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CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RUSSIAN INVASION

April 03 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will undoubtedly be a turning point in the evolution of international relations and balances on the old continent and beyond. However, equally important conclusions will emerge for the conduct of military operations, as after decades two modern armies participated in a high-intensity conflict, on a European battlefield, using a multitude of modern weapons systems and with little willingness on either side to demonstrate self-restraint.

Drawing military conclusions (lessons learned) is a laborious task, but even more difficult is their integration into the specific characteristics of each interested party and in relation to the threats they face. That is, all these conclusions that will be drawn must be carefully integrated into the armament program, the formation, the training and the doctrine of the armed forces for a specific operational environment and for defined threats.

Drawing conclusions - especially in the early stages - may, due to the fog of war, be problematic. An incomplete and superficial examination of the facts, as they are - for propaganda reasons - presented in the media, can be misleading and therefore dangerous.

 To be more specific, the strong resistance of the Ukrainians has reignited discussions about the value of a people's defense (and rightly so), well-equipped with modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft small arms even at the expense of a costly active army. This view ignores the existence of the organized Ukrainian army, which has been defending itself for weeks vigorously and successfully against Russian attacks on the confrontation line of the two rebel provinces of Donbas. The television focus on the "war of the cities" dominated by images of conscripted national guardsmen and volunteers does not convey the overall picture. Also, despite the relative ease of handling some modern weapons, the knowledge, skills and experiences acquired through military service are a basic condition (prerequisite) for the proper utilization of weapons systems. Ultimately, determined national guards and volunteers can excessively increase the cost of the opponent's operations, they can even "deny" his access to certain areas, but they can hardly bring about the decisive victory that will lead him to capitulate, retreat or abandon the opponent's effort. Popular defense is necessary - for many reasons - but as a complementary force (national guard forces) to a strong active army with close synergy and since peacetime preparation, training and mobilization procedures.

However, the supply of a multitude of portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided missiles and their dispersal in hundreds of groups does not ensure the interception of enemy armored vehicles or the confrontation with enemy aviation. Sometimes the success of anti-tank weapons is based not only on the actual accuracy of these weapons but also on the unsuccessful tactical use of armored vehicles by the enemy who, without an escort of infantry fighters, sends them as easy prey to unsuitable areas. Even the short-range anti-aircraft systems of the Egyptians in the Yom Kippur War lost their effectiveness when they found themselves outside the anti-aircraft "umbrella" provided by the cumbersome medium-range anti-aircraft systems deployed on the west bank of the canal. Undoubtedly, the excellent performance of a weapon system in a particular theater of operations and with a particular adversary does not mean that it will be repeated forever. Often, the repetition of tried and tested “recipes” leads to the loss of surprise as those monitoring developments proceed to adopt countermeasures. At the same time, the “winner” of the previous conflict rests on his “laurels” and soon tastes what military analyst Luttwak has called the “failure of success”.

However, there is a tendency to abandon the small-member classic battle group of 6 to 9 fighters and replace it with a twice-sized unit (about 15 fighters) with multiple strengths, equipped with portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and even hand-launched unmanned aerial vehicles capable of identifying and attacking "soft" targets. You mean that the new reinforced group will have continuous reliable two-way communication and exchange of data with superiors and neighboring echelons within the framework of what is now called network-centric command.

On the other side of the hill, in Russia, it is obvious that the enemy's capabilities and, above all, the will to resist of the armed forces, the people and the leadership were completely misjudged. This fundamental failure dragged down a multitude of plans and led to disastrous results on the battlefields and beyond. For the reasons for this failure, only speculation can be made, focusing on the tendency of organs of centralized regimes to tend to provide assessments and information that are pleasing to the leaderships, but also on the widespread tendency to underestimate the enemy and reject any indication of his actions that are incompatible with our own way of thinking.

The consequence of the above incorrect assessments was to limit the effectiveness of the first strike, which theoretically should have completely dismantled at least the Ukrainian air force, air defense, headquarters and communications centers within the first 48 hours. This delay was decisive as it enabled the survival of many critical weapons systems that were subsequently dispersed and successfully engaged in the fight.

  Additionally and due to the incorrect assessments, the provision of the multiple directions of attack with forces and means proved rather inadequate. In the development of the operations it appeared that there was no readiness to exploit the effort that was succeeding - probably in the southern sector - while incomprehensible hesitation was demonstrated in many cases. The kilometers-long columns immobilized for days, without any substantial security measures, can hardly be justified only by difficulties of support or ignorance of the terrain (incidentally, the same difficult terrain exists in neighboring Russia).

We are inevitably led to the conclusion of a general inability to conduct modern high-intensity cross-branch operations by troops that are distinguished by unsatisfactory training, both of fighters and of cadres. It seems that even the hardy Russian army has partially lost the ability to effectively engage in the brutal close-quarters combat that characterizes operations in populated areas. In addition, there is a tendency for the Russian army, as well as all Western armies, to rely on the provision of intensive fire support, aimed at eliminating the enemy's pockets of resistance and the subsequent advance of their own units under the protection of the armor of tanks and personnel carriers. This tactic, especially in populated areas, which now constitute the majority of battlefields, requires long-term training, special equipment and does not guarantee the avoidance of the ferocity of close combat. In these fights, the determined native, defending his homeland, well-trained and properly equipped fighter, has significant tactical advantages.

The exercise of command and control of combat units is primarily based on secure and reliable communications. Russian troops, since the conflict in Georgia (2008), have demonstrated serious weaknesses in communications. Despite the existence of multiple electronic warfare systems, it seems that they have not managed to secure - to the desired extent - their own communications. The failure to neutralize Ukrainian communications at least at the higher echelons may be partially attributable to the alternative capabilities provided by Western systems.

There are also indications of the unsatisfactory functioning of the daily supply chain of the Russian army. It is a fact that the unprecedented - even for Russian data - mobilization caused significant malfunctions that can hardly be predicted on their true scale from peacetime. The existing tendency to conduct low-intensity conflicts or for a limited period of hostilities acts catalytically at the expense of adequate logistics. Especially the extremely expensive ammunition for precision strikes is limited while often the modern but insufficiently tested weapons systems prove to be below expectations or prone to a multitude of failures.

So, modern technology may sometimes prove to be inferior to the circumstances, but innovation and ingenuity make commercial technologies and devices, power multipliers of the various existing weapons systems. Simple unmanned commercial systems managed to transmit images of opponents in real time, allowing targeting by artillery units, damage assessment and direct propaganda exploitation of the strike. Smart use of mobile phone applications allowed communication between units (a method initially used in 2006 with particular success by Hezbollah) of the Ukrainian army, while on the contrary, careless use led to the annihilation of units on both sides.

We summarize by resorting to well-known sayings of famous strategists. War is a real chameleon that constantly changes aspects (Clausewitz). Despite technological developments, passion and violence continue to dominate and, as the duration and stakes of conflicts increase, barbarity gradually displaces humanity and self-restraint tendencies (Creveld). From now on, military strategies and tactics will very soon become obsolete and will require their constant revision and adaptation to new technological developments (Buzan).

War therefore continues to be a reality that cannot be prevented by wishes, declarations and good intentions. The principle of self-help continues to be of primary importance without, of course, ignoring any power factor. Morale retains its importance while realistic training is of key importance. Equipment is also necessary, but equally necessary is the constant concern and effort to innovate and surprise using new technologies and experimentation in the fields of exercises by "anxious" spirits. Undoubtedly, however, all of this presupposes solid economic foundations and a broad perception of threats and, above all, acceptance of assuming responsibilities and risks by the rulers and society.

HIPPOKRATIS DASKALAKIS - Lieutenant General (retd.)

• PhD in International Relations at Panteion University
• Director of Studies at the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (ELISME)
• Lecturer at the National Defense Academy (NDA)
• Email: rafaelmarippo@yahoo.gr