey, with its proposals, seeks to remove the issue from the Security Council and have it discussed in the proposed five-party meeting, thus gaining time, believing that it can stop the final stretch of accession and that it will have more to gain from the influence of the US. This is precisely where its attempt to convey to the EU states that the Cypriot democracy cannot become a member of the EU, but only "Cyprus" is aimed.

The fact that the Cypriot republic is entering the EU without first resolving the political problem caused by Turkey, which has been recognized by all those involved, also has its positive dimension in the sense that the negotiating bases of the Greek Cypriot side are strengthened. Since the signing of the EU accession treaty, the actions of the Cypriot government must be carried out with prudence but also determination. Turkey is in a difficult position today in handling the Cyprus problem and this has led it to a series of "initiatives" which highlight on the one hand its nervousness and on the other hand the rejectionist attitude of the international community and especially the EU towards its initiatives, a fact that reveals Turkey's isolation. Today the Turkish establishment has to deal with the Cyprus problem which remains a high priority issue but developments are also underway and the Kurdish problem which will be forced to follow it closely in the sense that the Americans may today keep their promises and an independent Kurdish state may not be created, however it is estimated that Northern Iraq will become an area of ​​reference and interest for all Kurds in the wider region, a fact that will constantly absorb Turkey's attention.

Through many and varied complications, Cyprus was accepted by an overwhelming majority by the European Parliament as a Cypriot democracy. The vote in the European Parliament that took place recently marked the end of a long journey for Cyprus and the biggest diplomatic defeat for Turkey in the last thirty years. Of the 29 negative votes that Cyprus received in the vote, 22-23 were against all the countries under accession. This means that only 6-7 MEPs consciously voted against Cyprus and if we consider the furious reaction of Turkey then we are led to the conclusion that the Turkish "lobby" does not influence more than 1% of MEPs. And here too it is worth remembering where the threats of all those who insisted on the implementation of the famous timetables were based. Their "arguments" were that the EU would not accept the Republic of Cyprus unless the Annan plan was first accepted, that is, unless its self-dissolution was first signed before accession. Now that we are headed for seamless integration, the culprits of that collusion should be concerned. The integration of the Republic of Cyprus into the great European family creates great expectations that are not far from reality, with the solution of the political problem being more important in order to enable the substantial integration of the entire Cyprus into the EU. This strategic goal will be achieved with appropriate planning, by utilizing all the possibilities, means and opportunities that may appear and be created within the framework of the EU. The willingness of the majority of Turkish Cypriots to recognize the practical benefits of joining the EU is a decisive factor in achieving the goal. Highlighting the benefits and implementing practical measures for the participation of Turkish Cypriots in the common path will weaken the intransigent stance of those in charge on that side and will bring results. Without arrogance and by positively utilizing the European Union's stance, we must seek a European solution to the Cyprus problem.

As long as the Cypriot democracy resists, safeguarding its state entity and existence, and as long as the refugees realize that no occupation, no matter how long it lasts, can abolish their property titles, a solution of the form that Turkey wants to impose cannot exist. Turkey will be forced to become more conciliatory. If the Greek Cypriots accept a deviation from the European acquis, no European citizen can be more assertive. Persistence in purpose, sobriety and political wisdom will sooner or later bring the desired result. In light of recent developments and the imminent signing of the accession treaty of the Cypriot republic to the EU, it is not ruled out that Rauf Bey will make other "gestures of goodwill". The Greek Cypriots must demonstrate composure, determination and excessive responsibility and not forget what Laocoön said to the Trojans: "Fear the Danaans and those bearing gifts".