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Under the influence of Kastelorizo ​​and the shadow of Agia Sophia

Greece has not yet implemented any of the provisions of the new law of the sea, which it co-developed, signed and ratified.

Dr. Christos Ziogas Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean and Adjunct Lecturer at the Hellenic Military Academy

DEA / ARCHIVIO J. LANGE VIA GETTY IMAGES

Recently, Greek society has been monitoring and trying to understand whether and to what extent the complex of islands of Megisti (Kastelorizo)) is entitled to a continental shelf and therefore also Exclusive Economic Zone. Citizens, politicians and even the beggars are therefore wondering what the influence of Kastelorizo ​​is, regarding the definition of the Greek EEZ. Post-politically, the majority of domestic elites proclaimed that foreign policy should be exercised free from sentimentality and political confrontations, following the provisions of international law to the letter. While international law in general, and the law of the sea in particular, developed rapidly during the second half of the 20th century, in the period following the signing of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), its ratification by Greece (1995) and the twenty-five years that have passed since then, The Greek paradox has arisen. Greece has not yet implemented any of the provisions of the new law of the sea, which it co-developed, signed and ratified.

International law, as a collective conquest, constitutes a refuge for the less powerful states, but in the Greek and Cypriot case – and not only that, but let's focus on our own – It is observed that the application of certain provisions of the law is causally dependent and refers directly to power relationships.So instead of publicly discussing how we will articulate the most effective strategy for implementing the law of the sea, so as to better serve the national interest – yes, there is such a thing, even though it may be a hateful or outdated term for some – Many of us rail against the country for claiming to have maximalist goals. It is apparent that a significant number of individuals who have pioneered, contributed to, or agreed on the formation and exercise of Greek foreign policy over the past twenty-five years continue to resist the grim reality of Greek-Turkish relations, aligning themselves to a certain extent with Turkish accusations.  

Gradually but rapidly, the aforementioned Greek and Cypriot elites will "they are squeezed" interpretatively more and more between of Turkish hegemony  European dystocia on issues of common foreign and defense policy and the provisions of -otherwise their beloved- international law. Despite this, their claim for increased influence (sic) in the exercise of Greek foreign policy (will) remain undiminished. The well-known myth of "domestic consumption", thatTurkish actions in the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean are carried out to serve internal policies in the neighbor, exhausted its "analytical" limits. Convenient but short-lived and ambiguous as an argument, because it demonstrates Turkish certainty that Athens will not do anything that will impose a cost on Ankara, even for its actions hostile to Greece. The current story is about Greek maximalism, where according to its supporters, the application of the law of the sea constitutes an almost absurd Greek claim. We cannot know what the ultimate argument of this particular school of thought will be for Greek foreign policy. Although these positions are part of the pluralistic polyphony of a democratic country, there is probably a hidden aversion to the familiar collective subject, especially for certain of its characteristics, which are distasteful to a significant part of this elite.

From this perspective, the remote Kastelorizo ​​is also mentally related to the already remoteHagia Sophia, which "minimalist" Turkey decided to reopen as an Islamic mosque.  The interpretative deficits of this particular school of thought are covered by new imaginary schemes, of depicting the past and of urging for the present and future of Greek-Turkish relations. In fact, the intellectual self-flagellation about alleged Greek maximalism is baptized as a realistic approach. Of course, the prospect of an "honest compromise", which is manically projected, has caused the reaction even of persons who, to a greater or lesser extent, followed the policy in question.  

So the question arises, whether insensibly or not, parts of the Greek space and symbols of Hellenism are beginning to become dangerously distant in our collective consciousness, as long as acquired rights that secure positions and roles in the system of power are not affected. I fear then, lest from an organized and independent state with an elite, we fall into an administrative system of mandarins.