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THE INTERNALIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR AND THE US MID-TERM ELECTIONS

The term “internalization” of foreign policy refers to the connection of an international issue, current and major, with domestic political issues that directly affect American society. In this case, foreign policy is a topic of discussion within the United States and is largely determined by public opinion, as is the case with other areas of public policy. It affects the sense of national security, public prosperity and becomes a priority for the electoral base. A typical example of such a situation is the long-term and expensive US military operations abroad.[1].

American public opinion on foreign policy is overwhelmingly conservative, supporting isolationism, self-sufficiency, and inwardness. Foreign policy is rarely a primary topic of debate in American elections unless it has an impact on the economy and results in casualties on the battlefield.

The Russia-Ukraine war (which has been raging since February 24, 2022) concerns the case under consideration, which is part of the aforementioned context in view of the upcoming midterm elections (November 8, 2022). The peculiarity lies in the fact that the US is participating in the war by proxy, providing diplomatic, economic, military and technological assistance to Ukraine. At the diplomatic level, an anti-Russian coalition was created, unifying the bloc of Western countries (at the forefront are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Great Britain, Norway and the 27 EU member states) by imposing strict sanctions against Russia. At the military level, NATO allied states were activated in multiple ways through the dispatch of military equipment, cutting-edge technologies and access to intelligence services. It is estimated that the United States has sent $41,2 billion in economic and military aid to the Ukrainian government since the start of the war.[2]Washington's total political support for one of the two warring sides, the depth and scope of which has no historical precedent (at least for the period after the end of the Cold War), is also inextricably linked to internal parameters.

A few days before the unfolding Ukrainian crisis led to a military conflict, American public opinion overwhelmingly showed the country's unwillingness to take a leading role in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.[3]A month after the start of hostilities, she was opposed to immediate involvement by sending American troops.[4]. American media promoting events in Ukraine as front page news[5] They brought the Russian invasion into the realm of public debate and ultimately onto the agenda of political priorities.[6].

American citizens closely following the events on the battlefield[7], expressed a high level of moral support for the Ukrainians and condemnation of the Russian invasion. The friendly feelings towards Ukraine and the public outcry over Vladimir Putin's policy were reflected in the strong support for sending aid, imposing sanctions, and the high acceptance of the readiness of American citizens to suffer additional energy costs and price increases as a result of the war.[8]They overwhelmingly agreed with the political position of President Joe Biden, who declared two days before the start of the Russian invasion that "defending freedom has a cost for us, here at home."[9].

At an institutional level, it was reflected in the approval in the House of Representatives of the law on the Suspension of Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus – 420 in favor to 3 against – (The Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act, March 17, 2022)[10] and the Lend-Lease Agreement for the Defense of Democracy in Ukraine – 417 in favor to 10 against – (Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend Lease Act of 2022, April 28, 2022)[11]. Both pieces of legislation were unanimously approved by the Senate. The virtually complete bipartisan consensus that existed in the first three months of the war in both legislatures showed the first signs of divergence when the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (May 10, 2022) was put to a vote, providing $40 billion in aid.[12]. 11 of the 50 senators and 57 of the 425 representatives voted against him. All of them came from the conservative wing of the Republican Party that embraces non-interventionism or neo-isolationism. They belong to the third school of thought on foreign policy within the Republicans.[13].

The Heritage Foundation, one of the most iconic conservative think tanks with 2 million members, expressed its opposition to the proposed aid package in a statement before the vote.[14]. The criticism that was leveled concerns the support of a foreign state with resources from public revenues and the way in which such a large amount is utilized, instead of covering domestic needs and developing the economy. The eloquent statements of the members of Congress who opposed the passage of the bill reflect the spirit of this particular stance.[15], skepticism and public concern. The percentage of American citizens who felt that the United States had an obligation to defend Ukraine began to gradually decline.

This shift is primarily related to the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on the US economy. Specifically: a) inflation reached 9,1% in June 2022, surpassing the previous historical high of December 1981, b) the cost of fuel increased by 111% in June 2022, reaching $5,11 from $2,42 per gallon in January 2021. The US imported 8% of its oil needs from Russia before the war. After the ban on the import of[16] this quantity could not be covered by other exporting countries (Venezuela and Iran due to embargo) while the Arab OPEC states refused to increase production[17]. The rising prices of crude oil (from $40 per barrel of Brent in 2020 to $123 in June 2022, with the price in October 2022 reaching $84) are also inextricably linked to the energy policy of the Joe Biden administration. This policy promotes “clean” forms of energy, essentially preventing domestic oil companies from making new investments to produce a larger quantity of oil.[18], c) pre-existing problems in the supply chain have worsened. Russia is the largest exporter of nitrogen fertilizers and the second largest exporter of phosphate fertilizers and caustic potash (potash), which are essential sources of ingredients for agricultural crops. At the same time, together with Ukraine, they account for 1/3 of the world's grain production, which is used in the production of bread, pasta and many other products.

Farmers around the world are finding it harder to get fertilizer from Russia due to Western sanctions, which are limiting food production. In addition, the Russian blockade of Ukrainian grain that feeds millions of people is affecting not only African and Middle Eastern countries but also the United States itself. These two factors have contributed to the lack of supply of basic goods, leading to food insecurity, that is, the inability to provide enough food to ensure a healthy and productive life. According to data from the NGO Feeding America, the demand for food aid from the 200 or so food banks operating throughout the United States increased by 2022% ​​in March 65. Furthermore, the US Department of Agriculture estimates that more than 38 million Americans (including 12 million children) are food insecure[19]Food insecurity is related to the security strategy and self-sufficiency policy in the food sector.

The combination of high inflation, energy poverty and shortages of basic goods creates an explosive economic mix.[20]The war in Ukraine was placed on the agenda of public debate as a significant issue affecting the daily lives of American citizens with implications for social stability.

The criticism leveled at the Democratic government concerns its handling of the crisis in Ukraine. It focuses on the inability to find a diplomatic solution to maintain the frozen conflict between Ukraine and Russia (regarding the status quo of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions after the Minsk Agreements).[21]) so that it does not develop into a war. At the tactical level, the current American leadership has publicly revealed its intentions to not involve NATO forces in the form of sending troops to Ukrainian territory.[22] and spoke of a "small invasion" by Russia[23]The ambiguous statements (of the American presidency) and the projection of a non-dynamic stance did not act as a deterrent to the Russian intervention.[24].

Since the beginning of the military operations, criticism has focused on the lack of preparedness and planning to address the needs of the country. The US government has shown itself to not take into account all the parameters that affect the interior, following the events rather unprepared. At the same time, the ambiguity regarding the long-term strategy for fulfilling the objectives of American support for Ukraine (in terms of providing assistance from American taxpayers' money) is another area of ​​​​questioning the policy followed, which is intensifying as the war continues without the prospect of a peaceful settlement[25].

At the NATO summit in Madrid (June 30, 2022), the US president stated that the US would maintain its support “as long as necessary to ensure that Russia does not defeat Ukraine.” He stated that Russia bears sole responsibility for the current economic situation.[26] which acts maliciously to socially and politically destabilize Western countries.

With public opinion (almost) evenly divided on how effectively Joe Biden is handling the situation in Ukraine[27], Russia is in any case the point of reference for both his critics and supporters. The former accuse him of being unable to prevent Russia from attacking and of being responsible for not shielding the country from adverse consequences. The latter argue that Russia is using leverage, using energy and food to harm the US, and that the decision for the Russian invasion was already made and irreversible. In view of the midterm elections, the public debate is focused on finding responsibilities for the dire economic situation in which households and businesses have found themselves.

The question inevitably arises: What vital national interest is at stake with the US interventionist policy in Ukraine and at what cost?.

In the strategy towards Russia, there are two views in American foreign policy.

The first is based on the fundamental premise that Russia, regardless of its political system, democratization and human rights, is an integral part of the global security system. Without it, there can be no stability and peace in Eurasia, and for this a level of understanding is required, where its concerns are taken into account. A potential exclusion of Russia from Europe harms the West more than Russia. Given the geometric rise of China, which is the most important strategic competitor of the US, Russia needs to be neutralized in the context of the Sino-American power competition in the first phase. The ultimate goal is for the latter to be led as much as possible into a process of strategic alignment with Washington that will contribute crucially to the outcome of the conflict with China. Henry Kissinger, considering the constant points of friction between China and Russia in Siberia and Central Asia, embraced this approach as a balance of power advocate. This view was expressed during the administration of Donald Trump.[28].

The above framework partially acknowledges Russia's (as a country with an imperial past) perceptions of security issues and takes into account the historical background of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, it does not accept Russia's strategic instrumentalization, military means and invasion. The war could have been avoided in the context of preventive diplomacy and balancing interests. This approach also includes the proposal for a neutral Ukraine that will not join NATO, operating as a "buffer state" between the West and Russia. The criticism that was made focused on the fact that the current presidency, with its policy, essentially pushed out the Russian invasion, created strategic resistances to US hegemony (counter-alignments) by thwarting targets[29] from third countries (India, Turkey, Brazil, etc.) and forced its two major rivals (China and Russia) to unite[30]This union creates in Eurasia a single geopolitical entity (HyperAsia) with superpower characteristics.[31]With international stability fundamentally shaken, Henry Kissinger declared: "We are on the brink of war with Russia and China over issues that we have partly created, without any idea how it will end or where it is supposed to lead."[32]».

The second view of the American decision-making system stems from the long-standing strategy of encircling Russia.[33] and avoiding the coupling of Western and Eastern Europe, preventing the possibility of creating a new Eurasian power. The consolidation of peace and the existence of a functional collective security system presuppose coexistence with Russia as a truly democratic and European “post-imperial” nation-state with some form of connection or even understanding with the transatlantic community. For moral reasons, the westernization of society, political modernization and progress in human rights constitute prerequisites for Russia to be an integral part of the geostrategic triad in Eurasia along with Europe and China. Zbigniew Brzezinski strongly supported this specific framework according to which the US should confront Moscow from a position of strength with a combination of incentives for cooperation and readiness for confrontation with it[34]. The change in China's status quo from strategic partner to competitor, as first publicly acknowledged by George O. Bush[35], defined a new stake: balancing China's rise. As a result, the doctrine of dual containment towards Russia and China became the central axis of American strategy in the new multipolar world that was emerging. This vision was implemented mainly through the enlargement of NATO to Russia's western borders under the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George O. Bush.

The consolidation of a renewed vengeful Russia and a revisionist China has exposed the limits of the functionality of the containment doctrine. Simultaneous competition with two rival powerful poles requires sustained resources and the channeling of significant forces: a combination of preventive wars, selective engagements, and offshore balancing.[36]The main threat is now China, and because the two-front struggle seems ineffective, Russia needs to shrink when international circumstances allow. This will happen by cutting Russia off from Europe and turning it towards China.

The cooperative and at the same time competitive relations between the two countries enable China, due to its superiority in all indicators of power, to impose the conditions of engagement with Russia that in the long run will weaken it to such an extent that it will eventually assimilate it. A deadly embrace. In this way, the US will only have to deal with China. The war in Ukraine is the opportunity to achieve this goal. The US and the West as a whole could not remain uninvolved in the threat to the integrity and independence of Ukraine.[37].

In this context, the Russian-Ukrainian war requires a strict policy towards Moscow that will initially disconnect it from Europe and isolate it from the rest of the world. Instead of claiming a leading role in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, it should beg for favorable treatment from Washington. The basic belief of those who support this view is that the current international situation offers a historic opportunity to shrink Russia to such an extent that it ceases to be a problem for the West. The universal American support for Ukraine aims to crush Russia and create a precedent so that US adversaries, mainly China, will realize that there is a possibility of defending vital American interests and their allies by any means and at any price. Military aid to Kiev is an investment in American national security.

The midterm elections are taking place amid an unprecedented wave of extreme political polarization. Republicans have firmly established the belief that the Democratic victory in the 2020 elections came through corrupt practices, largely due to the mail-in ballots in the six contested states.[38](swing states) where the result was decided. This was emphatically expressed in the primaries where of the ten Republicans who had voted in favor of the impeachment of Donald Trump for the events on Capitol Hill, only two managed to be candidates again in the upcoming elections. With the 45th president of the United States completely dominating the party and with three judicial investigations underway against him, the elections have taken on a populist character from the Republican Party. Joe Biden has extremely low popularity ratings[39], he is discredited even among Democratic voters, the majority of whom do not want him to run again in 2024[40]With 48 out of 50 states disapproving of his policies, some are even calling for his replacement.[41]Added to the acute political confrontation is the undeclared internal cultural war that continues unabated over a series of identity issues, most notably gun ownership/use, abortion and immigration.[42]The US is divided as a country to such an extent that Democrats and Republicans feel like they are enemies of each other.[43]In public opinion, the possibility of an armed civil war in the future is a concern that has been recorded in various surveys.[44]American dysfunction is a danger to the entire world.

In this complex context, the problematic situation in the economy, which is in recession with the soaring inflation rate, the increase in poverty and the compression of households, is added. With the war on the territory of Ukraine contributing to this, the bad. When security needs conflict with issues related to the living standards of the entire society at home, this second priority prevails over the first - except in cases where the country faces an immediate threat. In the decentralized pluralistic and open institutional framework for shaping foreign policy, public opinion sometimes functions as a determining factor for indicating the limits of presidential initiatives in international affairs, setting limits on the involvement and ambitions of the leadership[45].

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is in its eighth month, with the US continuing to fund the Ukrainian side unabated and in every way. With no clear diplomatic channel of communication open and with unclear targeting as to the outcome and duration of US aid, the strategic impasse is intensifying to such an extent that even the use of tactical nuclear weapons is a matter of public reference by the American and Russian presidents.

Public approval of presidential actions is not self-evident. A number of successful presidents in US history failed to win re-election or ended their term with extremely low popularity ratings due to wrong choices or mishandling of American involvement in international affairs (Lyndon Johnson, Jim Carter, George O. Bush). The current administration, after the failed withdrawal from Afghanistan that damaged the country's image internationally and had a moral impact at home, is seeking a victory not only of substance but also of prestige on the Ukrainian front. The outcome of the midterm elections will largely determine whether Joe Biden will be able to overcome the reactions and mitigate the domestic repercussions of his choices in Ukraine.

Petros Tasios

Internationalist specializing in American foreign policy

[1] Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos, The institutional framework for shaping US foreign policy, Pedio Publications, Athens 2009, p. 200 and p. 270.

[2] The amount of US support for the Ukrainian government cannot be precisely determined. It is estimated that military assistance under the Joe Biden presidency has amounted to $18,3 billion through various programs of sales, financing and donations of equipment, services and technical support for the country's defense. The military assistance sent in the first three months of the conflict is more than the combined amount received by Afghanistan, Israel and Egypt in 2020.

By 2022, the US is spending about $110 million a day on Ukraine to meet all kinds of needs. If US funding continues at the same pace, Ukraine will be the largest recipient of US military aid in the 21st century, Alice Speri, “US Military aid to Ukraine grows to historic proportions – along with risks”, The Intercept, September 10, 2022, https://theintercept.com/2022/09/10/ukraine-military-aid-weapons-oversight/.

[3] Just 26% of the public believes the U.S. should be on the front lines of the conflict in Ukraine. 52% say it should have a limited role and 22% say it should have no role at all. The survey was conducted among 1.289 people from February 18-21, 2022, by the Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, Nomaan Merchant and Hannah Fingerhut, “AP-NORC poll: Most in U.S. oppose major role in Russia strife,” AP News, February 23, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-vladimir-putin-europe-election-2020-ac251d00b8979cebd0496374fc622a1b.

[4] The overwhelming majority of American public opinion does not want direct military assistance to be sent to Ukraine: “no boots on the ground or jets in the air”. The poll was conducted on a sample of 1.006 people between March 18 and 21, 2022, on behalf of the NPR/Ipsos company, “Americans support limited US intervention in Ukraine to prevent escalation with Russia”, Ipsos, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/Americans-support-limited-intervention-Ukraine-prevent-escalation-Russia.

[5] For the month of April 2022, 79 of the total 179 front-page stories in the Times newspaper (44%) were about the Russian invasion, Ted Galen Garpenter, “The Elite Press Remains the Handmaid of War”, The American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-elite-press-remains-the-handmaid-of-war/.

[6] The media generally accept the basic directions and choices of the foreign policy establishment and its definition of the enemies and friends of the US and align themselves with the manipulations of political power.

[7] In the first weeks of the war, 37% of American voters followed the news about Ukraine very closely and nearly 8 in 10 were relatively close to developments, David Lauter, “Essential Politics, War in Ukraine scrambles GOP and Democratic strategies for midterms”, Los Angeles Times, March 11, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/politics/newsletter/2022-03-11/politics-war-ukraine-scrambles-plans-2022-midterm-election-essential-politics.

[8] Shibley Telhami, "American's preparedness to pay a price for supporting Ukraine remains robust," The Brookings Institution, July 5, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/07/05/americans-preparedness-to-pay-a-price-for-supporting-ukraine-remains–robust/.

[9] Remarks by President Biden Announcing Response to Russian Actions in Ukraine, The White House, February 22, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/02/22/remarks-by-president-biden-announcing-response-to-russian-actions-in-ukraine/.

[10] Text – HR7108 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

[11] Text – S.3522 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

[12] Text – HR7691 – 117th Congress (2021-2022): Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

[13] In addition to foreign-policy non-interventionists, there are the so-called foreign policy activists who expressed themselves in the party throughout the Cold War, most notably during the Ronald Reagan administration, and the foreign policy hard-liners who were represented (along with the non-interventionists) in the Donald Trump administration, Danielle Pletka, “The Republicans Could Win the US Midterms. Here's What That Means for the World. It's All About Isolationists vs. Internationalists,” American Enterprise Institute, June 2, 2022, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-republicans-could-win-the-u-s-midterms-heres-what-that-means-for-the-world/.

[14] Ukraine Aid Package Puts America Last | Heritage Action For America.

[15] “We are spending money we don’t have and spending money on a conflict that does not advance our national interests,” Andy Biggs – Representative from Arizona in the House of Representatives – Twitter, June 24, 2022 and “No more billions for Ukraine!” Matt Gaetz,- Representative from Florida in the House of Representatives – Twitter, July 16, 2022.

[16] The US president signed Executive Order 14066 (March 8, 2022) which prohibits the import of oil, oil derivatives, liquefied natural gas, coal, and energy-related goods from Russia, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/eo_ 14066.pdf.

[17] The Joe Biden administration has released tens of millions of barrels of crude oil from the US strategic reserves as part of its effort to achieve balance and reduction in fuel prices.

[18] David Henderson, "What caused Gas Prices to Jump?", 30 June 2022 Econlib, https://www.econlib.org/what-caused-gas-prices- to-jump/.

[19] Mitri Shatara, “The US Food Shortage,” Alexander Shunnarah Trial Attorneys, 26 July 2022, https://shunnarah.com/food-shortage-in-us/.

[20] Indicative of the situation is the yield of the two-year US government bond, which far exceeds that of the ten-year (4,25% compared to 3,68%) and the liquidation of US stocks, which reached 30 billion dollars in just one week. This is reflected in the increase in FED interest rates, pushing the US dollar to rise, which as a currency of global transactions, leads to a generalized appreciation of products and services. The result is the inflation of the cost of debt repayment.

[21] The Minsk agreements were a series of international agreements that sought to end the war in Donbas between Russian separatist groups and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with Russian regular forces playing a central role. The first, known as the Minsk Protocol, was drafted in 2014 by the Tripartite Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mediated by the leaders of France and Germany in the so-called Normandy Format. After extensive talks in Minsk, Belarus, the agreement was signed (5 September 2014) by representatives of the Tripartite Contact Group, without recognition of their status, by the then leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. This agreement followed multiple previous attempts to stop the fighting in the region and was intended to implement an immediate ceasefire. The agreement failed to stop the war and was followed by a revised agreement, Minsk II (12 February 2015). This agreement included a ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines, the release of prisoners of war, constitutional reform in Ukraine, the granting of self-government to some areas of Donbass, and the restoration of control of the state border to the Ukrainian government. Although the fighting subsided after the signing of the agreement, it never fully ended and the provisions of the agreement were only partially implemented. The parties to the Normandy Format agreed that Minsk II remains the basis for any future resolution of the conflict.

[22] "I want to be clear: We will defend every inch of NATO territory. But we will not wage war against Russia in Ukraine. A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia would mean World War III," Joe Biden, Twitter, March 11, 2022.

[23] “Russia will be held accountable if it invades and it depends on what it does. It’s a different matter if it’s a small invasion and we end up arguing about what we’re doing and what we’re not doing, etc.”, Joe Biden, White House press conference, January 19, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/19/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-6/.

[24] Colin Dueck, “How Republicans Really Feel About Russia and Ukraine,” The National Interest, April 5, 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-republicans-really-feel-about-russia-and-ukraine-201626.

[25] Peter Van Buren, “Tell me how Ukraine Ends,” The American Conservative, March 14, 2022, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/tell-me-how-ukraine- ends/.

[26]“Fuel and food prices are rising because of Russia, Russia, Russia,” Joe Biden, press conference at the NATO summit in Madrid, June 30, 2022, President Biden holds news conference at NATO Summit in Madrid — 6/30/2022 – YouTube.

[27] According to the Monmouth University Poll conducted between March 10-14, 2022, 46% of respondents positively assessed the American president's handling of the situation, Gregory Krieg and Eric Bradner, "The 2022 campaign story was set. Then Russia invaded Ukraine", CNN Politics, March 27, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/27/politics/2022-midterm-elections-russia-ukraine-invasion/index.html.

[28] This first view is part of the school of political realism, where international relations are examined in the light of the global distribution of power and conflicts of interest at the geostrategic and geoeconomic levels. National interest determines choices and priorities in international affairs, not the rules of law or moral values. Political realism is largely expressed by the Jacksonian school, where less importance is given to international institutions and international law. Jacksonians favor the implementation of goals through unilateral and decisive measures when necessary, while opposing interventionist options as long as vital interests are not directly at stake. Their views have strong popular support in the conservative part of American society, mainly in the hinterland (Mid-Western states), and are expressed by the Republican Party.

[29] Steven Walt, Strategic Resistances to US Hegemony, Kastaniotis Publications, Athens 2007, pp. 186-189.

[30] Steven Walt, Strategic Resistances to US Hegemony, op. cit., pp. 288-290.

[31] Costas Grivas, “The Ukrainian issue shrinks Europe and creates Trans-Asia”, January 26, 2022, Infognomon Politics, https://infognomonpolitics.gr/2022/01/kostas-grivas-to-oukraniko-mikrainei-tin-evropi-kai-dimiourgei-yperasia/.

[32] Laura Secor, “Henry Kissinger is worried about disequilibrium,” Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2022.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/henry-kissinger-is-worried-about-disequilibrium-11660325251

[33] The containment strategy against Russia is called the doctrine of "latent encirclement", Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos, American foreign policy after the Cold War, Poitota Publications, Athens, p. 66.

[34] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Geostrategic Triad. The Symbiosis with China, New Europe and Russia, Eurasia Publications, Athens 2002, pp. 83-106.

[35] George O. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” Speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999.

[36] Steven Walt, Strategic Resistances to US Hegemony, op. cit., pp. 277-283.

[37] The specific policy choice by Joe Biden's democratic government expresses the school of liberal idealism. According to it, international institutions, democracy and economic interdependence can maintain cooperation and peace between states. A universal moral code of values ​​can regulate the international system. The preeminent exponent of liberal idealism is Wilsonianism, which is the dominant trend in American foreign policy. According to the Wilsonian school, the consolidation of world peace is based on the spread of democracy, the development of free trade and collective security. Democratic ideals, economic interdependence and multilateral international institutions operate coherently between states, regulating the international system. The popular bases of Wilsonianism in American society are found mainly in the ranks of center-left liberals, who are geographically concentrated mostly in the East Coast states. It is expressed almost universally within the Democratic Party.

[38] Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania.

[39] In June 2022, he reached his lowest approval rating of 31% and in September of the same year rose to 42%, Megan Brenan, “Biden's Latest 42% Job Approval Similar to Prior Presidents”, September 20, 2022, Gallup, https://news.gallup.com/poll/401633/biden-latest-job-approval-similar-prior-presidents aspx.

[40] David Harsanny, “President Biden, You're No Bill Clinton,” The National Review, January 19, 2022,

https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/president-biden-youre-no-bill-clinton/.

[41] Giorgos Venetis, “After Boris and Mario, who is next?”, SL Press, August 11, 2022, https://slpress.gr/diethni/meta-ton-mporis-kai-ton-mario-poios-echei-seira/.

[42] These are the so-called RINOs (Republicans in name only), that is, Republican politicians who differ both ideologically and in practice from the official party line. The term has its roots in the dispute between Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, as well as Senator Robert La Follette for control of the Republican Party in 1912.

[43] 57% of Republicans identify Democrats as enemies, believing that their lives are in danger from the latter due to their dominance in the 2020 elections. Correspondingly, 41% of Democrats consider Republicans to be enemies. The data concerns a survey conducted by YouGovAmerica between January 13-16, 2021, on a sample of 2.166 people. Today, the aforementioned percentages have increased due to the depth of the political division, Linley Sanders, “Americans now see other Americans as the biggest threat to their way of life”, January 20, 2021, YouGovAmerica, https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/01/20/americans-now-see-other-americans-biggest-threat.

[44] The most recent is the one that took place on August 20-23, 2022 among 1.500 respondents by YouGovAmerica, following the FBI investigation of Donald Trump's home in Mar-a-Lago, Florida. 4 in 10 Americans believe that an armed civil war could break out in the next 10 years, Taylor Orth, “Two in five Americans say a civil war is at least somewhat likely in the next decade”, August 26, 2022, YouGovAmerica, https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2022/08/26/two-in-five-americans-civil-war-somewhat-likely.

[45] Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos, The institutional framework for shaping US foreign policy, ibid., pp. 205-206.