Blog

(the speech was held at the Rotary Club "Piraeus-Anatolia" at the Nautical Club of Greece on October 21, 2019)
Good evening,
Allow me to begin by thanking the organizers of the event, as well as all of you present, for the honor of inviting me to deliver the eulogy for the anniversary of October 28th.
On the occasion of my presence, I would like to wish you every success in the multifaceted social work that you offer unselfishly and the success of the noble goals of your organization. I had the pleasure and honor, in 2013, upon the completion of my two-year service in Chania, as Commander of the Crete Shooting Range, to be declared an honorary member of the Rotary Club of Chania.
The delivery of a national anniversary eulogy to a distinguished audience always raises concerns for its author and speaker. My personal assessment is that the highest obligation in a eulogy is to pay tribute to the known and unknown, the fallen, the injured, the fighters, the contributors to the specific event. Of course, reference to the events themselves is also required with an attempt to objectively evaluate them. This evaluation aims to reflect, to draw conclusions and to compare them with current events. The ultimate goal and the most difficult task is the correct and realistic adaptation of the conclusions to the present situations and current problems that unfortunately accumulate dangerously every day and from different directions. I do not forget that the animation of the audience is also a goal of the eulogy and in some cases it is perhaps the primary pursuit.
With these thoughts, allow me to proceed with my own effort, mentally looking back at the events and walking a tightrope between past and present.
October 28, 1940. A brilliant page of Hellenism, an unexpected - for some - crushing of the unprovoked fascist attack in the difficult early years of World War II. Was the night visit of the Italian Ambassador and the ultimatum that was delivered an unexpected development that received an impulsive response from the Greek Prime Minister?
On the contrary, the clouds of a new European war had been thickening and becoming threatening since the mid-1930s. Perhaps the developments were predetermined by the problematic peace terms that followed the end of the Great War in 1918. In a repeat of World War I, Greek neutrality would once again be inevitable, a conclusion that the protagonists of Greek political life at the time, who had tragically experienced national division, had realized.
Was the outbreak of World War II the inevitable clash of democratic regimes with totalitarianism, Nazism and fascism?
Here we must point out that the other expression of totalitarianism - communism - was belatedly and out of necessity aligned with democratic regimes. Perhaps the ideological confrontation was not enough for the outbreak of the new tragedy. In the flammable mixture, nationalist outbursts, deep ethnic differences, unforgettable desires for national integration, but also social inequalities that had arisen from a profound economic crisis that struck the world coexisted. The causes of this outbreak were therefore multifaceted. Amidst this general turmoil, our neighboring Italy was experiencing an outburst of expansionism that was instigated by Mussolini and the fascist regime, but rather accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Italian people. Let us not forget that every nation goes through moments of rekindling of national sentiment which, under appropriate -internal and external- conditions, can take on aggressive-expansionary dispositions against neighboring peoples. This is not the result of a genetic anomaly, nor is it exclusively an expression of the wild impulses of capitalism, but a much more complex expression of the dispositions and aspirations of the peoples which is traced back to numerous socio-political causes and in relation to the external environment.
I made this digression so that we would realize that our current frictions with Turkey are not the result of the expansionist visions of the "sultan" but a deeper and long-term choice of the elites of Ankara with acceptance by the Turkish people. Correspondingly, then, was the acceptance of the plans of the fascist leadership by the sympathetic and friendly Italian people, and only successive failures and human losses would lead to the overthrow of the regime in 1943.
The Italian invasion did not come as a surprise, it had been preceded in April 1939 by the coup d'état invasion and occupation of Albania by Italian troops. Let us not forget that in 1923, at the height of Greek weakness, months after the disaster in Asia Minor, it had been preceded by the bombing and temporary occupation of Corfu by Italian troops. In the following years, Greek-Italian relations experienced fluctuations with rapprochements but also contradictions and frictions arising from Italian expansionism and the balances in the sensitive Mediterranean area. From mid-1939, the challenges increased in the air, sea and land (Albania). Yes, and the sympathetic Italians, published maps with their own "blue homeland", the famous "mare nostrum" with the Aegean Sea and the Italian-occupied Dodecanese having a dominant position! Yes, we also had violations of national airspace, territorial waters but even bombings of Greek Navy ships by Italian aircraft. And unfortunately they went further than our eastern friends, not content with attempts to ram our coast guard vessels and on August 15, 1940 they torpedoed and sank - with human losses - the Evdromo Elli under the eyes of the celebrating Theometor.
How did Greece react? With "strategic composure"! The identity of the submarine, although clearly known from the first moment, was kept secret. So, did Greece in 1940, with General Ioannis Metaxas as its commander, choose the unacceptable strategy of appeasement? If we had to answer in one word, we would give a positive answer, indeed, Greece did everything it could to avoid war. It was a choice based on the realistic perception of the suffering that a conflict with Italy would bring and the escalation that would follow due to the inevitable - and desired - British involvement and the subsequent German reaction. In addition, the cold tables of the available war systems of the potential opponents (Greeks and Italians) showed an overwhelming superiority of the latter in the feared and much-advertised weapons systems, tanks and aircraft at that time. At the same time, Bulgaria's moods continued to be threatening and revanchist, while the army of this country was feared. Greece was struggling to implement a huge armament program for that time. The difficulties of a country that had just 8 years previously -essentially and formally- gone bankrupt were numerous. The difficulties of finding military equipment for supply were also numerous, as all European countries had engaged in an arms race to protect their borders, refusing to execute even prepaid orders. But even Greece's potential supporters and allies - Britain and France - did not easily give security guarantees, and when they were first given in 1939, they were not reliable, while one of the guarantors - France - collapsed after a few months. Under these circumstances, Greece probably did not have many strategic options. Appeasement is therefore unacceptable, but under certain conditions it can work and bring about the desired results, when and only when it is chosen as a temporary option to gain time and appropriate preparation for the realization of our goals. Just as we say in the army, we undertake retreating operations to gain time and create appropriate conditions for our aggressive return or the destruction of the opponent.
These preparations were carried out - for four years - consistently and to an excellent degree by the dictatorial regime of Ioannis Metaxas and no fanaticism can overturn these documented elements. It is true that certain decisions - even orders for war material - had been taken and placed since 1935, but the regime of August 4, despite the financial constraints, expanded all these preparations and implemented them with a strict timetable and on the basis of a comprehensive defense plan that included all the possible contingencies of the time. The staff integrity of the regime was demonstrated when the surprise Italian invasion of Albania, in 1939, overturned the country's defense data, creating yet another front on our already long and multiply threatened borders. Athens reacted with partial mobilization, promotion and deployment of Units on the Greek-Albanian borders. The conclusions drawn from these actions were transformed into the necessary corrective actions so that the general mobilization, in October 1940, could be carried out successfully.
If we look back to the 1930s, we will see that Greece made desperate efforts to create a network of alliances that would ensure its national independence. The two pillars of Greek existence – Britain and France – refused until 1939 to provide the security guarantees that Athens was anxiously seeking. A surprise attack by Bulgaria and its descent into the eternal goal, the Aegean Sea, was a nightmare for the Greek military. The minimal depth of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, combined with the mountainous but sloping terrain - towards the Greek plains - made any defensive effort problematic. Any breach of the front, at any point, would result in the disruption of the continuity of the Greek defensive line. Let us not forget that the Greekness of the so-called "new countries" had not yet been established despite the massive and tragic arrival of thousands of refugees in 1922.
In addition to the traditional enemy, Bulgaria, Greece was faced with Italian expansionism that was pressing not only from the west but also from the southeast, from the Italian-occupied Dodecanese, with a dangerous wedge directed at the heart of Greece, in the Aegean. Even Yugoslavia's stance was ambivalent as the country, until the last moment, walked a tightrope between the Axis and the democratic regimes, listening with interest to the proposals of both sides and weighing gains and losses. The paradox is that in that turbulent era, Ankara seemed to be the least dangerous neighbor of our country, the only one that did not manifest intentions against our integrity. Of course, this did not prevent it from turning into a "sly neutral" with the start of World War II, constantly negotiating trade-offs for its entry into the conflict. Many of the trade-offs offered - by both sides - were once again at the expense of Hellenism.
In this difficult situation, the Greek political leadership followed a policy of creating loose alliances that initially aimed to isolate Bulgaria and then to prevent intervention by non-Balkan powers in the Balkan Peninsula. Treaties of friendship, cooperation, non-aggression, with many restrictions, asterisks, binding and non-binding, succeeded each other in bilateral and multilateral schemes, but all of them collapsed when the war reached the borders of the Balkans. I point this out so that we do not harbor illusions about the possibilities of the 3-party and 4-party schemes, which the Greek leadership has been building very correctly, carefully and consistently in recent years in the Eastern Mediterranean. Unfortunately, I believe that former Chief of the General Staff and Minister of Defense, Admiral Apostolakis, will be vindicated when, on the same issue and referring to a possible conflict with Turkey, he clearly stated that we will fight alone.
In 1940, in the Greco-Italian War, Britain, already a year into the war with the Axis powers, stood by our side. Its military involvement was limited, due to insufficient forces and the desperate position, but also to the desire to avoid provoking the Germans. Some would add that it considered Greece a lost cause, although this is not fully documented by the archives that are currently available.
The storm was therefore visible and was spreading to multiple points on the Greek border and from multiple directions. Diplomatic efforts to form alliances were several and in the right direction but with meager results, as no one - at that time of uncertainty - wanted to make strong commitments to another state. National survival depended on the principle of "self-help" to the maximum extent. Do we have evidence to prove that this is not happening today?
But was a Greek approach to the Axis possible? It has often been said that Ioannis Metaxas was forced by the fear of his overthrow by the King and the British to follow this specific policy, culminating in the rejection of the Italian ultimatum. However, Metaxas, with the consent of the King and the armed forces, had long ago chosen the path of alliance with the Western democracies. It is possible that the militaristic composition of the Axis forces and the military successes of their armed forces attracted the admiration of professional military personnel, both worldwide and in Greece, but the reading of the geopolitical balances and peculiarities of the country made our alliance on the side of the British and French the only way out. The coastal and insular nature of the country imposed cooperation with the naval powers that controlled the Mediterranean, namely Britain. Furthermore, the alliances and goals of Italy and Bulgaria made any other option impossible. The Greek elites of 1940 had bitterly drawn the right conclusions after the failed attempt to maintain neutrality in World War I. Consequently, they had realized that neutrality was not an option at that time.
Perhaps the presence of a decisive and capable dictator during this particular historical period contributed to the country's excellent defense preparation. A preparation that extended to every sector and every activity. The fortification of the Greek-Bulgarian border with the forts of the "Metaxa Line" is well known. The careful fortification organization - with semi-permanent campaign works - and the timely promotion of Units towards the Greek-Albanian borders were also careful. Less well known is the meticulous dispersal and storage of the country's archaeological treasures, as well as dozens of other actions related to civil protection.
Since April 1939, as we mentioned above, there has been intense defensive preparation of the Greek-Albanian border. Unit advances, testing of plans, secret recruitments, passive security measures in urban centers, orders for war materials, intensification of the work of the Greek defense industry, and all this while maintaining the peaceful form of everyday life of ordinary people.
Certainly Metaxas did not choose to give the primary surplus of his era in the form of benefits and allowances to the truly suffering popular strata. As a responsible governor, he directed it to the war effort, of course he did not have the anxiety of prevailing in the next elections and he probably did not give an account to the media and of course not to his political opponents. Fortunately, he did not have the anxiety of posting on Twitter. However, he also had to clash with the "institutions" of his era and the harsh economic measures that had been enacted in 1932 to the detriment of our country. He was certainly not a "saint". He was a man with many abilities and weaknesses, ambitious and with obsessions like the majority of the protagonists of that era. He used various methods and, skillfully exploiting a series of deaths of political figures, succeeded in obtaining the vote of confidence of the Parliament and becoming Prime Minister despite his low electoral percentage. True to his declarations, he did not delay in proceeding with the dissolution of the Parliament and the assumption of dictatorial rule. However, we are not evaluating the political work of Ioannis Metaxas here today. Simply for reasons of historical justice, we must recognize his contribution to the war preparation of the nation and his strong response at the critical time. Of course, history takes its revenge, the oppression of the regime, together of course with many other factors, fueled the terrible fratricidal conflict of the 1940s. However, Greece found itself prepared, to the extent possible, for the Italian attack. And not only to face the isolated Italian attack but also a simultaneous Bulgarian attack, hence the defense plans IB, IBa and IBb that were drawn up for all eventualities.
There was also a great deal of discussion about the choice of the General Staff of the Army and General Papagos to retreat to a great depth from the Greek-Albanian border and defend at the location of Amvrakikos. The accusations are probably unfair since the initial plan, IB, drawn up a few days after the Italian occupation of Albania and with the possibility of an immediate Italian (and Bulgarian) invasion, was supposed to ensure the conduct of the Greek mobilization behind a defensive location that could be held. As this danger was removed, we see that new plans, IBa and IBb, are drawn up and the defense gradually shifts towards the border. At the end of September 1940, we find in the Operations Instructions the first directions for offensive actions from Western Macedonia against the enemy in Albania.
Criticism also came from General Papagos' reminder in the first days of the Italian attack, to the commander of the VIII Infantry Division, Katsimitro, responsible for the defense of Epirus, of his primary mission, namely the prohibition of the directions to Thessaloniki (via Pindos) and to Athens. Some saw defeatism in this intervention by the General, others prudence, as the attempt to break the Greek border between the VIII Infantry Division and the Western Macedonia Army Division in Pindos, by the Julian Mountaineering Division, was already underway. In addition, the Italian attack in the Thesprotia sector had been successful in the coastal sector, which fortunately did not receive the required exploitation by the Italians. With the situation stabilized and the risk of the VIII Division being overrun avoided, Papagos returned with strict orders regarding defense to the last.
All this at the leadership level, but the Greek epic was written by the thousands of known and unknown heroes, fallen, wounded, fighters, women of Epirus and especially by our unburied dead. These people, few of whom are alive today, presented themselves at the recruitment centers in a festive atmosphere. They were advanced to the borders, even with short marches in a very short time and immediately threw themselves into battle in bad weather conditions and in a difficult mountainous environment. They faced a superiorly equipped opponent and who, despite the rumors - which Greek propaganda also spread to raise morale - fought stubbornly. The hand-to-hand battles, the continuous recaptures and counterattacks of both sides for control of Grambala, Hill 731 and other lesser-known points are irrefutable witnesses. A relentless opponent, for Greeks and Italians, the weather conditions, resulting in thousands of victims of frostbite. Despite the difficulties, the Greek forces, after repelling the Italian attack, proceeded to counterattack, liberating the martyred lands of Northern Epirus for the third time in the 20th century. A slow Greek advance through inaccessible lands, moving over the high mountains and avoiding the few feared lowland crossings for fear of the enemy's armored vehicles. This feared weapon did not bring the results that the Italian generals expected and whenever it was used, it was immobilized by the well-aimed fire of the Greek artillery and the well-coordinated anti-tank obstacles. Even the numerous Italian air force was unable to exploit its quantitative and qualitative (in material) advantages, giving a hard fight to the Greek aircraft and failing to bring about the lightning war that the Italian leadership dreamed of. Not even the powerful Italian navy was able to reverse the dramatic situation on the battlefields nor did it challenge the Greek presence on the seas. Fearing the English navy, it was limited to escorting Italian convoys to Albania, which often received daring attacks from the old-technology Greek submarines.
An undoubted contributor to Greek successes, the Greek soldier, the hero who made Churchill say that from now on we will not say that Greeks fight like heroes but that heroes fight like Greeks. Were our ancestors truly heroic figures who were created and sculpted in some special circumstances the likes of which we will never encounter again?
The concern of all of us is also common: "are today's generations worthy of similar feats and pages of glory if and when required?".
No one can guarantee future developments and much less people's reactions to them. One thing is certain, the gunpowder-smoked fathers of the fighters of 1940, those who had set out from Melouna, climbing Sarantaporos, fighting for 10 consecutive years and reaching Sangario, were also worried - with their right - about whether their descendants would show the same courage in any difficulties. And yet they did. Just as the betrayed fighters in Cyprus in 1974 showed the same unparalleled courage. Our conscripts in 1987 were impatient and with high morale, giving their best. With the same smile, Karathanasis, Vlachakos and Gialopsos disembarked from the PN 21 helicopter in Imia in 1996, fully aware of the dangers.
I know you will continue to have doubts about the strength and fighting spirit of the new generation. You may wonder how our well-educated Kanakaris will be able to cope far from their homes, without internet, without mobile phones, in a modern slaughterhouse with an abundance of deadly weapons systems.
But don't ask what our children will do in such a hypothetical but not improbable and not distant scenario. Let us ask ourselves better what we have done - and not the state - to forge the new generation. And I stop here, returning to the historical retrospective, so as not to become more unpleasant.
You will reasonably ask if everything went perfectly for the Greek armed forces in the 1940 war? Every military operation is accompanied by a number of mistakes - misfortunes at every level. It is the so-called "friction" according to the Prussian general and writer Clausewitz. Sometimes the opponent who commits the fewest or rather the least significant mistakes is the winner of the confrontation. There were unfortunate incidents, many weaknesses, administrations that did not rise to the occasion, failure to exploit opportunities, and even isolated incidents of lethargy were observed. However, the administration of the Chief of Staff, who, although accused of remaining in Athens, was solid. There was no other choice. Immediate replacements of administrations occurred when there were malfunctions. There was also a dramatic replacement of Commanders of Major Units - shortly before the German invasion - when doubts and different approaches were identified as to the optimal solution that should be adopted in the face of the coming storm.
In the celebrations and in the majority of historical teachings, we extensively examine the events of the beginning of the Greco-Italian War. The examination is limited to the Greek resistance on the border, the subsequent advance into Northern Epirus and the heroic resistance of the fortresses against the German-Bulgarians.
However, the period from the beginning of 1941 is a subject that should be taught in detail in diplomatic schools, in international relations departments and in the highest military institutions. Endless discussions between Greeks and British on finding a way to deal with the impending German invasion. Huge political and military dilemmas. The rational British military proposals for the defensive line to confront the Germans left Thrace and almost all of Macedonia in the hands of the invaders. A decision politically - perhaps unacceptable - and with enormous risk as any backward movement would likely lead to the collapse of the morale of the army. The dilemma is similar in Northern Epirus. Rationally, the army should have withdrawn in time to a defensive line near or even behind the Greek-Albanian border.
Conducting an effective defense against Italians-Germans and Bulgarians on the border - under the conditions of the time - was an unrealistic goal. Throughout the 20th century, from the expansion of Greece to the Balkan Wars, the problem faced by the Greek military leadership was the difficulty of defending our extensive northern borders with their lack of depth and the absence of strong territories to intercept an invasion from the neighboring northern countries. For 50 years, the danger has certainly shifted eastward but unfortunately geography continues to create objective difficulties for us in defending the hundreds of islands, islets and even rocky islets in the Aegean Sea, within a stone's throw of the enemy who also has the advantage of surprise.
Returning to the dilemmas of that time, we must point out that in addition, Yugoslav hesitation and its unclear position, in favor of the Axis or in favor of the British or neutral, created doubts about another front, that of the Axios and Monastiri valleys. From these two directions, it was possible to flank the Greek defense, which was what happened. On the political level, the question marks were equally huge. Militarily, timely British reinforcement was necessary, but this would provide a pretext for the intervention of German troops. And from a military point of view, would these British troops be enough to confront the Hitlerite forces? If they were a force of dubious value, would Greece have been better off rejecting the British offer? The British, for their part, also had limitations as they were involved worldwide against superior forces. Their offer was ultimately for about 21/2 divisions and with the condition of defense on the Olympus-Pindus line. The Greek position was defense to the last on the border. Endless discussions and visits by British staff in Athens. The situation became more difficult with the sudden death of Metaxas in January 1941. Conspiracy theories to this day. An inevitable feature of every personal dictatorial regime, the power vacuum when the leader emigrates. A political vacuum that was temporarily filled by the King and the Papagos who appointed a decent man as Prime Minister, the banker Alexandros Koryzis.
Endless negotiations with the British, sometimes blackmailing their positions. The approaching storm was visible. The entry of German troops into Bulgaria made the invasion inevitable. At the same time, Mussolini launched the "spring counterattack" on the northern continental front. With enormous sacrifices and efforts, this too was crushed by the Greek troops. However, we had exceeded our forces. The military leadership, having participated in the Asia Minor campaign and with fresh memories of the disaster, understood the risk of exhaustion and overextension. The danger from Papagos' Staff was visible, as was the risk of a disintegration that would potentially create a retreating movement in depth. The question of the reaction of our soldiers originating from Thrace and Macedonia in the event that we abandoned these areas to defend ourselves, according to the British instigation, at the -naturally strong- location of Olympus was also huge. The Yugoslav collaboration with the Axis made it imperative to abandon the Greek-Bulgarian and Greek-Yugoslav border and move towards the Olympus line. The immediate coup d'état overthrow of the pro-Nazi regime in Belgrade overturned the previous decision and sealed -now necessarily and due to lack of time- the Greek-British decision to defend the border.
When the German offensive began on April 6, new bright pages of glory were written. However, the Yugoslav collapse and the German advance through the Yugoslav territories and through the Axios valley led to the occupation of Thessaloniki and the overrunning of the Greek forces of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. A new drama was beginning regarding the fate of the victorious army of Epirus which had to retreat, while maintaining its fighting capabilities, to the Greek-Albanian border and reorient itself for defense against the Italians from the north and the Germans from the east. It soon became clear that this effort was beyond human capabilities. The German advance was very rapid while a number of Greek units in Epirus were beginning to disintegrate during the backward movement. The question of continuing the resistance or a dignified capitulation of the Army of Epirus was tragic. The thoughts of the commanders of the Large Units were realistic, who saw the impossibility of organizing an effective defense under the present circumstances and proposed capitulation-surrender to the Germans and not to the defeated Italians. Unwavering in defense to the last, Papagos, who probably saw further into the post-war positioning of Greece on the side of the victors. It was unthinkable that the Greek army (or part of it) would capitulate while the British troops would continue to be fighting against the Germans in Greece. This honorable position would be rewarded by London 13 years later by slandering him and targeting him for his patriotic positions on the Cyprus issue. Ultimately, the events led to the capitulation of the Epirus Army, on the initiative of its Commander, Lieutenant General Tsolakoglou and in complete contradiction to the orders of the Greek General Staff regarding defense until the end. Perhaps the best possible solution given the circumstances of that moment. However, the collapse was inevitable and dramatic. It culminated in the suicide of Prime Minister Koryzis, the inability to form a government and a terrible confusion as to how the Greek forces should react to the imminent entry of the Germans into Athens. On April 27, the swastika was raised on the Acropolis. The epic of the Northern Epirus War and the Fortresses was ending, but not the war that would continue in Crete, the Middle East and in the mountains, villages and cities of Greece.
In summary, the epic of 1940 was the result of the combination of the unbridled Greek momentum and heroism and a multifaceted national preparation to face the approaching storm. The excellent military preparation as well as the cool-headed handling - at the political and military level - are credited to the dictatorial government of Ioannis Metaxas. Success in war, according to the Prussian strategist Clausewitz, is based on the good cooperation of the people, the armed forces and the government. In 1940, this "triad" worked together harmoniously, resulting in the epic of the Greco-Italian war. The cohesive bond of the three components was the understanding, acceptance and belief in the political purpose of the war and specifically in securing the independence of Greece.
Today, a similar combination of the three elements is required for the benefit of the national strategy, that is, the main political objective, which is none other than the preservation once again of the national independence and defense of the sovereign rights of Hellenism. A basic prerequisite is to understand the multi-layered nature of the threat, namely the Turkish one. A threat that does not come from political games in Ankara, nor is it a choice of the "sultan" or the former all-powerful military bureaucracy, nor a genetic anomaly of the Turkish DNA. Turkey's reactions and pursuits are the inevitable evolution of the construction of the modern Turkish nation, which is reinforced by a significant increase in all power factors: demography, economy, armed forces, diplomatic influence. If we add a deeply rooted sense of superiority, due to the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire and a religious upsurge, then we better understand the nature and magnitude of the threat that manifests itself with intense expansionism at the expense of all its neighbors. Of course, Mussolini's Italian -fascist- empire also displayed similar characteristics in 1940 and was soundly defeated by the Greeks, contrary to the shallow predictions of all the "rating agencies" of that time!
I hope that with my speech I have shown you that the Greek triumph was not an unexpected development but the result of the harmonious combination of the war "holy trinity", people, armed forces and government. We honor all these contributors to the victory of 1940 today and bow before them. We learn from their bravery, their self-sacrifice, their perseverance, but also from their mistakes.
The basic guarantee of our national survival can only be the knowledge of our history, not of course through a dry memorization of events and dates, but through an objective and cool approach to events and developments, creations and disasters, personalities and everyday people, successes and failures, and away from political expediency.
This titanic task of experiencing Greek history is a mission of the state, with its main instrument being the National Education. However, without the contribution of the family, the success of the educational system is doubtful. The primary responsibility for educating children belongs to us, to the family. Let us speak tonight to our children and grandchildren about their grandparents who made the heroes fight like Greeks. If we speak honestly to their souls and especially if our own daily actions are in line with our words, then we can be sure that they will not fall behind the fighters of 1940.
With this exhortation, I call upon you to exclaim:
Long live the epic of 1940 and its immortal contributors.
Long live Greece.
Happy birthday and thank you.
HIPPOKRATIS DASKALAKIS - Lieutenant General (retd.)
• Graduate of the Department of International and European Studies, Panteion University
• Master's degree in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Panteion University
• PhD Candidate in International Relations at Panteion University
• Director of Studies of the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (ELISME)
• Associate of the Institute of International Relations (IRIS)
• Lecturer and collaborator at the National Defense Academy (NDA)
• Tel: 0030-210-6543131, 0030-6983457318
• E-mail: rafaelmarippo@yahoo.gr