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Conference on the Hybrid Threat

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" How NATO and the EU perceive the Hybrid Threat”

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Athens, 8 February 2022

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, good morning,

Let me begin my speech by thanking the organizers for their kind invitation to participate in this high-level Conference on such an interesting topic. The title of this presentation captures the perception of two important international organizations regarding this new form of warfare. But is it really a new form of warfare, or is it just a name that has changed?

The term “Hybrid Force” was first used in 1998 by US Navy (USN) Lieutenant Commander Robert G. Walker in his thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, entitled “US Marine Corps (USMC) Special Operations.” The term was attributed to the Marine Corps, which has historically proven itself to be a “Hybrid Force” capable of conducting operations in both conventional and unconventional warfare.

Avoiding referring to historical examples of Hybrid Warfare before the 20th century, the two World Wars of the 20th century with their tens of millions of victims, as well as the estimated total destruction with hundreds of millions of deaths in the event of a possible future thermonuclear war, reminded decision-makers and political-military scholars that another way to impose our will on adversaries must be found and pursued.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union realized that it had at its disposal an unconventional spiritual weapon of equal power to religion: the ideology of communism. And they began to use it, in the same way that various religions had been used by other power players in previous centuries.

Ideology, political maneuvering, exploitation of personal vulnerabilities, subversion, guerrilla groups and guerrilla tactics, unconventional warfare, press influence and Fake News, subversion and criminal activity became the new Weapons of Choice in this different kind of war. This period, known as the Cold War, saw limited combat action and few human losses by the Great Powers, but many bloody proxy wars, as well as intense political, diplomatic, economic, ideological activities and skirmishes that could achieve the same results as the bloody wars of the past.

When the Soviet system collapsed, new ideologies and new concepts began to fill the void: Globalization and Liberal order along with Islamic extremism and Terrorism. A new chapter for these combined forms of warfare has begun and this time it was called Hybrid War and was immediately adopted by everyone.

Another USMC military theorist, Lt. Col. (retd.) Frank Hoffman, contributed significantly to the popularization of the term, as a modern apostle of Hybrid Warfare. He first used the term to describe Hezbollah tactics and strategies, as seen in the summer of 2006 fighting between Israel and the Hezbollah Organization in Lebanon. Hezbollah clearly demonstrated the ability of non-state actors to study and exploit the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of Western military forces, even the best of them, such as the Israeli Armed Forces, and to devise appropriate countermeasures with surprising results. The term gained immense popularity and was further established from 2008 onwards, mainly due to its adoption by NATO's Allied Command Transformation as well as the existing interface between military and political planners in NATO.

In reality, Hybrid Wars combine the destructive and bloody conflict between states with the fanaticism, cruelty, and prolonged intensity of unorthodox warfare. There seem to be no limits to the Hybrid landscape.

After the above, we conclude that in general terms Hybrid Threats are characterized by:

• Ability to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities and weak points of targets across the spectrum of political, military, economic, social and informational activity as well as infrastructure activity (PMESII), in ways that have never been previously recognized and studied.
• A combination of conventional and unconventional, military and civilian, overt and covert actions.
• A broader set of military, political, economic and political information tools and techniques (MPECI) that usually cannot be found and recognized in traditional threat assessments.
• Attempt to create confusion and ambiguity regarding the origin, nature and target of the threat.
• Difficulty in being recognized as a Hybrid Threat until it is fully manifested, with harmful effects that will have already begun to manifest and thus reducing the target's ability to defend itself.
• Synchronizing Hybrid Media in New Ways.
• Ability to maintain the level of confrontation below any threshold of conventional war or armed attack and, therefore, beyond the UN Charter and provisions and jurisdiction of international Conventions, Laws and Treaties on war and armed conflict.

On the other hand, Hybrid Threats not:

• They are defined by their generating factors or their origin, since not only states, but also non-state actors and even individuals can be considered responsible for creating Hybrid Threats.
• They are related to a specific technology, because this technological list continues to grow with new developments, as new technologies are constantly becoming available.
• They aim for specific results, as a hybrid campaign can lead to different outcomes, such as human losses, change of political decisions, government changes, social or economic destruction, altered common understanding of the people, etc.

Overall, perhaps the best way to formulate the concept of the Hybrid Threat is that it could constitute a clear form of Total War beyond any classical definition of war, and beyond all limits of armed attack or conflict, and beyond all provisions and jurisdiction of International Law.

Based on all these issues, we can proceed to an initial definition of the “Hybrid Adversary” profile:

“The Hybrid Adversary, seeking to exploit the full range of target vulnerabilities, has the capability and initiative to simultaneously escalate at different points, along a broadly defined spectrum of conflicts, that transcends at will the boundaries of any conventional battlefield, in order to target the adversary’s state or society. At the same time, it can use different channels and proxies for illicit actions, often making it nearly impossible not only to identify the origin, but also to determine its real and clear strategic objectives.”

Who specifically these opponents might be is depicted on the screen.

Completing this historical review and the attempt at definition, a new question arises: To whom specifically can these Hybrid threats be attributed and who are these Hybrid adversaries, within the contemporary geopolitical context? If the characteristics of Hybrid War, as some scholars argue, "come from examining the enemy," then who is the enemy and what should we do to confront him?

According to the most widespread perception in the West, Russia is the embodiment of an adversary waging Hybrid War. Events in Georgia, Crimea, and Eastern Ukraine have led US, NATO, and EU security officials to pay closer attention to Russia’s dynamic behavior and the ways it conducts its conflicts. Russia’s Soviet past is also fully apparent.

Numerous sources describe “Hybrid Warfare,” a blend of Hard and Soft Power, as President Putin’s preferred method of action. Indeed, according to a 2006 statement by Putin, Russia’s approaches to conflict “must be based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetric and less costly.” His recent policy in Ukraine is fully indicative of this position.

Moreover, the statements of the Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Gerasimov, led some Western experts to believe that the West must adapt to the current state of relations with Russia, which can be characterized as a “permanent Hybrid War” where “…Russia has observed (or perhaps created) a tendency to blur the boundaries between war and peace… while… the role of non-military means in achieving political and strategic goals in many cases has exceeded the power of arms….”

Russia, however, is not the only Hybrid Threat perceived by the West. In the current European security environment, the other significant hybrid threat is considered to be the Islamic Organization of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) also known as ISIS or DAESH, as well as various affiliated or sister organizations of Islamic extremism and/or terrorism in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. ISIS has demonstrated a high level of expertise, knowledge and professionalism in hybrid matters, utilizing very quickly, ruthlessly and effectively and successfully all the hybrid tools at its disposal. They created, managed and spread terror in such a way that the New Iraqi Army, on which many billions of dollars had been spent, collapsed within a few weeks without any major battle.

But this is not exclusively a European issue or just a Middle Eastern issue. China remains a very old international player that has recently re-emerged on the world stage. We should not forget that Sun Tzu’s writings on winning wars without fighting were the real motivation and impetus for this form of warfare by the Chinese leadership. Chinese Hybrid operations conducted against and within neighboring countries (notably Australia), suggest that Beijing’s doctrine is much more operational than merely academic.

China’s concept of “Quasi-War” (a term referring to an undeclared, though heavily waged, primarily naval form of warfare), which is part of the Concept of Military Operations (War-Quasi-War-Non-War), widely known as the “Three Wars Concept”. This concept clearly includes legal, psychological and informational activities outside of war, while at the same time building national power, increasing conventional military capabilities and expanding its military reach. It remains to be seen to what extent China will maintain its interest in Hybrid War once it achieves global parity with other Great Powers or even superiority.

Another new and very skilled Hybrid player has emerged in recent years: Turkey. President Erdogan of Turkey, as part of his effort to elevate not only Turkey to a strong regional power, but also himself to a prominent and dominant figure in Turkish history, has proceeded to “instrumentalize” and later to “weaponize” the important and dominant Hybrid “tools” (or “Weapons”) that Turkey has in its Hybrid “toolbox.” These “tools” (or “weapons”) are known to Turkey as “the Three M’s” from their corresponding English words: (Migrants) refugees, (Military) military force, and (Mosques) mosques. Although they can be used independently, they are usually used in combination, with each complementing the others.

Against Greece, military threats, threatening Casus Belli statements, military projection of power and aggressive policy, combined with continuous violations of national sovereignty (all of these hybrid tools by definition), have been combined with the uncontrolled sending of refugees and migrants violating Greek and EU borders. This is a “Hybrid Invasion” designed to create problems in both Greece and the EU, trying to force both Athens and Brussels to bow to Turkish geopolitical and economic demands. Above all, this “Hybrid Invasion” has the potential to create a huge social, economic and security problem in Greece, the EU and all adjacent countries. The Hybrid character of this uncontrolled migration, this refugee “invasion” against the EU at its borders, is self-evident and must be considered as Hybrid because it is not carried out by armed soldiers but by unarmed citizens.

But we should examine what the West and the two main international organizations are doing to protect themselves.

At first, Hybrid Warfare became the chosen keyword for NATO and later for the EU. There was no common understanding of the term among NATO allies and EU member states. There was a continuation of the expression that Hybrid Warfare was completed “by examining the enemy”, adding that Hybrid Warfare also comes from “looking in the mirror” being the product of a sudden self-awareness of the West’s weakness and vulnerabilities when faced with an increasingly uncertain and volatile international environment and at the same time an adversary willing and ready to exploit it.

NATO was the first to develop an approach to “Hybrid Warfare”. Various understandings of Hybrid Warfare by NATO experts contradicted the established terms that tried to consider Hybrid Warfare as just another form of 21st century warfare, where an adversary can use any means at its disposal, while Hybrid Warfare should certainly not be placed on a pedestal of honor. Furthermore, Hybrid Warfare was an opportunity for military defense planners to stay “in touch” with developments, to remain involved in NATO Defense Planning and Crisis Response Measures, and to guarantee the military establishment a constant level of attention and interest. NATO officials acknowledged that NATO sees Hybrid Warfare as “a form of warfare that aims to destabilize and make a country more vulnerable to attack,” while providing “a useful, holistic understanding of security challenges from both the East and the South” as well as the “tools” for comparative strategic analysis, while allowing for the design and eventual implementation of a differentiated response.

However, NATO’s approach to “Hybrid Warfare” seems to be largely linked to a previously “dominant term”, known as the “Comprehensive Approach”, a “condensed” product of the Alliance’s experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan and earlier of the US in Vietnam. During these crises, NATO recognized that Armed Forces (AF) cannot resolve a Crisis or Conflict on their own. Achieving acceptable and sustainable solutions requires capabilities that AF alone cannot provide. A comprehensive and integrated political and military approach is essential for the effective management of today’s complex Crises. Therefore, NATO’s “Comprehensive/Integrated” approach can be understood as a concept, a philosophical or political or cognitive approach and not as a documented process or capability. Moreover, NATO has decided not to develop and publish any definition of this approach precisely so as not to be attributed the authorship. Even NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg in her attempt to achieve continuity in NATO’s adaptation efforts stated that “Hybrid Warfare is the dark reflection of our comprehensive approach” and began to refer to “preparation, deterrence and defense” against Hybrid Warfare.

Following the rule of the three “Ds” from the corresponding English words, although with Dialogue or Collective Defense, there was clear guidance and complete strategic and operational planning, with Deterrence the situation was more complex. Hybrid War was assessed as the least deterrent and therefore Deterrence of Hybrid War, not really easy and useful for the Alliance. For this purpose, the new concept of “Deterrent Denial” was created within the Alliance. This concept is based on reducing the expected advantage of an action by hardening the defense against it, while making the cost of a possible attack unbearable for the adversary. This form of “Deterrent Denial”, although initially counterproductive and costly, is expected to yield better results than the low chances of success of “Punitive Deterrence”, another form of Deterrence that aims to convince the adversary that the high cost of achieving its objective will be prohibitive. All these second thoughts ultimately make another form of Deterrence, “Deterrent Resilience”, the new, logical and natural choice of NATO for its defense planning.   

Cyber ​​attacks, one of the main tools of the “Hybrid Threat”, have made NATO Allies aware of the importance of “Resilience”. In addition to the survival of governments and the resilience of state mechanisms, the resilience of infrastructure, services and goods of critical societal importance, all of these are very important because they complement NATO’s “Military Mobility”. This is a joint extremely important NATO and EU Program and Plan, which guarantees the rapid mobility and deployment of allied troops throughout the territory of the EU and NATO in order to counter any threat against them, Hybrid or Conventional.

In addition, NATO developed guidelines for strengthening national resilience and established a new Directorate of Political and Military Intelligence at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, in order to convince NATO members to share the information that is a primary factor in identifying, understanding, knowing and responding to Hybrid Threats.

In short, NATO's approach and response to Hybrid Threats and War can be described as being based on its military capabilities, being focused, realistic, and non-obsessive about the nature of hybrid threats, being based on maintaining the Comprehensive Approach, and ultimately protecting the Solidarity and Cohesion that are the Centers of Gravity of the Alliance.

At the same time, and in the same geopolitical landscape, another international player now seems to be the most suitable for addressing Hybrid Threats, the European Union (EU).

In general, the EU, always keeping its distance from anything related to the UD, avoided the term “Hybrid Warfare” in principle and preferred the phrase “Hybrid Threats”. The usual lack of coherence was evident when the Union did not agree on a definition, it began to elaborate a series of “political responses”, based on a video produced by the EU Council in which “hybrid threats” were described as “a combination of military and non-military means aimed at destabilizing adversaries, creating confusion, masking the real situation on the ground and hindering decision-making”. To understand the EU’s relaxed approach to Hybrid Threats, we should bear in mind that as early as 2015, the then EU High Representative and Vice-President, Ms. Federica Mogherini, called them “the new normal”. In the same period, some Member States (MS) started to draft non-papers on the subject, but focusing on different issues. Thus, the non-paper from the Nordic Group focused on Russia, the French on the South and the Finnish on resilience. The Latvian and Luxembourg Presidencies of the EU drafted basic briefings as a background to provide the framework and proposals for future study and analysis of the subject. This was followed by a mandate to the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) of the EEAS (European External Action Service) to draft an initial discussion paper, to be issued in May 2015.

However, the process was officially launched with the invitation in May 2015 by the European Commission’s Foreign Affairs Council and the EU High Representative/Vice-President to develop a common framework on Hybrid Threats “with actionable proposals”. The EU sought to take into account all the concerns of the MS and as always, this comprehensive approach again led to confusion within the EU. The failure to provide a clear definition was called “a need for flexibility”, while the Director of the CMPD stated that Hybrid is “just a bumper sticker” and there is no need for a definition… as long as we know what we mean by it. Within the same framework, the CMPD stated in an early document in a surprisingly clear and pragmatic way for the EU, that “Hybrid Warfare can be characterized more easily than it is defined, as the centrally planned and controlled use of various covert and overt tactics, activated by military and/or non-military means, ranging from Information and Cyberspace actions to economic pressures and the use of conventional military forces.”

Ultimately, CMPD’s leadership in shaping the EU’s overall response to “Hybrid Warfare” resulted in an approach similar to NATO. CMPD staff argued that “Hybrid Attacks are designed to exploit a country’s vulnerabilities” and can “create ambiguity both among the affected population” and internationally with the “goal of overthrowing the government.” The emphasis on vulnerabilities leads directly to the issue of “building resilience” and ultimately “how the EU sees its role in addressing them.”

Although there is no doubt that the EU is better than any other Organization at addressing Hybrid Threats, the EU has officially acknowledged that “responding to and countering them is and will remain a national responsibility” and the Union’s role is described as a platform for harmonizing responses to specific issues, as well as providing added value in information, resilience and response.

This EU approach to countering “Hybrid Threats” was implemented in April 2016, when the Council welcomed the Joint Communication on Countering the “Hybrid Threat” and Promoting the Resilience of the EU and its Member States as well as its Partners “and invited the Commission and the EU High Representative/Vice-President “to provide a report by July 2017 to assess progress” on the issue, stressing “the need for closer dialogue, coordination and cooperation with NATO”.

In July 2016, following the bold launch of the EU Global Strategy, the EU leadership together with the NATO Secretary General (SECGEN) signed a Joint Declaration in Warsaw aimed at giving new impetus and substance to the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership. Two years later in 2018, the EU and NATO leaderships signed a second Joint Declaration in Brussels calling for rapid and demonstrable progress in implementation.

The Declarations outlined 74 concrete actions in seven areas where cooperation between the two Organizations should be strengthened. One of these areas is “Countering Hybrid Threats”, including 10 concrete actions. Five Progress Reports have since been submitted, highlighting the main achievements and added value of EU-NATO cooperation in the different areas.

 The study of these documents is essential for understanding the EU and NATO response to “Hybrid Warfare” as well as the cooperation between them. To this end, the EU has identified three steps:

• Situation perception
• Durability
• Reaction on a case-by-case basis

The first step of the EU response to “Hybrid Threats” involves “improving perception” with a key element of establishing a clear understanding of what exactly “Hybrid Threats” are and how they differ from “non-Hybrid” ones by accepting that not all modern threats are “Hybrid” and thus avoiding the usual “creative ambiguity”. The flagship initiative to address the ambiguity of “Hybrid Warfare” was the creation of an “EU Hybrid Fusion Cell” within the “EU Intelligence and Situation Centre” in order to:

• Identify the patterns and traces of a Hybrid campaign in the Information provided by MS and EU institutions.
• To cooperate with NATO.
• To provide the EU leadership responsible for decision-making with the best understanding of the situation.

Moving on to the second and third steps of the EU response to “Hybrid Threats”, we identify “Resilience” and “Ad hoc Response”. The multi-layered and multi-faceted nature of Threats of this kind requires an equally multi-layered Response, theoretically embracing the widest range of actions, with the aim of both “building Resilience” and “Responding to attacks”.

The first approach to addressing “Hybrid Threats” was mainly military-centric and this is especially true in the context of NATO. However, the non-military and primarily unconventional nature of this type of Threats requires that they be addressed using non-military means and a political approach. Most importantly, in the context of the EU, is the perception of the combination and continuity of external and internal policies as well as of the “security instruments and tools” which are likely to ultimately provide the most appropriate response.

Therefore, the EU needs a specific type of policy based on the balanced use of “Smart Power”. Originally known as the EU’s “Comprehensive Policy”, it is not to be confused with the NATO Policy of the same name. It later became known as the “Integrated Approach Policy to Conflicts and Crises” and became a strategic priority for EU External Action. It involves a more coherent use of the various policies and instruments at the EU’s disposal, ranging from conflict prevention and diplomacy, security and defence to development, governance, humanitarian aid, trade and finance. Given that these policy areas fall under the remit of different EU bodies and services, the implementation of the Integrated Approach requires a high degree of coordination, while respecting different mandates, roles, legal frameworks and chains of command. In operational terms, any EU-wide Response Policy should share responsibilities and identify synergies between four bodies or instruments:  

• EU Member States' instruments and activities.
• EU internal security instruments (security, justice, etc.).
• EU external security instruments, including EU civil or military operations and CSDP missions.
• NATO activities on the same topic or region.

Exploring the idea of ​​Deterrence that should be included in the EU’s responses to “Hybrid Threats”, the focus here again remains on Resilience. Although the EU officially does not mention Deterrence and unofficially EU people announce that “we do not deter”, many elements point in this direction. Actions that constitute Deterrence can be easily identified by the possible invocation by any MS of Article 42-7 of the EU Treaty requesting “Mutual Assistance” in the event of multiple serious “Hybrid Threats” that constitute armed aggression against that state (as happened in 2016 with France after the terrorist attacks in Paris). This can easily be assessed as “Deterrence through Resilience” or “Deterrence through Mutual Assistance”. In another area, “Deterrence through Resilience” was observed through increased cooperation with NATO, and this was done in the coordinated NATO-EU response to the Aegean refugee crisis in 2016, with the Resilience actors being mainly Greece and the remaining EU MS in the region or even at the end of the “refugee corridor” i.e. in Austria, Germany or Sweden.

Overall, although the EU indeed, for obvious political reasons and to "save its soul" does not openly use the concept of Deterrence, this does not mean that it will not use "Deterrent Denial", when necessary, using the right tool of denial, which includes the main "Hard Power tools" namely economic sanctions and political and diplomatic sanctions.

In conclusion, the EU response to “Hybrid threats” can be seen as a combination of existing measures together with new efforts to improve situational awareness and protect vulnerabilities. Although the first line of defence will likely (and perhaps should) remain with the MS, the EU needs to demonstrate its added value when it comes to improving situational awareness, building resilience and responding to attacks. This response, to be sustainable and effective, should include:

• Development of various sectoral strategies (most of them already implemented) such as maritime security or cybersecurity, and finally a broader "Global Strategy" drafted and approved in 2016.
• Existing national policies combined with EU-level cooperation in the areas of law enforcement, border control, drugs, counter-terrorism and information exchange.
• Possible EU initiatives aimed at either developing capabilities in third countries or countering hostile activities whenever they occur.
• Synchronization of all these actions, with a personalized approach on a case-by-case basis.

While NATO-EU cooperation outside the “Berlin Plus” arrangements is hampered by political obstacles, a new dynamic engagement has emerged in the context of “Hybrid Warfare”. Given the urgency, NATO Member States and Allies have given more space to the Staffs of both organisations to improve cooperation, find synergies and progressively deepen their relationship. Despite the slow progress and ups and downs of formal EU-NATO cooperation, “Hybrid Warfare” has set the tone for closer institutional contacts between NATO and the EU. To this end, NATO is engaged in mainly informal discussions with the EU, in four different areas:

• Political-military planning.
• Cyber ​​defense.
• Information sharing.
• Strategic Communications.

The 2015-1016 migration crisis in the Aegean was not only a real test of EU-NATO cooperation in emerging crises, but also an important and clear symbol with serious implications for European public opinion on how the two Organizations can jointly address crises. Considered a “key test of relevance” for the Alliance, it led NATO to involve its naval forces in patrolling the Aegean sea area and in exchanging information with the EU FRONTEX agency through liaison officers. NATO also launched Operation SEA GUARDIAN and supported, mainly with assets and information, and continues to support, the European Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAFORMED) in the execution of its mission in the Central Mediterranean.

However, full and comprehensive cooperation between NATO and the EU is constantly being hindered by the Cyprus-Turkey issue and more recently by the Austria-Turkey issue. It can be clearly said that it is the sense of urgency created by the “Hybrid Threats” and especially by Russian actions in Ukraine, which has created the current impetus for the formal EU-NATO relationship.

Another aspect of this informal cooperation is linked to the Centres of Excellence (COE). The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is an international and independent network of professionals and experts based in Helsinki, Finland. The Hybrid Centre of Excellence focuses on responses to Hybrid Threats under the auspices of the European Union (EU) and NATO.

The “Hybrid Center of Excellence” is described as a “practical application pool” that conducts training courses, relevant exercises, hosts workshops for politicians and practitioners, and produces assessment documents on Hybrid Threats, such as vulnerabilities in an electrical grid or the potential exploitation of vaguely written legislation. The Center was officially established in April 2017, inaugurated in October 2017, and has a budget of 1,5 million euros. The Hybrid Center of Excellence now includes 31 participating NATO and EU states.

The Finnish Centre of Excellence, in order to fulfil its mission, is allowed and can cooperate with all NATO Centres of Excellence (COE) dealing with issues related to “Hybrid Threats”. Furthermore, these interconnections have the potential to provide coordinated policy responses to both Organizations, provided that this EU Centre together with all other relevant NATO Centres avoids the trap of “academic awareness raising” and becomes clearly “operational” following in the footsteps of a more “operational” NATO Cooperative Centre of Excellence for Cyber ​​Defence located in Estonia.

 There is no doubt that the “Hybrid War” that has been known for over 15 years has created confusion in our vocabulary. “Hybrid” terms that evolve not only “looking at the enemy” but also “looking in the mirror”, have led both the EU and NATO to use “Hybrid” terminology to describe a changing cyber security environment in which permanent and stable policies could not be openly defined. Therefore, Hybrid terms do not refer to Russia, ISIS or the instrumentalization of migration, but seek to send a message of danger and urgency and perhaps fear in an era of virtual peace. But the most important role of this modern terminology and these policy models is to facilitate the understanding by both decision-makers and our population of all those challenges arising from the new online security environment and the observed diffusion of power.

The crises and conflicts of the 21st century reflect a greater degree of convergence and complexity and require everyone to keep informed and “open-minded” to the various modes of confrontation that already exist or are about to emerge. In this context, it is very important to have options available if for any reason red lines are crossed, thresholds are exceeded and the situation gets out of control or becomes irreversible. These options should mainly include stable military capabilities that will save the situation in order to ensure the support, defense or enforcement of the strategic objectives that have been set. If things get difficult, the Navy of Tweeter or Microsoft or the Air Force of Facebook or Apple (to remember Thomas L. Friedman), do not have sufficient combat power and will not come to the rescue, nor are they able to provide a decisive result. Real and stable military capabilities with high technology, availability and effectiveness, high combat value and power, as well as a firm will to use them if required, are often necessary to support "Hybrid Warfare" activities.

Ultimately and returning again to NATO and the EU, the "Hybrid War" intensified and facilitated the need for both Organizations to come and cooperate more closely to protect their role, freedom and democracy, their principles, their interests, their capabilities, their citizens and their way of life.