The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan – The Geopolitical Analysis of the Causes
Dr. Ioannis Sotiropoulos demonstrates scientific accuracy and methodological rigor, producing a work that can be ranked among the most important for the Afghan case. Sotiropoulos' work contributes decisively to the clarification of the causes of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, since, among other things, he reconstructs with precision, patience and meticulous documentation the chronicle of decision-making by the official bodies of the Soviet Union, within the geopolitical framework of the Cold War.
The scientific surplus value of the work at a political, historical and diplomatic level is particularly important, since by utilizing all the new declassified Soviet and American primary sources, it indicates a third, more valid, interpretation of a political-military event, which for 35 consecutive years was interpreted in only two ways by the international academic and research community. This book is certainly a top-notch analysis of the decision-making process in totalitarian regimes, as it certainly interprets the risk of organizational and operational weaknesses in this process. Particularly in the case it discusses (given the inadequacy of the Soviet administrative and organizational system during the late Brezhnev period), I. Sotiropoulos, inter alia, masterfully analyzes the penetration, influence and instrumentalization of bureaucracy, on the one hand at the level of state services, and on the other hand as the catalytic factor of the personal ambitions of Soviet leaders, a fact that decisively influenced the decision for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
