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Commenting on the prevailing choices, due to the mixture of Geostrategic (and not "Geopolitical"[1]) Importance/Defense Capability-Superiority, we end up comparing the American LCS frigates and the accompanying equipment/support package and the French MdCN (Belh@ra) with the corresponding "accompanying" package.

I. Th. Mazis, Professor of Economic Geography and Geopolitical Theory, NKUA
The following are, in the opinion of the author, the most important comparisons between the American and French proposals, which lead to the final choice of the French proposal. However, a choice which - despite the significant reinforcement that the French package provides to the Greek Navy and to the country's sub-strategic defense in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean - does not seem to be taken seriously by the Greek Government for reasons which are defined, with the necessary "Political correctness", as... "of a geopolitical nature" as it is incorrectly stated!

It is easy to read, I think, that the ultimate dominance of the American proposal is implied due to the "hegemonic" position of the USA in NATO and the strong influence of power (defense, economic and political) that Mr. Biden's White House exercises over Erdogan's Turkey for the benefit of Greek national interests at the present juncture. This fact is true, and no one can easily - and in principle - oppose this specific argument. However, we must analyze it in comparison with the corresponding French "geostrategic weight" that France of the social-liberal democrat Mr. Macron has developed and is constantly developing, and indeed over time.

a) Regarding the duration of the pressure that Washington is exerting on Erdogan's Ankara, I think the conclusion is clear: with the departure of the Islamofascist Mr. Erdogan from the government and his replacement by more pro-Western and pro-NATO forces, the American pressure will cease to be exerted on Ankara and Turkey will return to the "warm embrace" of the West and, above all, NATO. The same should be expected from the side of Paris.

[1] S. S.: From the point of view of scientifically correct terminology, the criterion should not be referred to as “geopolitical” because it is not a characteristic of 1) a universal and 2) an immutable geographical reality of power redistribution. It refers to “ethnocentric characteristics” and corresponding variable “ethnocentric correlations” of power. Therefore, it is “geostrategic” and not “geopolitical”. For reasons of scientific accuracy, therefore, from here on out we will use the term with its correct meaning within the present text.

a.1) What will then remain as a comparative advantage in Greece to be able to prevent Ankara's -in essence- own revisionist policy?

Answer: nothing!

a.2) What will Athens then propose as a military deterrent against Turkey and, of course, as a convincing argument against NATO, so that it is not forced to succumb to renewed NATO and American pressure exerted against it and in favor of the resurgent "Turkish prodigal son"?

Answer: nothing!

a.3) For what reason, convincing to NATO and Washington, but also to the entire Euro-Atlantic Security System, should Greek objections to the ongoing post-Erdogan revisionist Turkish policy be taken seriously, if not for the possibility of Athens – if it is forced to be drawn into a heated confrontation with Turkey – threatening the entire stability of this very South-Eastern Wing of NATO?

Answer: for no reason!

a.4) Where will such a "warm/sub-strategic" Greek power of dominance and deterrence in the Aegean and the NE Mediterranean be based, if not on Athens' own naval power?

Answer: nowhere!

a.5) When is the last opportunity to ensure this Greek military superiority before the change of government in Ankara and the unfavorable developments for Greece and Cyprus that this change will entail?

Answer: It's now or never!

a.6) Does the supposedly "geostrategically preferred" American (or even, for some, German or British) side offer the type and quality of sub-strategic weaponry that will allow Athens to maintain its convincing deterrent power, when (and if) Turkey returns to NATO as a "good ally" and distances itself (when and if) from its Russian-Iranian-Chinese (Eurasianist) alliances?

Answer: No!

a.7) Finally, is the real "geostrategic criterion" actually taken into account by Athens?

Answer: No!

The Table below shows the comparative advantages of the French proposal and was compiled following thorough research and interviews with experts and not only from "open sources" on the internet.

Table 1: Comparative data on frigate equipment proposals to Athens

The following additional observations should also be noted:

Despite Lockheed Martin's assurances, the problem with the LCS propulsion system has not been resolved and the supply of these vessels has been "frozen" by the US NAVY. The US Navy has ordered the manufacturers to review the design part and propose a new design (as well as the necessary tests) in the deceleration-launch section. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gilday, stated before the Congressional Procurement Subcommittee on April 29, 2021: "We've got to get the reliability piece resolved…[1]"!
It should be noted that the use of the LCS (Littoral Combat Ship), always without direction sensors, requires reinforced land personnel and annual operational maintenance costs of the order of 50-70 million USD (according to sources). The only "solution" proposed to reduce maintenance costs, which is however not advantageous, is to increase operational support, intensity of land maintenance personnel. Given the requirement for higher level equipment of a Greek MMSC, the cost of financing and human resources will be further burdened, becoming unbearable for the Armed Forces and ultimately, for the Greek taxpayer.
The LCS's anti-submarine warfare is essentially based on the use of a helicopter. Therefore, in the event of the inability to use the MH-60 Sea Hawk operationally, the only available anti-submarine warfare (ASM) tool is the towed sonar antenna, since it does not have a corresponding sonar integrated into the hull. Consequently, the ASM autonomous action capability of this vessel is completely degraded compared to the corresponding capability of the French vessel.
In the field of anti-air defense, the maximum range of the ESSM missiles corresponds to exactly half of the French ASTER 30 missiles (range 120km [tt type target] which are even rated by the highest Strike Effectiveness Index: 0.96. This is the "State of the art" of anti-air warfare/AAW), recalling even the much lower strike effectiveness (ESSM: range 25km and Strike Effectiveness Index: 0.70).
The LCS also presents great vulnerability and is extremely vulnerable to attacks, due to delayed detection of the attack since it uses a rotating radar with several "blind spots" and a much shorter coverage range than that of the corresponding French ones. Especially in attacks occurring at sea level and in an archipelagic environment, which are the operational characteristics of the Aegean Sea. On the contrary, the corresponding "Sea fire-500" radars, which the French proposal offers, are distributed in 4 fixed panels of the vessel (Stern-Forward) that allow the surveillance of a horizon of 300km, therefore they support with absolute completeness and reliability, without "blind spots" the "zone defense" required for the Hellenic Navy. An advantage that is not offered by any other candidate.
Beyond the above, I think that the conclusions of Athens' correct technical and geostrategic choices are rather obvious!

[2] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Testimony/display-testimony/Article/2590426/cno-gilday-at-hac-d-navy-posture-hearing/