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SATELLITES: SECURITY-AVAILABILITY. SYSTEMS OF GREECE, TURKEY Lieutenant General (retd) Kalfas Panagiotis,

SATELLITES:

SECURITY-AVAILABILITY. SYSTEMS OF GREECE, TURKEY

 

Lieutenant General (retd) Kalfas Panagiotis,

Honorary Director of the Fifth Branch of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff

 

 

Brief Historical Review

           

            On October 4, 1957, the first artificial satellite, the Soviet Sputnik 1 (Спутник-1), was launched. It was humanity's first decisive step in space exploration. Its official name was Artificial Earth Satellite or ISZ in Russian. It had two 1-watt transmitters and a cryptographic system for transmitting signals at frequencies of 20 and 40 MHz. Its transmitters operated on batteries for three weeks. During its three-month flight, it constantly lost altitude due to friction. On January 3, 1958, it burned up during its entry into the atmosphere.

            October 4, 1957 was the beginning of the space age but also the beginning of the competition in space between the then superpowers, the USA and the USSR. The success of Sputnik resulted in the Americans accelerating their efforts to launch their own satellite. Thus, on February 1, 1958, NASA launched the first US satellite "Explorer-1". It had two transceivers at 108.03 MHz and 108.00 MHz while 40% of its weight consisted of batteries.

 

General information

           

            The orbit of a satellite is characterized by its shape, altitude, and angle with the plane of the equator. Satellite manufacturers choose the characteristics of their orbits depending on their mission. Usually, orbits are circular, but there are also satellites that move in elliptical orbits. Different values ​​of the orbital altitude vary the period of the satellite and the extent of the Earth's surface that is visible from it at any given moment. The height of the satellite's orbit also plays a special role in their operation. The power, for example, that a satellite's transmitter must have depends directly on the distance that the electromagnetic waves must cover.

            Each satellite uses a frequency range (band) to transmit, while its transponders use specific frequencies. The higher this frequency, the more easily certain small objects, such as raindrops, block or interrupt communication. The frequency ranges are chosen depending on the mission and the type of satellite.

            Changes in Earth's gravity, the tilt of gravity relative to the satellite, solar radiation, solar flares, meteor bombardment, magnetic field forces, and the gravitational pull of the sun and moon tend to change the position and orientation of a satellite relative to the Earth. This variation is maintained within certain limits by radio control from Earth.

            Satellites, depending on their usefulness, can be classified into categories such as: telecommunications, aviation-navigation, positioning, meteorological, scientific and astronomical observations, geophysical studies and detection of wealth-producing sources, environmental pollution control, support for cadastral registration, search and rescue, early warning, support for archaeological research. Military satellites are of every category such as, for example, communication, positioning, observation, information collection, support for operational planning, etc.).  

 

Security – Availability

 

            The lifespan of a satellite system depends on the orbit (altitude and type), the equipment, the reliability of the materials, the software problems and the risks faced. These risks come from collisions with objects in space (meteorites, space debris, etc.), loss or overconsumption of control fuels, problems in the electrical supply (batteries, solar cells, etc.), failure of materials and from deliberate actions by rival or unfriendly states, mainly in times of tension and war. Such actions are, Electronic Warfare against the communications and control signals of the satellite with the aim of prohibiting their use and their physical destruction with the use of Laser beams, missile systems, etc. These actions can be directed from Earth or from space.  

            The efforts of states, etc., that have satellite systems, are focused on the safe and uninterrupted operation of these and the satellite services provided (communications, images, etc.).

            Despite the UN International Conventions on the return (1963) and registration (1972) of objects launched into space, the degree of contamination of space with useless objects (so-called space debris) is high and constitutes one of the most serious problems of space missions.

            On January 11, 2007, the Chinese fitted an anti-satellite weapon to the warhead of a medium-range ballistic missile and used kinetic energy to destroy their own satellite, Fengyun-1C. The satellite, launched on May 10, 1999, was a meteorological satellite and was in orbit 860 km above the earth. This action by China sparked reactions in the international community, because it created thousands of fragments, which remained in orbit and could endanger space missions and satellites. It marked the beginning of a new space competition with economic and geopolitical implications. About 1.000 small objects measuring 10 cm have been recorded, which have created a cloud from 200 to 3.800 km, which moves in a low orbit with an average height of 860 km. This cloud makes low-orbit space flights dangerous and endangers the International Space Station.

            Almost a year later, in March 2008, the US Navy destroyed one of its own spy satellites, the L-3, with a modified SM21 ballistic missile, designed to intercept missiles. It weighed two and a half tons, was the size of a small bus, and was filled with fuel (hydrazine). The satellite failed almost immediately after it was put into orbit in 2006. The missile was launched from an Aegis destroyer in the North Pacific and struck the satellite as it entered the atmosphere at an altitude of 240 km. The operation, despite denials from Pentagon officials, is in fact a demonstration of a satellite destruction system and a message to China and beyond. It is estimated that the Pentagon found or may even have created pretexts for testing weapons that destroy satellites. The US action did not create any fragments since the satellite was neutralized shortly before it entered the atmosphere, resulting in most of it burning up upon re-entry, a few days after the operation.

            Russia, China and the rest of the international community expressed their concerns after the US demonstrated this technology in shooting down satellites.

            On the other hand, the US Air Force, in the context of addressing international challenges in the space sector, has achieved an increase in spending on the financing of the Space Surveillance System (Space Situational Awareness – SSA). It is being prepared so that future satellites will not only be able to detect deliberate attacks but also provide information on who launched the attack. Bids from two companies for the SASSA (Self Aware Space Situation Awareness) system are already being considered. A construction contract is expected to be awarded in October 2008. Its value will be in the region of 30 million US dollars and it is estimated to be ready in 2010-2011. At present, this system does not include offensive means, or at least this is being leaked. It will only have defensive features, such as cameras to record the point from which the attack is being launched, laser beam detectors, electromagnetic interference detectors, object proximity detectors and near-space environment recorders. Of course, the placement of some or all of the detectors on a satellite depends on its type, its mission and the threats it may face. All these detectors and even more exist, all that remains is their construction with reduced weight. The SBIRS (Space Based Infrared System) program began in 2002 and after delays and revisions, the placement of the first two of the five satellites in geosynchronous orbit is expected around the end of 2009. SBIRS will replace the satellite missile warning system DSP (Defense Support System) and for greater accuracy, the placement of detectors on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is being studied.

            The US Air Force has also allocated $1,4 billion to improve the GPS III satellite navigation and positioning system. (Global Positioning System). The new improved system, among other upgrades, will cooperate with the corresponding European Union GALILEO system and will have high protection against enemy interference. The first satellite is expected to be put into orbit in 2014.

            Lockheed Martin is conducting final tests for the AEHF (Advanced Extremely High Frequency) satellite system of four geosynchronous satellites for the needs of the United States. The first satellite will be put into orbit in 2009, while the second and third in 2010 and later the fourth. The satellites will be high-capacity communications satellites, will allow very high speeds per user and will have extremely high protection against enemy interference. In addition, the system will allow data transfer between satellites, thus reducing the need for ground stations.

            In a parallel development, China is investing in a Space Monitoring Program codenamed “Meridian.” This program includes the installation of a series of ground-based space monitoring stations, utilizing modern technology.

            The United Kingdom (UK) has installed ground stations at its bases in Cyprus to monitor and record the movements of satellites and other objects in space (such as space debris). Cyprus was chosen because, due to its location, it provides excellent observation conditions. The UK Ministry of Defence and the British National Satellite Centre (BNSC) are collaborating on the programme.

            The very large development observed in non-military satellite systems has led many armies, and of course the US, to widespread use of the services provided by civil satellite systems, mainly for communications and observation purposes. They are often the most immediate (in terms of time) solution but also the most economical. To the question of how much these services should be used, the answer is relative, but for countries like Greece, which currently does not have its own technology and know-how, the use of these services is more economical but possibly also the safest solution. Safer because a potential attack against Greek interests would also be directed against the interests of other states and multinational users of satellite services. The availability of the services provided is of great importance and an obligation of the state or entity in possession of the satellite system, while the issue of security must be a concern of the end user through cryptographic systems.  

 

 

  Satellite Systems of the Hellenic Armed Forces (HAF)

 

            Our country's Armed Forces exploit satellite communications by using HELLAS SAT and other commercial satellite systems (INMARSAT/EUTELSAT etc.). Among other things, the needs of our missions abroad, island units, Special Forces, warships, RADAR stations, etc. are covered. In the field of Earth observation, our country participates with a percentage of 2,5% of the total expenditure in the Helios II satellite program. France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain also have access to Helios II. The first satellite of the program, "Helios IA", was placed in orbit in 1995, at an altitude of 680 kilometers, and in December 1999, Helios IB. The development of the second phase "Helios II" with two satellites follows. The first, Helios IIA, was built by EADS-Astrium, carries cameras from Alcatel Space and was launched on an Ariane 5 rocket in December 2004 from the base in French Guiana. It weighs 4,2 tons and was placed in a low orbit at 700 kilometers. It has advanced camera technology, which allows it to take images both during the day and at night and under any weather conditions. The second satellite, Helios IIB, is due to be launched in 2009. Helios IIA has the capacity to take 200-400 images per day with a resolution of approximately 40 centimeters. This capacity is double that of the Helios I satellites. Helios II cooperates with the SPOT satellite observation system of France.

 

Satellite Systems of the Turkish Armed Forces   

 

            In January 1994, the first attempt to launch a Turkish satellite, TURKSAT-1A, was unsuccessful.  

            On 11 August 1994 and 9 July 1996, the satellites TURKSAT-1B and TURKSAT-1C were successfully launched respectively. They are operated by the Turkish Telecommunications Organization. They cover Europe, Turkey and Central Asia. TURKSAT-1B carries 16 transponders in the Ku-band, is located at 31° East and its life limit expired in 2004, but after upgrading its flight data, it was extended for 3 years, which finally expired in 2007. TURKSAT-1C, is located at 42° East and its life limit expires in 2009. It provides better coverage than TURKSAT-1B in the same areas. It also has 16 transponders in the Ku-band. It is used for radio and television broadcasts and telecommunications.

            In the early 1990s, Turkey began contacts with the US, France and Israel to build a spy satellite for the needs of its Armed Forces.

            In 1999, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and the UK-based SURREY SATELITE TECHNOLOGY (SSTL) signed a contract for the construction of a low-orbit remote sensing microsatellite, named BILSAT-1. The aim of the program was to acquire know-how from Turkish engineers.

            In November 2000, an agreement was signed between the Turkish company Inta Space Systems and the American Space Imaging (SI), according to which the former becomes a member of the SI group, under the name SI Eurasia (SIEA). SIEA has a ground station, fully activated since December 2002 in Ankara, with the ability to receive IKONOS satellite images, from a wide area that includes parts of Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The IKONOS satellite, owned by SI, was launched on September 24, 1999 with the ability to receive color images with a resolution of 1 meter. SIEA has the right to process and sell the satellite images.

            In January 2001, TURKSAT-2A was launched, with a life limit in 2016. Its position is 42° East, the same as TURKSAT-1C, which it will probably replace. The satellite in question, also known as EURASIASAT-1, belongs to the EURASIASAT company (75% TURK TELECOM and 25% ALCATEL). It has two fixed beams covering the regions of Europe, the Middle East, Turkey, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf and two directional ones with the ability to cover, depending on the needs, regions such as India, China and South Africa. It carries 32 transponders in the Ku frequency range (transmission in the 11,7-12,2 and 12,5-12,75 GHz ranges and reception in the 17,3-17,8 and 13,75-14 GHz ranges), of which 12 have redirection capability. It is used for radio and television broadcasts and telecommunications. Two transponders have been allocated for the exclusive use of the telecommunications of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).

            In September 2002, Turkey established the Turkish Space Foundation (TUK), with the aim of coordinating and controlling all civil and military space activities.

            In the Turkish Armed Forces, there is a satellite telecommunications system in Ku-band, which is based on the TURKSAT satellites and is in development similar to the X-band. Also, the DMIP (Defense Mediterranean Improvement Program) program is underway, which concerns the modernization of military communications within the country, but also the connection with the outside world, through the INTELSAT satellites. 

            Turkey's efforts since 1999 to send a spy satellite were suspended due to the 2001 financial crisis. It returned in 2005 with a revised program and in 2008 announced an international tender. The Italian Telespazio, the German OHB and the UK-based EADS-Astrium declared an expression of interest. The satellite will be high-definition and low-orbit, weighing 100 to 200 kg, will carry various subsystems for similar missions. Two of them (a high-definition imaging system and a communication system in S-Band/X-Band) are being developed in Turkey. The program is budgeted from 250 to 300 million dollars.

 

 

Conclusions

 

            Space technology, infrastructure and services provide essential support for the Defense and Security of states and constitute a force multiplier. Earth observation satellites enable timely information, so that the response to crises and natural disasters is immediate and effective.

            Satellite services are characterized by fast transmission speed, security, reliability, quality, flexibility, serving a large number of requirements and a variety of transmission formats. On the other hand, they are high cost and require specialized personnel and modern technology, while their viability is now in question.

            After the two incidents of satellite attacks by China and the USA, it is now considered that the space war has begun. The pursuit of superiority and dominance in space remains everyone's goal. The effort to equip satellites with defensive and (covertly) offensive weapons systems is in full swing.

            Turkey has a particularly extensive space program and is making great efforts to develop space technology, which will allow it to create infrastructure so that it can become self-sufficient in the space sector.

            The involvement of the Greek Armed Forces with the Space Strategy must be immediate, ongoing and given relative priority with appropriate briefing of executives.

            Greece must increase its satellite capabilities in order to contribute to the further development and improvement of certain sectors, such as search and rescue, precision-guided munitions, strategic intelligence collection, strategic-level early warning, theater surveillance and reconnaissance, etc.

            Furthermore, given that the risk of complete disruption of the satellite services provided (communications, observation, navigation, etc.) by deliberate actions of our adversaries or allies and friendly countries adjacent to them is visible, it must collaborate with various states, the EU and international private entities, in order to achieve a plurality of satellite services from various entities, thus minimizing the possibility of their complete disruption. The principle of "multiplicity of means" is anything but up-to-date.

 

 

 

Bibliography

www.bilten.metu.edu.tr

www.tubicat.cog.tr

www.ssm.gov.tr

www.turksat.com.tr

www.helios.fr

www.defensenews.com

jtw.janes.com

www.afcea.org

www.hellas-sat.gr

www.fas.org/spp/military

www.decodesystems.com

www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/gps