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The Soviet Union was always opposed to the Union of Cyprus with Greece, since in this way it served its broader strategic plans and aspirations. This position was confirmed on 22 January 1965 by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, in an interview with Izvestia, in which he suggested the "federal form" as a solution for the internal structure of the Independent State of Cyprus.
This interview caused joy in Ankara and gloom in Athens, which immediately responded with a relaxed statement from the Prime Minister and a harsher one from St. Kostopoulos, who characterized the idea of ​​Federalization as unfounded and de facto unworkable. The communist pro-Soviet Working People's Uplift Party (AKEL) also reacted to Gromyko's statements by disapproving of Federalization and insisting on the idea of ​​Union.
On January 27, 1965, Makarios, alarmed by this unpleasant development, immediately issued a statement in response: "Gromyko's statements provoked various comments. It was certainly not expected from the Soviet Union to support the Union of Cyprus with Greece for reasons of favoritism. However, the Soviet Minister's reference to a Federal Status, as a possible solution to the Cyprus problem, even in the way it was phrased, that is, that the two Communities of Cyprus, without external intervention, can also agree on the status of a Federation, caused disappointment. The Soviet Government knew that the Greek Cypriot people strongly opposed the federation regime and Gromyko should not have referred to a solution unacceptable to the conservative majority of the Cypriot people..." (Petros Garoufallias, "GREECE AND CYPRUS - TRAGIC MISTAKES AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES, pp. 221-222).
"….The active Turkish diplomacy, which with skillful maneuvers managed to achieve a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement with the exchange of official visits to Moscow and Ankara, and the signing of agreements between Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Soviets, for the first time after the intercommunal crisis, spoke in January 1965 about "rights of the two communities of Cyprus" (Yiannos Kranidiotis, "Makarios as they saw him", p. 282).
The Soviet views on Federalization were reiterated on 17 May 1965, during Gromyko's official visit to Ankara. From this point on, Soviet policy towards Cyprus changed dramatically. The removal of Nikita Khrushchev from the leadership of the state, where he was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev, also played an important role in this development.
George Papandreou did not hide his gleeful satisfaction that the Soviet government had disappointed Archbishop Makarios with its support for the creation of a federal state in Cyprus. “Moscow is trying to satisfy Cyprus and Turkey at the same time,” George Papandreou commented, “just as Washington could not choose between Greece and Turkey earlier.” Labouise wrote that Papandreou told him that "he now sits and enjoys watching Makarios trying to explain the actions of his ally (the Soviet Union), just as he himself had earlier attempted to justify to Makarios the actions of his own ally (America)" (A. Papahela "THE RAPE OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC - THE AMERICAN FACTOR 1947-1967", pp. 155-156).
This stab in the back came at a time when relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union were excellent, especially given that the AKEL, which was Moscow's foremost expressive organ in Cyprus, was no longer opposed to Makarios' policy, but supported it in every way.
This was preceded by an interview of Archbishop Makarios with the Soviet newspaper Pravda and the Soviet agency TASS, which was published in Pravda on January 1, 1964: "I express the gratitude of the Cypriots to the Soviet Press for the objective treatment of the events in Cyprus at this difficult time that the Republic is going through. As President of the Republic, I would like to emphasize that we will do everything possible with the forces we have to eliminate the causes that gave us chaos and anarchy and to stabilize political life in Cyprus. The government that I lead has taken the decision to ensure, through the United Nations, the dissolution of the agreements concerning "guarantees" and the agreements concerning alliances in countries that signed the Zurich and London Agreements...". (Fanoulas Argyrou, “FROM UNION TO OCCUPATION”, p. 370).
Soviet policy on the Cyprus issue remained lukewarm since then and continued along the line of recognizing equal rights for both communities with the exception of 1971, when President Makarios officially visited Moscow. At that time, the Soviet Union again spoke of protecting the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and avoiding foreign interventions in the Island. However, in 1974, it watched as a simple spectator the brutal intervention of Turkey and NATO and the de-facto partition of Cyprus. For the simple reason that the division and the acute confrontation between two key NATO allies served its own strategic plans in the best way…
All of the above, of course, still constitutes a point of confrontation and friction between the political forces in Cyprus, while it should not. Because as discreditable and treacherous was the role of the U.S. in the Cyprus issue, that of the then Soviet Union was equally unacceptable…
Conclusion: Everything is a matter of interests! If you can and balance within this merciless confrontation that has nothing to do with the rules of morality, if you can create alliances without abandoning National goals and your own interests, that's fine. If not, you will suffer the consequences. Let all Greek leaders who are currently shaping foreign policy in Cyprus and Greece keep this in mind. As for today's Russia (with which we must cooperate), even the stones know that (unfortunately) it is now a capitalist state, just like the U.S., that has nothing to do with the old Soviet Union...