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Greek-Turkish relations have recently entered an unprecedented phase of challenges and provocations on the part of Ankara. Provocations, which in the past had led to a dangerous confrontation of military forces threatening to lead to a military confrontation, have now become a permanent practice to the detriment - mainly - of the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, the challenge of the sovereign rights of Hellenism continues unabated by many factors of the neighbor, in different styles and intensity.

At the same time, there is widespread concern about a further escalation of Turkish aggression and practical challenges, this time to the detriment of Athens. The current situation was preceded by a period of escalation with the established air violations and violations accompanied by similar naval incidents in the context of the decades-long, constant and consistent challenge of Greek positions. We see that despite the statements about the unpredictability of the Turkish President's choices, the long-term consistency of Turkish policy is remarkable, a fact that makes it predictable in terms of goals, but not always in terms of tactics.
The current escalation occurs at a time when Ankara, in its effort to emerge as a great power with an autonomous political agenda, is walking a tightrope between East and West, a peculiarly personal Islamic regime and a Western-oriented democracy. A series of confrontations between Ankara and Washington, and not only the issue of the procurement of the S-400 anti-aircraft system, are intensifying concerns as the known external (and sometimes coercive) de-escalation factors seem to be weakening.

A series of critical questions arise for the Greek side, which is called upon to outline and implement its strategy, taking into account not only its significant lag in power factors - to put it bluntly - but also a multitude of uncertain factors.

The main issue is the determination of the real Turkish aspirations in this specific period. I refer to this specific period because unfortunately the fulfillment - even partial - of Turkey's objective goals feeds back into its further expansionist policy. This attitude is not a genetic "anomaly" of the Turkish DNA, but a stable and timeless behavior of nations in a specific period of their history influenced by a multitude of, mainly internal, characteristics.

Related is the question of the degree of risk that Ankara seems willing to take in relation to these aspirations. The common Greek saying that the eastern neighbors always proceed cautiously and having ensured a high probability of success is a common one. However, the examination of Greek-Turkish relations proves the partial truth of this claim since in the past the neighbors have also undertaken operations with a relative (not high) risk. Furthermore, the growing self-confidence that comes from relative recent successes and the rise in power factors, lead to the easier undertaking of moves that involve the risk of conflict.

To be clearer: is Turkey seeking a military conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean today and tomorrow (if the previous one does not occur in the favorable theater of operations around Cyprus) on the outskirts of the Greek continental shelf? I estimate that it is not its first choice, without ruling out that it believes that a controlled-scale incident (regardless of the outcome) will strengthen its aspirations. Ankara estimates that creating a conflict climate in Athens-Nicosia and western capitals will strengthen the chances of finding (or imposing) a solution, similar to the Annan plan, that will serve its interests for the neutralization and control of Cyprus. Undoubtedly, energy issues are a priority for energy-thirsty Turkey, but control of the Eastern Mediterranean is a prerequisite for its emergence as a regional power. Let us therefore expect, against the backdrop of the conflictual climate in the region, that proposals for a "solution" to the Cyprus issue will emerge from different directions, with the lure of avoiding escalation and the profits of a joint exploitation that will gradually expand to the Aegean area. The recent Turkish Cypriot joint exploitation proposals are also moving in this direction, which must be treated with caution and are perhaps more dangerous than illegal drilling.

Finding a compromise solution that will conceal multiple Greek concessions, may satisfy several parties that currently stand - only verbally and reluctantly - on our side, but even part of Hellenism that is hesitant to be led into possible uncertain adventures. Optimistic analysts will argue that Ankara's gradual distancing from the West makes a similar development remote, as Turkish dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and in existing and future energy sources and routes is no longer desirable. They may be right, but they are unable to suggest who (other than us) in such a case would bear the cost of confrontation and they overlook the strong (long-term) tendency to satisfy Turkish demands in the hope of returning it to the Western orbit and the anxious effort of Western companies to penetrate the promising Turkish markets.

Some are looking forward to a very sharp confrontation between the US and Turkey that will lead to significant support for our positions from the former and its allies in the region (Israel). I consider this view overly optimistic and I would not be surprised if the two countries (leaderships) find a way to inexpensively overcome the issue of the coexistence of S-400 and F-35. Nor would I be surprised if the "sly" Turks turn the disadvantage of the Russians revealing the "secrets" of Western systems into an advantage of acquiring Russian anti-aircraft technology from Washington. Undoubtedly, Moscow, taking this possibility into account, will have already taken the corresponding measures, while Putin understands that the Russian-Turkish warm approach has an expiration date for reasons arising from stable geostrategic realities. Although it is beyond our own ability to influence, the important question arises, which Turkey do we want as a neighbor, the well-known difficult, West-oriented, cunning Turkey or an uncontrolled expansionist Islamic regime? Are we willing and able to assume the long-term cost of containing it - even with Western help - and with what guarantees? The memories of the readjustment of Western policy in our region 100 years ago are still fresh.

In our assessments, we must also take into account the “anti-systemic” way of approaching various issues by President Trump, as well as the temptation of Western institutional factors for a forced solution to the chronic Greek-Turkish problem that will occur as a consequence of a conflict (of a controlled scale) with inevitable concessions by the defeated party and with limited references to international law. Perhaps the only constant factor is the reluctance of the European Union to take drastic measures against Ankara. The successes of the Greek side are limited to verbal formulations and limited “targeted” measures that will probably not bring about any change in Turkish policy. Outrageous actions - e.g. a ban on exports of military equipment, real economic sanctions - belong to the realm of the unrealistic.

Every analysis, apart from listing the factors and highlighting the grim reality for us, must also be accompanied by the submission of proposals. The possible solutions range between the poles of accepting a compromise solution with multiple Greek concessions (an arrangement of dubious durability in the future) and determination and preparation for a full-scale confrontation, analogous to the infamous Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) with a guaranteed return - of the victor and the vanquished - fifty years ago. The justified deniers of the uniqueness of the two solutions will disagree by proposing intermediate solutions, based on strategies of avoiding escalation, diplomatic maneuvers, the formation of alliances, international pressure and recourse to international law. They may also propose the "successful" - for some - Greek choices of avoiding war from 1955 onwards (I do not consider 1974 as the year the conflict began) while at the same time maintaining the status quo in our favor.

I firmly believe that this policy has exhausted its limits mainly due to the relative reversal of power against us, the ability of our neighbor to exploit "obscure" points, the objective impossibility of our own proportionate retaliation and the Turkish assessment that we will not proceed with disproportionate dynamic reactions. Furthermore, intermediate options involve the risk of inadequate preparation on our part and an ultimately inevitable reaction of our own that will lead to defeat at the military level (a possibility that can never be ruled out as the opponent also has the initiative of movements).

Obviously you would conclude that I am implicitly proposing the choice of the “Israeli model”, a state with the weapon permanently in a “guard position”. It does not matter what I propose, what matters is the unanimous and consistent implementation of a long-term national line that will be accompanied by the assumption of the necessary cost and the inevitable risk and compatible with reality. The often invoked “Israeli model” has a terrifying multifaceted cost, has been built with blood over decades and survives thanks to the support of a thriving economy and the support of a (the) superpower. In addition and for reasons of survival, it has broad popular acceptance in a complex and divisive party environment similar to the Greek one. The greatest mistake for us is the choice of a hard line incompatible with our capabilities and with uncertain intentions of its consistent implementation.

The Greek dilemma is real and tragic. Kondylis posed it warningly and quite pessimistically, two decades ago, as a choice between a Greek “Finlandization” and military collapse. He did not rule out the possibility of an “honorable” (a concept that involves bitter concessions and even brings accusations of national treason) definitive but future-proof compromise.

However, he set as a basic condition for this controversial compromise - as a last and necessary option - the existence of balanced power, which unfortunately does not exist today. We must build this necessary multi-level power as it is essentially our only realistic option and hope that will strengthen the chances of defending our positions. The basic conditions are that the political forces and elites of the country agree on the obvious and speak honestly to the "proud" Greek people, and that any burdens are distributed fairly, ensuring to a high degree the optimal utilization of each resource.

*HIPPOKRATIS DASKALAKIS- Lieutenant General (retd.)
• Graduate of the Department of International and European Studies, Panteion University
• Master's degree in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Panteion University
• PhD Candidate in International Relations at Panteion University
• Director of Studies of the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (ELISME)
• Associate of the Institute of International Relations (IRIS)
• Lecturer and collaborator at the National Defense Academy (NDA)
• 0030-210-6543131, 0030-6983457318
• rafaelmarippo@yahoo.gr