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About six months ago, in the same columns, we had reported on an imminent rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. All this time, behind-the-scenes actions by the two parties involved in this direction continued with the mediation of the US and other European capitals. Therefore, the official and parallel agreement announced by the two countries on Monday, June 27, to restore their relations did not come as a bolt from the blue. In today's intense and rapidly changing international scene of interdependence and globalized problems, the severance of diplomatic relations between two important neighboring states is probably an unusual situation.
 As is known, relations between the two countries had begun to show signs of friction since 2009, and the crisis culminated the following year with the “Mavi Marmara” incident that claimed the lives of 9 Turkish activists. The Turkish activists who were on board the “Mavi Marmara” ship, accompanied by five other vessels, sought to break the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. In the Israeli special forces raid that followed, with the aim of controlling the vessels and preventing their passage, there was an extensive clash on the Turkish vessel with the well-known bloody results. Since then, and mainly due to Turkish statements and actions, the relations between the two once closely cooperating states have been led to a rupture, culminating in the recall of the ambassadors. Despite the aggravation of relations, trade cooperation between the two countries (worth approximately USD 5 billion per year) has continued, albeit at a reduced level, in recent years. Corresponding military cooperation programs have been “frozen” or canceled, but most material supply agreements between the two countries have continued amid friction. The sometimes extreme rhetoric of President Erdogan and the ruling AKP party has worsened the troubled relations between the two former “allies” and the side effects of the crisis have spilled over into their economic relations, including tourism.
The agreement reached aims to bridge the differences that arose between Tel Aviv and Ankara through mutual concessions and compromises and without "humiliating" concessions by either side. The agreement provides for the payment by Israel of 20 million USD to the families of the victims, while at the same time the Turkish parliament will block by law any further claims by the families of the victims for compensation or legal prosecution against Israeli institutions and citizens. In addition, Turkey will be allowed to proceed with the dispatch of humanitarian aid through the Israeli port of Ashdod, as well as the construction of public works in the Gaza Strip. The announced solution maintains the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza, while at the same time achieving Ankara's goal of promoting humanitarian aid and the parallel promotion of the latter as a protector of the persecuted Palestinians. The different wording of each side is also indicative, with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stating that the "defensive naval blockade" of the Hamas-controlled enclave continues but humanitarian aid can now arrive (through Israeli ports and obviously under the control of the Israeli authorities), while on the contrary, his Turkish counterpart Binali Yildirim stated that the blockade of Gaza is being lifted to a large extent.
    The expected partial restoration of relations was a result of the instability of the wider region, mutual concern about the end of Iranian isolation, American pressure, the security problems that Ankara and Tel Aviv face, but also the expectations of mutual gains from energy projects (supplying Turkey with Israeli natural gas) and trade and tourism cooperation. The unstable situation in Syria, the activities of the "Islamic State" and the gradual expected strengthening of Tehran's role forced the two countries to proceed with the restoration of their relations. However, it is estimated that mutual suspicion will continue to exist, especially in Tel Aviv, as long as President Erdogan and the AKP remain in power, while the expected Turkish actions to limit the extremist positions and actions of Hamas will also play an important role. Especially for the latter, the agreement provides that any use of Turkish territory for actions directed against the security of Israel will not be permitted. As is natural in similar situations, a number of sensitive issues remain unclear (e.g. the Kurdish issue, support for rival groups in Syria). The rapprochement took place under the blessing and continuous pressure of American diplomacy, with the "forced" telephone communication between the two leaders during the American President's visit to Tel Aviv as well as the continuous efforts and trips of the American Vice President. The restoration of relations also coincides with the recent veiled expression of apology by the Turkish President for the downing of the Russian aircraft in Syria (November 2015).
Once again, harsh reality and realism are forcing two countries to move in the direction of normalizing their relations, devising solutions, using mediators and adopting "creative ambiguities" to relatively painlessly overcome their previous hard-line statements and positions (domestic and foreign) and share expected mutual benefits.

International agencies refer to the role played by the common security problems faced by the two countries but also focus on the desire to launch joint energy programs. The discovery of significant natural gas deposits in the Cyprus (Aphrodite)-Israel (Leviathan)-Egypt (Zohr) maritime area raises a series of issues and prospects for their exploitation with the participation of multinational companies as well as serving the interests of the great powers. The announcement a year ago by the Italian company Eni of the discovery of a huge natural gas deposit on the Egyptian continental shelf leads to a reassessment of all the solutions that had been proposed in the last five years. Today, the Egyptian and Turkish markets are looking for additional energy sources, the first to cover the needs for electricity production and the second to become independent from Russian gas. Israel is also concerned about the best way to exploit its own deposits. The main options refer to the construction of an undersea pipeline (to Greece or Turkey and then to Europe) or the construction of onshore (Egypt or Cyprus) or floating facilities for liquefaction of natural gas and transport by LNG ships. Each solution contains advantages and disadvantages, with the cost of construction being an important criterion. Of course, the construction of an onshore pipeline that would cross Lebanon and Syria is seen as the most economical solution, which presupposes the uncertain peace of the region. Under these conditions, Tel Aviv estimates that a restart of relations with Turkey, in addition to its strengthening vis-à-vis Iran, offers more – perhaps even more efficient – ​​options for exploiting energy sources. Correspondingly, Ankara believes that it is strengthening its position in the energy game and possibly in matters of maritime zones.
As it became known, the Israeli Prime Minister also informed his Greek counterpart by phone about the restoration of Turkish-Israeli relations, confirming his country's willingness to further develop bilateral (and trilateral, with the participation of Cyprus) cooperation in the region. The Greek side seems to have long been expecting similar developments, which are estimated not to directly affect the Greek-Israeli approach and cooperation, as has been repeatedly declared in the past. Perhaps voices will be heard in our country about the audacity of exploiting the Turkish-Israeli tension in order to achieve benefits in our confrontation with Ankara. I consider such thoughts to be simplistic, based on party analogies of electoral alliances and incompatible with the complex international environment and the conflicting and often reversed national interests. Certainly, the cooperation of Greece and Cyprus with the state of Israel upgrades our position, but we should not ignore the specificities of the region nor expect the formation of "alliances" that will defend our national sovereign rights, especially when we ourselves do not seem determined to move in such a direction.
At the present time, the USA and the European Union desire stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region and therefore good (insofar as possible) cooperation and interdependence of the main powers (Greece, Turkey, Israel, Egypt). The success of Greek policy lies in safeguarding and promoting its own interests as well as those of the sister Republic of Cyprus in the region, appearing as the necessary factor of stability and a factor that ensures the completion of every program and initiative. However, in addition to the willingness to cooperate and take initiatives, the firm commitment of Greece and Cyprus to common pre-planned and carefully prepared positions away from phobic syndromes and opportunistic political expediencies is also required. Undoubtedly, Hellenism does not currently have the required strength, but nevertheless it possesses significant bases and overestimating the opponent is a fatal mistake. Let it not escape our attention that the one power that has forces and bases in the region is voluntarily distancing itself from the European Union, while Turkey, which occupies half of Cyprus, is also moving in the same direction.