8th INFORMATION SEMINAR
1st ARMY – A.T.A.
NOVEMBER 11-13, 2008

"DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE WIDER REGION – MINORITIES AS A CAUSE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN COUNTRIES – MINORITY PROBLEMS IN GREECE AND POSSIBLE IMPACTS ON THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY"

"CAUCASUS – CENTRAL ASIA – AFGHANISTAN"

Under Vice Admiral (retd) V. Martzoukos, H.N.

1. MODERN SHAPING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

It is a fact that the period that followed the fall of the bipolar system and which is still taking shape, provided optimistic indications of the creation of a more stable international system, with multiple opportunities for most states. The main driver of this optimism was globalization (communications, technology, interdependence, international trade and investment, strengthening and growth of international organizations and regimes, reduction of national power politics, cross-border activity of multinational enterprises, joint tackling of transnational problems, spread of Democracy, individual freedoms and independence, etc.), the required security and functioning of the rules of which would be regulated without obstacles by the USA as the sole superpower. In recent years, however, optimism has gradually been replaced by pessimism, and not without reason. According to the previous analysis, the following data emerge which lead to instability of the international system:

1. The continuous drastic increase in demand for fossil fuels by the major and emerging powers (vital for their economic development), combined with the reduction of global reserves of these fuels, significantly intensifies the already existing competition between them. Alternative forms of energy do not appear to be able to replace the shortage of fossil fuels in a timely and adequate manner.
2. The existing inequality in the international distribution of wealth is widening.
3. The world's population is growing significantly and unevenly (the increase is taking place in underdeveloped or developing areas), and this fact is combined with the reduction of available natural resources. The current intense wave of migration is not expected to stop but may increase.
4. Natural disasters are intensifying (due to adverse climate changes to which the human factor contributes significantly).
5. There is no supranational international institution capable of solving national problems.
6. The main poles of power in the international system are intensifying their extremely costly armament programs, and the number of countries (not necessarily behaving rationally) that possess weapons of mass destruction is increasing.
7. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can also supply these weapons to non-state groups (e.g. terrorist groups).
8. Developing military technology, weapons and weapons systems favor attack.
9. The American unipolar (or hegemonic) system is weakening (starting from the economic sector) and is gradually transforming into a multipolar one.
10. The global economy is going through a crisis with an uncertain future.
11. Military conflicts (interstate, terrorist, intrastate, guerrilla, religious, nationalist) continue in a multitude of geographical areas.

The above factors of instability are important, coexist and lead to competition and future conflicts. Given, however, the deterrent destructiveness of weapons of mass destruction, international economic interdependence and the relative impact of globalization, the question is the final form that the structure of the international system will take and whether a final conflict between great powers is possible. 

The four dominant geopolitical scenarios shaping the structure of the international system are the following:

1. Multipolar world order, centered on a small number of competing states.
2. Monopolistic world order based on strong political, military, technological, ideological and cultural American hegemony.
3. Division of the world into cultural groups in conflict with each other.
4. New international order with main players being political-economic coalitions, distributed geographically.

The scenario of the clash of civilizations (the main representative of which is Samuel Huntington) is estimated to have a low probability of realization, since in practice divisions, differences and conflicts are observed within these same cultural groups, which proves that the national interests of the states prevail over the interests of the cultural group, and furthermore, nothing proves that the interdependence between cultural groups tends to disappear. Similarly, the scenario of geographical political-economic coalitions (a multipolar system with reduced national sovereignty) does not appear feasible, since the only European experiment in the world has not yet convinced of its political and military cohesion (despite the fact that it includes similar cultural states), while the division of the world into such distinct coalitions is considered difficult.

The scenario of the continuation of a unipolar system with dominance and unilateral action by the USA, based on the data of the previous analysis, does not seem likely, if the current trends are extended into the coming years. The maintenance of coercive hegemony by the USA by hindering potential opponents (e.g. preventive war) does not seem rational, while the weakening of them (e.g. divide and conquer), is judged to have partial results and will not succeed in stopping the emerging developments. Finally, it is judged that the fundamental rules for creating a system of a Loose Bipolar Model (Const. Art. 194-196) are not met. According to all indications, the new structure of the international system under formation is evolving into a multipolar one, with the main poles of power being the USA, China, Russia, Europe, Japan and India, with relations of competition and balance of power between them. Within the framework of this system, there is a risk of foreseeing the creation of a coalition under the leadership of the USA, consisting of democratic and mainly naval powers (e.g. Europe, Japan, India, Australia, etc.), which will attempt to contain China and possibly Russia (in this case, a problem for Europe will be its energy dependence on Russia), especially if the latter, despite existing differences, approaches China more closely (e.g. if it prioritizes meeting Chinese energy needs and cooperates more closely with it through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). This deterrence can be implemented by combining and coordinating the actions of NATO (in western Eurasia) and a corresponding alliance in eastern Eurasia, with the common denominator of the USA and the connecting link of central and southern Asia. Elements that support this specific prediction are the fact that mutual nuclear deterrence is considered strong enough to prevent a military conflict between great powers (deterrence is indicated), if there is no Western interventionist strategy, the extension of current trends will lead China, at a minimum, to challenge the primacy of the USA (the USA considers it its vital interest to prevent the emergence of a competitor challenging its primacy), the large-scale unilateral action of the USA against a major competitor in a multipolar system is not considered feasible, the Euro-Atlantic relationship will remain strong despite existing problems, Japan and other countries in East and South Asia consider themselves threatened by China, favor American primacy, common Western democratic values ​​create tendencies of solidarity (and are taken into account when determining National Interests) and furthermore, Anglo-Saxon geopolitical theories (Mackinder, Spykman) are still valid and appreciated.

2. GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

The independence of the weak and unstable states of Central Asia, after the collapse of the USSR, changed the geopolitical data, as it created a political vacuum, which since then several external, competing powers have been trying to fill. In addition, cross-border national, religious, economic and trade historical ties have revived, increasing interactions between the states of the region. The issue of Afghanistan has an impact on all the states of the region, from a security perspective. Overall, security ties are developing between South Asia, China and Central Asia, the character of which is expected to influence international politics both in Asia and worldwide.

3. BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW.

Cold War.

After World War II, the bipolar structure of the international system overshadowed the local complex security parameters (small degree of freedom of autonomous movements, based on the NPT). Local security parameters are based on the existence of local groups of states whose security is linked (positively or negatively) to that of the rest. During the period of the Second World War, however, the dynamics of local security parameters were largely absorbed by the politics at a higher level, of the two poles of the international system.

By the end of the 1940s, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey played a key role in the American effort to contain the USSR, through their participation in the Baghdad Pact, which was later renamed the “Central Treaty Organization” (CENTO). During the 1950s, Afghanistan fell into the Soviet sphere of influence, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, while Iran, China and Turkey had no direct or indirect relations with the Central Asian states. The traditional trade routes, the most important of which was the so-called “Silk Road”, were interrupted. Historically and to this day, Central Asia’s main access to the sea was through Pakistan, but after its accession to the USSR and the abolition of internal borders in 1936, the region was linked to Moscow's economic planning. Thus, Afghanistan, being in the Soviet orbit, had conflicting relations with Pakistan, which, along with Iran, were critical allies of the United States.

In the 1970s, the situation changed. The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 deprived the United States of a valuable ally and weakened Washington's position in Asia and the Middle East, despite the fact that the new Iranian regime maintained cool relations with Moscow. In the mid-1970s, Afghanistan became unstable, provoking the Soviet intervention in 1979 and a subsequent war in which the United States and Pakistan actively supported the anti-Soviet Mujahideen. From this point on, subsequent events did not faithfully follow the policy of global bipolarity.

After the Indo-Soviet War of 1962, Indo-Soviet convergence of interests and military cooperation developed. During the 1980s, Pakistan had replaced Iran as the main ally of the United States in the region, receiving significant economic and military assistance from the latter in order to check Soviet expansion in Asia. Pakistan developed close cooperation with Beijing, mainly due to the common hostility towards India but also to the cold relations between the USSR and China (implementation of the Karakoram Highway that economically connected the two states). During the same 1980s, Pakistan's close cooperation with the Mujahideen during the war in Afghanistan created communication and transport routes between the two states. Given Afghanistan's Soviet-designed infrastructure, which connected it to the former Soviet republics, Pakistan was, in 1991, a serious candidate for the exit of the Central Asian states to the world market, a fact that did not materialize due to the instability in Afghanistan.

After Independence.

After the independence of the Central Asian states in 1991, there was a parallel effort by Turkey and Iran to exert influence in this region. This influence, among other things, took the form of conflicting models of governance and development. Iran offered the Islamic model, while Turkey presented a Western model of a secular democratic nation-state with a liberal economy. Of course, the U.S. promoted the Turkish model, fearing Iranian influence, while for the same reason Israel moved to create strong ties with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Ultimately, the result proved that neither Turkey nor Iran had the ability to exert dominant influence in Central Asia. Turkey was geographically distant from the region, had problems with the Kurdish language, internal political instability during the 1990s, high inflation and economic problems. Consequently, towards the end of the 1990s, Turkey remained involved in Central Asia mainly in the economic and cultural sector but at the same time adopted a policy oriented mainly towards the Caucasus which was more connected to its national security. Shiite Iran was ultimately unable to decisively influence Sunni Central Asia which, after all, had roots in the 70-year-old Soviet atheist regime. The revival of political or radical Islam in Central Asia was mainly due to economic mismanagement, as well as to existing human rights violations, including restrictions on the free exercise of religious duties. Moreover, the Soviet-based political power of the Central Asian countries considered political Islam a threat to its power, while several of these leaders (e.g. Karimov in Uzbekistan, Niyazov in Turkmenistan) had conducted anti-Islamic campaigns in the past. Finally, Iran also turned to the unstable Caucasus, as the strong Azerbaijani minority on its northern border (about 20.000.000) forced it to align itself with Moscow on issues in this region. Especially during the period 1992-1993, the nationalist and to a certain extent pan-Azerbaijani government of Azerbaijan, combined with the pro-American stance of this country, played an important role in Iranian policy in the Caucasus region. As for Turkey, the Russian presence in Armenia and the inexorable need for access to Azerbaijan, pushed Ankara to focus its efforts on the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan from Russia. In addition, for both Turkey and Azerbaijan there were other foreign policy priorities, vis-à-vis Central Asia. For Iran, the Persian Gulf was prominent, while Turkey's attention was mainly focused on its relationship with Europe, on local issues in the Middle East, as well as on the Balkans. 

4. CROSS-BORDER ETHNIC TIES

Ethnic heterogeneity is a main characteristic of the Central Asian states and their southern neighbors such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Central Asian states are multinational and have mutual national ties. Apart from Tajikistan, which has Persian national and cultural roots, the language of the remaining states is Turkic, while their geographical borders do not coincide with the ethnicities that inhabit them (e.g. S. Uzbekistan and N. Tajikistan). The same happens with their southern neighbors. For example, about half of the population of Afghanistan is Pashtun, however, more Pashtuns live in Pakistan. The Baloch live on the territory of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Moreover, more than a quarter of Afghanistan's population are Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen, who live in the northern regions of the country. In the autonomous Chinese province of Xinjiang, in the northwest of the country, there are about 10.000.000 Uyghurs, of Turkic origin, speaking a language close to Uzbek, in addition to Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.

Currently experiencing an era of nationalist upsurges, ethnicity in these regions poses a challenge to the security of these multinational states and they shape their policies accordingly. China has already faced separatist tendencies of the Uyghurs, while Pakistan's good relations with Afghanistan are linked, among other things, to the fear of separatist movements of the Pashtuns and Balochs. In recent years, the Afghan civil war has gradually taken on an ethnic character. The Taliban, beyond the religious mantle, are widely known as the Pashtun movement, while the other ethnicities, such as the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, are united under local tribal chiefs.

5. CENTRAL ASIA SECURITY AND AFGHANISTAN

In addition to the local and nationalist tensions of the Central Asian states, there are a number of other internal problems, such as the lack of full government control over the entire territory, crime and corruption, mismanagement, the lack of democratization and economic reforms. To these internal problems, two main external factors should be added. One concerns the production and promotion of fossil fuels on international markets, while the other is related to the challenge of radical Islam. Both of these factors are linked to Afghanistan.

The Central Asian states are landlocked and therefore access to the sea is mainly based on routes through Iran or through Afghanistan and Pakistan. The case of the passage of fossil fuel pipelines through Iran presents difficulties due to the measures currently in force against this country by the USA (superpower, American oil companies in the Caspian), (only Turkmenistan exports small quantities of natural gas to Iran). In addition, the importing countries, motivated by the geographical diversification of oil and natural gas sources, would not want Central Asian fuels to also end up in the Persian Gulf.

The large and ever-increasing demand for fossil fuels from the countries of SE Asia necessitates the existence of at least one pipeline to Asia, in addition to the pipelines from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In this context, the proposal of a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan (the most economically advantageous and shortest route for international markets) was examined. Security issues and long-term instability in Afghanistan prevented this construction.

Afghanistan holds a high priority in the security issues of the countries of Central Asia and for the fact of the spread of the current of political Islam through the Taliban (there is the predisposition, the infrastructure and the financing, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, based on the northern borders of Afghanistan, the support of the Chechens by the Taliban). The creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes the states of Central Asia, China and Russia, is related, among other things (terrorism, drugs, cross-border crime, illegal immigration, separatist military movements) and with this issue which is considered a threat. 

Pakistan's policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Pakistan's extensive involvement in Afghanistan has often been criticized by the West. However, Pakistani interest in developments in Afghanistan is linked both to its conflict with India and to Pakistan's historical connection to Central Asia and Afghanistan.

During the Cold War, Pakistan, acting as a bulwark against Soviet expansion, was particularly concerned about Moscow's close relations with both India and Afghanistan, a fact that could lead to a two-front war (lack of strategic depth, since the capital is 200 km from the border to the West and 100 to the East). For this reason, an Afghanistan with a friendly government and stability within it is a vital interest for Islamabad. This vital interest acquired an even higher priority after the Cold War, since American aid decreased and instability in Afghanistan increased, with the risk of spreading inside Pakistan or even disrupting the effort of Pakistani influence in Central Asia, but also of external forces appearing in the Central Asian region, under the pretext of normalizing the situation. The failure to build the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan fossil fuel pipeline is a tangible example of the effects of instability within Afghanistan.

In the early 1990s, Pakistan invested unsuccessfully in supporting various Mujahideen tribal chieftains, due to the conflict between them. The Taliban movement and the initial enthusiasm it garnered in central and southern Afghanistan as a unifying force that would restore law and order was dismissed by Pakistan as an opportunity worth supporting. However, this investment failed because the Taliban proved to be unreliable interlocutors, did not ensure law and order, but instead were particularly harsh on every other minority and trampled on human rights, especially against women, thus causing their international isolation. Therefore, Pakistan had to walk a tightrope between two opposing approaches. On the one hand, it had to convince the international community, and especially the worried states of the K. Asia, that the Taliban were not instruments of Pakistan but were pursuing an independent policy, on the other hand they should not continue contacts and exert influence over the Taliban, for three main reasons:

1. To achieve a normalization of Afghanistan's international isolation, in order to use it as a contact country with the states of Central Asia.
2. The Taliban's popular support should not be lost, which would lead to a new cycle of instability in this country.
3. To contribute to cultivating the international image of Afghanistan as a responsible country.

It is obvious that the restoration of peace and security in Afghanistan is considered essential for the security of the entire region. Central Asia attaches great importance to Pakistan, due to its economic potential, while for Islamabad economic cooperation with Central Asia is essential. In this context, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is a relevant example.

China and Central Asia.

China has a historical connection to Central Asia. The specificity of the Central Asian connection lies partly in the Muslim population in northwest China and the cross-border ethnic ties of the population of Xinjiang province. Sino-Soviet differences during the Cold War forced China to exert little influence in Central Asia.

Nowadays, things have changed significantly. The fact of the independence of the countries of Central Asia and the political vacuum caused by the fall of the USSR, is combined with the emergence of China as a global economic and political power with geopolitical ambitions in this region. In addition to the interest of Russia, India for the states of Central Asia, but even the neighboring states of this region, the current American presence and involvement for energy and geostrategic reasons, increases even more China's security concerns, on its sensitive northwestern borders, especially if the American plan foresees the containment of China. The created Shanghai Cooperation Organization, on the initiative of China, emphasizes its interest and concern for this region. Moreover, one of the major oil fields in Asia, the Tarim, is located in Xinjiang province. In addition, the long-term economic development of the NW regions of China is facilitated by extensive relations with the states of Central Asia. In addition to all this, Chinese foreign policy is at least equally or more interested in the E. and SE regions of the country and the Western side of the Pacific Ocean.

U.S. Policy in Central Asia.

Instability in Central Asia and its southern neighbors is a priority for the United States, due to the region's energy resources, local conflicts in the region that can potentially escalate into confrontations between major powers, terrorist movements that are usually anti-American in nature, and even drugs that are mass-produced and are mainly destined for Western societies. The United States has made it its vital interest to secure access to Central Asia's energy resources and the smooth flow of fossil fuels from the region to Western markets. To address these issues and ensure a balance of security, the United States should become actively involved in the region. However, the actions of this country since the 1990s and onwards present a confused picture of the strategy being followed. Although Washington has avoided unpleasant developments in the region, it has not had any major successes commensurate with its title of superpower. Certainly, the U.S. has contributed to the non-return of Russian hegemony, mainly in the Caucasus, by strengthening local countries, but the uncertainty regarding the degree of decisive American involvement has given rise to misinterpretations on the part of local powers. No one knows exactly how far Washington is willing to take the confrontation with Moscow in this region. In the 1990s, the U.S. sided with or even supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and terrorism prompted a change in American policy, without necessarily being linked to a broader and longer-term strategic plan. While the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed ally, should logically be a high priority for the United States, the recent US-Indian rapprochement is perceived by that country as an act directed against its security and intensifies existing internal problems, increasing anti-American sentiment and strengthening extremist Islam. Furthermore, Pakistan remains the only power that exercises relative influence over the Afghan Taliban, and therefore any relaxation of US-Pakistan relations affects the ability to influence developments in Afghanistan. The lack of a clear American strategy for the region has pushed one of the key regional powers, Uzbekistan, to develop new security relationships with Beijing and Moscow.

6. EURASIAN ENERGY RELATIONSHIPS AND EMERGING TRENDS.

The dominant geopolitical parameter of current and future international competition is estimated to be the energy security of the major countries of the international system.

Today, more than ever, American strategists believe that U.S. dominance in the global struggle for vital resources should be the highest priority of American military strategy, since according to their estimates, both China (gradual acquisition of the ability to project power) and Russia (control of energy transport routes, mainly to Europe) have placed the issue of energy at a high priority.25 Consequently, emphasis is placed on the global role of the U.S. Navy, with large expenditures for its qualitative upgrade (expenditures for warship construction amounted to $2007 billion in 2008 and 24,6, while $2009 billion have been proposed for 16.9), as well as on the redeployment of existing military forces and bases (e.g. military presence in North and Central Africa, the Caspian region and Central Asia, Eastern Europe). and SW Asia).26 Control of fossil fuel production sources as well as control of their transportation routes to the West is a vital interest of the USA, which makes influence in regions of Eurasia such as the Middle East, Central and Northeast Asia a high priority objective. Given that the USA considers China to be the most dangerous potential competitor, the basic strategy of this country (apart from unilateral action when necessary) is to exploit regional Eurasian rivalries (e.g. China – India, China – Japan, Russia – China, Russia – Japan, etc.) in order to promote its interests.

Central Asia (which could include the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) is the heart of Eurasia and is of particular interest to the great powers both because of its vast energy reserves and its strategic location. In this region, in addition to American, European, Indian, Japanese interest, as well as the interest of neighboring states (e.g. Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and even Ukraine), both China and Russia are trying to exert influence on the states of the region (economic, technical and military), at the expense of the U.S. (which is credited with a series of "velvet" and "colored" local revolutions), to control the flow of Caspian oil and natural gas to the markets of Europe (e.g. Georgia at the center of the dispute) and Asia. For the region in question, Russia aims, at a minimum, to prevent the dominance of any local power (e.g. Turkey, Iran) or to create a new American front on its borders, while at a maximum, it seeks its dominant influence over the states of the region in both their foreign and domestic policy.

European energy dependence on external sources is expected to increase from 50% in 2000 to 75% in 2020, while the share coming from Russia will increase from 27% in 2000 to 31% in 2010.39 The global energy market is a whole, on which Europe (and every other consumer) directly depends, its economic and social future. Consequently, within a highly competitive environment, the EU should acquire a unified energy policy and actively concern itself with stability in the Middle East (and in every potential hydrocarbon supply area), timely investments in these sectors, its internal infrastructure, as well as the security of energy resource transport. 

The Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline was a geostrategic Russian decision, based on its perception of the Turkish threat, following Turkey's role and initiatives in Chechnya, the Caucasus countries, the attempt to enter Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, the restrictions on the passage of oil tankers through the Bosphorus, as well as its role in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline. This pipeline, in combination with the Italy-Greece-Turkey and "South Stream" pipelines, increase the geostrategic role of our country and potentially create conditions for stability in the Evros region.

Today there is a significant strengthening of economic ties between Russia and Turkey, as well as the latter's energy dependence on the former, elements which also lead to political convergences which are further strengthened as these countries become isolated from the West. However, this convergence is limited by the aforementioned actions of Turkey, their energy competition (BTC and BTE pipelines), Russian nationalism and the anti-Islamic current, historical reasons, as well as the position of these countries on the Cyprus issue. This relationship between Russia and Turkey provides Today there is a significant strengthening of economic ties between Russia and opportunities for further cooperation between our country and Russia on systematic and realistic bases (without this contradicting the policy of our European partners, at least of the "old Europe").

The ongoing confrontation between the U.S. and Russia in the field of political influence and control of energy resources and their transportation in the Caucasus region has reached its peak during the recent events in Georgia. According to analysts, Russia’s actions in the region are aimed at political control of the Caucasus, at preventing the extension of the BTC pipeline to Central Asia (Kazakhstan), as well as at canceling the construction of the “Nabucco” pipeline which, connected to the BTE, will transport natural gas to Central Europe.

The above developments in the Caucasus and the revival of the Cold War climate between the U.S. and Russia, affect the particularly sensitive and critical region of the Middle East. This region is the focus of interest of all the main poles of the international system given the unique worldwide quantity of fossil fuel reserves and at the same time is a field of national, religious and terrorist local conflicts. Russia has already declared its intention to upgrade its naval presence in the Mediterranean in ports of Syria, and the President of the latter is trying to capitalize on the new situation by supplying modern Russian military equipment. Any isolation of Russia could lead to a hardening of its stance on a number of important issues for the West (veto in the UN Security Council, Iran's nuclear program, combating terrorism, energy, Hamas, Afghanistan, North Korea, etc.).

As fossil fuel consumption increases drastically (e.g. North America will consume 34 million barrels per day in 2020, compared to 23 million in 2000, while East Asia will consume 35 million barrels per day in 2020, compared to 21 million in 2000), reserves are decreasing and the discovery of new deposits is slowing down, an unprofitable increase in fuel prices and a stagnation of the economic development of dependent countries cannot be ruled out. In 2015, 70% of global demand will be imported, while 80% of traded oil (and 50% of traded gas) will come from just three regions, namely the Persian Gulf, West Africa and Russia. The ever-increasing concern of the main poles of power for their energy security (access to sources and control of the flow of fuels), presents great danger and raises the possibility, in the coming years, of escaping the economic and diplomatic framework of competition and entering the military level with incalculable consequences of instability and conflicts. The transition to alternative forms of energy, in the required percentages (now all together do not exceed 2.5% of global needs, while nuclear energy reaches 7%, without significant growth trends), within the next 10-15 years or so (estimated peak oil time), is a big bet which requires a huge financial investment. Perhaps the only way to find these funds would be a drastic reduction in military spending by all the main energy competitors and joint financial investment and cooperation for the timely development of sufficient alternative energy (depoliticization of energy and its commercial approach on market terms, within the framework of a win-win philosophy, instead of a zero-sum one). However, the current reality and the emerging trends in relations and armaments of the Great Powers indicate that this latter case, although rational, is not going to be practically implemented in the foreseeable future.

The ever-increasing energy dependence of the existing and emerging great powers of East Asia on the Middle East as well as on other continents increases the strategic importance of sea routes and especially mandatory transit areas (e.g. Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, Taiwan, Suez, Aegean, Bosphorus, Gibraltar, etc.) and at the same time strengthens the trend of naval armaments. Russia, with its main weapon being natural gas, is upgrading its prestige in Eurasia and becoming a decisive regulator of the evolving trends (either cooperation or confrontation). Despite the dispute over influence, mainly in the Middle East, Asia, a possible Eurasian energy cooperation and balance between fossil fuel producing countries and consumer countries, would likely bring about a mutual rapprochement of potential US competitors, as well as their rapprochement with countries hostile to it (e.g. Iran), with direct implications for the influence and presence of the superpower in Eurasia. Any implementation of this scenario is estimated to be gradual, since at present no state would directly challenge the security of the US, which, in addition to the existing economic interdependence (which would also involve US competitors), ensures the required security environment for the unhindered production and transport of fossil fuels, currently controls most of the world's fossil fuel sources and possesses insurmountable military power.

7. GEOPOLITICS OF EURASIAN PIPELINES

One of the long-standing problems in the Central Asian region and part of the geopolitical competition is the legal status of the Caspian. Russia claims that the Caspian is a lake and not a closed sea, which means that it is not subject to the law of the sea. Consequently, the exploitation of the Caspian's resources is the subject of an agreement between the 5 coastal countries. This view is also shared by Iran. On the contrary, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan argue that the Caspian is a sea and as such should be subdivided into national sectors. The USA, which does not recognize spheres of influence in the region, certainly agrees with this view.

The "Organization for Democracy and Economic Development", also called "GUAM", by the participating states, which are Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (observers Turkey and Lithuania), essentially aims to integrate these countries into European integration and is in a competitive relationship with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), thus subduing Russian influence in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. On July 1, 2008, a conference of the GUAM countries took place in Batumi, Georgia. On the sidelines of this, special meetings were held with high-ranking officials of the U.S. and Poland.

The main topic of the GUAM-NATO meeting in July was the OBP (Odessa-Brody-Plotsk) pipeline, which transports oil from Central Asia to Northern Europe, bypassing Russia, with a possible extension to Gdańsk, Poland. It is noted that the OBP pipeline is connected to the Russian Friendship Pipeline, as it is called (Druzhba pipeline), with the agreement of Russia. The objective of the U.S. is to weaken the Russian pipeline network, including the Friendship Pipeline, as well as the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), in the Western European energy market.

Russia has installed a pipeline, as part of the Friendship Pipeline, which runs through Belarus, bypassing Ukraine. The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), connects Samara with the Russian oil tanker terminal at Primorsk, in the Gulf of Finland. It transports oil from regions of Western Siberia to the Northern and Western markets of Europe.

Another strategic pipeline system is the so-called "Caspian Pipeline Consortium" (CPC), which is based on Russian-Kazakh cooperation, with the participation of a number of oil companies from the Middle East. This system transports oil from the Tengiz field in western Kazakhstan (Atyrau) to the Novorossiysk tanker export terminal. The BPS and CPC systems are connected to each other through the Russian-Kazakh pipeline Atyrau - Samara (AS) (from 16 to 20 million tons per year).

In May 2007, Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to build a natural gas pipeline around the Caspian Sea within three years, which will transport 10 billion cubic meters per year from Turkmenistan to the Russian existing network, for further promotion to Europe. This Russian success is also a blow to the American effort to send Central Asian natural gas directly to Europe (TCP) and cuts short the dreams of countries such as Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania to reduce energy dependence on Moscow. At the same time, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to increase the capacity of an already existing pipeline and discussed nuclear and space cooperation. When these projects are completed, Russia will have almost doubled its natural gas imports from the C. Asia (3 billion cubic meters, up from 90 billion cubic meters). Turkmenistan intends to simultaneously participate in the construction of the Western-interested NABUCO pipeline.

Russia is also moving to increase access to Central Asian oil. Recently, it was announced that Russia and Kazakhstan would expand their oil pipeline network to achieve an annual capacity of 40 million tons, up from the current 23 million. In addition, the two countries have agreed that Kazakhstan will supply 17 million tons annually through the 280 km Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline. Kazakhstan exported 2007 million tons of oil in 52.2, of which 42 million were via Russia.

The GUAM governments at the above-mentioned meeting in Batumi also approved the further development of the “GUAM Transportation Corridor” (GTC), which complements the BTC pipeline (controlled by BP). Both the GTC and BTC pipelines are militarily protected by GUAM and NATO forces. The GTC will connect Baku with the Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi, which will be connected to Odessa in Ukraine and from there by land or sea to Western and Northern Europe.

The BTC pipeline, which connects the Eastern Mediterranean with the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia, adds new data to the geopolitical situation in the region and forms new pro-Western ties between the countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Israel. Part of the oil from this pipeline will be channeled to Israel undersea from Ceyhan to Ashkelon and from there, through the Israeli pipeline system, to the Red Sea (Eilat) for Asian markets. It is therefore not surprising that Israel has concluded military agreements with Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The South Caucasus gas pipeline is a vital alternative for Western interests. The question, however, is whether Azerbaijani gas is sufficient for European needs, as the Trans-Caspian gas link, which would avoid Russia and Iran, remains controversial (agreement 1999, between Turkmenistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. High cost. Disagreement in 2000 on Azerbaijani participation in the pipeline) mainly due to existing differences in the legal status of the Caspian. The failure to resolve this problem also affects the implementation of the NABUCCO gas pipeline (31 billion cubic meters per year and 7.9 billion euros). The whole issue of sufficiency would be solved by building a pipeline connecting Iran (the only realistic and viable option), but this option is ruled out by the US.

The American-inspired TAP pipeline (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and later possibly India) faces implementation problems due to geography (Afghan mountain ranges and instability in Afghanistan).

The planned South Stream natural gas pipeline, with a capacity of 31 billion cubic meters per year, is considered a rival to NABUCCO and is expected to cost twice as much as the latter. Our country has proposed its interconnection with the Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline.

The Blue Stream natural gas pipeline will reach full capacity in 2010, with 16 billion cubic meters per year. One of the political goals of the pipeline is to discourage Western powers from using Turkish territory to transport Caspian gas directly to Europe.

The so-called "Silk Road Strategy" (SRS) is part of the post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States. The SRS took the form of a bill presented to Congress in 1999 and envisaged the creation of an energy and transport corridor connecting Western Europe with Central Asia and the Far East. The "Silk Road" is defined as a Trans-Eurasian Security System, while the militarization of this Eurasian corridor, as part of the great game, was considered a given. The objective was the development of the American commercial empire along a geographical corridor. While this bill (HR3196) was adopted by the House of Representatives, it never became law. Nevertheless, the Silk Road strategy, under the Bush administration, formed the de facto basis of American and NATO interventionism, under the vision of integrating the former Soviet Republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia into the American sphere of influence.

The militarization process of the SRS was directed against China, Russia and Iran. Specifically, the “106th Congress, Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999” provided for: “the development of strong political, economic and security ties of the West with the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, in order for the West to achieve stability in these regions, which are vulnerable to political and economic pressures from the South, the North and the East” (i.e. Iran and the Middle East, Russia and China respectively).

The adoption of a neoliberal policy agenda by the IMF and the P.O. is part of the SRS, which seeks to promote open market economies that encourage private investment, increased trade, and other forms of commercial reciprocity. These regions could provide the U.S. with sufficient quantities of fossil fuels to significantly reduce its dependence on the vulnerable Persian Gulf.

The SRS also intended to prevent the former Soviet Republics from developing autonomous political, economic and military cooperative relations both among themselves and mainly with Russia, China and Iran. In this context, the creation of GUAM, in 1997, aimed to include these former Soviet Republics in the network of military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. According to the SRS Act 1999, the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In this sense, this American objective has failed because, with the exception of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, the remaining countries are geopolitically close to Moscow.

Meanwhile, around 2010, a system of parallel natural gas pipelines from Kazakhstan to China, with a total length of 7000 km, will be operational and will connect Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with the NW Chinese province of Xinjiang (KCP). The main developer of the project is the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which signed relevant contracts with corresponding companies of other states, giving them 50% of the financing for the respective parts of the pipelines. The KCP opposes American strategic interests in Eurasia, fueling the SRS. The KPC is part of a competitive Eurasian transport and energy strategy, dominated by Russia, China and Iran.

These competing Eurasian communication and energy corridors are protected by two regional military alliances: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Both of these organizations confront US-NATO expansion into Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The SCO includes the states of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with Iran as an observer. The CSTO has as its member states Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and plays a central geopolitical role in terms of communication and energy routes, and operates in close cooperation with the SCO. These two alliances have conducted joint military exercises since 2006, in 2007 they signed an MOU on mutual military cooperation, while both actively cooperate with Iran.

Russia's intentions cannot be misunderstood. In June 2004, President Putin had clarified goals and priorities. Speaking at a conference at Lev Gumilev University in the Kazakh capital Astana, he had emphasized the following: "The ideas of Gumilev, who was the first to formulate the principle of neo-Eurasianism and which aimed at the union of the states of Eurasia against the Transatlantic West, are now mobilizing the masses of our countries. Protection from external threats and from growing global competition can only be achieved through united and decisive actions... Eurasia is the lever for achieving these goals, and Russia is the heart of Eurasia.... Individual nationalisms and foolish personal ambitions can only hinder our efforts. But we are not stupid." And in closing, he exclaimed: "Intelligent peoples of the world, unite."

8. CAUCASUS

The recent military conflict in Georgia and the ongoing crisis in that region are serious indications of the transitional era in which the structure of the international system is passing. The USA, until now the only superpower of the unipolar system, is faced with a new reality, according to which it cannot unilaterally control the course of events, at least in certain regions of the planet. In the context of the international competition for power in the Eurasian landmass, Russia's immediate and effective military response to the provocation that took place on its borders and the subsequent unilateral recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was a show of force for many recipients. Russia has sent the message that from now on, any decision of a security, foreign policy or economic and energy nature in its neighborhood can only be achieved with its active and dominant participation, regardless of any NATO promises to states in the region. Moscow’s next step may be to destabilize the pro-Western regime in Tbilisi, as soon as the national unity due to the recent events subsides, a fact for which the U.S. is already reacting by strengthening the Georgian government in every way. In addition, the Americans are threatening Russia with a series of measures (participation in the WTO, expulsion from the G-8) although it is not clear to what extent they will implement them.

It should be noted that from mid-July 31 to 2008 July 7 (a week before the Georgian attack on 1000 August), US-Georgian military exercises, codenamed "Immediate Response", were held near Tbilisi (Vaziani military base), with the participation of 600 US and XNUMX Georgian soldiers. The exercise involved troops from Ukraine, Azerbaijan and, paradoxically, Armenia (as part of the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan). The commander of the US military's Southern European Task Force, Major General William B. Garett, was responsible for coordinating the exercise.

On July 5, large-scale Russian military exercises began in the North Caucasus, involving 8.000 military personnel and 700 armored units of the 58th Army, as well as 30 aircraft. These units were used a few days later in the counterattack against Georgian forces in South Ossetia.

The conflict in Georgia provided Europe with the opportunity to acquire the image of a moderate power and to successfully play the role of an objective manager and diplomatic mediator of the entire crisis. It is a fact that the EU managed to reduce the tension in a timely manner, and to have the cessation of hostilities plan it proposed accepted. The fact of the commercial and energy co-existence with Russia also contributed to this result (the EU absorbs 48.6% of Russian foreign trade, while more than 90% of Russian energy exports go to European countries).

In order to understand the recent military conflict in South Ossetia, beyond the arguments and propaganda on both sides, one must focus on the essential parameters of the problem, which are briefly the following:

1. NATO's expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence.
2. The energy geopolitical dimension in the Caspian and Central Asian regions.
3. The conflicting policies of the United States regarding the stability of the Caucasus region.
4. The independence of Kosovo.

NATO expansion is a tool of American power projection and evokes Russia's instinctive phobic reflexes, dating back to the Tsarist era, about the country being surrounded by hostile forces. Moscow observes with concern a developing American arc of alliances and strategic partnerships around its territory, which begins with Poland and the Baltic states, passes through the NATO protectorate of Kosovo, Turkey, Israel, Georgia, occupied Iraq, the NATO presence in Afghanistan, the increasingly Western-aligned India and finally ends in South Korea and Japan.

In the late 1980s, US President George HW Bush promised his Russian counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not seek to incorporate former Warsaw Pact countries into Eastern Europe, and that talks on ending the transatlantic alliance would soon begin. Breaking these promises was one of the first actions of the new US President Bill Clinton. According to the Russian side, the US is demonstrating with its actions that for them the Cold War is not over.

Georgia's accession to NATO is perceived by Russia as part of a plan to encircle and contain the country. Since the rise of the American-backed President Saakashvili in 2003, the country has multiplied its defense budget 30 times, with the generous help of NATO countries. A NATO Georgia would automatically bring this country into the American sphere of influence, since an attack on a member country is equivalent to an attack on NATO.

Unlike the US, which seems to ignore the extent of Russia's political will to react forcefully in order to avoid being surrounded, with perhaps incalculable consequences, Europeans, such as France, Germany, Italy, etc., are resisting American pressure to force Georgia into NATO. Part of the European reaction may be due to its increasing energy dependence on Russia.

The second parameter concerning developments in the Caucasus is the geopolitics of energy in the region, which is dominated by the rivalry between the U.S. and Russia (the so-called "Great Game") over access to and control of oil and natural gas. In this area, Moscow seems to have recently gained an advantage, consolidating its access to Central Asia and strengthening its role as Europe's main supplier.

Moscow, through its state-owned oil giant Gazprom, largely controls Turkmenistan's natural gas, which is piped to the West. Kazakhstan has also refused to bow to Western pressure to sever close ties with Russia. Astana has fully supported Russia's positions during the recent conflict in South Ossetia, dismissing claims that Russian intervention would cause neighboring states to fear a similar fate and turn to the West.

The major Western oil players desperately need the pipeline of Kazakh oil, the BTC pipeline, which bypasses Russia. Supporting Tbilisi and aligning it with the US and the EU is of paramount importance to achieve the goal of reducing the EU's energy dependence on Moscow. Hence the strategic importance of Georgia's accession to the Atlantic alliance.

However, the BTC pipeline, the most expensive in history, may not fulfill its construction purpose, due to reduced fuel supply (Azerbaijani oil is not enough) and due to instability in the Caucasus. For example, during the recent conflict in Georgia, this pipeline, as well as the port infrastructure for fuel export, ceased operation and Baku, despite its pro-Western dispositions, reacted by diverting oil exports to the old Soviet pipeline network, which passes through Russia. The recent declaration of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with Russian support, inaugurate a period of instability for Georgia, with direct consequences for the operation and vulnerability of the BTC, BTE, Baku – Supsa pipelines, as well as the ports of Batumi, Poti and Kulevi.

After the recent conflict, Georgia is facing real damage, some of which will be irreversible. The previous image of Georgia as a safe energy destination for Western interests has changed. During the construction of the BTC pipeline, great importance was attached to its security only on the territories of Turkey and Azerbaijan. The instability that is now almost certain in Georgia will push oil companies to reconsider their policy. Over the past decade, Western companies have spent about $5 billion on the development of the ports of Batumi, Poti and Kulevi, along with the Baku-Supsa and VTE pipelines. However, the crown jewel of Western investments is the BTC pipeline, 1760 km long and capable of delivering 1 million barrels per day. In the new security environment, all of these are now targets.

The third parameter concerns stability in the Caucasus and the role of Washington in this region. In the Russian view, the dismemberment of Yugoslavia in the 1990s was an experiment and a test of the future attempt to dismember the Russian Caucasus. This view was supported by the estimates that the U.S. indirectly supported the military actions of the Chechens, through Saudi Arabia, while at the same time attempting to penetrate the Caucasus and exert influence, through Turkey. Thus, after the mid-1990s, two conflicting axes had formed in the Caucasus, the North-South axis with Russia, Armenia and Iran and the East-West axis with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, with American support.

The relative confusion in U.S. policy stems from the attempt to synthesize two conflicting interests. On the one hand, Washington would like to see an ineffective and long-term Russian military involvement in the Caucasus region, which would neutralize Russia as a strategic competitor and allow Western intervention in time, in the name of humanity and the independence of the autonomous Russian republics of the Caucasus, as in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it is equally in the interest of the United States to have stability and security in the region, which would ensure unhindered access and investment by Western oil companies in fossil fuel energy sources and in the safe construction of their transportation pipelines.

The above American policy contributed to the relative rapprochement between Turkey and Russia under the mediation of Iran, which has proposed several times the creation of an Ankara-Moscow-Tehran triangle with the aim of ending the conflicts in the Caucasus, through diplomacy and dialogue. During the recent Russia-Georgia conflict, Turkey maintained a neutral stance and proposed to Russia the creation of the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact” as a means of resolving the differences, not including Iran for favorable reasons at the moment. Iran also maintained a neutral stance in this conflict despite its ties with Russia and its differences with the U.S., while it has played an important role as a mediator between Turkey and Armenia, as well as between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The above trend of rapprochement between Moscow, Turkey and Tehran worries Washington. A rapid accession of Georgia to NATO would likely result in a revival of tension in relations between Russia and Turkey and perhaps even interrupt the recent trend of cooperation between Turkey and Iran.

The fourth parameter concerns the independence of Kosovo. Many argue that the autonomy of this Serbian province and its de facto transformation into a NATO protectorate since 1999 set a bad precedent that ignored basic principles of international law and threatened peace in the region, provoking Moscow. It is possible that the haste with which the U.S., and 45 other states, recognized Kosovo's independence, without taking Russia into account, led to the conflict in Georgia.

For the first time since World War II, the borders of a sovereign country, Serbia, were redefined by an occupying power (NATO), without a relevant decision by the UN Security Council. Why Kosovo and why now? The Albanian Kosovars were no longer in danger from Serbia, which was developing into a mature Republic with a European orientation. The answer is probably found in the American military base Bondsteel, the largest base outside the U.S. A military joke says that from space there are two visible human constructions: The Great Wall of China and the Bondsteel base. One of the purposes of this base is to protect the AMB (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria) trans-Balkan pipeline, which connects the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and comes into direct competition with the Russian-backed alternative Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline. Bondsteel also plays a supporting role for US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and could play an important role in a future attack on Iran. In addition, this base is likely to host secret CIA terrorist prisons.

The Bondsteel base is close enough to Russia to pose a threat, and therefore, in the event that Kosovo was returned to Serbia, there was a possibility that the U.S. would be asked to leave it in time, given the historical relationship between Belgrade and Moscow. Consequently, the U.S. had an interest in making Kosovo independent in order to project its power in the wider region. But why grant independence to Kosovo and not to South Ossetia and Abkhazia for identical humanitarian reasons? This is what Russia threatened to do and possibly prompted Georgia to invade South Ossetia last August.

The immediate implications and findings of recent events in the Caucasus are many:

1. Georgia lost the two disputed territories and, in the long term, the regime of peace and stability in the region, essential for American and Western energy interests but also for the development of the Georgian economy.
2. Georgia has closed its airspace to Russian planes that supply the large 5000-person Russian military base in the western territories of Armenia (city of Gyumri), and Russia is being forced with difficulty to supply the base through Azerbaijan and Iran.
3. Kazakhstan has abandoned, at least temporarily, investment projects to create grain storage facilities (500.000 tons at $10 million), as well as oil refineries ($1 billion) in the ports of Poti and Batumi respectively, a fact that is a blow to the already weakened Georgian economy due to the Russian embargo.
4. The implementation of the Kazakh oil interconnection program, with the BTC pipeline, which was intended to be completed in 2012, through the Kazakstan Caspian Transport System (KKST) and which would provide 20 million tons per year, is in doubt. The postponement or cancellation of this program affects Baku's geopolitical position in relation to Europe.
5. The high combat capability of the Russian armed forces was established, at least against neighboring states (the 58th Army, consisting of 23.000 soldiers, mobilized and reacted to the area of ​​operations within 12 hours. However, it is taken into account that they were probably expecting Georgia's aggressive initiative) although reservations are expressed about the cross-sectoral C4ISR capability.
6. The Eastern European states, former members of the Warsaw Pact and current members of NATO, were alarmed and rushed to seek cover from the U.S. and not from the militarily weak EU (Poland's reaction). However, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia are expected to follow a cautious policy towards Moscow due to geography. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization may serve as a useful pretext for this purpose.

Ultimately, it is legitimate and noble for a great power to help oppressed national entities gain their political autonomy. However, this has always been done selectively and in terms of the national interests of the great power. Moreover, in these cases the eternal dilemma of the right of self-determination of minorities on the one hand and respect for the national sovereignty of states on the other is usually highlighted. In any case, no solution is durable if the intervening great power does not know the limits of its power and even if it does not take into account the vital interests of other great powers in the region. The Bush administration seems to have failed in both.

9. AFGHANISTAN

The objective of American forces in Afghanistan, as officially stated, is to assist this country in defeating terrorists and restoring a stable, modern and democratic country, with respect for the rights of its citizens, with effective governance capacity throughout its territory, and finally to make it a reliable ally in the fight against terrorism.

For these purposes, President Bush requested Congress' approval to allocate $12 billion for the years 2007-2008 and ordered an increase in troops in Afghanistan.

In February 2007, the White House, in a relevant report, claimed that significant progress had been made in Afghanistan, for the following brief reasons:

1. The Taliban no longer exercise power, Al Qaeda has abandoned its camps, and the country is free.
2. Afghanistan democratically elects a President and National Council, the Parliament includes 91 women, while President Karzai has appointed the first female provincial governor.
3. The Afghan economy has doubled since 2001 and the country has attracted $800 million in foreign investment.
4. More than 5 million children go to school, of which 1.8 million are girls.
5. The U.S. has built or renovated 681 hospitals.
6. More than 4.6 million Afghan refugees have returned.

The Military Strategy in Afghanistan has set the following objectives:

1. Increasing the Afghan Police force from 61.000 to 82.000 at the end of 2008 and training it in a variety of subjects.
2.  Increase in the country's Armed Forces from 32.000 to 70.000 at the end of 2008, addition of new special forces units and reinforcement of these with weapons, helicopters and support material.
3. A joint operations intelligence center is already operating in Kabul.
4. Increase in NATO forces in Afghanistan.
5. Improving administration in the provinces and developing the rural economy. NATO operates 25 mixed civil-military reconstruction teams throughout the country.
6. So far, 5000 miles of road network have been constructed.
7. Reduction of opium cultivation and replacement with alternative crops.
8. Fighting corruption. President Karzai has already established a criminal law team for this purpose, assisted by prosecutors, lawyers and judges from NATO countries.
9. Providing assistance (military infrastructure, helicopters and equipment) to Pakistan to combat terrorism, mainly on its borders.
10. Encourage cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the war on terrorism. 

Despite the above, many argue that the U.S. policy in Afghanistan has failed mainly because it did not take into account the geography, culture of the region and relations with neighboring states, such as Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia. In recent months, the Taliban have been strengthened in the provinces, which are not controlled, heroin production reaches 600 tons, corruption is rampant and Bin Laden remains elusive, protected by local tribal leaders. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 undermined the mission in Afghanistan. The spread of democracy in the country seems impossible and despite the relative improvement of social structures and the economy, the situation for most citizens, especially in the provinces, is bleak. Local warlords still shape politics at the local level.

American policy views Afghanistan as a homogeneous political and cultural entity, capable of transforming into a democratic nation-state according to Western standards. In reality, the country is based on fragile and volatile alliances of hundreds of ethnicities and tribes with different origins, languages, and dialects. Local geography and culture prevail over national ones.

In addition, the Western half of Pakistan is inhabited and controlled by Pashtuns, many nationalists of whom consider West Pakistan to be part of the wider Pashtunistan, which creates additional challenges in the region.

A bottom-up strategy (local infrastructure and a loose federation or loose central authority) would be preferable to the current top-down policy, which legitimizes and empowers the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The weak point of this strategy, however, is the possible empowerment of local warlords and leaders, which could increase instability in the event of a future withdrawal of foreign troops. This new strategy should not be delayed by the change in leadership in the White House. A French diplomatic source leaked information to the French press that the British Ambassador (Cowper Coles) in Afghanistan predicts the failure of NATO troops and that the best solution would be an “acceptable dictator”.

General Petraeus, who was successful in Iraq, has already contacted the IMF and the P.T. to assist the effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan, assuming his new position as commander of Central Command. It has been realized that the solution in this country, in addition to being military, must also be economic, commercial and agricultural.

There are now a total of 32.000 American soldiers in Afghanistan, of which 19.000 are under CENTCOM and the remaining 13.000 are under NATO.

Finally, it should be noted that the Western adversary is playing for time. On June 11 and 12, 2008, an international conference of scientists, experts and politicians was organized, with the participation of the SCO countries, Afghanistan, Iran, Germany, Great Britain and Italy on the topic of Afghanistan, Eurasian security and the SCO. The members of the latter, after realizing that the American anti-terrorist campaign has not achieved its goals so far, offered to undertake multilateral assistance to Afghanistan.

10. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

The international system is undergoing a transitional period of restructuring its structure. A more likely evolution of the current unipolar system is a multipolar system with the poles of the USA, China, Russia, EU, Japan, India and balance of power relations between them. A possible convergence of land powers in Eurasia (e.g. Russia – China) is likely to cause a restraining coalition on the part of the remaining poles.

According to indications, the existing international instability is expected to intensify. The main causes are the drastic increase in demand for fossil fuels combined with the significant reduction in their reserves, the inequality in the international distribution of wealth in conjunction with the demographic explosion of underdeveloped regions, the crisis in the global economy, migration, environmental destruction, large-scale armaments (military technology favors attack), the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and military conflicts around the world.
Central Asia is gradually becoming part of the security equation of its southern and eastern neighbors. While the countries that traditionally constituted the main "players" in the region were Russia, the West, Turkey and Iran, Central Asia is gradually being dominated by more Asian states. Among them, China, Russia, Pakistan and India play an important role.

Afghanistan, due to its geographical value, attracts the attention of external "players". The need to promote the fossil fuel produced by the countries of Central Asia to international markets, as well as the challenge of radical Islam, makes Afghanistan a key country for the security of these countries. 

Central Asia remains a region of shifting alliances, in which there are no permanent enemies or friends. The incompatibility of the national interests of the main players in this region enhances the possibility of mutual miscalculations. In addition, all the external "players" of the region are also involved in other geographical areas of the planet, which means that any complications in their relations around the world will increase the instability of Central Asia. Attempts to create local security control mechanisms have so far failed, mainly due to different orientations and perceptions of threats on the part of local countries. Moreover, national heterogeneity and multiculturalism, combined with state pathogenicity (lack of control, crime, corruption, undemocratic behavior, mismanagement, etc.), cause instability in the states of Central Asia. Consequently, the formation of a lasting stable geopolitical environment in Central Asia does not seem likely for the foreseeable future.

The initial attempt to exert political influence on the states of Central Asia, by both Turkey and Iran, failed, resulting in these two countries turning their attention to the Caucasus, each for different reasons.

Pakistan's activity and special interest in Afghanistan stems from its vital interest in Afghanistan being a country with a friendly government and a stable internal regime. China is particularly interested in the Central Asian states for energy reasons, for reasons of competition with other external powers, and for the sensitive Northwestern Xinjiang province (an indication of this interest is the Chinese initiative of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). The involvement of the U.S. in the region is mainly due to its vital interest in access to energy sources and control of the smooth flow of energy resources, as well as to the Eurasian competition with other Great Powers in the region, such as Russia and China. Sometimes the U.S. sends contradictory strategic messages in the Central Asian region. Russia aims at least to prevent the dominance of a local power or to create a new American front on its borders, while at most it seeks its dominant influence over the states of Central Asia.

The ever-increasing energy dependence of the Great Powers on the Middle East as well as on other continents, correspondingly increases the strategic importance of sea routes and especially mandatory transit areas (e.g. Straits of Malacca, Hormuz, Taiwan, Suez, Aegean, Bosphorus, Gibraltar, etc.) and at the same time strengthens the trend of naval armaments.

The pending resolution of the legal status of the Caspian Sea (lake or enclosed sea) affects the relations of the countries concerned, the processes of exploiting the region's energy resources, as well as decisions to construct pipelines for transporting fossil fuels.

In the dispute between the U.S. and Russia over control of the flow of Central Asian fossil fuels to Europe and Asia, the latter seems to be taking precedence. In this region, the pipelines controlled by the West are militarily protected by NATO and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) forces, while the remaining pipelines are protected by both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

The main factors that contributed to the recent military conflict in the Caucasus are the effort to expand NATO into the former Soviet sphere of influence, the energy geopolitical dimension of the wider region, the conflicting policies of the U.S. and the independence of Kosovo.

The main effects of the August 2008 military conflict in the Caucasus are instability in the region with adverse political, economic and energy consequences mainly for Georgia but also for the USA, while Russia questioned the American unilateral intervention, at least in the area of ​​its borders and at the same time sent a warning message to its neighboring states regarding their political and economic choices.

Despite the relative progress that has been made in Afghanistan by NATO and American forces, in areas such as reconstruction, the central organization of the country, the logistical and military infrastructure, the situation is still far from the desired stability, the fight against terrorism, corruption and poverty. The relevant criticisms claim that an incorrect strategy is being followed which does not take into account geography, culture and local national and tribal peculiarities, while the parallel war in Iraq contributes to the failure to achieve the objective goals in Afghanistan. The new political leadership of the U.S. is considering the possibility of a comprehensive review of the strategy in this country.

11. CONCLUSIONS FOR GREECE

In the multipolar international system under formation, Turkey has greater scope for political and military autonomy, in its effort to become a regional power, while for our country, prudent and intelligent management of the network of internal and external power factors is required.

Greece, as a bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa, is influenced by developments in the Balkans, Turkey, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. The fact that our country is located within the triangle of instability of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, regardless of the high risk in security matters, provides it with opportunities to acquire a role in the formation of this specific geopolitical subsystem, by appropriately exploiting its national power factors. The country's National Strategy should aim to acquire an international reputation, in terms of its role in the region, containing at a minimum the following characteristics: "reliable", "stabilizer", "politically coherent", "economically robust", "bridge builder", "not a given", "the largest state in the region in terms of sea power", "essential player for the Eastern Mediterranean", "essential ally, based on capabilities", "status quo power", "controller of the Aegean", "energy hub". 

In view of the looming international challenge in the coming years, in the interconnected sectors of the economy and energy, our country should acquire a cross-party long-term relevant policy that will not follow but precede events. The basic principles of this policy should be the immediate adaptation to the economic rules of the international system, the exploitation of the opportunities created by emerging economic powers, the substantial investment in education (reorganization, control, evaluation, connection to production, parallel private education) and human capital, and the immediate implementation of actions to resolve the energy problem (e.g., a variety of sources of fossil fuel imports, sufficient production of alternative energy, including possibly nuclear energy, control of energy consumption, etc.).

The dynamically growing international energy problem increases the geostrategic importance of sea routes and especially a series of critical sea straits. This fact also geostrategically upgrades our country, which must capitalize on this opportunity by immediately reviewing its policy regarding its presence and role in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Greece's Western orientation is undeniable (NATO, EU, history, political system, culture). However, the geographical proximity to Russia and the economic interests resulting from the recent energy cooperation make Moscow part of the equation. Although the USA is the only country capable of influencing developments in matters of national interest, its current stance does not favor our country. It is up to the correctly chosen National Strategy of Greece to reverse the current climate. The basic principle of this ETHST should be the balance between client relations with the USA (and not given obedience) and parallel realistic cooperation with Russia in a way that will not exceed the already existing practices of Western EU states (e.g. Germany, Italy, etc.) and non-EU states (e.g. Turkey).