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RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

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HELLENIC SOCIETY FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (EL.E.S.M.E)

It is obvious that Cyprus' accession to the EU was linked from the beginning to the expectation of implementing the main national goal of the Republic of Cyprus, which is its survival as a single state in the sense of the political coexistence of the two communities, while at the same time and beyond any economic expediency and pursuits, achieving "national security" in the broad sense of the term.

The Copenhagen decision on Cyprus' accession to the EU favors the promotion of the main national goal of the Republic of Cyprus, since in the future the Greek Cypriot side will negotiate from an increased position of strength vis-à-vis the Turkish Cypriot side as long as the latter remains outside the EU, while Turkey should in any case take into account that in December 2004, when the issue of setting a date for the start of its accession negotiations is examined again, Cyprus will now be a full member of the EU.

Despite the fact that Cyprus' accession to the EU is considered "clean" for the Greek side and disconnected from the political solution of the Cyprus problem, the conclusions of the Presidency of the Copenhagen European Council Summit strongly state the need to resolve the Cyprus problem as a clear preference for the EU accession of a united Cyprus while at the same time Satisfaction is expressed for the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to continue negotiations with the aim of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by February 28, 2003, based on the proposals of the United Nations Secretary-General.

There is no Solomonic solution to the Cyprus Problem. The Annan Plan undoubtedly if examined in the light of the historical data of the entire problem and without the EU factor, should be unquestionably rejected by the Greek Cypriot side since it is obvious that it would create serious and insoluble problems and dead ends during its implementation which could lead not only to the failure of the entire effort but also to unpredictable and uncontrollable situations.

Despite the above, the undoubted interconnection of the Plan with the accession of Cyprus to the EU creates hope that the dynamics that will develop within the European framework will lead to a historic compromise between the two communities, which for the sake of the common interest will overcome the weaknesses of the Plan so that it will ultimately constitute a sustainable solution.

The final form of the Plan after the developments in Copenhagen has not been specified. The fact is that both sides are continuing negotiations and consequently do not accept the Plan as it is.

Our general findings on the Annan Plan are as follows:

It is based on the Zurich-London Treaties (Establishment, Guarantees and Alliances) which remain in force, but adapted to the new situation as created after the invasion and occupation by Turkish troops of the Northern part of Cyprus.

It is inextricably linked to the already achieved integration of Cyprus into the EU.

It contains provisions that perpetuate the division of the two communities that could potentially lead to partition, despite the contrary provision.

It moves more towards satisfying Turkish Cypriot positions and aspirations. In particular, it is clearly governed by the perception of securing the Turkish Cypriot side over the Greek Cypriot side, mainly with regard to issues of parity, security and ensuring bizonality.

With its implementation, the Greek Cypriot side will only benefit in terms of the return of territories, the return of some of the Greek Cypriot refugees and the removal of the majority of the Turkish occupation troops.

It provides excessive guarantees to the Turkish Cypriot minority in a way that calls into question the functionality of the legislative and executive branches.

It is a fact that neither side can fully impose its views on the other. Therefore, the Annan Plan or any other plan in the future for the resolution of the Cyprus problem should be based on certain conditions and principles, which are assessed as follows:

An imposed solution is not possible, therefore the solution that will come from any plan will contain compromises for both sides.

The perpetuation of the current situation even after the Copenhagen decision leads closer to the final partition, since the possibility of creating international circumstances that could lead to more general dynamic rearrangements in the region to the detriment of Turkey and result in the reunification of the Island is assessed as particularly limited.

A "sustainable" solution to the Cyprus problem should at a minimum provide for the abolition of any form of occupation of the northern part of the island.

The final agreement should not include elements that would contain the seeds of division of the single entity of Cyprus, regardless of the state form that will ultimately be accepted.

Based on the aforementioned conditions, the points of the Annan plan that are considered to need improvement are those that will progressively bring the populations closer together, alleviate the passions of the past and lay the foundations for future operation. of an independent and unguarded state.

The attempt to determine the points of the Annan Plan that could be modified to the benefit of the Greek Cypriot side, such as the issue of parity in the functioning of the Legislative Executive Power, the maintenance and extension of the Treaties of Guarantees and Alliances, the issue of settlers, etc. carries the risk of being drawn into maximalist pursuits, logical and fair, but practically unachievable, which may ultimately lead to dead ends that are dangerous for the future of the Island. Consequently, some points, perhaps not among the most serious, but which are realistic, negotiable and possibly acceptable to all sides, may be the following:

The Cypriot State should cultivate in its citizens a single and unique "Cypriot consciousness". Consequently, the provision of separate symbols (Hymns, Flags) of the "constituent states" contains the spirit of independence and separation of each community and in a given period may function divisively. The Anthem and Flag must be single and unique.

The "citizenship regime" that each "constituent state" can assign differentiates the populations, perpetuates their desire for separation and certainly does not create a unified consciousness of the Cypriot citizen. Citizenship must be one.

The restrictions on basic features of human rights (free movement, establishment, property issues) beyond injustice, create a problem in the sovereignty but also in the functioning of the unified state, compared to the functioning of any state that has joined the European Union. Rights that have been recognized internationally (Loizidou case for the return of her property) do not make sense to be abolished or modified by the new plan.

The participation of arbitrators in the Supreme Constitutional Court undermines the independence of the functioning of a united Cyprus. It is estimated that the disputes that will certainly arise are preferable to be resolved in European Union institutions.

The Treaty of Guarantees should be placed under the control of the UN. Any possible intervention by the guarantor powers should be subject to prior approval by the UN.

The provisions of the Treaty of Alliance should be minimized in terms of the number and structure of Forces, excluding major weapons systems such as tanks, air defense systems, etc., with the prospect of further gradual reduction until final withdrawal.

The transitional period should be shortened, particularly with regard to the co-presidency, with the aim of having it completed by December 2004, when Cyprus will gain the right to vote in the EU and the issue of the date for the start of Turkey's accession negotiations will be reconsidered.

The recording of the above points does not imply the concept of defining limits of "acceptance" or "rejection" of the Annan Plan. However, any effort that will result in a positive result for their differentiation is considered necessary.

Any improvements must be sought by the Greek Cypriot side and through the involvement of the European Union, which has every interest in achieving a sustainable solution based on the Annan Plan.