Turkey and the Possible War in Iraq
Turkey and the Possible War in Iraq
Turkey after Copenhagen
The decision taken at the Copenhagen European Council on 12 and 13 December 2002 on the future inclusion of Turkey among the candidate countries for accession to the European Union certainly creates a new perspective for its neighbour. This does not mean, of course, that Turkey should consider itself a full member of the community. It must also make a great effort to fulfil both the economic criteria of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the political criteria of Copenhagen of 1993.
Turkey is currently on the right track to fulfilling these criteria by promoting all these reforms, mainly of a legislative nature, which will allow it to meet the political criteria of Copenhagen in 1993. However, in the area of economic criteria, the Turkish economy, although it had initially shown signs of recovery and containment of public debt and deficits - under the guidelines of the "tsar" of the economy, Minister of Finance Kemal Dervis, former Vice President of the World Bank - now with the change in government policy there are indications that the initial effort has been wasted and that the current government has proceeded with the demagogic policy of lavish pro-people promises (and only), with the aim of manipulating and associating as much of the population as possible for vote-getting reasons, something that does not at all correspond to the capabilities of the Turkish economy. economy. In addition, the ongoing crisis and potential conflict in Iraq may further limit the potential of the Turkish economy.
Turkish policy in the face of the conflict
With the rapid increase of American and allied military forces in the wider Middle East and the political pressure growing exponentially, it seems that the decision to take military action against Iraq with the US as a proxy is already predetermined and timed for the second half of February, when the climatic conditions will be the most suitable. The initial position of the pro-European government in Ankara was both against taking military action and against including Turkish military forces or providing facilities to allied forces. Turkey does not forget that, despite the good relationship it maintains with the US and Israel, it does not cease to be a Near Eastern country that maintains unbreakable ties with the countries of the Middle East with which it shares a common religious spirit. Furthermore, Turkey is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which includes all Middle Eastern states, and borders many Islamic states, including Iraq. Therefore, it could not easily side with the Western allies against Iraq without risking being negatively characterized for this act by states with which it has many close ties as well as commercial and business activity. In addition, Turkey has to resolve several bilateral and multilateral problems that plague its relations with neighboring states, such as the rational management and distribution of water resources - an issue that is extremely important for all Middle Eastern states -, the issues of ethnic minorities, especially the Kurds who live in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic terrorism, Muslim minorities and the different approach to Islam, etc. Therefore, Turkey could not clash with Iraq militarily, nor be included in the Western camp, without fearing that the above issues would take a negative turn for it and would be the reason for aggravation in its relations with other countries.
The pro-Islamic government of Gul would risk losing even a little of the great popularity it enjoys if it decided to offer facilities to the Americans without resisting them, even nominally. When Saddam Hussein refers to the possible operation against Iraq, he does not stop talking about a holy war against the infidels, calling on all Islamists to fight against the Westerners. Such a call has a great resonance inside Turkey, despite the pro-Western and pro-European image that Ankara tries to project. Ultimately, Hussein is addressing the Islamic world of Turkey, which may radically disagree with the decisions of the institutional power in Ankara. Furthermore, a government like Turkey's, which came to power by such a large margin by making use almost exclusively of its (pro-)Islamic image and invoking its difference from the other purely secular parties, could not discard this image so quickly and suddenly by joining the West against a fraternal Islamic state, which invokes - rightly or wrongly, it does not matter - a holy war against infidels, without risking losing support from the electorate that elected it.
Providing assistance in exchange for -precious- exchanges
The Turkish government probably initially tried to prevent their country from being included among the states from which the US would request benefits and facilities, before and during the latter's involvement against Iraq, something that was in any case difficult to prevent due to Turkey's special bilateral relationship with the US and the resulting political, economic, defense and trade obligations of the former with the latter, Turkey's participation in NATO, its geostrategic position (bases, airports, ports) in relation to the impending attack and its proximity to Iraq and more generally to the wider zone of operations in the Middle East. Essentially, Turkey did not have the ability and the strength to resist coordinated pressure from the US and its allies for a long period of time.
The second version, which seems more plausible, is the possibility that the Turkish government tried to prevent its passive participation in the operations against Iraq for a long time by offering facilitations to the participants. The Ankara government was trying to extract, mainly from the US but also from its other allies, as much as possible in return for this participation, which it managed to gain by offering the US a large sum for the sublease of bases and the permission to transit, overfly and dock for American and non-American forces. Undoubtedly, this economic success will not be Turkey's last reward, as Ankara will try to extract other more profitable rewards from the US and its other allies, such as weapons systems production or co-production programs, preferential concessions (of surplus and non-surplus) defense equipment, possibilities to purchase weapons systems or high-tech components with preferential repayment methods that will not be available to other countries (especially those that surround Turkey and could pose a danger to it), as well as promises to favorably address its economic problems with foreign direct investment, boosting tourism, business exchanges, cancellation or reduction of foreign debts, etc.
Above all, however, Turkey will try to obtain the agreement and promises of the US and other states that its demands against other states will be regulated in the most appropriate manner, with the ultimate goal of its own dominance and its self-proclaiming as a principal and regional power. These demands often include extremely sensitive issues for neighboring countries, such as sovereign-territorial, minority, property, human rights, etc. This would mean the (undivided?) support and solidarity of the US in the bilateral and multilateral problems that Turkey has with neighboring countries.
Such a policy directly concerns our country, as Turkey will try to use American support to exert pressure and influence on Greece for the rapid resolution of pending bilateral problems, in a way that serves (almost) completely Turkish interests. Ankara will try to redeem its servile behavior towards the US and the other Western allies in the best way possible. This poses risks for our country, as, in the event that the operation against Iraq is undertaken, pressure from the US should be expected in the context of not only the transfer of corresponding servitudes by Greece but also the repayment of its debts to Turkey. There is a possibility that Greece will receive great pressure from the US and various European powers to satisfy Turkish (irrational) demands that disregard Greek interests.
Turkey and post-war Iraq
So far, the Turkish government has agreed to provide facilities and benefits in the event of a US intervention against Iraq. It is unknown whether this promise will be kept and in what exchange. It is also unknown whether Turkey will proceed with the involvement of its military units in a possible US attack against Iraq with the aim, on the one hand, of extracting greater benefits in return from the US, and on the other hand, of attempting to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs after the end of the conflict. Turkey will try to benefit from the potential intervention in Iraq, keeping in mind its inclusion in shaping political developments in post-war Iraq, as well as influencing the scene so that the regime that will assume its governance is friendly towards Turkey and, if possible, Ankara can shape and influence the political forces in Iraq accordingly.
Turkey will try, in case of military involvement, to seize, and if possible hold, the Mosul and Kirkuk regions, oil-producing fertile areas that it has always coveted. Turkey has never abandoned its secret thoughts about these areas that if they were under its control would make it much stronger economically - and therefore politically - since it would gain access to hydrocarbon exports. As a result, it would be upgraded to an oil-exporting country with corresponding benefits for it, in terms of influence and power both in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and in the Middle East in general.
The government in Ankara will try to prevent the occupation of the two aforementioned areas by the Iraqi Kurds living north of it. The possible intervention of the US will probably mobilize the Iraqi Kurds, who correspond to approximately 20-25% of its population, with the aim of directly contributing to the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, which has brutally suppressed their uprisings in the past, as well as to be included in the negotiations for the future political development of Iraq. The two aforementioned areas are very close to the safe areas where the Kurds live. Mosul, although located north of the 36th At the same time, it is under the control of Iraqi forces who have ceded in exchange other areas for the Kurds to live in south of the 36th parallel. It is very likely that during a major attack on Iraq and when its forces are busy repelling the invasion, the Kurdish political parties of the PUK and the KDP will attempt to occupy these areas, with the ultimate aim of using them as a bargaining chip in the post-war reorganization. Their main goal will be the establishment of an independent Kurdistan (through the secession of territories from neighboring states, including Turkey) as well as the improvement of the position of the Kurds in post-Saddam Iraq.
Such a potential move, which would make Turkey a hostage of the Kurds, will be tried to be prevented by Ankara with a lightning military operation, protecting its vital interests. For this reason, Ankara is already in contact with both the PUK and KDP leaderships with the aim, on the one hand, of sounding out their movements, and on the other hand, of preventing the occupation of Mosul and Kirkuk and any attempt to declare an independent Kurdish state, which would open the floodgates for Turkey. Ankara will also try to manipulate these two independent Kurdish parties and control both their political and military movements. It will also not hesitate to use one against the other, interpreting in the best possible way the British policy of divide and rule. After all, in the past it has done so with great success by aiding both parties, with the aim of turning one Kurdish party against the other and reducing their military power, from which it was also in danger, as there was a possibility that they would join forces with the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which was active in Turkey, to declare the state of Kurdistan and constitute a stronger threat in the southeast of Turkey. Certainly, such a scenario would be the worst for Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey used both of the aforementioned parties with their respective military forces to damage the military power of the PKK.
During his recent trip to Turkey, Barzani discussed the prospects of the armed conflict in Iraq, stating that he would not get involved in the upcoming operation and that he would not proceed with the declaration of an independent Kurdistan by removing parts of territory from Iraq. He also clarified that the Kurds of Iraq are very different from those of Turkey and the latter should not expect any (military) help from the Kurds of Iraq. He stated that the KDP would respect a multilateral (legal) intervention in Iraq while considering a unilateral operation, especially from Turkey or Iran, as a threat. Of course, what Barzani claims binds him at the moment he said it and it goes without saying that they do not bind the PUK. Besides, being invited by Ankara, how could he make any other kind of statements without taking risks?
Iran's aspirations
Iran intends, if given the opportunity, to get involved in the conflict under the pretext of protecting the minority of Shiite Muslims living south of the 33ο parallel. The Shiite community, which represents approximately 55% of the Arabs of Iraq, has always been a bone of contention between Iraq and Iran. Iraq suppressed the minority, mainly religious, rights of the Shiites, and this gave Iran the opportunity to interfere in its internal affairs by demanding protection from the international community, which was achieved to a large extent by creating a ban on flights by Iraqi aircraft below the 33ο parallel.
In essence, however, Iran will try to exploit the military conflict in Iraq to seize the disputed waterway by surprise. Shatt al-Arab which was the thorn in the relations between Baghdad and Tehran during the eight-year war (1980-88) between Iraq and Iran. Iran will also try to occupy Iraqi territory militarily. Undoubtedly, in a large and general conflict in which Iraqi forces will be very busy repelling the invasion, and fearing the occupation of this waterway by Turkey and/or Kurdish parties, Iran will try to preempt the passage. Iran will attempt such a military invasion in an attempt to prevent corresponding operations by Turkey or the Kurds, fearing that the latter will proceed to proclaim the state of Kurdistan and try to seize territory from Iran as well.
The scene in the Middle East today resembles the situation in Turkey at the end of 1900. At that time, Turkey - and today Iraq - was the terminally ill patient over whose body the Balkan states and mainly the Great Powers (England, Russia, Germany, Italy, France, Austria-Hungary), - today the USA and some of the other aforementioned powers - fought for the division of the spoils, that is, the territorial parts of Turkey. Today, the same battle is being fought not for the occupation of parts of Iraqi territory but for the change of the Iraqi regime, and through the new regime, the usurpation of power in Baghdad and the control of Iraq's wealth-producing sources. At that time, the Great Powers used the Balkan states as their proxies, as they were closer to the region, in exchange for small territorial (temporary) bribes at the expense of one Balkan state against another. Now that the technological revolution in military operations allows for remote attack, the “Great Powers” do not always need to mobilize “mercenary states” to achieve the result, thus reducing the “cost” of the entire operation.
The danger for Greece comes from Turkey's attempt to exploit the invasion of Iraq for its own benefit. Its aim is to occupy military territory in Iraq, and mainly oil-producing areas, in order to upgrade its power in the matter of liquid fuels (and water use), to extend its sovereignty within it, to destroy the Kurdish military forces and exterminate their populations - thus eliminating the possibility of them attempting to create an independent state -, as well as to offer its bases and other facilities to the US and its allies in exchange for large defense contracts, economic aid and promises of favorable treatment of its problems with its neighbors. In short, it will try to achieve its eternal dream, namely to proclaim itself, with Western support and tolerance, as a dominant regional power and the sole "protector" and representative of Western interests in both the Balkans and the Middle East and Central Asia, something it has not achieved so far.
Doctor of History, full member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (IISS) and Strategic Analyst of the Hellenic Society for Strategic Studies (EL.E.S.M.E.)