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While the international media focused on the gradual and cautious turn in Turkish foreign policy and efforts to repair relations with Russia and Israel, the news of the pre-midnight coup attempt on Friday, July 15, created a global uproar. The initial picture was confusing, with the coup plotters appearing to be in control and President Erdogan and his government gone. In the first moments of confusion, a “colorless” statement from the “anonymous” Turkish armed forces was broadcast on the under-occupied station of the low-rated state television, while no high-ranking officer addressed the Turkish people. Images and rumors from social media and interrupted telephone conversations flooded the domestic and foreign media. An initial impression of restraint and bloodless intervention with older tried-and-tested “recipes” lingered in the air of the news. Even the sporadic explosions and overflights in Ankara were seen as a demonstration of the coup plotters’ power. The first (before midnight) unofficial statements by the representatives of the “great” powers referred to the need to avoid bloodshed and recommended restraint on all sides. A strong diplomatic stance and direct support for a legally elected and recognized government (perhaps not very popular) did not exist in those first critical hours.
Limited military forces in Ankara and Istanbul moved in and were stationed at key points. Unaware, passing drivers followed the columns of armored vehicles in side lanes on the avenues leading to the Bosphorus bridges. At the same time, the first rumors of the President's departure and request for political asylum were circulating in a panoply of European capitals.
Shortly after midnight, an irritated and agitated President Erdogan appeared using social media and addressed the Turkish citizens, calling on them to take to the streets and resist the military's coup attempt. The message resonated as it was reproduced by a well-organized party apparatus with extensive use of mobile phones and traditional imams. The landing of Erdogan's plane at Istanbul airport further ignited popular support and determination. However, the spectacular comeback also affected a significant number of armed forces officers who had previously avoided taking a position, waiting to see which way the scales would tip. The highest and most senior military officials began to declare their allegiance to the "sultan" and the security forces, largely controlled by the President, were encouraged and launched a counterattack against the rebels. It was now a matter of time and human losses for the complete collapse of the coup and the arrest of the ringleaders, those involved, sympathizers and all sorts of opponents of the "sultan". The dawn of Saturday found Erdogan the absolute master of the game, hero and protector of Turkish democracy with a multitude of question marks hanging over the course of the country. A country deeply divided, despite the impressive victory of the AKP (in the recent elections and in the fields of internal multi-deadly conflicts) and walking a tightrope once again between conflicting choices and perceptions. Of course, all countries gradually condemned the attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government. The first statements of the victors rather lack moderation and went so far as to characterize the attempt as a “divine gift” so that they could remove the “cancer” from the body of the armed forces. In fact, there was no shortage of heinous acts against arrested soldiers and even ordinary conscripts, in a worrying outburst of violence by a feared Islamofascist segment of AKP supporters.

The rapid collapse of the coup, the mass arrests and immediate removals of thousands of state officials (so far, at least 15.000 people have been reported) sparked rumors of a premeditated move by the regime (provocation) to proceed with sweeping changes and complete control of the army and the state apparatus. Conspiracy theories always have a greater appeal than the attempt to examine and analyze the complex causes and usually seek the secret of developments and the interpretation of events, focusing exclusively on the question of who ultimately benefited. According to these views, the collapse of the movement probably strengthens the position of the "sultan" (correct) and therefore his own mechanisms and people organized or allowed the coup to occur. Indeed, in the unlikely event that the secret services had information about the preparation of such a move, they might have monitored the conspirators for a sufficient period of time without intervening in order to subsequently maximize the number of those arrested and to ensure the collection of sufficient incriminating evidence. However, they would hardly have reached the point of risking their survival, both physical and political, in order to maximize their benefits, allowing such a high-risk action to take place for themselves and for the state itself. Moreover, there is also the precedent of the prosecution of a sufficient number of officials in the recent past using inadequate and rather prefabricated charges.
The revelations that are gradually coming to light also answer the reasonable question of not targeting the center of gravity of the AKP, that is, President Erdogan himself. The conspirators tried with select forces and the use of aerial means to neutralize the "sultan" who eventually escaped with a time difference of a few minutes, relying on timely warning but also on the strength and militancy of his well-organized, multi-faceted personal guard. Also, the numbers of those involved, the panspermia of the units that participated show that a relatively organized movement to overthrow the regime took place despite the existence of a multitude of errors that are usually identified in retrospect and are criticized from the sidelines. However, a similar stance that results in overnight clashes with approximately 300 dead in Ankara and Istanbul and at the same time shakes the country's image internationally cannot be characterized as an "operetta" coup or attributed to the satanic cunning of the all-powerful Turkish President. Statistically, the minority of military coups succeed in overthrowing the existing government, although in the case of Turkey we were accustomed to the effectiveness of military interventions (classical and otherwise: 1960, 1980, 1997). However, in the aforementioned cases, the Turkish armed forces acted as a coordinated whole and for the most part under their natural leadership. In the current case, the leadership, although hostage to the rebels, remained loyal to the government while the wavering senior officers gradually closed in favor of legality (without, it seems, securing their positions and their exemption from prosecution). The attempt was made by a limited portion of the army who probably hoped that the momentum of the developments would draw other units and more officers along. Despite the persecutions, arrests, imprisonments, transfers and dismissals, under various pretexts, of a large number of officers during the previous period of AKP rule, the majority of career officers, nurtured in the principles of Kemalism, view the Islamic rise with distrust. However, a significant number of executives, despite their negative predisposition towards Erdogan's Islamists, have accepted the AKP's dominance and consider any attempt at political diversion as dangerous acrobatics.
The coup attempt involved relatively few forces, by Turkish standards, in an effort to maintain the greatest possible secrecy and not reveal the plans. It seems that the goal of surprise was achieved to a large extent. In similar cases of overthrowing a government, the aim is to neutralize the opponent's center of gravity (in our case, President Erdogan and his close associates) with lightning speed in order to exclude any attempt at reaction. Also, the actions must be immediate and the blows overwhelming, as time is usually on the side of the legitimate government. The July 15 rebels not only failed to neutralize their main target with the raid on Bodrum, but they also showed hesitation in their attempt to control key government buildings and points. They may have underestimated the reaction of the security forces defending key points (headquarters of the Turkish intelligence service, police headquarters) or even shown a fatal initial restraint in the attempt to avoid a fratricidal conflict. On the contrary, it seems that they overestimated the psychological effect of the armored units on the well-equipped and, above all, determined defenders of government buildings. The coup event quickly degenerated and instead of a manifestation of decisive actions (inevitably bloody) it led to a series of clashes of attrition between military units of the rebels and the inferior in combat power but determined security forces. The television images from the Bosphorus bridges showed the image more of check points than of an army determined to clash. It is certainly understandable, especially on the part of the rebels, to seek to limit human losses, as well as the hesitation to attack vital but at the same time symbolic targets of Turkey's prestige, such as the MIT headquarters. Therefore, the low participation of units in the movement with a parallel hesitation in actions and a failed "surgical" intervention are among the main reasons that led to the failure of the movement. In addition, in the actions of the rebels it seems that there was poor coordination and a lack of alternative solutions, events that are likely due to a hasty manifestation of the coup or to the limited preparation and participation for reasons of secrecy. The President's escape from the hotel in Bodrum proved that the conspirators did not have (or were unable to implement) a reliable alternative solution in case of failure of the offensive action. The rather deliberate spread of rumors about the President's defection may have momentarily created a climate of concern among his followers, but his reappearance on television, after the first three hours of doubts, boosted their morale and fighting spirit, while on the contrary, collapsing that of the rebels.
In the media, the main reason for the failure of the coup is the decisive mobilization of AKP supporters who surrounded the rebels' military units. In any case, the impressive popular presence (after 02.00:XNUMX on Saturday) on the streets and at key points contributed to the gradual decline of the rebels and their surrender. However, an initial dynamic action accompanied by a larger military presence, psychological operations and preventing the political leadership from addressing the supporters would probably have brought about a different development of events and certainly greater bloodshed. Erdogan's reaction is presented as a "hybrid" response to the "old-fashioned" military coup that was unsuccessfully attempted. Some even go so far as to proclaim the absolute sovereignty of the popular masses, suitably incited by social media. This oversimplified belief now assumes a dominant position in the planning of opponents and a bright future is predicted for the "experts" of these media. Their influence is therefore undeniable, but like any medium, social media is also subject to countermeasures (silencing, misleading, black propaganda, etc.) and victory will always continue to be on the side of the one who is original, exploits the means and opportunities appropriately and is willing to risk even his existence to achieve his goals. The incompetence-inability of the rebels to "silence" mass media broadcasts and the operation of the internet remains incomprehensible, although technology allows these actions with relative success.
Perhaps the main reason for the failure lies in the age-old self-trap that has always accompanied politicians, generals, and conspirators who hope for broad acceptance (or at least favorable neutrality) of their movements by the popular classes as well as by the personnel of the security forces and armed forces. Accusations of corruption, political failures and persecutions, state incompetence, and a party state are not always sufficient to push the popular classes to seek constitutional deviation, especially when there is a significant rise in living standards and a more general redistribution of wealth and power that is diffused to broader and for years neglected social classes.
The combination of all the above reasons and situations led to the failure of the coup attempt by part of the Turkish armed forces. The question of the instigators and masterminds of the uprising continues to linger. From the first hours, President Erdogan named his former ally and now undisputed opponent, Fethullah Gulen, as the mastermind of the coup. The targeting of the self-exiled imam is not without logic, but the presentation of sufficient evidence is required since the abysmal gap that separates the two men does not in itself substantiate the accusation. The presentation of sufficient incriminating evidence was also the official position of the United States in the statements of Turkish officials for the expulsion of Gulen to Turkey. Of course, the self-exiled imam in the US never had any influence in the armed forces and it would have been difficult for the coup leaders to have reached an agreement with him (hence the risk of leaking the conspiracy plans to the US secret services, which are rumored to have ties to Gulen). It is estimated that a multitude of accusations will be leveled and a flood of evidence will be presented in the coming days against any person, organization, movement or party that the "sultan" dislikes. The processes of purification, punishment and establishment of full party control were launched in the early hours of Saturday, July 16, with the aim of protecting democracy. I estimate that the coup plotters come from those loyal to the bureaucratic Kemalist regime who, since the AKP's rise to power in 2002, have seen their powers limited and the country moving in a direction incompatible with the principles of Kemalism and slowly but steadily distancing itself from its Western allies. 
After analyzing the events of the uprising, its suppression, and the final imposition of Erdogan, let us focus on the consequences of the coup on Turkey's international position, the pursuit of its strategic goals, but also the impact on the broader balance in the region and the plans of the great powers.
Most analysts rightly believe that Erdogan is becoming the absolute ruler within a deeply divided Turkey. This sense of omnipotence will push him to immediately advance his goals of strengthening presidential powers and eliminating all his political opponents. In this direction, the announcement of early elections in the neighboring country is also possible. The "sultan" dreams of establishing a state that is ostensibly democratic but essentially one-party, in contrast to the Kemalist regime of the first two decades of the Turkish Republic. Unlike Kemal, Erdogan does not aim to strengthen a national homogenized Turkish state but to make Turkey the leading power of the Sunni world and a regional hegemon in the Middle East-Balkans-Caucasus and Eastern Mediterranean. These aspirations are evident already from the second period of his rule and constitute the successful (so far) coupling of Turkish nationalism with a relatively moderate Islamic ideology. Both supports, sometimes contradictory, stem from an imperial memory and a theocratic perception and are reinforced by the country's rapid demographic and economic growth. The excessive momentum that has been given to the country's multifaceted development has also resulted in the misrecognition of serious structural weaknesses and problems that it faces. In the internal "post-coup" environment, the sultan gains the ability to remove the last pockets of supporters of the Kemalist regime from the armed forces, the judiciary and the broader state apparatus. The security forces are already leaning towards the Islamic regime and their loyalty to it will be rewarded with further material and moral upgrading. Several analysts, of course, claim that this strengthening of the "sultan" will be temporary as serious and pressing internal and external problems remain to be resolved. In addition, some initial statements and actions of the regime show that it is indifferent to the consequences of its choices and is proceeding with a verbal escalation of relations with the West, especially on issues of principle for the latter (death penalty, human rights, individual freedoms). Of course, Turkey has accustomed us to the tactic of controlled escalation of relations at various levels and their subsequent withdrawal after a tug-of-war of contacts and blackmail (oriental bargaining) and the reaping of negotiating profits.
The trauma of the coup will leave deep scars on the armed forces not so much in terms of the loss and removal of experienced officers (it is estimated that at least 5000 officers will be dismissed from the army) as in the collapse of its prestige and the shaking of the trust of a significant part of Turkish society. The experienced Turkish politician, foreseeing the dangers of weakening the armed forces, in times of trouble, in addition to the imposition of tighter party control, will try to create the conditions for restoring the damaged prestige, and the external environment offers such opportunities. The question is not whether, but in what direction, in what form and when this "demonstration" and operation to restore the prestige of the new loyalists now in the armed forces regime will take place. The Greek area is among the high-risk areas. It is estimated that before the ink dries on the writing of this text, the overflights, violations and transgressions will have returned to their previous "normal" rates, while a corresponding projection of power will also be made for the rapid promotion of the 8 officers who escaped to Greece. The Sultan understands that strong armed forces are the guarantee for the realization of his ambitious goals and it is urgent, on the one hand, their complete submission to the Islamic regime and, on the other, the restoration of their prestige as an effective mechanism for external coercion and projection of power. The crushing of their morale is a fact that should not be overestimated, and the historical examples of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s and of the Iranian army after the Khomeini revolution provide useful lessons.
. Turkey's relations with the US are expected to enter a period of uncertainty and mutual wariness. High-ranking Turkish officials have already made an inelegant attempt to influence Washington to advance the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, while an official extradition request is expected soon. The US, after initial statements of restraint and avoidance of bloodshed, supported (as did all countries) the legitimate government. Perhaps a balance between rebels and the government with the selection of a moderate figure from the AKP (e.g. former President Gul) would have been the best solution for the Americans that would allow for the maintenance of democratic pretenses and the removal of the unpredictable Erdogan from power. Turkey is, for a number of reasons, America's necessary strategic partner for controlling the region. Self-awareness of this necessity combined with (usually) successful diplomatic flexibility offer significant possibilities for promoting Turkish strategic goals and interests. Ankara's contribution to strengthening ISIS yesterday and confronting it today is significant. Ankara is a problem but also part of the solution to the Syrian problem and the necessary bulwark to contain Russian expansionism. Area of ​​passage of pipelines and energy routes from north to south and from east to west. Key country for controlling migration-refugee flows. A model of modern Western-style Islamic democracy and at the same time a despotic and authoritarian state with multiple violations of human rights (how many similarities with the description of the communist regime in Kennan's "long telegram" in 1947). A basis of stability and a nightmare of destabilization. America, almost 4 months before the presidential elections, is not expected to make any change in its stance towards Ankara. It will certainly broadcast a message of annoyance to the Turkish leadership through its own channels, but it will continue to desire the unhindered continuation of military cooperation to combat terrorism. Ultimately, she must be pleased with the Turkey-Israel rapprochement as well as the removal of the risk of a heated incident with Russia, but she is certainly resentful of Ankara's incomprehensible urgings to Moscow for closer military cooperation against ISIS. In any case, Erdogan's Turkish foreign policy is a permanent source of concern and concern for Washington, which understands Ankara's regional aspirations but hopes that through admonitions, dependence and pressure it will tame, within reasonable limits, these demands, keeping the country in the Western camp and making it a model of democracy, progress, development and stability in the Muslim world. In this regard, the unpredictable leader Erdogan is certainly not Washington's first choice.  The new American administration is likely to be more demanding of Turkey, and for this reason the "sultan" may be in a hurry to close (or even open) certain fronts (e.g., the request to extradite Fethullah Gulen). The American side, in this tug-of-war with Ankara, has the "superweapon" of the Kurdish issue, while Turkey, for its part, is "bluffing" into a spectacular warming of relations with Russia, to the point of a possible complete destabilization of the region. In recent years, Ankara has also been blackmailingly promoting the option of a possible complete autonomy of its foreign policy accompanied by an Islamic turn that would deprive the West of the significant advantages that stem from its cooperation. To date, Ankara seems capable of understanding the limits of its challenges and folding back without forcing a rupture in its relations with Western countries. The self-confidence given by the internal dominance will probably push the "sultan" once again to exert multiple pressures and annoyances on Western governments, but again without going beyond what was intended. However, these ongoing challenges are likely to lead, whether planned or accidental, to a significant rupture that will bring about significant rearrangements in the balances of the region.
Russia, for its part, welcomes a warming of relations with Turkey, always under the condition of a Turkish retreat on the issue of the downing of the Russian aircraft. The first indications have already been seen, while rapprochement actions are underway. Perhaps the failed coup offers a prime opportunity to unveil a new "Dagger" plan, this time against Russia (and targeting the gullible Turkish domestic audience). Turkish newspapers are already reporting that the pilot of the Turkish F-16 that shot down the Russian Su-24 aircraft on the Turkish-Syrian border is among the coup plotters! The "scapegoat", the new "Iphigenia" for the restoration of Turkish-Russian relations, is probably underway. Despite possible mutual efforts to restore relations between them, Russia and Turkey are two neighboring candidate regional powers which, despite the temporary convergence of interests, are doomed to be in constant competition. The presence of two authoritarian leaders with excessive personal ambitions and possessed of maximalist tendencies for their countries, is a tried and tested “recipe” for continuous friction and confrontation. Again, the historical analogy highlights the example of Hitler-Stalin’s wolfishness, its sealing with the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement over the partitioned Poland and their final showdown to the death. However, at this particular period, the economic consequences, mainly but not only, of the restarting of relations between them seem mutually beneficial and their gradual restoration is expected.
But even distant China looks favorably on the attractive market of 80 million Turks, although it resents Ankara's support for isolated Muslim populations on the country's western borders. Let us not forget that Erdogan's government is the one that favored the much-discussed and yet unconfirmed supply of Chinese anti-aircraft missile systems, which caused discontent in NATO circles and Western defense industries. However, similar orders for surface-to-surface missile systems had been launched in the past by the military-controlled political governments.
This multidimensional game of Turkey is expected to intensify in the coming period as part of the autonomy of Turkish foreign policy but also as a maximization of negotiating pressure in every direction. Relations with the European Union will also move in this direction, with the negotiating weapon of controlling refugee-immigrant flows being demonstrated at every opportunity to European partners. Of course, the coup and what may follow are likely to further distance Turkey from Europe, a course that is increasingly finding less and less resonance among the Turkish people but is also the nightmare of many European capitals. Despite the continuous removal of the possibility of Turkish accession to the European Union, maintaining a special relationship with a different weight and a creeping accession process is a strategic goal of Turkey and several European states. The treatment of the arrested coup plotters and the ongoing prosecutions will be temporary points of friction between Turkey and European countries, which will subside, however, when once again international developments and economic interests favor cooperation with this country. The rejection, at the last minute, by the Turkish President of the (guided) popular demand to reinstate the death penalty for coup plotters remains in his "quiver" as an indication of the magnanimity and goodwill of the "sultan" towards both domestic and foreign countries.
The ongoing restoration of relations with Israel will continue as it was a result of the instability of the wider region, mutual concern about the end of Iranian isolation, American pressure, the security problems that Ankara and Tel Aviv face, as well as the expectations of mutual gains from energy projects (supplying Turkey with Israeli natural gas) and trade and tourism cooperation. However, it is estimated that mutual suspicion will continue to exist, especially in Tel Aviv, as long as President Erdogan and the AKP remain in power, while the further weakening of the Turkish armed forces will raise serious concerns in Israel about the credibility of its "resurrected" ally.
Despite the Turkish President's grandiloquence (which may intensify in the coming days along with revelations of broader conspiracies by forces that are working to hinder the progress of the Turkish Republic and the Islamic authorities), it is estimated that the basic directions of foreign policy will remain the same with a tactical distraction in the effort to reduce the friction caused by the failed implementation of the "zero problems with neighbors policy", but the ultimate strategic goal will remain the emergence of Turkey as the most important regional power. At the same time, Turkey will continue to participate in the international coalition to confront ISIS by granting permission to use its bases and participating in selective strikes against the jihadists. It should not escape our attention that ISIS turned against the coup plotters, in a premeditated move to further polarize Turkish society and create doubts in global public opinion and the international coalition about the AKP's real intentions. A new terrorist act on Turkish soil by ISIS jihadists is also quite possible, which will give rise to further allegations of provocative actions by the regime's diverse opponents (ISIS, Kurds, Kemalists, Gulen followers). However, a spectacular turnaround by Erdogan on the Syrian issue remains possible, with the acceptance of moderate positions (even Assad's "temporary" stay in power), in exchange for neutralizing the risk of creating a strong and unified Kurdish canton in northern Syria.
A key point in Turkish politics is the issue of dealing with the Kurdish issue. The initially much-publicized will to resolve the Kurdish problem has now foundered and since 2014, in an informal alliance between the AKP and the armed forces, the latter had been given the initiative to deal with the Kurdish uprising dynamically. At the same time, a judicial effort to ban the pro-Kurdish HDP party, which has managed to enter the Turkish National Assembly for the second time in a row, exceeding the 10% threshold, has been underway for months. Erdogan's strengthening, combined with his character, creates reasonable suspicions about the continuation of a dynamic policy of dealing with the Kurdish issue. However, the coup attempt may provide an opportunity for the "sultan" to blame the escalation of the Kurdish uprising on the hard-core elements of the armed forces and to try, through appropriate political moves and painless concessions, to divide the Kurds, restoring calm to the eastern regions and politically weakening or eliminating the HDP. Such a strategic move requires masterful manipulations and, above all, a demonstration of realism and moderation on the part of the government, practices usually unknown to triumphant factions of politically immature societies. It is estimated that Erdogan will proceed with such a move to re-approach the Kurdish element, but this initiative will subsequently collapse under the weight of the inevitable awakening of the Kurdish national identity, international developments and Turkish opportunistic policy. Therefore, it should not be surprising that a political initiative inviting the resumption of dialogue by the cunning "sultan" towards the Kurds. Ultimately, a significant portion of the AKP accepts as the basic connecting link of Turkey (aiming at a reconstitution of the Ottoman Empire) the common religion and not the national identity.
We left for last the examination of the effects that the failed coup attempt will have on Turkey's relations with Hellenism (Greece, Cyprus). My assessment does not foresee serious changes in the relations between the two sides. The 14 years of Islamic rule have not brought about significant changes in the relations of the three states, nor has any spectacular progress been achieved on the open issues between the two sides. The emergence of crises (1976, 1983, 1987, 1996, 1998-9) between Greece and Turkey may have disappeared, but the differences and mainly the Turkish claims remain. In fact, the latter are constantly being escalated and new arbitrary Turkish interpretations and claims are being added. The absence of escalation is probably due to the decision of Greece and Cyprus to adopt a low-key policy towards Turkish claims, considering that in this way and with the given reversal of power (on many levels) to our detriment, the maintenance of the desired status quo is better achieved. This policy of ours probably temporarily serves Ankara, which estimates that avoiding escalation in the Aegean facilitates the handling of other more pressing internal and external issues, while time works in favor of the uneven growth of Turkish power. I was also impressed by the concern of some Greek analysts about the possible collapse of the process of resolving the Cyprus problem in the event of the insurgents prevailing, as I do not see any possibility of launching, if not a favorable, at least a decent solution for Greek interests! In the first phase, we will experience inelegant pressures for the extradition of the 8 officers who sought asylum in our country. These pressures aim not only to extradite the asylum seekers but also to project yet another success of Turkish foreign policy and power towards Greece and further undermine the latter's prestige while creating internal friction. For this reason, Ankara is deliberately choosing the tactic of controlled pressure and leaks in order to create even more problems for the Greek government, which already seems willing to proceed with the extradition of the officers. Under these circumstances, an extradition decision (quite justified by international law) will be seen as yet another success for Turkey and a retreat for our country. Turkey's behavior in this episode also shows the tactics of constant pressure, controlled escalation, and projection of power that Ankara will steadily continue to exercise at our expense.
In this light, the high-risk assessment that any significant internal destabilization of Turkey (civil conflicts, division, external isolation, involvement in regional conflicts and antagonisms, economic hardship, social crisis) is in the interests of Hellenism is probably not far from reality. The counterargument refers to the established Turkish policy of exporting internal problems (perhaps even flows) which is likely to lead to uncontrolled situations. However, when the revisionist, expansionist and aggressive policy of a state constitutes a continuation and structural element of its demographic, economic development and historical evolution, then it is rather dangerous to dwell on theories of "domestication", democratization and the prevalence of a good neighborly spirit. The basic Turkish strategy towards Hellenism is not going to present changes at a strategic level regardless of the government or regime for the next decade. On a tactical level, the challenges will remain unchanged and will fluctuate depending on the prevailing situation. In Ankara's quiver, vis-à-vis Greece (and Europe), the control of refugee and migration flows has recently been added.
The Turkish coup of July 15 is reminiscent of the last and failed attempt of the communist system in 1991 to overturn the changes brought about by Gorbachev's policy in the USSR. Relatively similar conditions to those in Turkey led to the failure of the coup and the emergence of Yeltsin as the new strongman of Russia, and this is probably where any similarities between the two periods end. Kemalism in Turkey, after approximately 75 years of dominance, seems to have completed its course and is in decline. It would be unfair to judge that it failed to achieve its goals. Kemalism completed the country's national identity, created important structures and, when it finally exhausted its potential, retreated before the momentum of the deeply rooted Islamic ideology. His "resurrection" is no longer possible, but his legacy will remain alive and will constitute a barrier to any attempt to prevail extreme Islamic tactics in Turkey. Once again, Turkey is in a period of "transition" without however giving up its role as a regional power. Let us therefore not harbor illusions on the other side of the Aegean and let us not expect from third parties or unproven international theories the solution to the problems we face with our neighboring country.