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The war in Ukraine has "hopefully" entered its ninth month, shattering noble aspirations to eliminate it from international relations and demonstrating the uncertainty and unpredictability of military operations. The multitude of analysts has been successively proven wrong in their initial predictions of a short Russian advance or at least of Russian dominance in areas with a significant Russian-speaking population.

The consequences of the war have spread worldwide and neighboring Europe is facing an unprecedented energy crisis that is fueling high inflation accompanied by the threatening reappearance of recession. In this environment and through indirect Russian threats of possible use of nuclear weapons, the countries of Europe are trying to articulate a common policy to deal with this unprecedented situation. The adoption of a common European policy is made difficult by the different perceptions of threats, national interests, economic data, general approaches and the predispositions of peoples and elites.

Undoubtedly, Washington - also mobilizing the Atlantic Alliance - has thrown all its weight into strengthening Ukrainian defense and building a solid anti-Russian front. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that a conflict "by proxy" is currently taking place in Ukraine between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia. The size and stakes of the conflict force most countries to take a clear position in this confrontation. Of course, there is no single and absolute choice of one of the two poles, but there are certainly several gradations between the two extreme positions.

This completely logical approach is the basis for those who in good faith propose a relatively cautious stance for our country towards the two adversaries. In fact, they invoke the need for a partial rupture with Moscow, as the latter will (probably) continue to be a superpower and a member of the Security Council after the end of the war. These arguments are also framed by feelings of justified bitterness towards the West for its stance on a multitude of Greek concerns and problems, from security issues to the recent economic crisis. These positions find support in several strata of the Greek people who view the Orthodox Russian people positively (as do the Ukrainians to a large extent) and also maintain an overestimated appreciation of past Russian support.

With these thoughts, they propose a strong condemnation of the Russian invasion but the avoidance of providing defense assistance to Ukraine and avoiding our involvement in economic and other sanctions. They even hope that Moscow will “reward” our cautious stance with exemptions from the sanctions that it has imposed on several Western countries. To strengthen their positions, they invoke the ambiguous stance of Turkey, which manages to maintain contacts and cooperation with both sides and has not tasted - to a large extent - the consequences of economic sanctions.

All these plausible arguments would be sufficient for choosing a moderate and relatively balanced position between the two opponents, provided that our country did not border the expansionist and revisionist Turkey.

For decades, we have - perhaps excessively - placed our hopes for dealing with our neighboring country in the application of international law. Realizing, however, that this is not enough, we have invested in our armed forces while at the same time striving to activate a real common European defense and security policy that will evolve into a common defense. Under these circumstances, it would be at least hypocritical not to fervently and in practice support a country that is being invaded from outside. Let us not rush to look for arguments to justify the Russian invasion - there may be nuggets - but Ankara is using exactly the same arguments. In the final analysis, it is not convincing to seek from our allies and partners to proceed with sanctions against Ankara and for us to avoid aligning ourselves with those European nations that feel the threat of the Russian bear.

I recognize that our current clear position certainly does not guarantee the success of our national goals. Nor should we hope that with the end of the Ukrainian crisis, our allies and partners will launch a series of sanctions and pressures on the revisionist Turkey. However, I estimate that Ankara will become more cautious in taking aggressive action against us as the cost of such action will have increased (in case of successful counteraction to the Russian action).

Of course, I understand that it is not a given that Turkey will continue its ambiguous and balancing tactic between the two adversaries. It has proven that at the last moment it can completely opportunistically (and correctly for its national interests) choose a camp, overturning all assessments. Unfortunately, its position and size allow these opportunistic regressions to a degree that is not possible for countries - like ours - that are still economically completely dependent on the dispositions of allies and partners. This dependence also applies to the supplies of defense equipment, while Ankara is constantly strengthening its self-sufficiency. Let us not ignore the fact, however, that Turkey's gradual distancing from the Western camp has brought about, in Western capitals, restrained reassessments of its role and credibility.

In any case, our clear and firm stance from the beginning on the side of our allies strengthens the persuasiveness of our positions and arguments and constitutes our own necessary contribution to the time-consuming and arduous construction of a real European security mechanism. Often, the choice of a hesitant and balanced stance also brings the wrath of both opponents as it is perceived as opportunistic in the light of the view of "whoever is not with us is against us".

In line with today's dilemmas, we have faced them as a nation in the recent past. We can boast that we made the right choices, but unfortunately the division that came through the process of dominance has partially reversed any positive results of the right decisions of the 20th century. It is certainly not always possible to predict developments and outcomes in advance, and all arguments and positions must be treated with due attention, respect and a willingness to compromise.

I believe that history, the current security situation in our region, the choices of political-economic, financial and cultural life, in connection with the attitude of the threatening neighbor, lead us to ardent and practical partnership with the majority of Western countries and support for the Ukrainian struggle. The most important thing, however, is to realize that the only thing we do not have the luxury of is to experience a new division.

* Hippocrates Daskalakis, Lieutenant General, Lecturer at the National Defense Academy, Doctor of International Relations at Panteion University, Director of Studies at the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies