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After the July coup, the neighboring country, burdened by dozens of problems, significantly limited its pre-planned and declarative actions in the Aegean. The abstention was of course temporary, while the gradual reappearance of Turkish aircraft and surface ships was accompanied by high-level statements questioning the conditions and indirectly the existing - for about 100 years - status quo. The continuation of the provocations was triggered by the decision of the Supreme Court of Greece not to extradite Turkish officers who requested political asylum, while the 21st anniversary of the events of the Imia crisis gave the opportunity to the highest Turkish military leadership to star in a low-quality television show. In recent days, we have been experiencing high numbers of violations, violations with the "forgotten" entanglements coming back to the fore. Although, quite rightly, the Greek political leadership, with the support of the media, maintains the problem in its true dimensions, the Greek citizen is rightly wondering about Ankara's intentions.

In fact, the general instability in the Middle East region, the wait-and-see attitude of all states in the face of the Trump "phenomenon" and the weakening of Europe raise concerns about the possible creation of conditions that will allow another adventurous move by Ankara. The question is often repeated whether a responsible high-ranking American official will find himself picking up the phone (in the evening hours when Europe is sleeping) and posing terrible dilemmas to the leaders in Athens and Ankara, preserving peace in the region at the expense of the less determined and more terrified. However, even those who are not worried about "hot" episodes are terrified by the idea of ​​a recurrence of uncontrolled refugee flows. Others, again, see in the growing tension in the Aegean, another (last) opportunity to resolve the Cyprus problem sinking. And the professional doomsayers and defeatists cite numbers, data and trends and recommend anything from moderation to an honest compromise to avoid the greater "evil".

All the above thoughts, concerns and phobic syndromes constitute the Turkish targeting of Hellenism. Ankara, with obvious traces of a general disorientation, internal problems and external ambivalence, is experiencing the nightmare of Sevres very intensely. I am not claiming that Turkey is collapsing today, simply trapped in contradictory choices, it has alone opened the “Aeolus’ pockets” by releasing forces that it can no longer control. In this situation, resorting to all kinds of psychological operations, both domestically and internationally, is a relatively harmless, low-cost and tried-and-tested method. If we consider that this attitude has worked for Ankara in the past, we understand its predisposition to resort to “old tricks”.

Understanding this reality does not mean complacency, nor is it an antidote to the power shift in favor of Ankara that has been taking place gradually at all levels in recent years. Nor does it rule out the accidental provocation of a heated episode in the Aegean. Simply, my assessment is that Turkey, in a very difficult position, does not intend to add another “open wound” to the deadlocked problems it faces. It is much more constructive for it to maintain a threatening situation, to register its claims, to rally its population, hoping for the economic or psychological collapse of its most feared opponent (Greece).

Because in a similar fluid situation, a low-intensity heated episode is always possible, the Greek side must be prepared and determined for a positive outcome, not hesitating to partially escalate the response, with the required speed, limiting the opponent's reaction options, maintaining the initiative but also the potential and inevitable risk. The outcome of a low-intensity conflict in the Aegean is necessary today to find us with a positive outcome and perhaps we should revise our general strategy from avoidance at all costs to our marginal dominance even in points (I am always talking about a more or less random isolated incident). Let us finally understand that beyond the cold numbers, the dynamics are not on Ankara's side today and the threatening neighbor is causing relative (temporary) weakness and despair by position. Of course, I understand the often-mentioned risk of being led, on the occasion of a heated episode, into painful negotiations of unknown outcome, but this "weapon" will always be in Ankara's hands.