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1 CURRENT SITUATION – POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SKOPJE

By Lieutenant General S. Panagopoulos

It has not been 19 to 20 years since a Greek politician said that: "After ten years, the problem of Skopje's name will be forgotten." The development of the issue and the current situation have rejected or proven the "prophetic(!)" saying to be false, while Greece is in danger of suffering a huge national defeat that is a short distance from the loss of national territory. And this is because the decolonization of the historical name of Macedonia by us and in favor of the Skopje people will have this deeper meaning, since it will not only strengthen a false irredentism against us (which both domestic Fifth Phalangists and Tito created and strengthened) but also because if this is achieved, a significant part of our national history will be lost in favor of the Slavs of Vardaska who have no historical, anthropological or national relationship with the Greeks of Ancient Macedonia. But how did we get here? Many reasons can be cited for this issue, with the responsibilities of the Greek political leadership from the early 1990s to the present day being enormous and criminal. The purpose of this article, of course, is not to deal with these gentlemen, but to point out the historical mistakes (in economic terms) that have been made in this national issue, alongside the others that were raised as the subject of the article. First mistake: While a unified national line had been formed on the issue, namely that "no name should be acceptable if it contains the word "Macedonia" or a derivative thereof and that we do not accept a Macedonian national identity and language, a national line that was supported by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people, a position that was embraced by our European partners in the EU, as was evident with the Lisbon decision in 1992, the political leadership at the time was simultaneously moving to ensure a solution to the issue through a compromise, accepting and synthetic name that also contains the term "Macedonia". Thus, the unified national line was initially broken, creating the conditions for the Skopjeans to further harden their position, while in the European Union, questions were understandably raised about this stance, which shaped their cautious position on the issue. Second mistake: We "allowed" Skopje's entry into the UN with Security Council (SC) Resolution 817 in April 1993, under the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and a change in the national symbol (Sixteen-pointed Sun of Vergina). "We allowed" refers to the fact that: * First, we did not press to the extent that Skopje should have to adapt to the EU's Lisbon decision on its future name. * Secondly, and based on the Greek government's retreat on the issue of the name of Skopje, and since this was feasible and realistic, it was not ensured that the retreat would be supported by the entire Greek political leadership and that Skopje would subsequently adapt to a geographical definition of its name, rejecting irredentism, accepting the Macedonian and Albanian ethnicities as well as the corresponding languages ​​as national. 2 * Thirdly, given that two EU countries participate as permanent members of the UN Security Council, which should normally be bound by the Lisbon decision, we did not ensure through them that Skopje would be accepted into the Organization as an observer, until the name issue is resolved. (Normally the principle of solidarity advocated by the EU should have bound all members everywhere and not just within the EU). It should be noted that the aforementioned decision, on the issue of the final name, provided for the resolution of the dispute through negotiations in the context of ensuring peace and good neighborliness and that the UN would offer its good services for this purpose (….and offered the good services of UN to the parties to find a compromise solution). Third mistake: The signing of the Interim Agreement or Accord between Greece and Skopje in 1995, which created conditions for cooperation and understanding to resolve the dispute over the final name of Skopje by resorting to the "good offices" of the United Nations, after the failed embargo imposed by our homeland on Skopje (we were not serious about this either). Of particular importance in the agreement is Article 11, according to which Greece undertakes not to prevent the participation of Skopje, under its temporary name, FYROM, in the organizations in which it participates. Fourth mistake: Greece's lenient attitude towards Skopje and the failure to even exploit the crisis that occurred in this country in 2001 between Albanians and Slavs, in order to resolve the issue. This lenient stance, which included economic and political assistance, military assistance during the 2001 crisis in Macedonia, as well as broad support for that country's accession to the EU, yielded nothing. Especially after the recognition of this country by the US in 2004 immediately after the second re-election of George Boosh Jr., an act that made the Skopjeans further entrench themselves behind their intransigent, ahistorical positions. This practice of the Skopje people became more intransigent immediately after the VMRO/OPMNE party took over the government of the country, with Nikola Gruevski as Prime Minister. Nikola Gruevski and his faction began a stormy policy (which continues today) for the creation of the Ancient History of the Slavs of Skopje, with the appropriation of Greek History and especially that of Alexander the Great's Macedonia, with the implementation of a widespread propaganda program inside and outside the country, renaming of regions (e.g. airports) with names from Ancient Greek History of the Macedonians in the Slavic-Macedonian construction of classical ancient Greek architecture of buildings, placement in prominent locations of cities of Hadrians of Alexander the Great and Philip and implementation of a hostile policy against Greece, which did not react and does not react aggressively to these practices, expecting the "good services of the UN representative", etc. Mathew Nimetz through which to find an equal compromise for a commonly accepted name. Our homeland, instead of making the practice of the Skopjes the property of third interested countries, organizations, negotiators, and especially the fact that under these conditions that they themselves (the Skopjes) have created, it is not possible to find a solution and to denounce the interim agreement (which has expired but is tacitly renewed) due to the continuous antagonisms of this arrogant northern neighbor of ours, withdrew in 2008 from the national line of 1992-93, defining a new one (they called it a red line) which includes: A commonly accepted name for all (erga omnes), without raising the issue of the name Macedonia, as long as it is synthetic or a derivative thereof) or is included in a geographical designation. This decision by Greece, which was again not accepted by Skopje, which remained and remains attached to the so-called Constitutional name of the country, along with ethnicity and language, is a failure of our country's Strategy, which failed to make it clear that: - Macedonia is a geographical and historical region of Greece, which holds as its national territory 52% of the wider geographical area called Macedonia, with the remaining percentage of this (geographical area) being distributed 37,5% in FYROM, 9% in Bulgaria and 1,5% in Albania). – The wider geographical area of ​​Macedonia, which also includes the area of ​​Greek Macedonia, can in no way be considered or proven historically, politically, ethnologically and anthropologically as the homeland of the Slavs of FYROM who call themselves "MAKEDONSKI". Thus, in 2008, during the NATO Summit in Bucharest (April 2-3, 59th NATO SUMMIT), Skopje, with the support of the US (or rather the Administration of G. Boosh of the younger or small with or without quotation marks) had submitted a request to the Gen. NATO Secretariat since 2007, they attempted to become a member of NATO under their temporary name FYROM. Greece's reaction (which never turned into a veto since the issue was not discussed at this Summit given the negative stance of France and Spain) was correct since the temporary name FYROM always constituted Skopje's Trojan Horse. Contrary to Skopje's aspirations, the decision of this Summit on the issue of Skopje's accession to NATO, as seen in the Communiqué that was issued, states that: "Skopje's accession to NATO will take place as soon as a commonly accepted solution for the name has been reached." This decision was unanimous and was reiterated in the conclusions of the NATO Summits in Strasbourg (2009) and Lisbon (2010), (there was no Summit in 2011). This result created a serious political problem in Skopje, which tried to find a way to react mainly against Greece and, based on this reaction, to continue the delaying policy to achieve a commonly accepted solution for the name based on the geographical designation. The method chosen by the political leadership of Skopje was the unilateral appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague on November 17, 2008, with the aim of bypassing the UN-led negotiation process to resolve the name issue and forcing Greece in the future not to obstruct its accession with the temporary name to NATO on the one hand and to other international organizations on the other (e.g. in the EU where, with the help of Greece, FYROM, within the framework of Greek policy for the Western Balkans, has been a candidate for membership since 2005). On December 5, 2011, the International Court of Justice in The Hague, according to the Press Release No. 2011/37 it issued, announced its decision on the appeal according to which: – The Court, evaluating all the facts put before it, as well as the public political statements of the Greek side during and after the NATO Summit on April 4-2, 3, found that Greece violated Article 2008 of the 11 Interim Agreement, by raising objections to the accession of FYROM to NATO. (Here we must remember, as we said above, that Greece did not veto Macedonia's entry into NATO, since due to the positions expressed by other members of the alliance, the issue was not discussed in depth nor was it ever put to a vote. On the contrary, it was decided that Macedonia, according to the conclusions of the Summit, will be invited to join NATO if there is a mutually acceptable solution for the final name of this country. The reason why Skopje's proposal was accepted by the IDF is due to the public statements by the leadership of the then Greek government regarding the veto, mainly to demonstrate work and for ballot papers, statements that were used as evidence by the Skopjeans). – The Court also rejected FYROM's second request, considering it unnecessary to order Greece not to repeat similar behavior in the future. According to a statement by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs: – The decision does not deal with the issue of the name dispute, accepting that this dispute must be resolved in accordance with the decisions of the UN Security Council, i.e. the negotiations launched under the auspices of the UN, while inviting the two parties (Greece - FYROM) to engage substantively in these negotiations. – The decision does not and could not concern the decision-making process in NATO since the interim agreement between Greece and FYROM does not create obligations towards third parties and cannot cancel the procedures implemented in NATO for the accession of new members. The leadership of Skopje declared itself satisfied with the decision of the ICJ (5/12/2012) and based on it, a campaign was launched in Europe and America to promote the process of Macedonia's NATO accession. These efforts include: – Nicola Gruevski's visit to Germany, during which the German Chancellor essentially referred him to the process of resolving the name dispute (which is already being implemented by the UN) and subsequent accession. – The Prime Minister of Macedonia received approximately the same response from the EU President-in-Office, Mr. Herman Van Rompuy, a response that is also related to the decision of January 23, 2012 of the Council of the European Union on the accession of this country (to the Union). – President of the Republic of Macedonia Ivanov, in light of the decision of the ICJ, sent a letter to all 27 leaders of NATO countries requesting support for the country's accession to this Organization during the NATO Summit in Chicago, USA, later this year (April 2012). Of these efforts, only Turkey (as was evident from Ivanov's visit to it), Bulgaria (which has not fully clarified the issue) and Slovenia have expressed their support for Macedonia's accession to NATO during the upcoming Alliance Summit. – Around the end of January 2012, the Prime Minister of Skopje, through the Deputy Prime Minister of his government, Mrs. Arif (of Albanian nationality), requested a meeting with the Greek Prime Minister to examine bilateral relations. The meeting took place on March 2, 2012 in Brussels, within the framework of the 5th EU Summit, during which the two parties declared their intention to continue bilateral negotiations to resolve the name dispute with the assistance of the UN, as well as other issues. This meeting was preceded by: * The visits to Skopje and Greece of the UN negotiator Mr. Mathew Nimetz who seems to have not only assessed the situation but also conveyed appropriate messages. * The US Ambassador's briefing to the political leadership of Skopje, according to which "without a mutually acceptable resolution of the name dispute, there is no NATO membership." * The briefing of Skopje by the NATO Secretary General, Mr. Rasmussen, according to which the upcoming NATO Summit in Chicago, USA, based on the decision of the 2008 Bucharest Summit (which was reaffirmed in the conclusions of the Strasbourg (2009) and Lisbon (2010) Summits), cannot accept Skopje's accession to it under its provisional name, without first resolving the dispute, since the acceptance process requires unanimity, and therefore Greek consent. So at present, the ICJ decision does not have immediate positive results in favor of Skopje in NATO and we believe in the EU as well. {This is despite the decision of the plenary session of the European Parliament (EP) of 14-3-2012, following a relevant recommendation of its competent subcommittee of 24-1-2012, to start negotiations with Skopje, saying that the name dispute creates a problem in the EU's enlargement planning, and even expressing annoyance because the EU documents referring to Skopje and the Skopje people are absent from the Constitutional names of Skopje (Macedonia - Macedonian - Macedonians). The decision is not binding on the European Commission, but it is an indication of what is happening and how we have let the situation slide. The Commissioner responsible for enlargement, Šefan Füle, has already begun contacts with the Skopje leadership, which does not constitute the start of accession negotiations, but certainly high-level contacts. In fact, the aforementioned Commissioner does not use FYROM in his public statements but Macedonia. The issue, as it is developing, has created serious pressure on Gruevski's "ancients", while at the same time there is a reaction from the Albanian side of Skopje, to disengage from the name dispute. It is characteristic that this pressure comes from the Albanian party collaborating with the Skopje government, Ali Ahmeti's DUI. Of course, for the international agent of goodwill, it will be a task for him to understand the unjust, aggressive, blackmailing, inflexible, arrogant, irreconcilable and ahistorical practice of Skopje and not to be due to pity for the difficult situation in which Greece has found itself due to the generalized crisis that is plaguing it and because he does not want any positive action on his part for Skopje to trigger uncontrolled situations in our country. Whatever the philosophy of the international factor, we are gaining time, which in order to be constructive, both Greek diplomacy and the other actors of our society at home and abroad must mobilize immediately so that, on the one hand, the international factor is convinced of the rightness of the Greek positions and, on the other hand, Skopje is pressured to accept the mutually acceptable solution with a geographical definition (as unfortunately the national red line 6 is now), which will apply to everyone (erga omnes) and in addition, the official language will be determined to be Macedonian (as well as Albanian), while the ethnicities of Skopje will be determined to be Macedonians and Albanians. At the same time, the correct and non-fanatic information of the Greek people is absolutely necessary, since the Greek state allows the development of theories (which the Skopjeans are happy about and support), by certain "professors" or certain strange types (e.g. a group of fanatical supporters of Skopje, Greek-speaking, who through a website or e-mail accuse Greece of false and unhistorical positions on Skopje), while the worst thing is that this philosophy with positions against the truth and History has in some cases also been included in school books approved and made available by the Greek Ministry of Education (e.g. the 160rd High School History book, page XNUMX). These situations must stop and because Greece is a true democracy, there must be a response to the former, in terms of textbook sanctions. Despite the crisis we are going through, we cannot allow ourselves to suffer further national loss and humiliation. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 817/1993 UN Security Council Resolution 2. Interim Agreement Between Greece and FYROM (1995) 3. NATO Summit 2008 “Conclusions” 4. International Court of Justice / Press Release No 2011/33, 5 Dec 2011 5. Council of European Union “Council Conclusions on Enlargement / 5 Dec 2011 6. The Current Macedonian Issue between Athens and Skopje : Is there an option for Break Thought, by Dr Evangelos Kofos (April 2009)