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Prokopis Pavlopoulos interview on T/S Meganews tonight and to the journalist Ms. Voula Kechagia (17/1/2026)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78VjBOF9eXs

The former President of the Republic, Academic and Honorary Professor of the Law School of the University of Athens, Mr. Prokopios Pavlopoulos, granted an interview to MEGANEWS (broadcast from ONE Channel) and to the journalist Ms. Voula Kechagia. His answers were within the framework of his following established positions:

 I. Donald Trump's second victory in the USA and the "New Order of Things» on a planetary level

It is an indisputable fact that the second election of Donald Trump in the USA - which clearly ""surprised" the European Union while it was rather expected, a fact that also shows the great political deficits of European leaders today - has brought about shocking geopolitical and geostrategic, and not only, changes of global dimensions. Changes, which need to be studied and analyzed with precision but also with due projection into the future as to their general effects. In particular, the European Union, if it certainly has an elementary awareness of the dangers that lie ahead for European Unification and European Integration, must draw the key conclusions as to what it should do in the immediate future. Finally, with regard to Greece and Cyprus - that is, Hellenism as a whole - and with the main focus on how we must prevent and effectively neutralize the obvious and ruthless Turkish threat, it is, of course, the time for full empathy with our National Debt, especially for the defense of our Territorial Integrity and our National Sovereignty, with the additional shielding of all our Sovereign Rights.

A. The "New Order of Things» -which US Vice President J.D. Vance described at the Munich Security Conference on 14.2.2025 with the cynical, even graphic, phrase ""There's a new sheriff in town."– is due to what we could call “Trump doctrine". One "doctrine" which consists, basically, in the fact that the planetary dominance of the United States cannot be achieved under purely geopolitical and geostrategic conditions, but much more under economic conditions. Because the economic "suzerainty" is the one that certainly establishes the more general planetary superiority, in all its manifestations. It is, obviously, the "apotheosis" of the modern "economism» worldwide, with all that this entails. In particular:

B. Before Trump, the USA as a global superpower sought its global dominance under almost purely geopolitical and geostrategic conditions, integrating its economic aspirations within this framework. And specifically, still influenced by the remnants of the Cold War era and the then not insignificant geostrategic "volume" of the USSR, they considered Russia as their main opponent. Therefore, and on the basis of the early 20th century theory of John Mackinter – in his study “The geographical pivot of history'('The geographical axis of history"), Geographical Journal, 1904, 23, p. 421-437 – that "K"Ruler of the Planet"  is the one who controls the "K""Earth's bread",  approximately the size of the then USSR, they rejected and prevented any rapprochement of Russia with NATO and the European Union. Hence, with NATO at the tip of the spear, they looked forward to a "reasonably"  a strong European Union as an ally against Russia, while at times they attempted to develop good relations with China, already since the Nixon-Kissinger era.

C. After Donald Trump's second election, the big change is that the US is now seeking global dominance not so much in geopolitical and geostrategic terms, but much more in almost purely economic terms. And this is because, according to Donald Trump, economic "suzerainty" is the one that ensures the planetary supremacy of the United States. It is the "apotheosis" of the logic of the modern "economism", through "sovereignty" of "economic" on the "institutional". In this light, the main opponent on the path to the planetary dominance of the US is not Russia but China, as a rapidly rising power economically and technologically. This is the reason why Donald Trump does not seem to count on the European Union, which is already weak in many ways anyway, and mainly economically and militarily. While he no longer considers Russia as a dangerous opponent, especially due to its geopolitical and economic weakening under conditions that are extremely difficult to overturn. This further explains why Donald Trump does not consider the ""multi-purpose" NATO, with its new broader role, is useful and crucial for the USA. In parallel and accordingly, it is rushing to close the war fronts on the one hand in wider Europe - and to be precise in Ukraine - and indeed in a way that clearly favors the USA economically. And, on the other hand, in the Middle East, leaving a large field of action there primarily to Israel, and partly to Turkey, judging that both of these countries are now, and in the long term, under the control of the USA. In this way, it believes that in a very short time the USA will have all its forces, and primarily the economic ones, available exclusively against China. So that China's path to the global economic summit will be halted, without the possibility of reversal, which today appears to be very likely. The recent moves of the American President towards both Venezuela and Greenland should be judged in the same direction, while respecting the necessary analogies.

D. It should be noted, in addition, that this entire policy of Donald Trump presupposes a ""almighty" President of the USA - therefore an all-powerful Executive Power - who can control, to a large extent, the Legislative Power (Congress, i.e. Senate and House of Representatives) and the Judicial Power (i.e. basically the Supreme Court of the USA). This certainly implies a dangerous weakening of the institutional guarantees of Representative Democracy in the USA, due to the corresponding weakening of the ""institutional counterweights" which constitute the ""crown" of the American Republic since its establishment, but also an example to be emulated internationally. Let us not underestimate the fact that nothing can prejudge that this weakening of the "institutional counterweights"can be consolidated and continued in the US in the future and become"endemic", a negative phenomenon for democratic institutions in this world-leading country. With what this implies for the "export" on a more permanent basis and to other Western countries, especially Europe.

II.  The Decline of International Law and Sovereignty: In the Constellation of the Pre-Treaty of Westphalia (1648) Era?

For over three decades, but especially since the start of the War in Ukraine on 24.2.2022 and thereafter - and especially after Donald Trump was elected President of the United States for the second time in 2024 - the global manifestations have been multiple and significant. "honorary" which attest, with increasingly ominous evidence, to the decadent course of International Law and Sovereignty, as a fundamental constituent element of the Nation-State: War conflicts follow one another, while International Law is used to address them. "he/she/it is studying" emphatically, fatalistically conceding the force of the rule of law to the arbitrariness of the powerful and the law of might. In parallel, but also concomitantly, the concept of Sovereignty, this pillar of the existence of the Nation-State which under the regime of Representative Democracy supported, from the 19^ο century and beyond, the democratic institutional and political edifice, at least in the West, is shrinking dramatically as another "skin of sadness" through the demonstration of power of the protagonists of the claim to a quasi-global hegemony. The above development appears all the more dystopian, as this newly built "imperialism" is based, almost exclusively, on purely economic goals and objectives, with the main aim of global economic "suzerainty" in the context of an Economic Globalization that does not tolerate other rules of law than those that it itself produces and imposes. But is it possible that in this way – and, of course, respecting historical analogies, and beyond the elementary precepts of accepted historical comparison – the specific international framework and system returns, under conditions of depressing lawlessness, to the era before 1648? That is, to the era before the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which laid the foundations of modern International Law and the so-called "Westphalian Sovereignty", as a primary institutional and political feature of the subsequently emerging Nation-State?

A. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 is the normative amalgam of three Treaties, which were signed between May and October 1648 in the Westphalian cities of Münster and Osnabrück, with its final form being institutionalized in «Peace Hall» of Osnabrück on 24.10.1648. This Treaty put an end to the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648).   The Thirty Years' War began with the operations in Bohemia, when Protestant leaders established a provisional government based in Prague, in response to the authoritarianism of Emperor Ferdinand II, head of the then Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. It was a Protestant uprising, which turned against both the Habsburg Dynasty and the Catholic Church, offering the crown of Bohemia to the Calvinist Elector Palatine Frederick, who accepted it in 1619, as Frederick V (Wittelsbach dynasty). The general war that followed involved troops from France, England, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Poland, Bavaria, Saxony and Brandenburg. In 1640, when the war had led to enormous loss of life and unprecedented destruction, the first peace talks began as many Continental European states sent 145 representatives to Westphalia for peace talks regarding the end of the hostilities and the future of Europe.

B. As already noted, the peace talks had a happy ending with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia on 24.10.1648. The aforementioned Treaty led to significant territorial compromises and corresponding territorial changes, through the creation of new States - e.g. United Dutch Provinces, Swiss Confederation - through the preservation of existing ones, such as e.g. France and Denmark, but also through the strengthening of the autonomy of the then German States. The same Treaty also led essentially to the end of the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) between Spain and 17 provinces of the then Netherlands. This territorial distribution lasted approximately until 1789, that is, until the outbreak of the French Revolution. There were two most important institutional and political achievements of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia.

1. FirstThe "birth" of International Law of the expanded International Treaties and Conventions, aiming at the peaceful coexistence of Peoples and States primarily by ensuring the balance of power and the peaceful resolution of international disputes, and consequently by peaceful cooperation and creation on this basis. In this sense, and always respecting historical analogies, the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was a kind of precursor for the Treaties that led, in the 20^ο century, in the establishment of both the League of Nations, after the First World War, and the UN, after the Second World War, and to a certain extent in the establishment of the European Communities, which ultimately took the form of the European Union.
2. Second, the formation of the modern concept of Sovereignty – hence the term "Westphalian Sovereignty"– as an institutional and political quasi-existential element of the Nation-State. Which in the process, with the additional institutional and political characteristics of Representative Democracy, provided the foundation and basis of Democratic Culture in general in Europe and more broadly in the West.

C.  The initial euphoria of the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990, which heralded a new era of definitive consolidation of the aforementioned achievements of International Law and Sovereignty as catalysts for the peaceful coexistence and creation of Peoples and States worldwide, was soon followed by the depressing transition to a new order of things. Which has begun to marginalize both the, admittedly long-problematic, normative power of International Law and the emblematic principle of respect for the Sovereignty of States, which is beneficially reinforced by the institutions of Representative Democracy and its corresponding institutional counterparts, namely the guarantees of the Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the respect for Fundamental Human Rights. A simple observation of international events is enough to demonstrate that, with the key responsibility of the planetary powers led by the USA, International Relations in general, from the declaration of war to peacemaking processes, are anything but governed by International Law. Thus, the power of International Law is gradually being replaced by "fair" of the power of those who dominate the world stage. Who even openly speak out against International Law with unprecedented arrogance, without considering that their attitude constitutes a sign of arbitrariness that undermines the very roots of our common Civilization, especially the roots of Humanism, Democracy and Justice, and therefore the humanitarian and democratic roots of the States they lead. In addition, the conflicts succeed one another, to the extent that they begin to take on the characteristics of an indestructible everyday life. Based on the fact that the motivations of these conflicts are clearly economic - with the ultimate goal of conquering economic dominance - such wars now have all the characteristics of a Global Economic War. A war whose symptoms we have not yet understood precisely because they are unprecedented and, therefore, the meager experiences of the past do not help us decipher them.

D. The same situations as above explain how and why the Sovereignty of States, whose irreplaceable institutional guarantee is International Law, is losing its inherent characteristics with geometric progression. And thus it leads these States to a status of satellites that are simply called upon to choose in the international firmament the "star" around which they will revolve. Such a loss of the institutional sovereign links of the weaker States – and therefore of the links of their Representative Democracy – because it evolves under the  "suzerainty" of "economic" on him "institutional" As explained above, it results not only in their international but also in their economic marginalization. Inevitably, it also shapes the ever-widening multidimensional inequalities between States, as demonstrated by the studies of D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. Robinson, who in 2024 were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for them.

E. Ironically, on November 3 and 4, 2022, due to the fact that the war in Ukraine had begun a few months earlier, with its dark prospects already apparent, the Foreign Ministers of the G7 – USA, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Canada, with the participation of the European Union – met in Münster, Federal Republic of Germany, in a kind of "Peace Conference"The associations for a "new Peace Treaty of Westphalia", with the aim of safeguarding world peace, were more than obvious. The disastrous failure of this Conference probably sounded like the  "swan song" of modern International Law. Furthermore, as the "swan song"  regarding what remains of the achievements of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Therefore, the major stake of our time for the fate of our Planet should probably be condensed into the following dilemma: Primarily, will we, the citizens of the European Union and shareholders of its historical Culture, accept, under the dominance of a fatalistic epistemic logic, to return to the pre-1648 era of authoritarianism and warlike anarchy? Or will we defend, with whatever means we have at our disposal and at whatever cost, Peace, Democracy and Justice, and ultimately Man and Humanism?

III.  Ο «surprise" of the weak European Union since the second election of Donald Trump

It is certain that the European Union ""was taken by surprise" -and wrongly- from both the second election of Donald Trump and his plans, believing that they were pre-election excesses without any significant prospects for their practical implementation.

A. But as was wrongly pointed out "was surprised", and because the election of Donald Trump was predictable and because the European Union is not legitimate, based on its History and Culture, to represent the "judge" of the US in order to justify its shortcomings. It must first look at its own house, remembering the words of Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, in the House of Commons, in 1850: In international relations there are no friendships but interests. Consequently, it is responsible for the fact that Donald Trump's USA treats it with disdain. And this is because the European Union today is more "weak» since ever, that is, since it was created as a single international entity, in 1993, with the Maastricht Treaty and as a Union of the pre-existing European Communities.

B. This is because the basic pillars on which the European Union was founded and is supported under the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union have not acquired the necessary roots and do not function effectively, so as to guarantee the European Union the appropriate respect towards it from third parties. First of all, the CFSP pillar has never been organized in an elementary way, given that today there is neither a structured Common Foreign Policy nor a fully structured Security Policy. Also, in the economic field the European Union is "incomplete". Because there is only an elementary "Monetary Union"through the Eurozone, but not a real one"Economic Union». There are probably as many economic policies as there are Member States of the European Union, which makes the scope of the Euro's monetary reach within the framework of the Global Economy extremely precarious. And this is crucial for the whole and the perspective of the European Union, as Mario Draghi's recent report showed. In simple words, under these circumstances the European Union cannot become a global economic power, while the investment value of the Euro internationally is undermined from the outset.

ΙV. Turkey's long-standing revisionist aspirations to the detriment of Greece and Hellenism

Turkey's historically provocative and revisionist - and strategic in nature for it - aspirations towards Greece and Hellenism, especially in the era of Tayyip Erdogan, which completely ignore International Law and European Law, are basically three:

A. First, the eventual coming of Cyprus under its full control. A fact which is easily proven by the fact that Turkey does not seek nor accept in essence a solution of the Cyprus Issue on, even elementary, terms of International Law and European Law, aiming initially at partition and in the distant future at the entrapment of Cyprus under its sovereign influence.

B. Second, the quasi "partition" of the Aegean Sea and the corresponding equal co-exploitation therein, in clear violation of every concept of the fundamental principles of the UN Law of the Sea. "Command line" in this regard it is the 25th^th meridian, in the sense that in this way Turkey "claims" 50% of the Aegean Sea. When today, always according to the UN Law of the Sea, its influence in this case is limited to a maximum of 25%, while the remaining 75% is attributed to Greece. For example, and always according to the UN Law of the Sea, having as a reference point the Territorial Zone in the Aegean Sea on both sides under the temporary regime of 6 nm, Greece is attributed 43,5% and Turkey is only 7,5%. Whereas if Greece fully exercises its right to extend the Territorial Zone to 12 nm - of course always under the terms and conditions of the UN International Law of the Sea (mainly article 3) - Greece is attributed 71,5% of the Aegean Sea and Turkey is only 8,7%. This alone explains the unthinkable, from the perspective of International Law and European Law, promotion by Turkey of the casus belli of 1995, the year in which the UN International Law of the Sea came into force.

C. And, thirdly, the creation of conditions for the future autonomy of the entire region of Greek Thrace through the creation of a powerful so-called "Turkish minority". That is, a supposedly "national minority", which has no legal basis or can have, especially to the extent that it is in obvious contradiction with the substantive statutory provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Provisions which recognize in Greek Thrace only a Religious Muslim Minority, and certainly not, and indeed not in any way, an ethnic "Turkish minority".

1. VThe Cyprus Question in the Light of International Law and European Law

In the wake of the fragile peace achieved in the Middle East, and with a time horizon of the near and distant future, it is obvious that the geoeconomic, geopolitical and geostrategic data in the Eastern Mediterranean are changing rapidly, especially in light of the exploitation of the energy resources of this region in full compliance mainly with the rules of the UN International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Montego Bay Convention of 1982), par excellence with regard to the delimitation of Maritime Zones and primarily the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). And the geographical position of Cyprus alone clearly highlights that its role in the context of the above major changes in the Eastern Mediterranean is, almost by nature and by definition, decisive. In this regard, only the "testimonials» on the one hand, the Greek Initiative for the Multilateral Framework "5X5" in the Eastern Mediterranean with the participation of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, Turkey and Libya, for cooperation on common issues such as Migration, the Protection of the Marine Environment and the delimitation of Maritime Zones. And, on the other hand, the very recent (6.11.2025) joint statement of the Ministers of Energy of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Israel and the USA, as well as the Co-Chairs of the US National Energy Sovereignty Council (3+1 Cooperation), regarding their joint commitment to promoting energy security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean as a key factor in the stability of the region, with energy development and the protection of energy infrastructure as key axes. The extremely worrying fact in this regard is that the aforementioned second initiative (3+1 Cooperation) to promote security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the corresponding role of Cyprus are rather approached and planned on purely economic grounds, while the necessary appropriate institutional guarantees, and in particular those based on International Law and European Law, are almost completely absent. A typical example in this worrying direction is the recent interview of the US Ambassador to Ankara, Mr. Tom Barrack. In the context of this interview, Mr. Tom Barrack referred, among others, to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey and stressed the need to form new communication structures for the normalization of their relations. However, structures that are based exclusively on economic connectivity for an institutionalized dialogue in the wider region, from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. However, Mr. Tom Barak diligently avoided clarifying on what institutional and regulatory basis this economic connectivity would be founded, with the additional observation that any reference to International Law and European Law was conspicuously absent from his reasoning. The obvious danger that lurks due to such a vague position is the entire project being based on the purely economic criteria of a supposedly "fair distribution", with obvious marginalization or even complete disregard of International Law and European Law, and above all the UN Law of the Sea. Therefore, the fate of Cyprus in such a plan will be judged not based on the rules of International Law and European Law, but on the "Procrustean bed"of"sovereignty"of"financial"on the "institutional". Something which from the perspective of Greece and Cyprus must be considered unthinkable and, therefore, rejectable from the outset.

A. For this reason, it is obvious that the following must be made clear from the outset, from the perspective of Greece and Cyprus: The key role of Cyprus in the field of energy security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean - and therefore stability in this region - is clearly deduced from the points of the aforementioned joint statement, which focus on the urgent need, on the one hand, to plan and execute broader regional interconnection projects, both ongoing and future. And, on the other hand, to support the goal of diversifying the region's energy sources, with a corresponding reduction in dependence on non-"friendly» factors but also strengthening connectivity between «like-minded people» friendly regional partners. In order for the Republic of Cyprus to fully play this specific role, the Cyprus Question must first be resolved with full implementation of International Law and European Law, so that the State in question can be fully and appropriately protected in terms of exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations as a Member State of the International Community and the European Union.   In fact, the Republic of Cyprus must return to the status quo prior to the provocatively illegal Turkish invasion and occupation. That is, to the status of a Republic that can exercise, also in full, at least its stricto sensu Sovereignty and all, without exception, its Sovereign Rights, with emphasis on those established and guaranteed by the UN International Law of the Sea. Unfortunately, up to now and although the Republic of Cyprus has been a full Member State of the European Union for two decades, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has never been sufficiently activated - and certainly under conditions that correspond to the Principle of Solidarity, primarily in accordance with the provisions of Article 42, paragraph 7, of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) - in favor of Cyprus and to the detriment of Turkey. The CFSP sanctions against Turkey for the flagrant violation of European Law and International Law to the detriment of the Republic of Cyprus are conspicuously absent, while this country has never been pressured, in essence, for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue under the conditions of European Law and European Legality. That is, under the conditions of a federal type of Representative Democracy, as required by the European Acquis. Therefore, according to what was stated previously, a resolution of the Cyprus Issue is conceivable and acceptable to the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Cyprus only under the terms and conditions set by International Law and European Law, of course without any concession of any kind. Given that only in this way can the solution of the Cyprus Issue be just and sustainable. Within this framework, the following are observed:

B. International Law

International Law determines the minimum conditions for resolving the Cyprus Issue with a multitude of regulations.

1. These regulations certainly include all kinds of regulatory Security Council Resolutions which have been, and indeed repeatedly and in various ways, unequivocally condemning Turkey since 1974, when the barbaric invasion of the Territory of the Republic of Cyprus took place. It is recalled that the most critical Security Council Resolutions in this regard have been - and remain - primarily the following:

a) First of all, the initial, basic Resolution of 20.7.1974, no. 353/1974, for the unequivocal condemnation of the Turkish invasion and for the appeal-decision for full respect for the Independence, Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. This Resolution was reaffirmed and supplemented in the strictest terms - particularly due to the continuation and expansion of the Turkish invasion in 1974, the demonstration of provocative intransigence on the part of Turkey and the humanitarianally deplorable situation of the refugees - with the successive Resolutions of 23.7.1974, no. 354/1974, 1.8.1974, no. 355/1974, 14.8.1974, no. 357/1974, 15.8.1974, no. 358/1974, 15.8.1974, no. 359/1974, 16.8.1974, no. 360/1974, 30.8.1974, no. 361/1974 and 13.12.1974, no. 364/1974.

b) And then the, of decisive importance for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue in a manner consistent with International Law, Resolution of 12.3.1975 No. 367/1975, by which the unilateral decision of 13.2.1975, on the part of Turkey, for the creation of the internationally completely isolated pseudo-state of "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". It should be noted that the above Resolution was supplemented, specifically with regard to the conditions imposed by International Law for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue, by the Resolutions of 18.11.1983, no. 541/1983, 11.5.1984, no. 550/1984, 12.3.1990, no. 649/1990, 10.4.1992, no. 750/1992, 25.11.1992, no. 789/1992 and 29.6.1999, no. 1251/1999. Specifically, with these last Resolutions, it was accepted - and has been consistently accepted since then - that the solution of the Cyprus Question in accordance with International Law presupposes, at a minimum, that the Republic of Cyprus must be, without other terms and conditions, an Independent State, with a single Sovereignty, a single International Personality and a single Citizenship, politically organized in the form of a Bicommunal and Bizonal Federation - therefore excluding, almost by definition, the Confederate State - while consequently rejecting, and even categorically, any "perspective» partition or secession.

1. Furthermore, for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue, the importance of the regulations of the UN Law of the Sea is of paramount importance. Especially its regulations regarding stricto sensu Sovereignty and the individual Sovereign Rights of the Member States of the International Community and the UN.

a) A Convention which, as already briefly noted, was drawn up in 1982 - as "Contract of Montego Bay"- and entered into force in 1995. And a Convention to which the European Union has acceded independently - that is, as a legal entity, in addition to the legal entities of its Member States - since 1998. This means that this Convention has since then been an integral part of the European Acquis, which automatically binds not only the European Union but also all its Member States. It must also bind, in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 and the Madrid Criteria of 1995, as they are constantly updated, the candidate States for accession to the European Union - such as Turkey - in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6(1) and 49 of the TEU.

b) Regardless of this, and according to the case law of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the aforementioned UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also binds States that have not acceded to it - such as Turkey - because, due to the fact that in any case a sufficient number of Member States of the International Community have acceded to it, it now produces generally accepted rules of International Law, binding erga omnes. That is, even for Member States of the International Community that have not accepted it in writing. This is all the more true for Turkey since, as its contradictory and provocative foreign policy proves, it accepts the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.as they wish", as is evident from the signing between it and the then alleged Government of Libya of the legally completely non-existent "Turkish-Libyan memorandum", of 2019. It is noted - in order to continuously promote it internationally, something which unfortunately does not happen with the required stability and "purity"- that the legally completely non-existent "Turkish-Libyan memorandum» has been explicitly accepted by the European Union itself, in accordance with the clear decision of the European Council of December 2019. The "protocolization" of "memorandum" This by the UN in 2020 does not add or ensure any legal validity to it since, as the relevant practice of such "protocols" international texts, this is a purely formal procedure that has nothing to do with the recognition of "normative dynamics" of the various above texts.

C. European Law

Much more important for the resolution of the Cyprus Issue, however, is the importance and influence of European Law. This is because, as already emphasized, the Republic of Cyprus is a full Member State of the European Union and of the "hard core"of the Eurozone. In this regard, there is no just and sustainable solution to the Cyprus Issue if it is not fully consistent with the entirety of European Law, and primarily with the fundamental institutional coordinates of the European Acquis. European Law, par excellence through the TEU, which is fundamental to the institutional existence of the European Union (Articles 1-12), sets specific basic conditions regarding the legal and institutional existence of a State, in order for it to be able to become, with the necessary effectiveness and duration, a Member State. That is, so that its participation in the European Union does not undermine, de jure and de facto, its institutional and political coherence and perspective, starting from the continuous and effective application in practice of all, without exception, the rules of the European Legal Order.

D. The minimum conditions for resolving the Cyprus Issue under International Law and European Law

From what has already been stated, it becomes obvious that the resolution of the Cyprus Issue, in full compliance with the rules of International Law and European Law, must meet, in total, the following conditions:

1. First, the Republic of Cyprus must have the political form of a Federal State at most, according to International and mainly European standards. No form of Confederation, direct or covert, is tolerated. And this primarily because, in addition to the fact that such a "solution" is, by definition, stillborn and serves only the aspirations and interests of Turkey by leading to a substantial political disintegration of the Republic of Cyprus, it is in complete contradiction with the core of primary European Law. Especially with the provisions of the TEU, regarding the political form and sovereignty of its Member States. In fact, it constitutes a common legal and political "place"that a Confederal State cannot be a Member State of the European Union, given that it cannot, by nature, meet, among other things, the requirements of adequate compliance with the European Acquis. This alone proves, without a doubt, among other things, that the notorious "Anan plan"for Cyprus not only was there no "missed opportunity"but, on the contrary, if it were implemented - and given that it would result in the creation of a confederal-type state - it would lead, by law, to the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus and its withdrawal from the European Union.
2. Second, the Republic of Cyprus must be based, in its entirety, on the fundamental principles of Representative Democracy, as an institutional guarantee of Freedomin the world.  Therefore, as an institutional guarantee of Fundamental Human Rights, not only under National Law but also under International Law and European Law.
3. Thirdly, the Republic of Cyprus must have, as a member of the International Community and the European Union, an International Legal Personality.
4. Fourth, in the Republic of Cyprus there is one, and only one, Citizenship.
5. Fifth, the Sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus must be complete, with equally full respect for all, without exception, the provisions of International Law and European Law. This means completeness andstrict sensu Its sovereignty - e.g. with regard to its territorial integrity, its borders, its coastal zone, etc. - and its the capital market sector, equity side and debt side, in all the preparatory and executive phases for the issue and placement of financial instruments; sensu Its Sovereignty, therefore the full exercise of all, without any discrimination, of its Sovereign Rights, with a focus on its Rights over all of its Maritime Zones under the International Law of the Sea, e.g. over its Continental Shelf and its Exclusive Economic Zone. The fact that Turkey has not acceded to the above International Convention has no bearing on this, as already clarified, since, according to the case law of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, it produces internationally accepted rules of International Law which are applicable erga omnis.
6. Sixth -and consequently- it is not permissible for occupation troops to remain, in any way, in the Republic of Cyprus, nor for third-party guarantees to apply, also in any way. And in the "guarantees» these include possible "guarantees» and Great Britain, especially after Brexit.
7. And, seventh, the above implies that the "...settlers",whom Turkey illegally settled, in accordance with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and for the refugees who were forcibly displaced from their homes due to the Turkish invasion to return, fully recovering all their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

E.  The stance of the International Community and the UN

As for the International Community and the UN, the resulting "equal" dealing with Turkey and Cyprus - that is, the ""offender" with the "victim" of the Turkish invasion and occupation - according to the logic of tolerating endless and empty discussions between the two parties, shows how much in our days International Law, with the exclusive responsibility of the International Community itself and the UN, is composed not so much of read perfect, but in many cases from read minus how much perfect or also read imperfectGreece and Cyprus, therefore, sending the message that they are not prepared to accept this quasi-"winters mine"  of the CFSP and International Legality must, as Member States of the European Union and the International Community, hold the European Institutions and those of the International Community accountable, pointing out, without any twists, concessions or retreats, the following: Just as we all stand today on the side of Ukraine, condemning unequivocally and in practice the war crime of Russia, in the same line of defense of European Legality and International Legality, Turkey's ongoing criminal tactics against Martyr Cyprus must also be condemned unequivocally and in practice - by using the veto if necessary in future decisions of the European Union. Because the selective application of International and European Legality leads, inevitably, to their essential nullification.

1. VI.Distortions of the rules for revising the Constitution systematically undermine its established rigor.

The historical assessment of the ratio revisendae constitutionis in the field of the revisions of the 1975 Constitution, successively in 1986, 2001, 2008 and 2019, necessarily refers us to an even briefly codified reminder of the reasons for the enactment of the provisions of article 110 of the Constitution, relating to its lege artis revision. And at this point, obviously for reasons of faithful representation of our constitutional reality and practice, it must be emphasized that under the regime of application of the current 1975 Constitution, it is the first time in our constitutional history that its provisions are generally applied, in a significant part, satisfactorily and its revisions are initiated and completed with faithful observance of the specific procedural constitutional provisions for this purpose. A fact which also implies that from 1975 onwards we have been experiencing, in keeping with historical proportions, the most smooth period of constitutionally regulated governance in the history of the Modern Greek State. Regarding the above reference to the regulatory roots of the provisions of article 110 on the revision of the Constitution, perhaps someone might object that these are elementary legal concepts and knowledge, commonly known and accepted at least in our lato sensu Legal Community. However, this probably does not correspond to reality, if we understand what caused the above revisions of the Constitution and how they evolved in practice.

A. An experiential testimony

From the outset, let me briefly present my personal experience. Given that I experienced the revision of the 1986 Constitution as a Professor at the Law School of the University of Athens, and that I actively participated in the revisions of the Constitution of 2001 and 2008 as a member of the respective revisionist Parliaments. In fact, in the revision of the Constitution of 2001, I participated initially as a Rapporteur and, subsequently, as a Parliamentary Representative of New Democracy, then the Official Opposition. Finally, I experienced the revision of the 2019 Constitution as the acting President of the Republic, who, although according to his constitutional role, did not participate, in any way, institutionally in the revision process, nevertheless, out of constitutional duty, I followed it throughout its duration, namely in both its phases, all the more so when the provisions to be revised included the regulations of the current Constitution regarding the election of the President of the Republic. In this experiential light, I believe that of the four revisions of the Constitution mentioned above, only those of 2001 and 2008 – the latter certainly incomplete due to the political conditions and expediencies of the time – were completed with full compliance with the letter and spirit of the provisions of Article 110 of the Constitution, that is, with full compliance not only with the procedural but also with the substantive, in their entirety, conditions for revising our Charter. While during the other two, of course, the procedural conditions of the provisions of this article were mainly faithfully observed, the revisionist majorities in the two Houses distanced themselves, even if only partially, from the institutionally due respect for their regulatory spirit. Respect which lies – as will be explained below – in the updating of the provisions of the Constitution without any other political expediency, so that through their necessary adaptation to the a posteriori essential changes in the socio-economic reality, intra and extra muros, it may maintain its regulatory framework as a Charter of superior formal force. A Charter which constitutes, at the same time, the basis and the summit of the Legal Order within the framework of the institutional pillars of the Representative Democracy which guarantee, above all, the unhindered exercise of Fundamental Human Rights according to their institutional purpose and the support of "twins" institutional pillars of the Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law. Therefore, contrary to the aforementioned requirements of the provisions of article 110 of the Constitution, the objectives of the revisions of the Constitution of 1986 and 2019 were much more political and clearly less institutional. Given that on the one hand, through the 1986 revision, the regulatory impairment of the general regulatory role of the President of the Republic and the consolidation of the foundations of a clearly Prime Minister-centric system was sought, and ultimately achieved. And, on the other hand, through the revision of the 2019 Constitution - and in order to avoid in any case the resort to early elections - the increased majority that ensured the essentially consensual election of the President of the Republic was abolished, and indeed to the point that this became possible even with the relative majority of the Members of Parliament, and therefore even by an occasional government majority.

1. BThe regulatoryheadquartersmatter the provisions of article 110 of the Constitution

After the above, I return to the regulatory nature of the provisions of article 110 of the Constitution, arguing that these provisions, in their letter and spirit, institutionalize – if I may be permitted this theoretical metaphor – the "regulatory instinct of self-preservation and survival" of the Constitution. And specifically that legal process, which through the observance of the established appropriate procedural and substantive conditions for the initiation and completion of the revision allows the Constitution, by its very institutional nature, to maintain its regulatory scope and, consequently, its force, undiminished - or even further strengthened according to the circumstances -, adapting appropriately to the also perpetual changes in the socio-economic infrastructure and reality that it must regulatoryly frame under conditions of transparency and regulatory regularity. In practice, the institutional degeneration of the provisions of the Constitution by our political leaders with the ultimate goal and objective of fulfilling their aspirations by any means, which results almost as a matter of course in their progressive regulatory shrinkage, has appeared basically in two ways. Of which the second mainly affects the institutional validity of the provisions but also the very regulatory role of the Constitution. The first way is, according to the above, the method of in concreto interpretation and application of the current provisions of the Constitution not according to their letter and spirit, but according to the aspirations of the political leaders and, further, according to the expediencies served by their relevant decisions. As is obvious, this method, in what concerns the control of the constitutionality of the executive provisions of the Constitution in order to adapt them to the government's objectives, ends, through a clearly distorting interpretation of these provisions, certainly not in a genuine control of constitutionality but, e contrario and as a result, in a kind of control of the legality of the applicable provisions of the Constitution in each case. It must be added, and indeed with particular emphasis, that in order to make it possible, according to the aforementioned, to realize the objectives of political leaders through the regulatory path, through the distorting interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution in accordance with the legislative provisions and the subsequent institutionally unthinkable control of the legality of the Constitution, the collaboration of the officials of the Justice System is also required. The corresponding facilitation in this regard has been observed several times in the past and today. The very recent example of the control of the constitutionality of the provisions of laws, which were enacted with the object of the selection regime of members and the responsibilities of Independent Authorities, namely constitutionally guaranteed ones, such as e.g. the National Radio and Television Council (ESR) and the Authority for the Assurance of the Privacy of Communications (ADAE). This judicial "assistance"in terms of fulfilling the government's objectives by shrinking the regulatory content of the Constitution, it has reached such a point that when the unconstitutionality of the disputed and contested legislative regulations is obvious and cannot be circumvented, the "filter"of procedural inadmissibility. That is, the invocation by the competent judicial body - even the highest - of reasons for admissibility for the formal rejection of the legal remedy or means applied for, with the most common reason being the lack of the required personal, direct and present legal interest. So that, supposedly, the corresponding legal remedy or means is not converted in practice into an actio popularis.  And the second way is to directly intervene in the regulatory framework of the Constitution through the revision of its provisions, not because their regulatory content had not been successfully established in terms of the correspondingly sought ratio constitutionis, but simply because their regulations, no matter how broadly they were interpreted, even almost distortingly, did not allow for the fulfillment of the aspirations of the leaders of the Executive Branch - in other words, the Prime Minister and the Government - in the pursuit of satisfying their political goals and objectives. In this direction, a part of the Legal Scientific Community has recently been collaborating, visibly and directly, when it rushes to interpret provisions of laws and regulatory acts not based on the current Constitution but - something completely unprecedented in our constitutional data - with what is going to happen, according to government announcements, after an upcoming revision of the Constitution. This is a legally manifestly incorrect method of interpreting the Constitution based on the "expectation of revision"of. A method which leads, with even greater risk, not only to the further regulatory shrinkage of the Constitution but even to its given regulatory marginalization. All the more so when within this interpretative framework those who attempt to apply the provisions of the Constitution under this logic prejudge, and indeed arbitrarily, on the one hand the possibility of their revision and, on the other hand, the very content which the provisions under revision will ultimately have in their assessment.