EQUIPMENT AND ECONOMY

The most expensive weapon system is the cheapest.

By Lieutenant General G. KORAKIS

            Our country has been openly facing a threat from Turkey and the role assigned to it in the context of political-military integrations for the formation of regional security systems in recent decades. Turkish aggression is manifested in its continuous armaments and its declared goals. Since the early 90s, significant changes have been observed in almost all states, in terms of the structure of military organization and the production and international circulation of weapons systems. NATO countries are following a policy of reducing military spending due to the collapse of the opposing military coalition and the need to reduce public deficits, with the only exception being Turkey, which, although its per capita income is at low levels compared to other NATO member countries, nevertheless, the Turkish social formation accepts high military spending at a time when, as a country, it is facing many economic and social problems. The political regime of this country is implementing its strategically ambitious policy in order to play the role of a local superpower, which will certainly have positive effects on Turkish society as a whole.

            It is the right and obligation of every country to take care of its security. However, disproportionately large military expenditures contribute to regional instability, in addition to serious economic consequences. Large armaments, instead of enhancing security, often create uncertainty and tension between states while reducing opportunities for economic development. In most regions where there is tension and instability, the effects of defense spending on the well-being of the populations are very often dramatic.

            Its over-weaponry, in addition, makes Turkey unpredictable in its behavior, which often even disregards international legal rules, projecting its aggression wherever and whenever its strategic goals are served. Our country, which has tasted not only the verbal but also the practical threat from Turkey, must maintain a strong deterrent force. The country's defensive armor has priority because without national independence there is no economic development. However, without economic development, continuous and consistent defensive armor cannot be ensured, without economic development there can be no defense strategy.

            To ensure our defense adequacy, we are obliged to ensure the availability of sufficient financial resources directed to the Armed Forces.

            Defense spending, which since 1974 has absorbed approximately 5% of GDP, is an unpleasant necessity and has both negative and positive effects on the national economy.

            The negative ones consist in the fact that they must be done within a certain time frame and because we cannot produce the weapons systems that we need, a large part of the capital leaves our country. In addition, defense spending reduces our country's capabilities for social spending or education spending. The positive impacts include the possibilities of strengthening domestic production, the absorption of know-how and the secondary effects on the rest of the industry (non-defense).

            Many sides support the view that purchases of weapons systems or investments in defense in general are equivalent to a loss of resources. This approach is not correct because defense is a public good. No one has ever thought of abolishing the Police, the Coast Guard, the Courts, because they ensure the public good that is internal security. Defense and all kinds of investments in it are equivalent to investments, in deterrence units that ensure peace, stability and generally the smooth development of the economy. Protests are heard about the high rates of our defense spending, e.g. Recently, one of the "public opinion shapers" protested about the sum of 700 billion that has been approved by the KYSEA for the purchase of 170 modern battle tanks, but I have not heard any protests about the subsidies that were given every year to the DEKOs, which from a single year's deficit could have financed the purchase of this specific military equipment that will be used for a period of approximately 20 years.

            If the Countervailing Benefits that the foreign companies from which we procure weapons systems offer to our country are also calculated, especially when there is a transfer of high technology, then a measurable economic benefit results from defense spending.

            The real gain from Countervailing Benefits only arises when the right proposals are made and easy solutions are avoided. (We have a case where the arrivals of tourists from a specific European country to our homeland, who would probably have been on vacation in our country anyway, were calculated as a countervailing benefit.

            The combat effectiveness of the armed forces depends on many factors such as the morale of the personnel, training, organization, equipment with modern means, etc. If we counter the most modern weapons systems, we will not have any result without the actions of the operators and this signals the main influence of the human factor and the state's concern for it must have a high priority. If we do not take care of people, cutting-edge technological weapons systems by themselves will not save us. Investment in the improvement of personnel is not in danger of being devalued or neutralized and is certainly efficient.

            To meet the needs for modern weapons systems, the General Staffs of the Branches draw up a 5-year armament program. The design is based on the conclusions of an analytical study of the threat, the specific conditions of use of the weapons systems, the emerging technology in each sector and of course the human factor. The structuring of the armament factor must aim to address the threat and not the armament competition. It must be designed in a way that serves the defense strategy of our country and not an irrational armament competition that the financial interests of the large defense industries and the policies that serve these interests are trying to impose.

            An armament program is realistic when it is based on the qualitative superiority of the weapons systems and the professional specialization of the human resources that will operate the systems and moves within the framework of the country's economic capabilities so as not to jeopardize the country's economic development and progress nor lead to excessive foreign borrowing because then its implementation is combined with dependencies (political or economic) with obvious negative results.

            With regard to the selection of the main weapons systems necessary for the armed forces (Tanks - Aircraft - Artillery - Warships - etc.) that are included in the armament programs, a study of international practice shows that the material of the Armed Forces is divided into three basic categories, modern military material that covers a period of use of approximately 15 years, modernized material (modern improvements are incorporated into existing material) and old material. The General Staffs must take this distinction of material into account when drafting the armament programs. The General Staffs must also take into account that the terrain as a power factor has been degraded. This does not mean, of course, that the terrain has ceased to be important in today's "globalized" world. It is an element of power but with a different perspective, that is, it maintains its strategic importance not on the surface but rather as a starting point for operations (mainly air) inside the opponent's country for route control operations, etc.

            What the first war communiqué of the Albanian Epic expressed in a wonderful way, "Our forces defend the homeland", cannot today be our strategic goal in the sense that small countries cannot hope to resist for long by relying strongly on static territorial defense. Today, we must ensure our defense with appropriate weapons systems with organized armed forces in the logic of the power of a strong state with which it can protect our territorial integrity using economic, diplomatic and military means and pressures exerted on a regional and international scale.

            A people must be strong so as not to risk losing its territory. The terms of the game have changed and the states (small or large) that have the advantages required by today's reality are in an advantageous position, under the basic condition that they will adapt their behavior accordingly, abandoning outdated defense strategies. The security of a small country such as Greece is guaranteed by a reliable deterrent force, high-quality and efficient diplomatic services, effective intelligence services, a developed economy and a high level of cultural sector that shapes the image of the country and its people, which influences the political decisions of the great powers.

            These thoughts should concern those responsible in order to make the right choices of the weapons systems that we will acquire. As far as the choice of the weapon system is concerned, from an economic perspective alone, the principle "the more expensive is the cheaper" applies. This results from the cost-effectiveness indicators. In order to understand the principle, it will be specified in a specific example. The experience from the Gulf War and from the recent wars in the former G/B showed us that the degree of effectiveness of one ton of a guided bomb was 51,25 times greater than one ton of a simple bomb. The cost of a guided bomb is approximately 10 times that of a simple one of the same category and effectiveness, so the overall result is that the destruction of a target with a guided bomb costs 5 times less than with simple ones. This relationship applies to all types of weapon systems to a greater or lesser extent.

            Previously, the General Staffs were responsible for the planning and implementation of the armament programs. The armament system within the General Staffs was considered to have weaknesses and after reflections and backward planning, in 1995, law 1992/95 was passed, which institutionalized the reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense with the main innovation being the establishment of two new services: the Staff of the Minister of National Defense (SND) and the General Directorate of Armaments (GDE), which is responsible for the implementation of the defense armament programs as well as the defense industry, research, technology and compensatory benefits.

            The new regulations do not address the planning-implementation problem comprehensively. One body plans and another implements: Long delays are observed in the implementation of programs due to the coordination of these two bodies. However, the most important disadvantage of this operation arises from the many consultants hired who operate outside the institution and from the almost total change of personnel manning these two services with every other change of Minister. Those responsible must address these disadvantages because the combat value of the Armed Forces and, more generally, our defensive deterrent capability is the result of a continuous effort where the quality of the final "product" does not accept compromises of any type, because it is of absolute value. There is rarely any room for improvement.