Blog

Prokopios Pavlopoulos, former President of the Republic, Academic, Honorary Professor of the Law School of the National University of Athens

Prologue

«Consistent"in its established tactic of constantly adding manifestly non-existent and legally non-existent issues supposedly to "negotiation» with Greece - and, consequently, to question our non-negotiable National Position that there is one, and only, difference between us, that of the delimitation of the Insular Continental Shelf and the corresponding Exclusive Economic Zone - Turkey occasionally raises the issue of whether Greece has the right to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. And in fact, regardless of their size and whether they are inhabited or not.

A. It is highly characteristic of its provocativeness that Turkey raises this issue either by completely distorting the meaning of specific provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, of 1923 and the subsequent amendment of the Treaty of Montreux, of 1936. Or - even worse - by invoking International Treaties to which it is not even a party, such as e.g. the Paris Peace Treaty, of 1947, for the Dodecanese. A Treaty which, according to International Law, constitutes for Turkey, in terms of its scope of application, "rs inter Alios record". To these unthinkable, institutionally and politically, and outrageous challenges from Turkey, Greece consistently responds, always based on International Law - and acting additionally on behalf of the European Union, since according to primary European Law the territory and borders of Greece are also the territory and borders of the European Union - that it has not only a well-founded right but also an equally well-founded obligation to provide defensive protection for all, without exception and without any discrimination, of its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, this right of Greece finds a firm footing in the provisions of primary European Law, given that specific rules of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) guarantee it, especially when applied in combination with corresponding provisions of customary and written International Law - in this case primarily the UN Charter - which already form part of the European Acquis.

B. In supporting our above positions for the defensive armoring of our Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, we must always keep in mind that Turkey, as proven by its long-standing internationally condemnable revisionist stance, is completely unreliable. Primarily in the sense that it does not hesitate to break all kinds of commitments, which it undertakes at any time under International Law, against everything. A fact which has made it, by general admission and admission, "international unrest"as per sixth and per relapse"offender" of International Legality. This is much more true towards Greece, as is also documented by Turkey's very recent behavior after the "Declaration of the Athens on Friendly and Good Neighborly Relations", which was signed in Athens on 7^η December 2023. Although this text has no substantive legal force - something which automatically makes it, from the point of view of International Law, a form of at most "lex imperfect"- but it constitutes a "declaration of principles» in order to normalize the relations of friendship and good neighborliness between Greece and Turkey, in any case it can serve as “text of intentions". That is, a text through which the sincerity of each signatory party is confirmed in practice. In this regard, Turkey's unarmed and cynical questioning of "core"of the elementary principles, which derive from the above "Declaration", and indeed immediately after its signing and repeatedly to this day, must constitute for Greece "direction indicator" about the fact that no trust can "inspire» the Turkish side, especially with regard to our National Issues. And especially with regard to those issues that are related to the defensive armoring of our Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Specifically regarding these, Greece's safe and fully documented argumentation, based on International Law and European Law, is based mainly on the following:

I. The legal status of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 and the subsequent Treaty of Montreux, 1936, as well as the Paris Peace Treaty, 1947

First of all, it is noted that Greece's inalienable right to defensively shield certain of its Aegean Islands is based, with due and very clear legal certainty, on the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, to the extent that it was later amended, in 1936, by the Treaty of Montreux. While with regard to other Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean - specifically the Dodecanese - Turkey is in no way justified in invoking the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.

A. The Treaty of Lausanne, 1923, and its amendment by the Treaty of Montreux, 1936

The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, among other things within the framework of the provisions of article 1, defines "Straits". And within the framework of the provisions of article 4, it determines the legal dimensions of the demilitarization of the Islands of the region, also defining that: "The zones and islands defined below are neutralized… 3. In the Aegean, the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and the Lagous Islands (Mauriae). "

1. The legal data of the Montreux Treaty of 1936

This regime of the Treaty of Lausanne was amended by the Treaty of Montreux of 1936. Which on the one hand repeats in its preamble, relatively vaguely, the definition of "Straits" and, on the other hand, it no longer explicitly lists the above five Islands. Interpreting the above wording of the Montreux Treaty of 1936 as a lifting of the demilitarization regime, Turkey rushed, immediately after its entry into force, to militarize the three Islands under its sovereignty, namely Imbros, Tenedos and Lagouses. Given that according to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 - and according to an explicit statement by the then Mustafa Ismet Pasha and, after 1934, Ismet Inönü, in the context of the relevant Lausanne Conference - with regard to their demilitarization, all five aforementioned islands were considered as "single geographical entity"for the purposes of the legal determination of"Straits Zone", their different treatment within the scope of the Montreux Treaty of 1936 is inconceivable.

2. The need for a unified institutional approach to the status of all Islands falling under the "Straits Zone»

Therefore - and especially in accordance with the principle of proportional equality in the interpretation of all kinds of provisions of International Law - it is not conceivable and permissible to accept, after the Treaty of Montreux of 1936, only the remilitarization of the three Turkish islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Lagos, but not that of the Greek Islands of Samothrace and Lemnos. Which means that as incorporated all, without exception, the aforementioned Islands in the "legal unity of the Straits", after the Treaty of Montreux, 1936, were remilitarized, and indeed in their entirety. Therefore, quasi "autocratically» Both Lemnos and Samothrace were re-militarized.

B. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947

It is preliminary clarified that the status of the final concession of the Dodecanese to Greece is governed by the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty (April 1947) between the Allies, victors of World War II, and Italy. Of particular importance, within this institutional framework, are the provisions of article 14 of the aforementioned Treaty, according to which: "1. Italy cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the islands of the Dodecanese listed below, namely: Astypalaia, Rhodes, Chalki, Karpathos, Kasos, Tilos, Nisyros, Kalymnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsi, Symi, Kos and Kastellorizo, as well as the adjacent islets. 2. The above islands shall be demilitarized and shall remain demilitarized.". From these provisions, interpreted on the basis of the entirety of both International Law and European Law, to the extent that they now form part of the European Acquis - and therefore on the basis of the general principles governing the interpretation of International Law and European Law - the following can be deduced regarding the current legal status of the Dodecanese with regard to the extent of their defensive shield.

1. The provisions of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947

The wording of the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 14 of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 is so clear that it leaves no room for doubt as to the essence and extent of the lato sensu Sovereignty of Greece over the Dodecanese. Specifically:

a) This Sovereignty is "complete", which means that it is not subject to any restrictions in its exercise. The more specific content of "full"Sovereignty is determined, with regard to the Dodecanese, primarily based on the rules of the current Greek Constitution on Sovereignty, as well as on the provisions on Sovereignty of the Member States of the European Union, in particular Article 4, paragraph 2 of the TEU. Any questioning of the interpretation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 14 of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, therefore, constitutes, by definition, a violation of both International Law and European Law.

b) The Sovereignty of Greece, in the above sense, extends not only to all the Islands expressly mentioned in the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 14 of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, but, according to the categorical wording of the above paragraph, additionally to the "adjacent islets", in their entirety. Since these provisions do not accept any distinction in this regard, their wording also covers all kinds of "adjacent islets", regardless of their size or other characteristics (e.g. whether they are inhabited or not). In light of this, it is obvious that in the Dodecanese region, too, they are not conceivable, from the point of view of International Law but also of European Law, "gray zones» regarding the extent and content of Greek Sovereignty.

2. The inconcrete application of the principle of International Law "rs inter Alios proceedings» against Turkey

    With regard to the demilitarization of the Dodecanese, which was provided for by the provisions of article 14, paragraph 2, of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, based on the rules of International Law, the following applies:

a) The demilitarization of the Dodecanese, according to the provisions of article 14, paragraph 2, of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, must also be interpreted in light of Greece's exercise, against Turkey, of the right to militarize islands of a UN Member State that are threatened by another Member State, as analyzed in more detail in the relevant place.

b) However, beyond this argument, Turkey does not, in any case, have the right to invoke the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. And this is because:

b1) The provisions of articles 34, 35 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) stipulate, inter alia, that:

• Every Treaty is valid – and therefore creates rights and obligations – only between the contracting parties. Therefore, towards third States, the Treaty, as a regulatory framework, constitutes “rsinter Alios record».
• For this reason, a Treaty is valid against a third State only under the twofold condition that, on the one hand, this is the intention of the contracting parties. And, on the other hand, the third State has accepted the obligation expressly and in writing.
• According to logical legal sequence, a Treaty creates a right for a third State only under the, also double, condition that on the one hand the contracting parties seek, through the Treaty, the assignment of a right to the third State. And, on the other hand, the latter consents to this, expressly and in writing.

b2) Turkey is not, under any legally acceptable interpretation, a party to the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. Therefore, this Treaty, in respect of which Turkey is a third State, does not create rights or obligations in favor of or against it, respectively. Furthermore:

• No provision of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 - as its application to date proves - proves, even if only by implication, that the contracting parties sought to cede any right to Turkey, much less a right relating to the military regime of the Dodecanese. In fact, as is indisputably evident from the circumstances under which the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 was concluded, the demilitarization of the Dodecanese was decided upon following a proposal by the then Soviet Union, in order for it to accept their cession to Greece. This was due to the reservations of the Soviet side regarding the use of the Dodecanese for military purposes by a country of "Western bloc", like Greece. In other words, the prediction of the demilitarization of the Dodecanese had nothing to do with Turkey and its security.
• The above is also reinforced by the fact that Turkey's consent to the assignment of such a right was never requested and, consequently, there was never such consent on its part. The accuracy of this argument is documented, and indeed uncontested, by Turkey's own behavior. For example, Turkey had addressed – see the Turkish Aide-Mémoire of 3^thApril 1975 - to the contracting parties of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, denouncing alleged violations by Greece in the wider Dodecanese region. This denunciation concluded with the following: "It is up to the governments of the contracting countries… to demand that the Greek Government comply in spirit and letter." of the aforementioned Peace Treaty. And from this wording alone it clearly follows that not even Turkey itself claimed that it derives a right deriving from the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, regarding the military regime of the Dodecanese. And the "deafening"silence of the parties to this"complaint"of Turkey"confirms the safe word».

II. The application of the principle of "international law" to all, without exception, of the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern MediterraneanWhat is threatened is not demilitarized.»

   Regardless of the above-mentioned special provisions of International Treaties - here the Treaty of Lausanne, of 1923 and the amending Treaty of Montreux, of 1936 and the Paris Peace Treaty, of 1947 - fundamental provisions of International Law in general guarantee, with regulatory clarity and without room for doubt, the right of Greece to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. And even independently of any more specific, even if apparently contrary, provisions of individual International Treaties. These are all those provisions of International Law which, on the basis of the "order"of the protection of the territorial sovereignty of a State also result in the institutional consolidation of the principle"What is threatened is not demilitarized, regardless of specific ad ad hoc contractual arrangements". A principle which leads, quasi e contrario, to the normatively equivalent principle "whatever is threatened can, in any case, be shielded defensively against the possibility of this threat coming true". As can be deduced from the following, these complementary principles are substantiated from a legal perspective certainly based on the combination of, on the one hand, the principle of Customary International Law, according to which there is an inalienable right of States to protect, by any lawful means of defense, their territorial sovereignty. And, on the other hand, the practical application of the provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1, 2, paragraph 4 and 51 of the UN Charter.

A. The exclusive invocation of the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter for the defensive protection of a threatened part of the territory of a State over which its sovereignty extends

Right from the beginning, it must be emphasized that the view is supported, and indeed with many arguments, that Greece's right to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean can be sufficiently based exclusively on the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, under the interpretative "light"of the beginning of"legal defense» versus «imminent threat" and, a fortiori, "threat of use of violence».

1. The legal basis of the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter

According to the aforementioned view, this is a right that was born in favor of Greece many decades ago, given the perennial Turkish aggression and provocation. However, it has been particularly established, with irrefutable evidence as will be analyzed in more detail below, after the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus in 1974, and above all after the "conclusion», in November 2019, the so-called «Turkish-Libyan memorandum", between Turkey and the then alleged "Prime Minister» of Libya.

a)  And this, because this and only the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus - and for as long as it continues - constitutes, in any case, an undisclosed "imminent threat"against Greece or even clearly"threat of violence» against her.

a1) While the ever-expanding Turkish provocation and aggression in the Aegean, mainly in terms of challenging Greece's sovereign and other rights regarding the Continental Shelf and Maritime Zones - culminating in the Exclusive Economic Zone - perpetuates and intensifies the aforementioned "imminent threat» on her behalf.

a2) In particular, and as explained above, after the "conclusion"the legally non-existent"Turkish-Libyan memorandum"In November 2019, Turkey's behavior has exceeded all limits of provocation and blatant violation of International Law, especially the UN Law of the Sea under the Montego Bay Convention of 1982. A treaty that is binding, in all its provisions, on Turkey, even though it has not acceded to it. This is because the aforementioned Treaty, due to the large number of UN Member States that have acceded to it - and the European Union has acceded, as an independent legal entity, since 1998 - produces, according to the case law of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, generally binding customary rules or, in the most correct view, equally binding "generally accepted rules of international law».

b) As already pointed out, according to the aforementioned view, this right of Greece is founded on the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which establish – and indeed as jus cogens – the right of “legal defense» UN Member State and in the event of «imminent threat", especially in the case of "threat of use of violence».

b1) Despite the wording of these provisions which, prima faciae, seem to set as a condition for resorting to the procedure of the above "legal defense"the manifested armed attack, the vast majority of international scholars and international practice itself accept that for the exercise of this right, "it is sufficientimminent threat". Much more so the "threat of violence", which constitutes a direct violation of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter.

b2) For example, the USA, after the terrorist attacks of 11^th September 2001, they resorted to exercising the right "legal defense" - and indeed without a time limit, since the threat appeared to be imminent indefinitely - in the form of legitimate preventive action due to an imminent threat and, consequently, an imminent attack. This view was fully adopted by the UN Secretary-General himself, declaring - on March 21, 2005 - among other things that: "Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which ensures the natural right of sovereign states to defend themselves against armed attack.».

2. The right of "legal defense"

   In view of the above, a fortiori Greece is entitled, when and if it deems it appropriate for its defense, to make use of all its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, of the right "legal defense» against Turkey, without any time limit.

a) And this is because, especially after 1974, according to the above, the "threat of violence"on behalf of Turkey - and therefore the consequent "imminent threat"- is on the one hand more than obvious, and with repeated and various forms of provocations. And, on the other hand, continuous, as demonstrated even by today's Turkish behavior in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially after the aforementioned "conclusion"the legally non-existent"Turkish-Libyan memorandum". Behavior, which due to Turkey's arbitrary attempt to implement in practice the legally non-existent "Turkish-Libyan memorandum» carries all the characteristics of «threat of use of violence", in the sense set out above.

b) Additional proof of this is the fact, completely contrary to every concept of International Law, "casus beautiful"of Turkey, regarding the extension of the Territorial Zone of Greece. The above "casus beautiful", in addition to being decided - on 8.6.1995, immediately after the entry into force of the Montego Bay Convention, 1982, on the Law of the Sea - by the Turkish National Assembly in a manner contrary even to the very constitution of Turkey, it has since then constituted a permanent "threat of violence» against Greece.

c) Finally, the aforementioned "imminent threat» or and «threat of violence", on behalf of Turkey and against Greece, completes the formation of the so-called Turkish "Aegean Army", in July 1975, and indeed with numerous amphibious forces. This is an evolution and renaming of the 4^th Army (4. Ordu) of Turkey, which is based in Izmir and, in fact, has been organized to train the Turkish army for a possible attack against the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

B. The comprehensive foundation of Greece's right to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean on the basis of the combination of principles of Customary International Law with the provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1, 2, paragraph 4 and 51 of the UN Charter

    More correct, as legally more complete, appears, however, the view that supports the foundation of Greece's right to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean on the basis of the combination of principles of Customary International Law with the provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1, 2, paragraph 4 and 51 of the UN Charter.

1. The regulatory framework in question is defined by the combination of principles of Customary International Law with the provisions of Articles 1(1), 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.

    The above regulatory framework, on which Greece's right to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean is based in a comprehensive manner, is institutionally based on the following two regulatory components:

   a)  The first regulatory component "is being formed» institutionally, in accordance with the above, by the fundamental principle of International Customary Law, according to which the Rules of International Law on demilitarization are not permitted to negate the inalienable right of every State to defend, in particular by defensively shielding its threatened territories, its lato sensu Sovereignty.

a1) In particular, in the present case the above defensive armor is not considered so much as "preventive defense", nor as "deterrent legal defense", but primarily as "independent right» which provides to «threatened» A State has the legal ability under International Law - with its parallel application in practice at any time - to take all permitted preparatory actions to effectively prevent a potential realization of a threat against it by another State.

 a2) Furthermore, the aforementioned threat against the territorial sovereignty of one State by another is a necessary and sufficient condition for accepting, always according to International Customary Law, even if there are more specific provisions of International Law that provide for a status of a kind "demilitarization", the new situation due to the in concreto threat has brought about such a change in the conditions and circumstances, that the surrounding "demilitarization» provisions have been weakened, de facto and de jure, normatively in practice. This is because the application of the rule of defense of the territorial sovereignty of each State, as an elementary condition for the peaceful coexistence of the Member States of the International Community, takes precedence, according to International Law.

b) The second regulatory component "is being formed» institutionally - again in accordance with the above - by the combination of the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, interpreted and under the "light"of the provisions of articles 1, paragraph 1 and 2, paragraph 4 of the same Charter. And this because, as can be seen from their grammar and mainly from their teleological and systematic interpretation, they must be understood, in their interpretation and application, as a single regulatory whole. Specifically:

b1) Firstly, the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter on the purposes of the UN provide the following: "1. To maintain international peace and security, and to this end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of any threat to the peace and for the suppression of any act of aggression or other breach of the peace, and to achieve this, by peaceful means and in accordance with the principles of justice and international law, settlement or adjustment of international disputes or situations which could lead to a breach of the peace.”

b2) Secondly, the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter on the manner of achieving the purposes of the UN provide the following: "4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other action inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.»

b3) And, thirdly, the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter provide the following: "51. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if a Member of the United Nations is the object of an armed attack, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Any measures taken by Members of the United Nations in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall in no case impair the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.. "

2. The provocative "from Turkey's perspective"writing samples"which fully document the presence of the conditions"imminent threat» or and «threat of use of violence» to the detriment of the territorial integrity of the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean

   Summarizing what has already been stated, it must be further accepted - on the basis of the combination of the aforementioned two regulatory components of International Customary Law on the one hand and, on the other, the provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1, 2, paragraph 4 and 51 of the UN Charter - that Greece has the inalienable right to defend all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean - and even independently of individual provisions of specific International Treaties - because Turkey is clearly threatening them, even by resorting to the use of force. The most specific, and most obvious, examples of such a "imminent threat» or and «threat of use of violence» from the side of Turkey against the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean are, as was partially emphasized previously for specific ones, the following:

a) The first example is, as already pointed out, that of the occupation of one-third and more of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, which continued for 50 years, after the barbaric invasion of Turkey in July 1974. And yes, the Republic of Cyprus is an independent Member State of the International Community and, after 1^η May 2004, and a full Member State of the European Union and of the "narrow core" of the Eurozone, and that is why the Cyprus Issue is considered - and rightly so - an International and European Issue. However, the long-standing special relationship of Cyprus with Greece, which had made it "out of date" integral part of "trunk" of Hellenism in the broad sense, as well as the conditions under which the barbaric crime of the Turkish invasion was committed in 1974, demonstrate without a doubt that in essence, through the occupation of Cyprus, Turkey "anticipates", directly and continuously, and Greece. So the situation of the long-term Turkish occupation in Cyprus also has characteristics of one to the detriment of Greece "imminent threat"  or even her "threat of use of violence".

b) A second example, which confirms the previous one, is, as also already pointed out, that of the organization of the so-called Turkish "Army of the Aegean"combining luxury accommodations with the potential for significant expansion. "Army of the Aegean" was formed in July 1975 – that is, one year after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and, undoubtedly, in its aftermath – possessing, among other things, numerous amphibious forces. More precisely, the above-mentioned "Army of the Aegean" It clearly represents an evolution – with a consequent renaming – of 4^th Army (4. Ordu) of Turkey which has its headquarters in Izmir. And in fact it has been organized in order to train a significant part of the Turkish army so that it is ready, at any time, for a possible sudden attack against the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The above-mentioned expediency of Turkey becomes increasingly evident when it develops the "sultanic fantasies» "rhetoric" about "Blue Homeland", with the commanding threat "We will come at night"For all these reasons, the creation and maintenance of "Army of the Aegean" from Turkey operates in practice as "epitome"   "threat of use of violence" against Greece, and specifically against its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

c) A third example, in the same direction, is that of the aforementioned "case" bells», which "shakes"  Turkey against Greece since 1995. This is the direct threat of war blatantly raised by Turkey, in the event that Greece exercises its inalienable right to extend, under the terms and conditions of the UN Law of the Sea (Montego Bay Convention, 1982), its Territorial Zone up to 12 nautical miles. The aforementioned "case" bells» was decided, in an obviously illegal manner, by the Turkish National Assembly, which is completely incompetent in this matter according to the Constitution of Turkey, on 8.6.1995, immediately after the entry into force of the Montego Bay Convention of 1982. To which Turkey has not yet acceded, but nevertheless invokes it, arbitrarily and at will, as is evident from the conclusion of the so-called "Turkish-Lybian Memorandum", which is discussed below. No one can, given the above data, question the fact that this "case" bells» of Turkey constitutes a permanent and extremely dangerous "threat of use of violence" against Greece, in violation of every concept of International Law.

d) Finally, the fourth example is that of the above "Turkish-Lybian Memorandum", which has "concluded" since November 2019, also in clear violation, and at least double, of International Law. And this is because on the one hand, its conclusion was made through an agreement between Turkey and a temporary and completely questionable – even within Libya – government. And, on the other hand, the "forecasts" are in clear contradiction with key and crucial provisions of the Montego Bay Convention of 1982. Because, among other things, when delimiting the EEZ, they ignore even the "geographical volumes" of Rhodes and Crete. Therefore, the so-called "Turkish-Lybian memorandum" is not only illegal and invalid but also completely non-existent in law, which also implies that it does not produce legal effects. This was also explicitly accepted in the conclusions of the European Council Meeting on 10 December 2019, since the "forecasts" of "memorandum" This affects Greece, a Member State of the European Union, and therefore the European Union itself. Under these circumstances, and given that since then Turkey has been continuously and relentlessly violating the status of the Maritime Zones of Greece - and therefore of the European Union - in the Eastern Mediterranean, this very so-called "Turkish-Lybian memorandum"  constitutes not only "imminent threat" and "threat of use of violence" to the detriment of Greece. All of the above does not support the argument that Greece should have extended its Territorial Zone to 2019 nm by 12 throughout its Islands, especially in the Southeastern Mediterranean, challenging and in practice annulling the legally non-existent "Turkish-Lybian memorandum".

III. Customary International Law and the provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1, 2, paragraph 4 and 51 of the UN Charter as part of the European Acquis and the legal consequences thereof for the defense armoring of all, without exception, of the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean

The aforementioned provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1, 2, paragraph 4 and 51 of the UN Charter, in addition to their independent regulatory force in terms of International Law as stated above, also produce legal effects as part of the European Acquis. This is because the provisions of Article 42, paragraph 7, subparagraph a of the TEU refer directly to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, in the organization and implementation of the clause "Mutual Defense" between the Member States of the European Union. As is obvious, the "osmosis"This International Law and European Law, within the scope of application of the provisions of Article 51 - and therefore also of Articles 1, paragraph 1 and 2, paragraph 4 - of the UN Charter, has significant legal consequences for Greece. And this both with regard to the activation of the clause "Mutual Defense» against «imminent threat" or even in "threat of violence" on behalf of Turkey. As well as regarding the very defense armor of the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean which, of course, are also part of the European "Territory". Specifically:

A. The clauses "Mutual Defense" and "Solidarity"

The aforementioned clause "Mutual Defense'('Mutual Defence» Clause), within the framework of European Law, regulate, in its integrated form which includes - of course, in a complementary manner, and with a completely secondary importance in the present case - the clause «Solidarity'('solidarity» Clause), specific provisions:

1. The provisions of Articles 42(7) TEU and 222(1) TFEU

These are the provisions:

a) Article 42, paragraph 7, subparagraph a, of the TEU, according to which: "In the event that a member state is attacked on its territory, the other member states must provide it with aid and assistance by all means at their disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.».

b) And Article 222(1) of the TFEU, according to which: "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly, in a spirit of solidarity, if a Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack or is the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the means at its disposal, including the military means made available by the Member States, to: (a) prevent a terrorist threat on the territory of the Member States, protect democratic institutions and the civilian population against any terrorist attack, provide assistance to a Member State on its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack, (b) provide assistance to a Member State on its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster».

2. The binding nature of its clauses "Mutual Defense"and "Solidarity"

The clauses applied in combination - but also in a complementary manner, as explained above - "Mutual Defense" and "Solidarity» are, in terms of normative force, complete leges perfectae, therefore binding in their entirety.

a) This results mainly from the Opinion, which was formulated - following a relevant request to this effect - by the Legal Service of the European Council, in 2016. To be precise, on 12.7.2016 the Legal Service of the European Council ruled, with a series of documented legal considerations, that the above clauses produce full legal effects, provided that the conditions for their application are met in accordance with the provisions of Articles 42(7)(a) of the TEU and 222(1) of the TFEU, respectively.

b)     According to the same Opinion, the implementation of the mechanism of the clauses "Mutual Defense" and "Solidarity"may lead to the adoption of a series of measures, especially diplomatic, administrative, technical and - above all - military, through the activation of the armed forces, as the case may be. It should be emphasized that the above activation of means and armed forces is expressly provided for by the provisions of Articles 42, paragraph 7, subparagraph a, of the TEU and 222, paragraph 1, of the TFEU.

b1) It is highly indicative that in the relatively recent Treaty of Aachen, of 2019, between France and Germany, which entered into force in January 2020 - and in particular in Article 4, paragraph b thereof, included in Chapter 2 "Peace, Security and Development"- a mutual defense assistance clause is established, "including the use of military force", in the event of an armed attack on the territory of one of the Parties, in the light, as expressly stated in the first paragraph of the same article, of the obligations of the two States not only under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, but also under Article 42, paragraph 7 of the TEU.

b2) In fact, the then Chancellor A. Merkel, in her statements during the signing of the Treaty, stated, with regard in particular to the provisions of the 2^th Chapter on the defense cooperation between France and Germany, that it is about the "Germany's contribution to the advent of a European Army».

c) Essentially, the clause "Mutual Defense" - as enshrined in Article 42, paragraph 7, of the TEU, with reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter - constitutes applicable law also in bilateral intergovernmental agreements of the Member States of the European Union which, in essence, pave the way for the formation of a common defense policy with common military forces of the European Union itself.

B. The practical application of the provisions of Articles 42(7)(a) of the TEU and 222(1) of the TFEU

In terms of practical application of the provisions of Articles 42(7)(a) of the TEU and 222(1) of the TFEU, with regard to the clauses "Mutual Defense" and "Solidarity", there are at least two very characteristic examples so far:

1. The example of the terrorist attacks in France in November 2015

In November 2015, after the deadly terrorist attacks in Paris, France, through its then President François Hollande, requested and succeeded in activating the application of the "Mutual Defense"of article 42, paragraph 7, subparagraph a, of the TEU.

a) It should be noted that France relied, in this case, on the precedent of the application of the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter by the USA, during the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001, as already noted. It is emphasized that the French Government consciously decided to invoke exclusively the clause "Mutual Defense"of Article 42, paragraph 7, subparagraph a of the TEU and not the corresponding clause of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

b) In fact, the then Minister of Defense and later Minister of Foreign Affairs of France Jean-Yves Le Drian said in a statement that ""France cannot do everything," directly citing, in terms of the provision of military assistance by the Member States of the European Union, the increased operational needs to combat Islamic terrorism in the Middle East and Africa. In "call» this is what many Member States of the European Union responded to.

2. The example of the European Union Defense Ministers' Meeting on 16.6.2020

    The reference to the aforementioned clauses during the European Union Defense Ministers' Summit on 16.6.2020 can also be characterized as a precedent in the same direction. And precisely in view of the critical data that Turkish provocations have created in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Specifically, in item 6 of the conclusions, this Summit: "It reiterates the importance of mutual assistance and/or solidarity, in accordance with the provisions of Article 42(7) TEU and Article 222 TFEU. It agrees to continue the effort towards a common understanding of Article 42(7) TEU and to draw lessons from it, building policies based on specific scenarios in the coming months.».

3. Concluding remarks

    In light of the above findings, it also becomes obvious that:

a) Greece's right to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean also finds support in European Law, through the European Acquis, which includes the crucial provisions of International Law in this regard.

a1) And to be precise, the direct reference of the provisions of article 42 par. 7 sub-paragraph a to the provisions of article 51 of the UN Charter also implies that Greece is entitled to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean and based on European Law, under the terms and conditions of the now established interpretation of the provisions of article 51 of the UN Charter. That is, not only when there is a direct attack against the Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, but also when there is "imminent threat" or, a fortiori, "threat of violence". And Turkey's current stance, which is distinguished by its unprecedented provocativeness as already explained in detail, not only reaches the limits of "imminent threat" but also goes far beyond them, at least to the extent of "threat of use of violence».

a2) This position was confirmed by, "solemnly", and the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 10^th September 2020 in Ajaccio, Corsica, insofar as they found that, under the current circumstances, Turkey is carrying out, in fact, serial violations of the Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights of Greece and Cyprus. In particular, paragraph 6 of the above conclusions states, among other things, that the participants: "They express their full support and solidarity with Greece and Cyprus, for the repeated violations of sovereignty and sovereign rights as well as for Turkey's aggressive actions.". Consequently, Greece is entitled to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, both on the basis of International Law and European Law.

b) Because the provisions of Article 42(7) of the TEU refer directly to the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, regarding the activation of the mechanism of the clause "Mutual Defense" -combinatively and complementary to the mechanism of the clause "Solidarity»- this also becomes obvious:

b1) Because Turkey's provocative behavior is within the limits - or even beyond the limits - of "imminent threat", Greece is entitled, at any time and at its discretion, to request from the competent bodies of the European Union the activation of the mechanism of the clause "Mutual Defense", in combination - when and if this is justified by the circumstances - with the activation of the mechanism of the clause "Solidarity", according to the provisions of articles, respectively, 42 para. 7 sub. a of the TEU and 222 para. 1 of the TFEU.

b2) This conclusion, within the framework of the application of European Law, is catalytically reinforced by all the statements of the European Union institutions and individual European Officials, which directly refer to the Turkish arbitrariness against Greece. It is particularly reinforced by the aforementioned conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 10^th September 2020 in Ajaccio, Corsica.

Epilogue

The preceding analysis can becondense» in the following conclusions:

A. Our non-negotiable National Position is that there is one, and only one, difference between Greece and Turkey: namely that of the delimitation of the Insular Continental Shelf and the corresponding EEZ. There is no issue regarding the defensive shielding of the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece has the inalienable right - but also the obligation, since this concerns the protection of the Greek Territory - both on its own behalf and towards the European Union as a full Member State, to defensively shield all, without exception, its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, regardless of the extent of their territory and whether they are inhabited or not. This right is based on the principles of International Customary Law in combination with the provisions of Articles 1 para. 1, 2 par. 4 and 51 of the UN Charter, which guarantee the right of a UN Member State to defend itself by any lawful means not only in the event of an armed attack against it, but also in the event of "threat of use of violence» or even «imminent threat", as is evident from the practice of this very UN. And it is a given that Turkey, especially after the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the formation of "Aegean Army"and the completely arbitrary "casus beautiful" regarding the expansion of our Territorial Zone, it has been threatening Greece diachronically and directly with the use of force - as is also proven by its recent stance, after the "conclusion"of the so-called "Turkish-Libyan memorandum"- in direct violation of International Law and, above all, the Law of the Sea under the Montego Bay Convention of 1982. A Convention, which also binds Turkey, through generally accepted rules of International Law.

1. Greece derives the same right - and therefore the same obligation - based on European Law and the corresponding European Acquis, in accordance with the following clarifications and given the constantly intensifying provocative and aggressive behavior of Turkey towards it, which, according to the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 10^th September 2020 in Ajaccio, Corsica, directly violates the Sovereignty and sovereign rights of Greece: The provisions of article 42 par. 7 sub-paragraph a of the TEU, which enshrine the institutional guarantees for the activation of the clause "Mutual Defense", when a Member State of the European Union is threatened, refer directly, as to the conditions for activating this clause, to the aforementioned provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the above provisions - as well as the relevant provisions of Articles 1, paragraph 1 and 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter - constitute part of the European Acquis, so that Greece has the right to defensively shield all, without exception, of its Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean against the Turkish threat or threat of use of force and based on the institutional framework of European Law and the corresponding European Acquis. Furthermore, and in view of the blatant Turkish provocation and direct threat against it, Greece is entitled, at any time, to request, as a Member State of the European Union, the activation of the clause "Mutual Defense", according to the provisions of Article 42, paragraph 7 of the TEU. In this direction, Greece can also invoke the practice, which has been followed so far within the framework of the European Union for the activation of the above clause.

The legal status of the defensive shield of the Greek Islands in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean according to the provisions of International and European Law