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“Provocations, threats, violations against the external borders in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.”

Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence of the University of Athens

                                                Athens, July 8 2020

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Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear friends,

Thank you for the honor you have done me by inviting me to speak at this webinar.

There is no doubt that we are witnessing significant geopolitical realignments in the wider area of ​​the EU's S. and SE borders as defined in the South from Spain to Cyprus and in the Southeast by Cyprus and Greece. The situation in the region has been critical, difficult and volatile since the 1960s and was exacerbated by the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent occupation of Cypriot territory.

With the entry of our country and later Cyprus into the EU, the borders of these countries (as well as those of other southern countries) also became the borders of the EU, and a strong hope, based on ignorance, was created in both countries that the EU would undertake or at least participate in their defense.  

To all these more or less well-known events, some new exogenous factors were added that exacerbated and complicated the situation much more:

First of all, the failure of the "Arab Spring" outside Europe's southern borders, but also the failure of American policy in Iraq, which single-handedly created the terrifying Islamic State, brought civil wars, provoked military interventions, created incalculable disasters, and serious waves of migration from Asia and Africa to Europe.

At the same time, climate change, the demographic explosion in Africa, the war in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the globe, along with the failure of governance, political instability and civil, tribal or religious conflicts in many remote countries in Asia and Africa, always combined with cable television, social media and mobile telephony that "awakened African and Asian citizens", created new and intensified the already existing migratory waves from the Middle East and North Africa.

Finally, the discovery of energy deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean and within the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus, as well as the commencement of licensing of hydrocarbon exploration within our country’s hypothetical EEZ, if and when we declare it, has given a new dimension to Turkey’s conflict with Cyprus and Greece. Turkey has unilaterally decided – as “the bully of the neighborhood” – that it should have a share of any profits from hydrocarbon extraction in the region.

In parallel with all this, and while the US, with President Trump's introverted and unpredictable personal policy, created a huge hegemonic vacuum in the region, President Erdogan's neo-Ottoman Turkey decided to exploit the difficult situation and revise the existing status quo in the SE and Central Mediterranean, the Aegean and North Africa to its advantage.

Starting from the revisionism of the neo-Ottoman Turkey, we must not forget that Turkey is a new country that was founded in 1923 from the ashes of the multinational Ottoman Empire dissolved by the First World War. The leader of the Turks, Mustafa Kemal, was so pressured and pleasantly surprised by his unexpected and unanticipated victory in August 1922 at Afyon Karahisar and was in such a hurry to institutionally delimit the new Turkey that he quickly signed the Treaty of Lausanne, defining the borders of the new Turkey. An experienced and threatening Venizelos, with the air of a victor despite being defeated and having the Army of Thrace ready for war, secured the Aegean islands for Greece and condemned Turkey to a suffocating strategic embrace.

The Turks realized their strategic mistake after Kemal's death in the 1930s and have since tried to free themselves from the Greek strategic embrace, but without success.

The appearance of Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the Turkish political scene gave rise to great hopes in Greece of understanding and coexistence with Turkey. Since 2002, when he won the elections with the Justice and Development Party-AKP, he has continued to govern Turkey alternately from the position of Prime Minister and President. The European perspective was his initial goal, but in the process it was abandoned and he soon began an ambitious revisionist course with an Islamic orientation and great geopolitical ambitions. He was the main exponent of the so-called "Political Islam" of an Islamic-style democracy with Western characteristics, human rights and political freedoms. However, "Political Islam" does not exist as a final form of government. It is simply a political "vehicle" that gradually and covertly leads to Islamism. Even Erdogan openly abandoned it.

In 2016, he faced a deadly coup, probably organized by the Gulenists, and in Erdogan's own opinion by the Americans, who since then (except for President Trump, who was not involved) have become his worst enemies and he treats them as such. Gradually, perhaps for health reasons, he passed into a state that some internationalists define as "insecure self-confidence" that transformed him, if not into an unpredictable, at least into an unstable factor in the region. The arrival of President Trump and his personal diplomacy and personal interest, created a close personal relationship with Erdogan, which he is trying to exploit to the fullest.   

In any case, Erdogan's desire to emerge as the father of the Turks in 2023 – the 100th anniversary of Turkish democracy – is evident, replacing Kemal Ataturk in the line of the Gray Wolf, Alp Arslan, Mehmet the Conqueror, and Suleiman the Magnificent.

That is why he brought to the fore the National Oath, a six-point declaration by the last Ottoman parliament in the early 1920s that set the borders of the future Turkish republic based on the borders of the defeated Ottoman Empire. He began, based on this neo-Ottomanism, to design and implement a distinct expansionist policy for Turkey.

The “Blue Homeland” is the new narrative of this megalomania, which targets for occupation, annexation or influence an area of ​​462.000 square kilometers covering areas and the continental shelf of Greece and other neighboring countries, but which for the most part constitutes European territory. Furthermore, it proclaims the absolute denial of the continental shelf of the islands, the forced co-management of the rest of the Aegean and the exclusive control of all the huge geopolitically important sea lines of communication that pass through the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean (to and from the Suez Canal for Asia and Africa). In this way, the geopolitical value of Crete and Cyprus, the two unsinkable aircraft carriers at the disposal of the West in the Eastern Mediterranean, is neutralized and the sea lines of communication are controlled, that is, the trade routes that supply Europe from the sea. At the same time, the second migration route from North Africa to Europe is also controlled with incalculable political consequences. We should not overlook the fact that 30% of commercial traffic to Europe is carried out by sea. At the same time, a significant part of the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” Plan, close to Europe, which constitutes the Chinese geopolitical narrative and concerns the global expansion of Chinese commercial and strategic activities and interests, is coming under Turkish control. 

            In reality, then, the "Blue Homeland" defines the maximized framework of Turkish negotiating claims and seeks to annex European territory and control European maritime transport lines. This is what they want, this is what they demand from Greece and Europe in every negotiation and will demand for the coming years. This is what they will constantly "inform" the international community about, this is what they will teach in their schools, and ultimately, if given the opportunity, this is what they will claim with the spear. The plan has already been put into effect. Already after the announcement to their interior and Greece, they announced it to the EU and communicated a more specific but maximized variant of it in a letter to the United Nations, claiming Greek islands and the continental shelf, essentially questioning European sovereignty in the region as well as European sovereign rights. The signing of the Turkish-Libyan "agreement" is completely in line with this plan.

But why this expansionism in the maritime space? Turkey realized as early as 1996 with the then Chief of the General Staff Admiral Erkaya, who was the first to formulate these positions, that it is not possible to claim the role of a regional power without claiming control of sea lines - communications and underwater energy wealth. If this would violate borders or sovereign rights and would bring it into confrontation with the EU and Greece or other maritime neighbors, this would be faced with a multiplication of its naval power. Turkey cannot be imprisoned within its territorial waters. The Ottomans began to decline when they lost maritime sovereignty and every defeat they had also a naval weakness or disaster. And Turkey has since begun building naval capabilities to restore naval power that would bring it to the forefront as a regional naval power. The narrative of the “Blue Homeland” is precisely the description of the Turks’ return to claiming control of the sea lanes – communications in the Mediterranean, to participating on Turkish terms in the sharing of maritime wealth, and to dynamically lifting the Greek strategic embrace in the Aegean.

            To this end, Turkey has instrumentalized all the possibilities at its disposal. The rule of Ankara's tools for expanding its influence throughout the world is well known: the famous three m – migration, military, mosques. With these three weapons-tools, it conducts clear hybrid operations aimed at bending the opponent and forcing him to submit to the demands of Turkish policy.

The events in Evros during the three-day period of Clean Monday, when thousands of refugees and migrants were encouraged, helped or even forced to try to enter Greece, were the clearest example of these hybrid operations. Greece repelled the hybrid invasion and it was the first time that Europe openly supported Greece politically and economically.

In this way, Erdogan is proceeding opportunistically and with high risk, pursuing long-term strategic goals, always ready to exploit American diplomatic embarrassment and European ostrichism that believes that with credits and purchases he will address the problems of power and influence. It should be clear, however, that Erdogan does not have a clear integrated strategy of national scope but is proceeding with opportunism and arrogance, relying on impulse and, in his opinion, “on God and destiny.” He seeks an expansion of Turkish power throughout the region, where, as he himself says, “our ancestors were previously located” or “were our old vilayets,” that is, in a region of the former Ottoman Empire, which includes the entire Near East, North Africa and the western Balkans.

In Libya, he is taking another high risk: if Sarraj, who is supported by the UN, the EU and Italy, manages to prevail in Libya with Turkish help, then Erdogan will have achieved a real feat by suddenly and quickly setting foot in Libya as a sovereign or "guarantor" power, making Libya a vassal state and dominating the country's rich energy infrastructure but also the second migration route to the EU. The latest developments show that Erdogan has gone even further and has gained an additional advantage by acting as a proxy, if not of the US, then at least of President Trump in the region. Its emergence as the dominant regional power with the blessings of the US gives Turkey increased power and makes all other regional players such as Egypt, Italy, even Israel, France and NATO, as well as smaller countries, wary and cautious towards Turkey, initially reducing their support for Greece to levels susceptible to future revision.

Italy, which, with the help of the EU and the funds and political support it provided lavishly and with the support of former EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, until recently had absolute control over the Sarraj government, has seen its investment and influence lost to the benefit of the Turks and is trying to regain its role.

France has been seriously disturbed by Turkey's unwanted presence in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean and in what it considers its zone of influence, as well as by Turkish provocation and aggression, and is reacting with aggressively escalating statements towards Turkey and NATO, without any substantial result so far.   

Although Russia has always been a strategic adversary of Turkey, recently, immediately after the coup, we are witnessing a temporary tactical alliance in some areas and a fluid rivalry in others. In relations with Turkey, they show an enviable tactical flexibility of which Libya is a typical example.

The EU has taken on a very specific role and adopted its new security strategy in June 2016, under the title European Union Global Strategy – EUGS. This is particularly important given that the Union is not a military organization, like NATO, nor is it a defensive Alliance. On the contrary, its military power, its Hard Power, is a small fraction of its overall Smart Power, constituting a tool in the toolbox of the Integrated Approach policy that it implements.

In any case, the protection of EU citizens is a strategic priority of the Union and it is trying to implement it. The protection of citizens also includes border guarding, but this is not a military issue for the EU. It is a matter for law enforcement agencies, police, Border Guard, Gendarmerie, Coast Guard, Customs Police, Counter-Terrorism Service, etc.

The most prominent and familiar European border agency is FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, as its name suggests. (from the French phrase: “Frontières extérieures”). This Agency has a responsibility towards the EU, because the responsibility for the borders themselves is a national responsibility as related to national sovereignty, and international organizations have only a supporting role. The upgrading of the agency and its transformation into a European Border and Coast Guard Agency, with the same name, is expected soon.

The EU, under pressure from Greece and other coastal partners, recently decided to activate a naval operation called IRINI, a successor to the recently disbanded naval operation SOPHIA, with the aim of enforcing the arms embargo, preventing fuel smuggling and controlling migratory flows. The short period of time since the start of the operation does not allow for its evaluation.

Returning to the Greek-Turkish confrontation, it is now accepted by everyone that Turkey seeks co-management in the Aegean, which is essentially being implemented through the effort to divide the region into two parts based on the 25^ο Meridian.

It is useful to recall that the only recognized Greek-Turkish difference according to the established Greek position is the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries, a difference that dates back to 1973. This has recently been adjusted to the delimitation of maritime zones to include the EEZ. Anything else constitutes a unilateral and arbitrary claim by Turkey.

It is certain that Turkey in the immediate future will continue by all means to strengthen its role, even in violation of what was discussed and informally agreed. Ankara, in parallel with its footprint of influence in the Central Mediterranean, will continue its efforts to secure sovereign rights at our expense, questioning the continental shelf of the islands and seeking to permanently leave Greece and Cyprus as it has always sought, with only two options: Crisis and a heated incident with a confrontation with its powerful armed forces or an agreement with the fait accompli that it will have already created.

We must understand that the Turks are not consensual. Their culture and mentality are not rooted in the Enlightenment, Greco-Roman civilization, Christian tradition and humanism. Their political culture is not based on consensus, dialogue and negotiation. They do not desire understanding and mutually beneficial solutions. They are confrontational, they recognize violence as an option for action and are always ready to resort to it, and although they negotiate with a bargaining logic, they perceive all conflicts as zero-sum games.

Unfortunately, not taking the above into account, appeasing Turkey has been a choice of Greek governments in recent years. Henry Kissinger has stated regarding appeasement that "In cases where 'appeasement' is not used as a pretext to gain time, it is a sign of an inability to effectively deal with a policy of unlimited goals." This is precisely the policy of unlimited goals that we are facing. In the case of Greek-Turkish relations, appeasement has obviously failed, and the lure of a European perspective no longer works. We must look to the future with clear eyes, self-confidence and determination, and make decisions.

Our reaction as a state to Turkish revisionism, in my opinion, should move in two directions: non parallel levels:  

The first is the military, with the maintenance of sufficient deterrent power and its credible projection to avoid the creation of faits accomplis. I will recall here that our doctrine is deterrent-defensive. 

The second level is diplomatic, with the projection of events and the effort to create an international climate favorable to us, which will force Turkey to change its stance, or to retreat on a case-by-case basis, weighing the consequences.

Both levels, however, should be mutually reinforcing, complementary, and in good cooperation and synchronization with each other, and obey and serve a common national narrative. A narrative that will accurately describe the limits of our sovereign rights and with clear red lines will explain to the international community that we will not tolerate their violations. In simple Greek, to clearly formulate what will happen to anyone who violates these limits. Without threats and without addressing any neighbor. But clear to everyone. I do not know if geographical coordinates will be officially declared to the UN. This is something that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will decide. It is enough that it has been communicated in some way, perhaps informally, to all neighbors as well as to the Armed Forces so that they now know clearly what they are defending and what must in any case remain Greek. The six-digit number of the extent of Greek territory and the number of islands are known and absolutely specific. It does not matter if the Turks or other neighbors dispute this demarcation. We also dispute agreements they have concluded with others in the region. They should simply know the limits within which they will encounter our dynamic – not necessarily military – reaction. The possibility of research and drilling by foreign countries in areas that we silently consider ours or of daily overflights of enemy aircraft over the heads of our citizens that we, the Greeks, are supposed to defend, does not honor us as a country that wants to be considered sovereign and independent.

I want to call this narrative "The State of the Sea" that is, "The Maritime Sovereignty" based on Thucydides' rendering of the saying "great is the State of the Sea", that is, that sovereignty over the sea is a great thing. And this must be the Greek narrative, the equivalent of the Turkish "Blue Homeland".

But not only demarcations and prohibited actions. In this narrative we must clarify to everyone, but first of all to ourselves, whether or not we wish to increase our territorial waters to 10 or 12 nm, whether we plan to align the airspace with our maritime national space, whether it is worth giving in to the cunning obstructionism of the Egyptians, whether or not we are going to accept a partial EEZ, whether our islands are entirely ours or according to the new term “influence” they also belong to others a little, as well as whether and when we will agree on the EEZ with Cyprus. We must also decide whether Cyprus “lies far away” or whether we want – both we and the Cypriots – a Unified Defense Space. Finally, we must make it clear to those responsible in our country and the international community whether we will tolerate negotiating with the procedures of the Caesarea bazaar, as Davutoglu boasted of doing as Turkish Foreign Minister, or whether we will negotiate as a sovereign European state with the clear non-negotiable prices and procedures of a modern European super market where everything you want to acquire has a defined value and price and violators are prosecuted. Answering all these questions and defining all these “boundaries”, “The State of the Sea” must become our agreed, immovable, non-negotiable and clear strategy in the unstable region of the Eastern Mediterranean, constantly bearing in mind Sun Tzu’s saying that “Tactics without Strategy is merely noise before defeat”.

This narrative must also form the basis for the organization, disposition and armament programs of the Armed Forces. Our organization must be supplemented where it is lacking, with absolute priority given to the wider Aegean island area and the forces of all branches of the Armed Forces operating and deployed in it, with priority given to our aeronautical capabilities (Fleet and Air Force) and the air forces of the Hellenic Air Force. Our disposition, and this has been decided by the Greek Parliament since 2013 but has not been implemented, with an unprecedented criminal-level violation of orders by the intermediate political-military leaderships, must be moved towards the South and Southeast with a clear orientation and capabilities for intervention towards the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, our armament programs must aim at acquiring these aeronautical and airborne capabilities, which will allow the country to dominate the Aegean and intervene effectively in the Eastern Mediterranean, acquiring a "long and strong arm" of military intervention and finally a Blue Water Navy. And of course, before all this, it must ensure the absolute operational availability of all the means and capabilities it already possesses.

Our diplomacy, on the other hand, should learn to utilize and not reject or renounce all these military capabilities, because they are the only weapon it has to make our opponents come to negotiations when required or at least listen to our views on International Law and the international legal order. Although we all completely agree that in the 21^ο century there are no military solutions to political international problems, without reliable military capabilities, we end up in negotiations "with a revolver on the table" where unfortunately the saying of the Athenians in the dialogue with the Miletus is repeated, namely, "the weak suffer what their weakness imposes on them". It is also known and often stated in official Turkish documents of their national strategy, that Turkey seeks to leave its opponents only two options: to agree with the fait accompli it has created or to confront its great military power. When this is the modus operandi of your opponent, acquiring reliable military capabilities is, in my opinion, the only way to ensure effective and balanced negotiations.

It is estimated that it has become clear to Greek society that we should not rely on external military support in a potential Greek-Turkish crisis or conflict or even a dispute over our eastern borders. Neither NATO, to which both countries belong, nor the European Union, which does not have the means, are going to do such a thing. Any expectations that are artificially cultivated for assistance at a bilateral, transnational level, I consider to range between naivety and suspicious reassurance. It is clear that in the event of a crisis, tension or conflict of any extent or intensity, we will be completely alone, with endless declarations of self-restraint or perhaps even veiled sympathy or even support from the international and European community. The invocation of the mutual defense support clause and the solidarity clause provided for by the European treaties is not expected to produce serious and decisive results. And here I will repeat my statement from years ago, which landed some airmen in a bad way: The creation of a Euro-army that will resort to our help, or anyone else's, is not planned or imminent. Let us not wait in vain for them, as the Byzantines waited for help from the West in 1453. First of all, because there is no Euro-army and secondly, because no one will rush to our aid. We are the external borders of Europe, we are the European outposts and we must defend our country and Europe. Alone? Initially, I think so. Anyone who expects French or Austrian soldiers to defend the Greek islands against the Turks or anyone else, because these are the borders of Europe and European territory is threatened, I personally believe that they are deluding themselves. The EU's reflexes are usually very slow, often inadequate, exclusively political or economic and often after a celebration.

Is Europe ready to defend or protect its borders effectively in the current situation? Personally, I doubt it, but I firmly believe that we must support and continue all efforts to make the EU capable of defending its territory, borders, citizens and identity, no matter how long and how much it costs. I am optimistic that the international situation will force the EU to diversify its role and capabilities. I believe that in the distant future the EU will be forced under the pressure of geopolitical reality to create its own Armed Forces, to acquire the Hard Power that suits it and to enjoy the strategic autonomy that will allow it to defend and promote its interests as it collectively deems necessary. And where the European political leadership will have the will and the courage to confront its Hard Power against any threat against the EU.

Until then, however, we alone will defend our borders and the interests and integrity of our Nation and perhaps we will be the first to defend the European borders. For this reason, we must be properly equipped and mentally prepared. And fortunately, we are and have remained prepared for many years. However, if we really want to prevent in real time any adversary who plots against us, we must stand on our feet, look him in the eye as an equal and let him understand that we will not be an easy opponent at all, as has been the case for several thousand years now. Perhaps this will ensure our peace.

Thank you.