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1. Import
The Greek print and electronic press publishes analyses of a possible Greek-Turkish military confrontation. Some are so pessimistic that they consider a Greek defeat certain. The purpose of the article is to approach current developments from the perspective of international relations, military power and the economy and to highlight that such a development in the current period is extremely difficult to implement.

2. The current international system
The international system is characterized by great instability on the axis:
Arctic Circle, North Pacific, North South Korea, China Sea, Indian, India-Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, Caucasus, Ukraine, Baltic, North Atlantic. In all these regions, the interests of the USA, Russia, China, Canada and other regional powers clash. It is clear that any additional tension in the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and North Africa increases the instability of the international system and does not bring any benefit to international relations.

3. Turkish strategy: Options and the balance of political-military power
Within this international system, Turkey published the “Blue Homeland Doctrine”, which is an evolution of the previous theory of “gray zones” in the Aegean, increasing the tension dramatically. The theory of the gray zones concerned the legal status of 132 uninhabited rocky islets, but the Blue Homeland Doctrine disputes the continental shelf on inhabited Greek islands, cuts the Aegean in half and the recent Libyan-Turkish “agreement” usurps sovereignty over Greek waters south of Crete. Turkey’s rhetoric and diplomatic activity increase the tension but at the level of political and military moves its possibilities are limited, since it has the following five options:
1. Drilling south of Crete. This scenario is diplomatically desirable by Turkey but is currently militarily unfeasible. In particular, any sending of a drillship south of Crete under the protection of the Turkish Navy will be done without substantial air cover. Turkey has 7 KC-135R aerial refueling aircraft. The cost of these aircraft is enormous. In particular, based on data from the United States Air Force (USAAF), in 1996 the flight hour of such an aircraft was $8.400 and in 2002 the hourly cost had increased to $11.000. The US Air Force's estimate for the fifteen-year period 2002-2017 was that the cost of supporting these planes would skyrocket from $2,2 billion to $5,1 billion (in 2003 prices), an increase of 130% or an annual cost increase of 6,2%. Under these financial constraints, the USAAF delivered 7 such planes to Turkey and it is unknown whether all of them are operational. Assuming that all of them are operational, then they can equip 7-14 or 21 fighter planes of the Turkish Air Force, i.e. a fairly small number. On the other hand, Greece south of Crete can deploy surface ships and submarines, and have air cover from Crete. Anti-ship missiles can also be launched from the territory of Crete. Thus, the implementation of the scenario has a small chance of success. This advantage may change if Turkey, in the future, acquires an aircraft carrier with planes or helicopters.
2. Attack on the Megisti complex. This scenario is militarily feasible, but politically undesirable. Any invasion and occupation of an inhabited Greek island will trigger a strong reaction from Greece and the international community. In such a case, the international community will not remain indifferent. The invasion and occupation of an inhabited island with Greek citizens leaves no room for maneuver for Ankara. The aggressor will not gain diplomatically after this development.
3. The scenario for an attack on western Thrace also has little chance of success both due to the military situation in the region and because of Alexandroupolis, which now plays a key role in American energy and geopolitical interests.
4. The scenario of occupying uninhabited rocky islets (not one but several at the same time) is possible. However, on a military level, potential countermeasures could cancel out any benefits.
5. The last scenario concerns drilling in the Cypriot EEZ. The move, although militarily effective, also carries high risk due to the possible reaction of other countries.
6. Beyond the geographical location, there is also the issue of the type of forces that will be involved and the operations. Thus, there is the scenario of an air-naval battle for a number of hours, the scenario of a clash of elite special forces to occupy and retake rocky islets, and the scenario of total war.
It is clear that the potential Turkish options involve high risk in their implementation and a positive development for Turkey is not certain. The following parameters must be taken into account in the above:
-Turkey does not have a diplomatic presence in three important countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Syria) but pursues a regional power policy throughout the region. This contradiction of diplomatic absence and military presence has already led Turkey into problems. Specifically:

-In Syria, Ankara carried out three military operations between 2016 and 2019. The Turkish strategy aimed at creating a zone 440 km long and 30-40 km wide under Ankara's full control and destroying the Kurdish forces. Turkey controls an area of ​​only 250 km long and 10 km wide, and that under joint Russian-Turkish forces and not unilaterally. Also, the Kurdish YPG fighters were not eliminated but have lined up further south, protecting Syrian oil fields and thus increasing their revenues... Since 2017, Russia has tried in vain to bring Turkey and Syria together, but the only high-level meeting between the two sides took place between the head of the MIT Hakan Fidan and Assad's military advisor, General Ali Mamlouk, on 13-1-2020. The content of the meeting is difficult to ascertain, but certainly, the normalization of relations between the two sides is not easy, and will take time. Syria rightly claims that Turkey is violating its territorial integrity and has threatened retaliation. Although the Syrian army is not strong, bilateral frictions should not be underestimated.
-In Iraq, the deployment of approximately 500 Turkish soldiers since March 2015 in the town of Bashika near Mosul triggered a significant political crisis between the two countries as early as January 2017, which continues to this day.
-In Lebanon, Turkey participates in the UN peacekeeping force with a small number of soldiers.
-In the Eastern Mediterranean, the construction of the East-Med Pipeline between Greece-Cyprus and Israel is not a decided energy project of the three countries. It has been characterized as a national security agreement by the US President and the legislative bodies. At the same time, for a state of 8,5 million people like Israel, the discovery and exploitation of natural gas deposits of 30-60 trillion cubic feet is an economic opportunity that is impossible not to realize. Shortly before the arrival of the Greek Minister of Defense in Israel, the newspaper The Times of Israel published an article according to which the Israeli Armed Forces (IDF) now characterize Turkey as an adversary. The publication was neither confirmed nor denied by the country's Ministry of Defense or the government. Thus, official Israel confirmed the old practice that requires the IDF to never publish either the potential adversary, the time, or the means they will use against it.
-In Libya, the situation is complicated. The country has been divided, on one side there is the official government supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey and Qatar, and on the other side there is the Tobruk government under General Haftar who is supported by the Russian mercenary corps Wagner. The deployment of Turkish troops triggered not only the reaction of Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan parliament, but also the reaction of Egypt. Cairo proceeded to implement the Qadir 2020 exercise in which almost the entire armed forces participated, with deployment on the border with Libya, in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Red Sea. In the Mediterranean, Egypt deployed frigates, corvettes, submarines, a helicopter carrier, F-16 aircraft, and Apache and Chinook Kamov helicopters. Finally, on 8/1/2020, the Muslim International condemned the Turkish invasion of Libya. At the Berlin Conference, the USA, represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, called for the removal of all foreign troops from the country, while the Greece-Cyprus-Egypt-France summit had preceded it, which had condemned the Turkish actions and plans. Already before and during the Berlin Conference, almost all of Libya's internal factions, the Arab League, Saudi Arabia and other countries have expressed a similar position. Finally, geography creates a problem of supplying any Turkish force in Libya. Under these circumstances, the implementation of the decision of the Turkish National Assembly of 2/1/2020 to send troops to Libya will be difficult. Beyond these obstacles, the possibility of a clash between Russian and Turkish troops is real. Russia, in order to avoid such a development, tried to impose a peace plan. Both the US and the EU do not want to see a Russian military presence in Libya. Thus, the position that has already been stated that foreign troops must leave also carries the Turkish-Islamic military formations.
-Between 2016-2019, due to the internal unrest in Turkey, over 300.000 people have been imprisoned or dismissed from their jobs. Among them, more than 8.000 military personnel. The number, although small in relation to the total personnel of the Armed Forces, is not negligible since it concerns officers in key positions and pilots.
-US-NATO-Turkey relations continue to be tested by the Turkish procurement of the S-400 and the overall upgrading of Turkey-Russia-Iran-Venezuela relations. This development has already led to the cancellation of Turkey's participation in the F-35 aircraft program, as well as additional US sanctions on the Turkish defense industry. For example - coincidentally (?) - the sales of Turkish attack helicopters and frigates to Pakistan have been frozen, while at the same time the Turkish defense industry's effort to build the ALTAY tank is encountering huge obstacles since no industry supplies Turkey with engines for the tanks. These are just some of the current obstacles to the Turkish defense industry. There are other problematic armament programs that are not mentioned for reasons of space.

4. The Economic and Institutional Parameters.
In international conflicts, both the economy and institutions play a key role. In particular, people who have not been happy with the situation in their country since the peace period find it difficult to fight for it. The level of happiness is directly linked to the economic situation of the people but also to the level of institutions. It is therefore worth briefly examining the above parameters.
The Turkish economy, although it has a strong industrial base, presents significant structural weaknesses. Unemployment plagues the country after it jumped to 2019% for young people between 27-15 years old in August 34, approximately 2,8 million people! In particular, 26% of graduates are unable to work and 5 million graduates are unable to repay their student loans. In the two years 2017-2018, a total of 550.000 Turks migrated abroad for work reasons. At the same time, inflation is increasing, the Turkish lira is depreciating and businesses are unable to repay their loans. The banking sector is also facing significant problems. Turkish GDP from $950 billion in 2013 decreased to $748 billion in 2019.
In this context, any Greek-Turkish confrontation would trigger a major devaluation of the Turkish lira, increased inflation, a decrease in foreign exchange reserves and gold reserves. In such a case, popular discontent against the Erdogan regime could lead to its downfall.
Let us now examine the institutional parameter. This has to do with the relationship between the military and political sectors of the economy (civil-military relations) but also the level of institutions in the country. After the failed coup of 2016, Turkey is a democracy in name only. An Islamic regime has been established that is personal and has persecuted both a portion of the Islamists (the so-called followers of Gulen), as well as the Kemalists, the Kurds, and any other voice of opposition. In today's Turkey, over 9.000 journalists have lost their jobs or have been imprisoned. Popular discontent has led thousands of Turks to buy housing in Greece since these people see that sooner or later they will have to leave Turkey. Under the current circumstances, a people that is getting poorer day by day and at the same time sees and experiences the non-existence of the rule of law simply does not fight. It is characteristic that the Turkish commanders themselves are using Islamist mercenaries, former ISIS fighters, in Syria and Libya, and not Turkish troops.

5. Historical experience and the Greek phobic syndrome.
Having exposed the multiple negative parameters of the Turkish strategy, we now come to the Greek phobic syndrome. For decades, Greece has lived with the mistaken idea that Turkey is “the West’s favorite child.” This is largely a fantasy since the opposite idea prevails in Turkey itself, namely that the Christian West aims to dismember Turkey!
In particular, the Turks believe that the West never abandoned the idea of ​​the Treaty of Sèvres and constantly threatens Turkey with dismemberment. The attempt to unify Greece and Cyprus in the 1950s-1970s was considered by the Turks as a Western attempt to encircle their country and the beginning of a new Western plan of dismemberment. The arms embargo imposed by the US on Turkey in the period 1975-1979 after the invasion of Cyprus is for the Turks proof that the West was continuing the policy of division. The recent warm American relations with the Kurds of Syria and Iraq and the long-term negotiation with the EEC/EU for Turkey's accession which never became a reality are also examples of the Western anti-Turkish policy.
HERE THEY HAVE ABSOLUTE FOREIGN POLICY PSYCHOSIS SINCE EACH OF THE TWO COUNTRIES CONSIDERS THAT THE WEST IS CONSPIRACYING AGAINST THEM BY SUPPORTING THE OPPONENT. THUS EVERY WESTERN MOVE OR STATEMENT IS CONSIDERED TO FAVOR ONE OR THE OTHER SIDE. From this psychosis, the hope has been born in both countries that Russia will save them. Many in Greece support the solution of the 'Blonde Nation', which however never supported the Greeks with the exception of the naval battle of Navarino. Correspondingly, many in Turkey believe that the repetition of the Lenin-Kemal Friendship Pact is taking place today under the friendly relations between Putin and Erdogan.
However, an analysis of the Greek-Turkish crises of the period 1955-1996 shows that the West's consistent policy is to avoid tensions between the two countries. It is characteristic that in the March 1987 crisis, the then NATO Secretary General made a personal phone call to Özal to de-escalate it, while in January 1996 the then US president also got involved in de-escalating the situation.
It is worth quoting the testimony of Yannis Kapsis, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding the 1987 crisis: "He was a wonderful man, the representative type of the English patriot, Lord Carrington... It was about midnight and life in Brussels stops around 7-8 in the afternoon. And yet Lord Carrington immediately answered the phone. And as soon as I explained to him who I was, he hurried, with the well-known English courtesy, to apologize for not having recognized my voice - as if we spoke on the phone every day. Without hesitation, I emphasized to him that at 11:30 the next morning the fleets of the two countries... would cross fire... - I understand, he told me the seriousness of the situation and I understand your position. I will take the initiative...". The initiative of the then NATO Secretary General led to an escalation of the crisis and ignited Turkish anger against him...

6. The Current Dynamics
The speculation (and not certainty) of a heated incident was triggered by the statement of former Defense Minister Evangelos Apostolakis that in the event of a military engagement with Turkey “we will be on our own”. This was followed at the Delphi Conference in November 2019 by the statement of former US Ambassador to Greece Nicholas Burns according to which “I regret to say it but if Greece needs US support in a heated incident with Turkey I do not think it will get it from President Trump. 2020 is not 1996”. After the meeting of the Greek Prime Minister with President Trump in the US (7-1-2020) information was published that in their dialogue, President Trump asked the Greek Prime Minister what would happen if Greece lost in the event of a Greek-Turkish military confrontation and received the answer that Greece would not lose. These statements fueled a large number of publications about an inevitable Greek-Turkish military confrontation.
The superficiality with which international relations are approached in Greece is astonishing. The simple expression of personal assessments triggers the “certainty” of the impending crisis from which we will indeed emerge defeated. THESE ASSESSMENTS ARE MADE WHEN there is both the historical precedent that both NATO and the US acted as fire-fighters, putting the Greek-Turkish conflict away. But let us come to the US and to President Trump himself.

7. Current Situation Analysis The Trump Factor Unknown X or Predictable personality in the Greek-Turkish confrontation?
The US does not have a single center of power; there are many centers (White House, State Department, CIA, NSA, Pentagon, and others) that do not always have the same understanding of foreign policy. However, there are some "fixed fixed perceptions" on international issues that are sooner or later activated. Many times the US establishment came into conflict with the occupant of the White House on issues of tactics or strategy. When President Kennedy was handling the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Pentagon called for an immediate military attack on the Soviet missiles on the island, but the White House had the opposite opinion, fearing Soviet military retaliation. The president sent his brother, the only person he could trust, to the Soviet ambassador, asking for Moscow's help in resolving the crisis without resorting to weapons. In 1987, the famous Iran-Contra scandal broke out. In particular, after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the US cut off all contact with the Iranian regime. However, it was revealed that behind the scenes the CIA had financial dealings with Iran and was using the money to help the Contras in Latin America, bypassing official state policy. In the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s, the State Department supported military action against the Serbs using military ground forces, but the Pentagon considered such a policy too dangerous. When the State Department sent President Clinton the text announcing American military action against the Serbs, it included the use of Army forces. Then Clinton's military advisor unilaterally amended the document and the presidential announcement emphasized that action would be taken against the Serbs only with the use of air weapons, that is, only with aerial bombings. These examples are just a few of many that show the difference of opinion in the American political leadership and elite.
Let's come to President Trump himself, who is currently facing possible dismissal from the White House, turning him, according to many analysts, into a weak president who will not intervene in any Greek-Turkish crisis. The White House has come face to face with the centers of US power on many foreign policy issues. We mention some:
1. Trump's insistence on good relations with Russia is characteristic, when all the US power mechanisms consider Russia to be a threat to American interests. Thus, the White House disagrees with American sanctions on Russia but is forced to sign and impose them after they have been approved by the Senate.
2. North Korea is considered by the establishment as a rogue state, but the president emphasizes that the North Korean leader is his friend with whom he can work constructively.
3. The third example is highly instructive. It concerns US relations with Japan. US-Japan relations were established post-war in 1951 when the Treaty of Alliance was signed between the two countries. The original treaty was amended in 1960 under Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi, grandfather of the current Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe. The 1961 Treaty obliges the US to defend Japan in the event of war and in return Japan grants the US military bases from which the US armed forces can strike deep into Asia. In essence, the treaty does not provide for Japan's military assistance to the US if it is attacked. The American president raised the issue in a very harsh way with the Japanese on July 28-29, 2019, during the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, saying publicly: “If Japan is attacked, we will help them, we will fight at all costs. But if we are attacked, Japan has no obligation to help us. They [the Japanese] will see the attack on a Sony TV.”
This statement caused a shock in Tokyo. Japan has open security issues
-with Russia (for the Kuril Islands in the North Pacific),
-with North Korea, which has launched its nuclear program and whose missiles have repeatedly violated Japanese airspace, and
-with China on the status of islets in the South China Sea.
Trump's statement was interpreted as a change in US policy despite the State Department's immediate reaction in favor of Japan. Tokyo reacted in two ways. The country, which has been increasing its defense spending by 2012% annually since 10 due to external threats, announced on 20-12-2019 record annual defense spending of 5,31 trillion yen ($48,56 billion) and at the same time began to develop a timid diplomatic initiative to normalize relations with China.
4. The fourth example of President Trump's behavior concerns the US-Kurds-Turkey triangle. All US agencies had expressed American support for the Kurds, but the White House allowed the Turkish invasion of Syria. However, Trump's letter to Erdogan on 9-10-2019 was made public and emphasizes:

"Dear President Erdogan,
"Let's work for a good deal. You don't want to be responsible for the slaughter of thousands of people and I don't want to be responsible for the destruction of the Turkish economy - which I will do...don't be stupid."

Here we see the American establishment having expressed specific positions on various international issues (Russia, North Korea, Middle East, Japan, etc.) and the White House having expressed different opinions. Especially regarding Greece, both the US Senate, the State Department, and the Pentagon have repeatedly expressed their support for Athens and for transforming Greece into a strategic partner. The upgraded diplomatic AND MILITARY relations between Athens and the US have already been established both with the new joint defense alliance and with many actions (joint exercises, etc.) but it is surprising that some in Greece are demolishing the edifice without realizing it in actions or words.
It is noteworthy that the US president, despite his personal reservations, signed the East-Med Act, taking the huge step.

TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USA WILL INTERVENE IN THE EVENT OF A HEATED GREEK-TURKISH CRISIS, THE ANSWER IS YES FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1. Both the State Department and the Pentagon are committed to protecting the territorial integrity of Greece. Beyond the legal commitment, there are shared long-term geopolitical, strategic, and energy interests. No president in the White House can ignore these.
2. If the US does not intervene, the NATO Secretary General will be forced to intervene.
3. If NATO and the US do not intervene, then France will intervene, which as a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council will emerge as a case of special power within the UN and the international system. French involvement will force the US and NATO to intervene, otherwise they will be ridiculed in the international system, if they maintain a neutral stance as a mere observer of French movements.
4. There are two other potential interventions in favor of Greece by powerful Asian countries that I would not like to name for obvious reasons.
5. The expression “we will be alone” is extremely unfortunate for two reasons: First, it sends the wrong message of Greece’s military and diplomatic isolation to Turkey and second, in the era of satellites and electronic warfare, countries allied to Greece do not need to deploy an army, fleet and air force in the Aegean. The transmission of information in real time about the movements of the Turkish armed forces and an electronic warfare that will block Turkish telecommunications are sufficient. Other actions can be taken that are not mentioned for obvious reasons….
6. The EU is not a military superpower, but the euro as a currency will suffer a heavy blow in the international financial markets if two EMU countries (Greece-Cyprus) get involved in military operations. The EU certainly does not want to have any more negative consequences in the current period since BREXIT is already creating problems in Brussels.

8. Greek-Turkish military balance
It is true that in the period 2009-2019 the bilateral balance of military power shifted to Greece's detriment, as Athens recklessly reduced defense spending while Ankara increased it by 60%. However, despite the reduction, the Greek armed forces maintained a significant combat power that Ankara cannot ignore.

9. Conclusion
In the current international system of instability throughout Eurasia, the immediate implementation of the Blue Homeland doctrine is unfeasible. Caution is needed but not panic. If Turkey tries to implement a military confrontation with Greece at this time, it will probably not be to Ankara's advantage. In such a case, Erdogan himself may lose power and his personal fate may be similar to that of other tyrants...
The Greek authorities must prevent Turkey from becoming a naval power that can impose itself in the eastern Mediterranean. The transformation of the Turkish navy into a Blue water navy must receive the appropriate response. At the same time, Greece should focus its efforts on canceling Turkey's nuclear program. If Ankara has nuclear weapons in 15-20 years, then it will be uncontrolled... 2020 is a year of tension, but it will not be the new 1922 if there is appropriate and proper deterrence at all levels. Greece has several safety keys that it must gradually use if Turkey increases the tension further. Napoleon's saying "Never interrupt your opponent when he is making a mistake" must be in our plans.

(*) He teaches at the National University of Athens and at military and police academies.
Member of EL.I.S.M.E.