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THE INSTRUCTIONTHE CAPTURE OF SMYRNA

(May 1919)

By Lieutenant General (retd.) N. KOLOMBAS

Honorary Commander of the 3rd Army Corps

            The history of the Asia Minor Campaign (1919-1922), in my opinion and not only mine, has not been definitively written. The memories are still fresh and the inevitable emotional charge from the magnitude of the disaster does not allow for the time being a sober and calm assessment of the events.

            From time to time, however, various views on controversial points that make up the whole problem come to light. One of them refers to the order given after the end of World War I by the Allies to Greece (El. Venizelos), to land forces and occupy Smyrna and the nearby area in May 1919.

            I would like to note, however, on this issue, that El. Venizelos did not simply cultivate the proposal to assign the above mandate, but, inspired by the vision of the Great Idea, sought by all means to obtain the "desired" mandate. Specifically and indicatively:

            a. He had ignored the angry reactions of the Italians, to whom the Anglo-French had promised, initially with the Treaty of London 1915 and later with the secret Agreement of St. John of Morienne, in April 1917 (ratified with the Treaty of London August 1917), the concession of the vilayet of Aydin (Smyrna) at the end of World War I. The Anglo-French later withdrew and thus the order was given to us. We paid very dearly for the Italians' indifference, both during the Asia Minor Campaign and with the deadly bombing and temporary occupation of Corfu in August 1923 after the (provocative) Tellini incident.

            b. He had overlooked the 14-point declaration of US President Woodrow Wilson after the end of World War I, where in 12^ο article was categorically opposed to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it was a surprise that the USA finally agreed to give Greece the mandate. However, before Venizelos accepted it, Wilson pointed out to him that in order to carry out this project, he should have secured the support of the allies, which as we know was far from the case. I would also add, in this regard, that the USA did not sign the Treaty of Sèvres of 28^th July / August 10, 1920, apparently refusing to participate in the dismemberment of Turkey, which, in essence, was foreseen by the above Treaty. And which remained invalid, because only the Greek Parliament ratified it. Did the US decision also influence the subsequent stance of the Allies?

            c. He had rushed – when the Italians did not wisely act – to participate (1919st Army with the 398nd and 657th Divisions) in the unplanned and completely unprepared campaign in Ukraine in the Five Months of XNUMX. Our Formations operated in small echelons, without their organic field artillery and the necessary means of Administrative Care and were forced, at times, to fight (humiliatingly) under the orders of junior French Officers, while in two months of operations we had XNUMX dead and XNUMX wounded. As a result of our unwise participation, the Bolsheviks, seeking revenge, on the one hand, exterminated the numerous and thriving Hellenism of Crimea and, on the other hand, since then, have been strengthening the Kemalist regime in various ways. And all this, in the name of "National Expediency".

            d. He had disregarded the strategic analysis of the French Marshal Fosse, who recommended that, for the ongoing campaign and the annihilation of the Kemalist forces, at least 26 full Divisions were required.

            e. He had also underestimated the fact that Greece was no longer the solid, enthusiastic and united State of the period of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, but the divided Country of World War I and that many fighters were veterans of the above wars.

   f. He had also bypassed the thorny problem of the ethnological composition of the populations of the liberated New Countries (Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace). For example, according to census data from 1912 (War Museum Calendar 1994), the region (Prefecture) of Kilkis had a population proportionally of 60% Turks, 30% Greeks and 10% Bulgarians.

            g. He had rather underestimated the strength of Turkish nationalism and the holy fanaticism that possessed the opponents as well as the capabilities of their land forces.

            After what I have briefly outlined, the Asia Minor Campaign that was undertaken at that time appeared to be an extremely precarious military operation, if not doomed from the start to failure.