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1. We want to strengthen ourselves in the geopolitical area of ​​interest (Aegean and Southeastern Mediterranean),
2. We want to protect our homeland,
3. We want to work with partners and allies across the region of interest to prevent war.

These issues, combined with rigorous research, analysis and debate, lead to a comprehensive national strategy that needs to be designed to meet the expectations and needs of the peoples of Hellenism. In this context, we try with our analysis to contribute to this debate.
What we have seen in the last month in Cyprus and the Aegean can give us, in a nutshell, four basic truths.
First, the private interests of companies cannot by themselves secure the national interest of Greece and Cyprus. ENI is Italian, Total is French, Exxon is American. Spectrum is a UK company that has conducted geophysical surveys in the Lebanese part of the Levant basin in recent years, while the Russian company Novatek has proceeded to submit bids for the exercise of rights in the same area. Very differently will these companies be able to be supported by their army. Therefore, the first and decisive element of power remains the army, hard power.

Second, economic interests do not solve territorial disputes. They are not catalysts as liberal models claim. Political solutions precede economic solutions. This erroneous reasoning has its roots in the resolution of the differences between France and Germany after World War II. But how did this happen? How did coal become the cause of union and not conflict? With US pressure, with the securing - in favor of France - of a nuclear advantage and with European states being ready to sign whatever the Americans bring in order to rebuild themselves economically and avoid satelliteization by the USSR.

Thirdly, the failure to create a coherent definition that will be friendly to the truth, for Turkish foreign policy. The myths are dispelled. There is no difference between Kemalist Turkey and Islamic Turkey regarding Turkish perceptions towards Hellenism. Turkey will continue to have expansionist aspirations towards Greece and Cyprus. Therefore, we must stop dealing with the interior of Turkey as the first factor in studying Greek politics in Greek-Turkish. The failure of all appeasing practices (the connection of Greek-Turkish relations with the EU during the Simitis era was also an appeasing practice) leads us to the conclusion. We have tried everything except one: The gradual creation of a deterrent reputation towards Turkey. In other words, the strengthening of our hard power which will prevent Turkey from exercising its bluffing game in the Aegean and Cyprus. And the Cypriots, finally, must acquire reliable aeronautical units. It is impossible, even if the Mediterranean were a swan lake, not to have control units. In a short time, if all goes well with the drilling, Cyprus will be at a disadvantage due to the security problem.

Fourth, Turkey's panic and its impasses against Greece and Cyprus did not come from any EU support for Hellenism. They came because Greece did the right thing and regionalized the Greek-Turkish (and Cyprus) and developed strong ties with Israel and Egypt. That is, with countries that have the ability to project hard power.

Given the increased likelihood of conflict over the region’s energy resources, it is no coincidence that military cooperation agreements are being developed that include a “comprehensive framework for coordination” with the Armed Forces of Israel and Egypt, which includes joint military exercises and the use of Greek and Cypriot ports and airports. These agreements also include the exchange of information on defense resources and the strengthening of international security capabilities. We also know that they provide for the activation of anti-terrorism cooperation, the improvement of joint cooperation in the areas of training of the military personnel involved, military exercises and the building of armed forces with the exchange of know-how in the field of information technology, establishing mechanisms for cooperation between the military forces of our countries. In short, these are important partnerships that cannot, however, by themselves ensure reliable and strong deterrence.

If there were to be conflicts between Turkey and Hellenism, it would not be a war for the simple control of potential sources of oil or natural gas in the waters of the Mediterranean. The real goal would be Greek sovereignty which, while guaranteed by the International Law of the Sea, is strongly contested by the Turks.

Whether the United States can hold back Turkish forces from an all-out war is not yet clear. The decisions to move forward with military cooperation agreements with Israel and Egypt, while leading energy companies have won the right to exhaust oil and gas in the EEZs of Greece, are not decisions for direct military involvement by the companies’ countries. However, this is a calculated chess move in one of the most confusing regions of the world, and for the good of humanity it is necessary that we ultimately manage to limit the need for war.
Never before have the air-naval forces of Greece and Cyprus had the appropriate opportunity together to create a unified maritime strategy. This Naval Strategy that will emphasize the approach of the single defense space which will integrate Seapower with all other elements of national power, as well as those of our friends and allies, in the Aegean and Mediterranean region. These circumstances give the direction that Seapower must be applied throughout our geopolitical field of interests for the protection of the two states, and one nation. Our commitment to the protection of the homeland and the victory of our nation in possible wars is combined with a corresponding commitment to the prevention of war, or better, the deterrence of the enemy. If we wish in the future to have a critical regional role in the eastern Mediterranean region and the Balkan Peninsula, if we wish to become an energy hub (and/or producer), then it is necessary to strengthen the hard power of our country.
Security and economic development have a dialectical relationship and in Greece, due to obsessions, we have separated them. Economic development, prosperity and stability have a cost and are claimed daily. Hard power forms the appropriate framework for deterrence, raising the cost of the challenges of each actor who wishes to proceed with the intrusion of our interests.
A strategic alliance for Seapower that binds our services more closely than ever before to advance the prosperity and security of our nation. In closing, we believe that credible and robust deterrence is as important as winning the war.

*Mr. Dimitrios N. Tsailas is a Rear Admiral (retd.) of the Hellenic Navy.
** Mr. Alexandros Drivas is “TORENE-IDIS Coordinator, member of the ELISME Maritime Strategy Group”