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The goals of the Turkish exercise "Blue Homeland" that has just begun are multiple. In addition to operational ones, they selectively send messages against Cyprus and Greece - in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean - projecting Turkey as the puppet of the region, with strategic ambitions beyond that.
Of course, it would be ridiculous for Ankara, by using such a volume of aeronautical and other military forces in the "Blue Homeland" exercise - as is rumored - to seek only to scare the small Republic of Cyprus and its plans in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The proportions and sizes, especially in the air and sea, are known, as is the Turkish military superiority.

On the other hand, the truly sensitive point of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey is Cyprus, due to geographical data. Despite this and although such Turkish actions put the Greek Armed Forces on alert, they do not terrorize Athens either in the Aegean or in the wider Greek-Turkish area. The comparison here is not so good for Turkey, while in some areas in the Navy and Air Force it is at a disadvantage compared to Greece. It knows that the outcome of a conflict is unpredictable and the price enormous.
In addition, the “Blue Homeland” exercise includes the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Ankara diligently avoids references that would be considered a direct provocation or threat by other countries in the region. This is despite the fact that – regardless of their recent relatively good relations – Turkey’s permanent geopolitical rival in the region is the powerful Russia, whose threatening breath in the Black Sea is felt closer after the Russian occupation of Crimea and the strengthening of its fleet there.
Also in the Eastern Mediterranean, apart from its skirmishes with Cyprus, Turkey cannot do the same with other regional powers such as Egypt and Israel. Despite President Tayyip Erdogan’s antipathy towards the two countries, Ankara does not have such vital national differences with them – apart from indirect frictions on EEZ issues – nor does it possess the military capabilities that would make any threats against them credible and serious.
Of course, the main purpose of the exercise is to train the Three Arms in combined operations. It is a test of the Command and Control systems, the training and coordination of these forces, which, after the purges of cadres by Erdogan in 2016, experienced serious organizational and operational gaps.
At the same time, one should not underestimate Turkey's interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, where it is expected to become increasingly assertive over maritime resources, especially the Cypriot EEZ. Nor should it underestimate its ambitions to play a dominant role in the region, but also to exert influence beyond it. The base in Qatar and Somalia are indicative of Turkey's intentions and ambitions.
With the "concept" of "blue homeland", Turkey conveys the importance it attaches to the sea as an integral part of its territory and interests. This is underlined both by the "Blue Homeland" exercise and by the military planning, armaments programs, the military industry and shipbuilding that have been developed with state assistance to make his country much stronger and self-sufficient in defense, according to the Turkish President.
Particularly in the Navy, Turkey has devoted itself to the production of corvettes and submarines, and in April 2021 it is expected to build its first light aircraft carrier, creating conditions not only for further strengthening its naval superiority, but also its claims and its ability to project power beyond the region.
Greece does not have the luxury of remaining a spectator to these developments nor of allowing the balances to be upset, especially in the Greek-Turkish area, because it will risk being forced into national concessions and compromises. Athens should place particular emphasis not so much on quantitative reinforcement as on the technological upgrade of its forces, gaining a comparative advantage in this crucial area over the other side.
Cyprus has wrongly allowed its defense sector to decline to unacceptable levels. As we have repeatedly emphasized, in addition to efforts to secure international support and seek a solution to the Cyprus problem, a strong defense, albeit small but effective, combined with a much stronger Greece militarily, constitute a seriously calculable deterrent factor in protecting the Republic and enhancing its prospects for survival.
25/2/2019

*Aristos Aristotelous, Dr., Former Member of Parliament, Expert in Defense and Strategy Issues