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The bill establishing the National Security Council (NSC) is currently under consultation, which for years has been enlivening discussions and closing every action – lecture – seminar – conference – on national and major issues, and is considered a panacea for resolving all the weaknesses and obstacles of every government in recent years.

All Institutes, Research and Analysis Centers, University Professors, Ambassadors, Great Analysts and Internationalists, New Doctoral Candidates, etc., etc., discuss, propose, emphasize the necessity of the Greek National Security Council, on average almost every day...

The panacea bill in consultation... and pay attention-pay attention IN CONSULTATION on 24/4/2019 MAD WEDNESDAY (1400) until Tuesday 7/5/2019 (0900), here: PDF

During Easter, during May Day, during two weeks that include seven YES seven Holidays, 4 weeks before the elections...
But we are a state, but we consult, but we have brains, but...And the comments! -so far a few on issues of minor importance- that concern anything other than the CEA!

But where are all the Institutes, the Centers for Studies and Analysis, the University Professors, the Ambassadors, the Great Analysts and Internationalists, the New Doctoral Candidates, etc., etc. that were ruminating, discussing, proposing, emphasizing the 'famous' and 'long-awaited' Greek National Assembly!!! Behold Rhodes! Behold the Leap of Comments, Suggestions, Improvements, unless the sadness of Good Friday, the Barystomach of Easter, the May Day protest and the Thomas weekend make it difficult to think….

Be careful, then, let's give due seriousness to this issue, otherwise the CEA will become another mechanism of dubious purpose in the vast and ineffective state fabric that, instead of filling institutional and other gaps, will evolve into an institutional space for the rehabilitation of 'stale' Ambassadors, Professors, Generals and Analysts-Internationalists!

Anastasios Bassaras Vice President of the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies!

Below are the only comments added to the Parliament's post, which concern the ΣΕΑ. These comments were submitted by Konstantinos Gini, General re.a. – Honorary General of the Hellenic Army, Member of the IDIS / Panteion University, and Stylianos Petroulakis, Lieutenant General re.a.

Konstantinos Ginis General ret. – Honorary General of the General Staff Member IDIS / Panteion University
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1.Generally, Greece is located in an area (Balkans - Middle East - North Africa) dominated by instability and insecurity and in a long-term prolonged confrontation with Turkey, which constantly generate issues of Defense and National Security. It is also imperative to support national interests. These require long-term, medium-term and short-term strategic planning to address them, as well as the ability to make rapid and qualitative decisions to deal with situations of tension and crisis, which can arise completely unexpectedly and escalate to high intensity and even lead to conflict. In order to meet the requirements of security and defense issues, Greece has established, at the political-strategic level, a collective government body, the Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense (GCC) (PD 63/2005, article 18, Government Gazette A' 98/2005 Codification of Legislation for the Government). The GCC over time (even under its previous name of ASEA), unfortunately, has not responded effectively to the strategic requirements of Greece. In order to address these weaknesses, various views have been expressed, either for improving the effectiveness of the GCC or for its evolution or the creation of another body of the National Security Council (NSC). The recognition of this reality is assessed as positive, as it led to the present legislative initiative. 2. NSC – GCC. Nature of the Scheme The present bill attempts to address the identified weaknesses of the KYSEA by creating a collective advisory body, under the Prime Minister, the SEA, while maintaining the KYSEA intact at the decision-making level, for foreign policy, security and defense issues, without of course any improvement. That is, in the field of security, a parallel advisory structure is added, the SEA, whose recommendations are directed towards decision-making in a proven ineffective body, the KYSEA. The legislator has used the US SEA as a model, that is, as a field of consultation, which responds to completely different governance conditions (President, Senate, Parliament, Ministries, Intelligence Services, etc.) but also strategic conditions, from those of Greece.
While the CSC has an advisory nature, executive powers also creep in, such as coordination (article 154, paragraph 2, article 156, paragraph 1. b) and article 157, paragraph 2. b)) and crisis management (article 156, paragraph 3. a) and article 157, paragraph 2. a)). For crisis management, the National Security and Defense Council also has relevant responsibilities, such as emergency assessments and the organization of a crisis management system (PD 63/2005, article 19, par. d)). The NSC-NSC scheme leads to a bureaucratic, time-consuming and inflexible combination, which is impossible to respond qualitatively to rapidly escalating situations, which are common in the area of ​​geostrategic interest of Greece, as well as with overlapping and sometimes conflicting responsibilities and, most importantly, with an unclear character of each institution. Unfortunately, this specific model inherently contains the seeds of failure. The most effective, efficient and most flexible solution is the creation of a single National Security institution at this level. The most appropriate solution is considered to be the transformation of the NSC into a National Security and Defense Council. 3. SIS and Strategic Intelligence Assessment The SIS is considered responsible for the “… timely diagnosis of threats to the country’s security at a regional and international level…” (article 154, par. 2), which puts it in contrast with the mission of the institutionally responsible body, namely the National Intelligence Service (Law 3649/2008, article 2, Government Gazette 39 A’/2008). This is also outside the capabilities of the SIS, which as a small-member and even advisory body, does not have the capabilities to search, collect, process, analyze and produce information products. This creates overlapping and conflicting responsibilities and multiplication of efforts. Responsible for assessing the risks and threats against the Country is the community of the country’s intelligence services, led by the National Intelligence Service, which can be depicted in a “Strategic National Intelligence Assessment”. This specific product can be produced by the Intelligence Council of the Hellenic Security Service (Law 3649/2008, article 8, Government Gazette 39 A'/2008), approved by the Intelligence Management Coordinating Council of the Hellenic Security Service (Law 3649/2008, article 7, Government Gazette 39 A'/2008) and assess the long-term threats and risks against the Country at the domestic, regional and international levels. The "Strategic National Intelligence Assessment" must be reviewed periodically, e.g. every three years and exceptionally if required, and constitute the formal starting point for all actions and activities of National Security. 4. National Security Staff Products
The National Security Council “…shall submit … to the Prime Minister an annual strategic planning report entitled “National Security Strategy”” (article 156, par. c)) which is also presented “… at a special meeting of the National Foreign Policy Council (NFPS)” (article 158, par. 3). It also “…shall submit to the Prime Minister an annual confidential report with a presentation, analysis and assessment of critical national security issues as well as the submission of proposals for a plan to address them, which also includes an annual analysis of the country’s strategic priorities” (article 157, par. 2. c)). From the description it follows that these two documents are of a similar nature and it is difficult to distinguish what each one includes. In general, the “National Security Strategy” is not a short-term document (annual basis) but a long-term one, with a horizon of about a decade and is the fundamental text and the basis for planning National Security. The annual report is moving in the right direction. Both documents are completely introverted and do not dynamically feed the National Security process. A typical process for producing basic National Security staff products could be the following: Based on the risks and threats that arise from the “Strategic National Intelligence Assessment”, the National Security Strategy prepares the “National Security Strategy” to address them, as well as to support and achieve national objectives. The "National Security Strategy" must be approved by the KYSEA, reviewed periodically or even exceptionally if required and distributed to the relevant bodies for implementation. From this, the involved bodies must develop individual strategies to support it and then programs and plans for their implementation. In particular, Foreign Policy Strategy (YPEF), National Defense Strategy (YPETHA), Internal Security Strategy (YPPROPO - YPEN), Civil Protection Strategy (YPES), Cyber ​​Defense Strategy (YPPSPP) etc., which must be approved by the KYSEA. The SES for the preparation of the "sectoral" strategies must issue guiding and coordinating instructions, for cooperation and achieving the best result among those involved. The responsible bodies of the individual strategies must submit annually by 15 January an implementation and evaluation report of the individual strategies and then the National Security Strategy Committee by 15 February the "Annual Progress and Evaluation Report of the National Security Strategy" in the spirit of article 157, par. 2. c), to the National Security Strategy Committee. The latter, after its approval, must be distributed to the
competent bodies for corrective actions and redesign if necessary. The “… development of crisis management plans” is provided for (article 156, par. 1. a)). The NSC is a high-level strategic and not an operational body. Therefore, it does not develop plans. Plans are the responsibility of the lower bodies of the National Security System and have a different philosophy and structure. The NSC is oriented towards the development of strategies, strategic directions and coordination instructions and evaluation reports on the National Security situation. As mentioned above, here too the NSC is shifting towards the executive sector. Also, the National Security Advisor “… may request information or recommend to the competent Minister the submission of reports or analyses on issues related to National Security”. The SSC represents the Prime Minister; it is not possible to make suggestions (i.e. if they wish and if they are convinced) to ministers for the submission of documents on National Security. This should be a mandatory and legally binding obligation, without suggestions or requests and self-restrictions. The bill fails to depict a coherent process of producing National Security staff products and the one described is of a limited horizon and completely introverted, unable to trigger and coordinate a dynamic process of mutual and two-way (from top to bottom and vice versa), but also horizontal interaction between the National Security organs and bodies. Also, the SSC is sliding towards the work of lower echelons and is self-restricting. 5. National Security Architecture It is obvious, from the content of the draft law and the aforementioned, that a coherent security architecture is not depicted, which is reflected in a clear hierarchical relationship of bodies, production of basic executive products and National Security procedures. 6. Composition of the National Security Council The body of the basic composition of the National Security Council (article 158, par. 2) raises concerns regarding its composition. It consists of four members of the Government, who also participate in the National Security Council (Government Gazette A'26/2015), the Minister of Finance, a representative of the Parliament, i.e. of the legislative power and five service factors are absent. That is to say, in
The supreme body of National Security, whose decisions are primarily governmental and political, according to the Constitution and the Laws, the representatives of the Government are a minority. It is necessary to separate the regular members, with the right to vote, from the extraordinary members, without the relevant right. The best solution is for the regular members to be the same as the KYSEA. Of course, as mentioned above, this creates a multiplication of efforts, bureaucracy and dysfunction. 7. Decision-Making in the SNA From the spirit of the law, because there is no introductory report from which to draw clarifying elements and because the SNA has been characterized as "advisory", it is clear that this is considered simply as a forum for exchanging views and not for making a decision. However, because it is also characterized as "... special collective..." (article 154, par. 1), the provisions for the collective bodies of the Government (PD 63/2005, articles 15 and 16) probably apply, corresponding to the KYSEA and could not fail to apply to the top National Security body, which also prepares the relevant strategy. That is, decision-making by open vote and majority, a casting vote of the president in the event of a tie, and keeping secret minutes. There is a need to clarify all of this. 8. Organization of the SEA A structure of the SEA is described (article 156, par. 3 and 4) which is completely superficial and insufficient for the fulfillment of its work and mission. Indicatively, the absence of a legal department is mentioned, with an emphasis on international law, which is vital for the operation of this specific body. Also, the definition of the organization by law is inflexible and it is not easy to modify if operational needs arise. The organization must be the subject of systematic analysis and study, in order to determine the quantitative and qualitative elements, infrastructure and support for its operation. It is more efficient for the organization and responsibilities of the individual structural departments of the SAC to be determined by presidential decree, so as to include all the necessary elements and to make modification or readjustment, if necessary, easier. 9. Functionality of the SAC The SAC session with the participation of political figures for the production of executive products, as well as other procedures, is very difficult. It is necessary to provide for a functional body with
headed by the National Security Advisor and authorized representatives of the National Security bodies, e.g. the Secretaries General of the ministries, etc., with the name e.g. "NSA Working Group" which will carry out the daily work of preparing and drafting the final products to be approved by the NSA. Also, for reasons of speed and efficiency, it is advisable to adopt the "tacit acceptance" procedure, both at the level of the Working Group and at that of the NSA plenary session. 10. Other It is necessary to review the terminology used in the draft law and to harmonize it in a general context with that of defense and security, in order to ensure clarity, completeness, brevity and full understanding among those involved. 11. Conclusions The geostrategic conditions of the regional and international environment, as well as that of Greece itself, require rapid and qualitative decision-making in the field of National Security. The existing body at the Political-Strategic level, namely the National Security Council, has so far proven ineffective. The undertaking of the legislative initiative is considered positive, as it recognizes the existing gap in this field of National Security. The choice of establishing the National Security Council as an advisory body and the maintenance of the National Security Council without any improvement, namely a twin model, leads to a bureaucratic, time-consuming, inflexible and dysfunctional decision-making process, with a high degree of risk of failure. The National Security Council, although characterized as an advisory body, also includes executive powers, creating an overlap with the National Security Council, as well as other State bodies. The executive products produced by the National Security Council are limited in scope, introverted and do not trigger the necessary hierarchical processes of National Security. The draft law in combination with the existing structures and functions of National Security does not succeed in forming a comprehensive, coherent, effective, extroverted and efficient National Security architecture. The composition of the National Security Council is precarious, in terms of the quality of decision-making.
The decision-making process in the National Security Council requires clarification. The organization of the National Security Council is inadequate and inflexible for the fulfillment of its work and mission. There is a need to create a complementary structure for the National Security Council and to introduce new procedures, in order to achieve rapid and efficient operation. 12. Proposals The establishment of a single National Security institution at the Political-Strategic level, with the transformation of the National Security Council into the National Security Council. The formation of an integrated, coherent and functional National Security architecture, which should be reflected in the draft law, capable of responding to the geostrategic needs and requirements of Greece, taking into account the above.

STELIOS PETROULAKIS, Apchos (I) n.a.
As is known, the issues of Security and Defense of our Country are managed by the Government Council of National Defense (KY.S.E.A.), in accordance with the founding law 1266/82 and as amended by newer laws, headed by the Prime Minister and attended by the competent Ministers and other Administrative factors, by law.
However, there is an absence of a competent Service, a Secretariat, which would have collected all the required information, processed and made recommendations in advance, so as to be able to responsibly and promptly inform the Prime Minister of the country and make the recommendation to the KY.S.E.A.
Today, for the National Security and Defense of our country, information is used that is collected, classified, analyzed and utilized by the following Ministries:
a. Ministry of National Defense (General Directorate of National Defense, Army General Staff,
Navy and Air Force).
b. Ministry of Citizen Protection (EL.AS., EYP).
c. Ministry of Merchant Marine (Coast Guard).
d. Ministry of Press (International and Greek News Agencies and press representatives at Greek Embassies).
e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Embassies and their services).
f. Ministry of Development (trade representatives at Greek Embassies).
In some of the above ministries, there are also Operations and Crisis Management Centers, but without the necessary and appropriate coordination.

This need was identified many times in the past and of course during the crisis in Imia. After this crisis, the then government tried to create the Secretariat of the KY.S.E.A. with the following responsibilities:
a. Ensuring the general secretarial support of the KY.S.E.A. by establishing an appropriate infrastructure.
b. The continuous timely and valid information and support of the work of the Prime Minister and the KY.S.E.A.
c, The collection of all processed information from all the intelligence services listed above.
d. The production, in collaboration with the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and other public bodies, of appropriate information material to promote Greek positions and inform international public opinion.
This effort, although it made considerable progress, ultimately did not come to fruition because the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs probably did not reach an agreement.
Later, on February 1, 2011, then Prime Minister George Papandreou created the Prime Minister's General Secretariat with responsibilities that covered the needs of policy, coordination, reaction and action in matters of foreign relations, defense and security,
Unfortunately, the governments that followed used and continue to use the Prime Minister's General Secretariat for other issues. Thus arose the need for the creation of the National Security Council (NSC).
This missing service is conveniently covered by article 154 of the draft Law of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Modernization of Foreign Policy: Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council, Council of Greeks Abroad and other provisions".
However, when a service is created, the relevant services and the relevant texts that exist are taken into account, in order to plan, organize, and staff it appropriately. So that its mission can be precisely defined and it can fill the gaps that exist.
The National Security Council must produce a National Defense - Security Policy and not a National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy stems from the National Defense - Security Policy of the Government and is the work of other Ministries. It must also gather ready-to-use information from other national sources on the basis of which the National Defense - Security Policy will be determined. Finally, it receives the positions and recommendations of the other state defense - security bodies of the country and prepares the Prime Minister's recommendation to the National Security Council.
With the clear mission and operation of the SEA, the following will be avoided: a. Overlapping responsibilities with the relevant ministries and services. b. Hierarchy issues. c. Competition issues. d. Issues of lack of trust and jealousy. e. And finally, issues of poor coordination, poor operation and poor results.