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At the time of writing, the issue of the provision of a battery of the Patriot anti-aircraft guided missile system of the Air Force to Saudi Arabia has not yet been clarified. The provision of this specific unit, if implemented, will constitute an unprecedented Greek participation in a region that is not directly adjacent to our country. It will undoubtedly constitute an important move with a political message and significance to many recipients. Inevitably, some (Iran) will dismiss it as an “unfriendly” move towards them. Any position we take, for or against, of this move is premature and risky without knowing the basic parameters of the transaction.

The offer certainly satisfies the request of the US and Saudi Arabia, while the European Union also seems to be advocating fervently in this direction. Given the "unholy" alliance between Riyadh and Tel Aviv (or perhaps Jerusalem now!), we consider Israeli complacency to be present. Journalistic information indicates that all travel, accommodation, security costs, and even the guided missiles that may be fired, will be covered by Saudi Arabia. References are also made to the modernization of part of the Greek Patriot systems by Washington.
Leaks from government sources indicate that with this assistance, Greece is demonstrating its multidimensional foreign policy and its good rapprochement with the wider Western world. In addition, they report that our relations with Saudi Arabia and the wider group of Sunni Arab countries that are aligned with it are being strengthened, seeking their support for Greek positions. Of course, all of the above remains to be proven in practice, while a number of other developments will affect the success of these Greek expectations. It is a given that Tehran will not be satisfied with this specific Greek move (especially at a symbolic level), which will certainly negatively (and hopefully temporarily) affect the positions of the two countries. Of course, the dispatch of a military unit to a high-risk area involves certain risks (I consider acceptable), especially in the event of escalation. The government (always through leaks) tried to present that the relocation of the battery - with unfortunate arguments in my opinion - does not affect the capabilities of the Greek air defense. The fact is that any removal of a weapon system creates a gap, a deficiency. The question is on the one hand whether the expected benefit of the action compensates for the risk and on the other hand whether the absence of the system is what will determine the outcome of a potential conflict. As we mentioned above, time will answer the first question while on the second question we should probably choose the negative answer. Ultimately, the various weapon systems should never be upgraded as these procedures put the weapons out of action for a significant period.
However, leaving aside the consequences of the assistance at the high levels of Greek foreign policy, we can distinguish a series of advantages at the level of military capabilities. We mentioned the discussed upgrade of the system above, but we should not forget the acquisition of experience by military personnel who will participate in high-readiness situations in a unified international air defense system. In addition, Greece could (possibly already have been requested) as a small exchange, at the level of military diplomacy, request the brief operational evaluation and firing of all allied anti-aircraft units directed to the Arabian Gulf at the NATO Missile Firing Installations-NAMFI. It is noted that NAMFI is the only NATO training entity officially authorized by SHAPE (Supreme Command Allied Forces Europe) to assess the operational capability of the Alliance's anti-aircraft units. Of course, and under certain conditions, this process is also open to other friendly countries that we would like to see exercise in our area with a multitude of benefits (economic and not only). Of course, our main goal should be the return of the USA as a user-nation in the currently tri-national PBC (Greece-Germany-Netherlands). And a key point, NAMFI, i.e. Greece, since its establishment and with NATO blessing, has almost permanently reserved a huge area of ​​the Greek FIR north of Crete, preventing the friendly and neighboring country from issuing NOTAMs for reservations of areas in the South Aegean for its often provocative exercises.
I tried to give a general picture of the side effects, positive and negative, of the deployment of a -significantly capable- military unit in a distant unstable environment in the context of the invoked military diplomacy. A move that our armed forces will certainly carry out in the best way, but its final utilization -in the overall national effort- will depend on the correct "compromise" that will precede it but also on a series of uncertain and unpredictable factors. Life, politics and war require risk and this is not going to change no matter how much technology evolves.
HIPPOKRATIS DASKALAKIS - Lieutenant General (retd.)
• Graduate of the Department of International and European Studies, Panteion University
• Master's degree in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Panteion University
• PhD Candidate in International Relations at Panteion University
• Director of Studies of the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (ELISME)
• Associate of the Institute of International Relations (IRIS)
• Lecturer and collaborator at the National Defense Academy (NDA)
• Tel: +30-210-6543131, +30-6983457318
• E-mail: rafaelmarippo@yahoo.gr