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SPUTNIK PHOTO AGENCY / REUTERS
Recently, a trend has been taking shape in Greek diplomacy towards adapting to international political reality. The prevailing conditions limit the hitherto dominant perceptions and positions regarding the nature of the international system, the limits of its regulatory functioning and the consequent manner of exercising Greek foreign policy; especially towards Turkey.

The exclusion of Athens from the Berlin Conference on Libya seems to mark the beginning of a shift in Greek diplomacy, which has realized that the pursuit of effective foreign policy is far from arbitrary perceptions, ideologically charged positions, or scientifically familiar assumptions.

It is a fact that Greece, while acting in accordance with diplomatic protocols, full respect for international law, UN and EU decisions, was ultimately excluded from the Berlin Conference.

On the contrary, Turkey, by doing exactly the opposite, was invited in. This specific case fed back into foreign policy - both at the level of public debate and in the decision-making process - with arguments that demonstrate the gap between the hitherto dominant perceptions of its formation and international political practice.

Subsequently, in a recent interview, the Greek Prime Minister stated that if and when we appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the dispute will only concern the determination of the EEZ and the continental shelf. This specific statement reflects the trend of change, delimiting - in the most rational way - the issues that can be brought under the jurisdiction of the judicial body.

Really, what is the political legitimacy within the country of the other point of view, according to which, even in the context of resolving Greek-Turkish disputes, issues that touch on the core of state sovereignty will be placed under the jurisdiction of the said body and the (pre)determination of those who comprise it? The basic axis of Greek foreign policy remains the defense and perpetuation of the collective subject it serves.

The civil war in Libya, in addition to being an issue of regional security and a humanitarian crisis, is now registered as yet another aspect of the ever-deteriorating Greek-Turkish relations.

In a recent article, the Turkish President was particularly revealing about the role Turkey wants to play. The article is smugly titled: “The Road to Peace in Libya Passes Through Turkey,” and at one point, with excessive arrogance, he notes: “Considering that Europe is less interested in providing military support to Libya, the obvious choice is to work with Turkey, which has already promised military assistance.

The reminder of European weakness at the military level may not be far from reality, but ignoring French capabilities poses serious risks for Turkey. The timing of the publication aims to inform the participants in the Conference of Turkish capabilities, to prejudge the European position and in general to foreshadow that no agreement can be signed and come into effect if it does not include Ankara's demands.

Lately, the Greek government has been proclaiming to all sides that while it is not present, it is not absent from the Libya Conference. The Greek Foreign Minister's tour of Libya and Egypt, as well as Khalifa Haftar's most recent visit to Athens, constituted a last-ditch effort by the Greek side to recall its indirect participation both in the final pre-negotiation stage and during the negotiation.

The EU's participation implicates it anyway, despite Germany's diligent efforts to soften the impression of Athens' non-invitation and, above all, to prevent any Greek obstruction of the process through the EU. Greece's absence from Berlin is the logical result of the "geopolitical parasitism" that emerged as a mentality and practice after the Imia crisis. The current government understands, even if by necessity, the impasse of these specific ineffective practices, trying to replace the hitherto passive Greek stance with a more active foreign policy.

The Berlin Conference concluded with an agreement in principle – not between the directly involved Fayez Al Sarraj and Khalifa Haftar – on a ceasefire in Libya, as the first step towards a political solution to the crisis. The participants pledged to end the provision of military means to the belligerents and to refrain from interventions in Libya. As in any interstate or intrastate conflict, so in the case of Libya, a ceasefire is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a political solution to the crisis.

After the end of the Conference, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas reiterated that: "the main issue is the ceasefire" and added that, if achieved and maintained, it will form the basis for future processes in which countries that did not take part in today's session will also participate.

It is precisely on this statement that we must focus, both to assess the success or otherwise of the Berlin Conference, and to examine the possibilities of Greece's participation at a later stage, provided that the political settlement process progresses. Under these circumstances, the question of annulling the Libya-Turkey Agreement on the delimitation of maritime zones may be raised, during the process of finding a political solution.

In the meantime, the Greek government must strengthen its position by delimiting its maritime zones with neighboring states, where feasible. Turkish hegemony will continue to push Greek foreign policy towards options to reorient its deterrence strategy, abandoning the slippery paths of appeasement.
*Dr. Christos Ziogas, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean and Adjunct Lecturer at the Hellenic Military Academy