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EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME AND NAVAL POWER AND STRATEGY BULLETIN

15–30 October 2026

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Increasing trend in commercial shipping services through the Suez Canal.
• Geopolitical tensions surrounding undersea interconnections and Turkey–Libya’s unilateral actions.
• Greek–Egyptian cooperation initiatives in maritime transport, energy infrastructure, and maritime delimitation.
• Cyprus and Egypt explore opportunities for the exploitation of Cypriot natural gas.
• Greek–Israeli cooperation.
• Military exercises and air and naval procurement developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

DEVELOPMENTS OF MARITIME GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE

1. Return of Commercial Shipping to the Red Sea–Suez Route

Between 15 September and 15 October, 63% of the capacity deployed on scheduled Far East–Europe shipping services had returned to routes through the Red Sea. COSCO, OOCL, Maersk, and MSC were among the shipping companies that had resumed operations along these routes.

Assessment: The return to the Suez route enhances the geoeconomic significance of the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the importance and competitiveness of the Port of Piraeus. Nevertheless, security risks persist in the Red Sea, particularly for vessels associated with certain commercial interests or states.

Sources: Ship & Bunker / Alphaliner, 21 October 2026; Reuters, 22 October 2026.

2. Increased Container Throughput at the Port of Piraeus

According to COSCO Shipping Ports data, container throughput at Piraeus Terminals II and III reached approximately 367,000 TEUs in September 2026, compared with 318,000 TEUs in the corresponding month of 2025.

Assessment: This development strengthens Piraeus’s position as a European gateway for Asian trade, while once again highlighting the strategic implications of China’s presence at the port. Greece must ensure reliable transport and logistics connections with the European hinterland.

Source: Naftemporiki, 17 October 2026.

3. Great Sea Interconnector: Subsea Surveys and Turkish Claims

Efforts are underway to resume seabed surveys for the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI). The project, with an estimated cost of €1.9 billion and €680 million in EU funding, aims to establish an electricity interconnection between continental Europe and Cyprus, with a potential future extension to Israel.

It should be noted that Turkey claims exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf rights over extensive maritime areas of the Aegean and Southeastern Mediterranean, based on its internationally exceptional assertion that Greek islands are not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf. This position is in direct contradiction with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as interpreted by Greece.

The French company Nexans has requested the necessary authorizations from Greece.

Assessment: This project is linked to the European Union’s energy security. French participation demonstrates its commercial value, while US support adds diplomatic weight to its implementation.

Turkey demands written notification, in addition to the relevant NAVTEX, as a prerequisite for authorizing activities in a maritime area that it unilaterally claims falls under its jurisdiction.

Greece rejects these Turkish demands as arbitrary and detrimental to its vital national interests. Any Greek compromise would undermine the country’s credibility and establish a precedent for similar Turkish demands in the Aegean.

The European Union should reassess its role and provide more active support for its energy and digital infrastructure investments.

Turkey’s actions contribute to regional destabilization.

Sources: Reuters, 15 October 2026; Kathimerini Cyprus, 16 October 2026; Dnews, 19 October 2026.

4. Cyprus–Egypt Cooperation in Natural Gas Development

Cyprus’s Minister of Energy, Michalis Damianos, visited the Damietta liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities to receive briefings and assess the readiness of Egyptian infrastructure to receive, liquefy, and re-export Cypriot natural gas.

Assessment: Cyprus gains access to international energy markets without having to construct its own LNG terminal.

At the same time, energy cooperation between Cyprus and Egypt is strengthened, while Europe further diversifies its energy supply sources.

Source: Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum, 21 October 2026.

5. Maritime Security Incidents in the Persian Gulf

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has published a list of 119 confirmed incidents involving attacks against merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf during the recent period.

Assessment: Continuing instability in the Persian Gulf affects international energy supplies, insurance premiums, vessel chartering costs, and maritime transportation more broadly.

These developments directly affect the extensive Greek-owned fleet of oil tankers and LNG carriers.

Source: IMO, Confirmed Maritime Incidents in the Middle East, updated 21 October 2026.

6. Ratification of the Turkey–Libya Maritime Delimitation Memorandum

On 20 October, the House of Representatives in eastern Libya ratified the 2019 Turkey–Libya Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Delimitation.

This development is particularly significant because the same political authority had previously rejected the agreement.

The ratification was condemned not only by Greece and Cyprus but also by all EU member states, Eastern Mediterranean countries such as Egypt and Israel, while the United States described the move as provocative.

Assessment: Libya is highly dependent on Turkey, which exercises decisive influence over the country.

This development further strengthens Turkey’s position within Libya, creates potential obstacles to the uninterrupted implementation of regional energy projects of importance to the European Union and reflects Turkey’s expansionist ambitions vis-à-vis Greece.

Greek–Libyan relations are therefore becoming increasingly critical.

Sources: Associated Press, 21 October 2026; Reuters, 21 October 2026.

7. Turkish Counter-NAVTEX Notices in the Eastern Mediterranean

On 16 October, Turkey issued counter-NAVTEX notices concerning activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, including seabed surveys for an undersea telecommunications cable associated with the East to Med Corridor (EMC).

At the same time, a Turkish counter-NAVTEX challenged Greece’s authority to issue navigational warnings in a maritime area south of Kastellorizo, where the multinational exercise EUNOMIA had been scheduled for 19 October.

Assessment: Turkey is challenging the established allocation of responsibility for issuing navigational warnings and linking seabed surveys to competing claims of maritime jurisdiction, thereby increasing the risk of escalation and the outbreak of a crisis.

Source: Kathimerini, 16 October 2026.

8. Greece–Egypt Discussions on Extending EEZ Delimitation

The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Athens and Cairo are discussing the eastward extension of their existing EEZ delimitation beyond the 28th meridian.

The announcement followed the approval of the Turkey–Libya memorandum by the authorities in eastern Libya.

Assessment: Such a development would strengthen diplomatic coordination between Greece and Egypt, potentially also involving Cyprus, and would highlight UNCLOS as the appropriate legal framework for resolving regional maritime disputes and competing claims.

Egypt, in contrast to Turkey, would further consolidate its stabilizing role in the region.

Source: Reuters, 22 October 2026, “Greece, Egypt in talks to extend maritime zone further east.”

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

There are indications of a renewed strengthening of the Suez–Eastern Mediterranean–Europe maritime corridor.

Turkey is generating tensions surrounding the development of undersea infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean through unilateral claims that fall outside the provisions of UNCLOS.

At the same time, new opportunities are emerging for further strengthening cooperation among Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

1. Greek–Israeli Naval Cooperation and Live-Fire Exercises

On 21 October, acceptance live-fire trials of SPIKE NLOS and SPIKE ER guided missiles were conducted in the Sea of Crete, with the participation of Greek and Israeli naval units.

Submarines, aircraft, and special operations forces also participated.

A decommissioned Greek frigate was sunk using an SUT torpedo.

The Chiefs of the two Navies discussed maritime security, freedom of navigation, and opportunities for further operational cooperation.

Assessment: Greek–Israeli defence cooperation is deepening in the areas of interoperability, technology, and tactical coordination, while the Sea of Crete provides an exceptional environment for combined training.

Source: Hellenic Navy General Staff, official announcement, 23 October 2026.

2. Cyprus Strengthens Its Offshore Patrol Capabilities

Israel Shipyards and Rafael are reportedly close to signing an agreement worth approximately €150 million for the procurement of a second offshore patrol vessel (OPV), equipped with modern Israeli weapons and combat systems.

These systems are also expected to be installed on Cyprus’s existing first OPV.

Assessment: Cyprus is strengthening its ability to monitor its EEZ and protect critical maritime infrastructure.

The acquisition will also further enhance defence cooperation with Israel and increase opportunities for naval cooperation with Greece.

Sources: Kathimerini, 20 October 2026; Cyprus Mail, 20 October 2026.

3. Cypriot National Guard Exercise IRIS 2026

During the Cypriot National Guard’s exercise IRIS 2026, held from 12 to 15 October, Greek F-16 Viper fighter aircraft, H145M helicopters, and unmanned aerial systems participated.

Cypriot UAVs were deployed and employed for reconnaissance, surveillance, target designation, and strike missions.

Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (Counter-UAS) capabilities were also demonstrated.

Assessment: The domestic development and employment of modern technologies reduce operational costs, increase equipment availability, and provide Cypriot forces with greater autonomy and enhanced operational capabilities.

Source: Military Press, 16 October 2026.

4. Turkish Joint Military Exercise in the Cyprus Area

During the Turkish exercise Şehit Yüzbaşı Cengiz Topel Akdeniz Fırtınası 2026, conducted from 12 to 16 October in the wider Cyprus area, the reported participating assets included:

• F-16 fighter aircraft.
• T129 ATAK attack helicopters.
• CN-235 aircraft.
• Unmanned aerial vehicles.
• Frigates and fast attack craft.
• HİSAR-O and KORKUT air-defence systems.
• L-UMTAS and Cirit guided missiles.

Operational activities included close air support, airborne operations, amphibious operations, and combat search and rescue.

Assessment: Turkey is demonstrating joint operational capabilities, with particular emphasis on protection against aerial threats.

Source: Military Press, 16 October 2026.

5. Turkish KORKUT Air-Defence System

The Turkish KORKUT air-defence system, manufactured by ASELSAN, employs 35 mm guns and programmable ammunition.

The reported cost of engaging a target can remain below US$10,000, substantially lower than the cost of multiple missile interceptions.

The system has reportedly been exported to nine countries, although its effectiveness against today’s faster drones has not been conclusively established.

Assessment: Turkey possesses a competitive, export-oriented defence industry and continues to strengthen its military self-sufficiency.

Source: Financial Times, 22 October 2026.

6. ADRION Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Venice

On 6 October, the Defence Ministers’ Meeting of the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative (ADRION) took place in Venice, where the participating ministers issued a joint declaration.

Assessment: The Joint Declaration of the ADRION Defence Ministers confirms the deepening of regional defence cooperation and maritime security.

The initiative places particular emphasis on developing a common “Defence Shield” against contemporary threats, highlighting the Ionian and Adriatic Seas as a strategic security link.

Source: Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, Joint Declaration of the Defence Ministers of the Adriatic–Ionian Initiative (ADRION).

https://www.mod.mil.gr/koini-dilosi-ton-ypoyrgon-amynas-tis-protovoylias-adriatikis-ionioy-adrion/

7. Modernization of the Hellenic Navy and Unmanned Naval Systems

Greece is investing substantially in the development of indigenous defence technologies, aiming to establish autonomous domestic production capabilities.

A central element of this effort is Pyrpolitis, a Greek-designed and manufactured unmanned surface vessel (USV), alongside the development of autonomous underwater vehicles.

Greece has submitted an official Letter of Request (LOR) to the United States for the procurement of at least 30 Corsair unmanned surface vessels manufactured by Saronic.

Meanwhile, the Greek flag has been raised aboard the second FDI frigate, which is expected to arrive in Greece from France during December 2026.

Assessment: The Hellenic Navy is undergoing organizational, operational, and material modernization to address contemporary security challenges effectively.

Sources:

The National Herald, “From Greece’s Naval Heritage to the Hellenic Navy’s Modern Unmanned Vessel,” 14 October 2026.

https://www.thenationalherald.com/from-greeces-naval-heritage-to-the-hellenic-navys-modern-unmanned-vessel/

Greek City Times, “Greece Seeks 30 US Corsair Unmanned Surface Vessels,” 15 October 2026.

https://greekcitytimes.com/2026/10/15/greece-seeks-30-us-corsair-unmanned-surface-vessels/

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Cyprus is progressively strengthening its naval, technological, and deterrent capabilities.

The defence industry remains a major component of Turkey’s national power.

UAVs and Counter-UAS systems are acquiring increasing operational significance.

New military equipment acquisitions must be accompanied by high levels of operational readiness and equipment availability, as well as adequate stocks of ammunition, spare parts, and fuel.

Greek–Cypriot air and naval cooperation constitutes an important factor for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Further strengthening this cooperation through Israeli and Egyptian participation would reinforce the regional balance of power and deterrence, enabling the Eastern Mediterranean to fulfil its role as a commercial and energy bridge between the East and Europe.

FINAL GEOPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT

In the Eastern Mediterranean, energy policy, maritime jurisdiction, and military presence are directly interconnected.

Greece is entering a period in which commercial shipping, energy interconnections, submarine infrastructure, and maritime security are converging. These developments require harmonization and effective utilization through coordinated policies in foreign affairs, shipping, energy, infrastructure, and national defence.

Marco Rubio’s recent visit to Greece confirms the country’s central role in developments across the Eastern Mediterranean.

Turkey persists in its unilateral and arbitrary claims and seeks to influence the implementation of regional energy projects.

The ratification of the Turkey–Libya maritime memorandum by the authorities in eastern Libya further strengthens Turkish influence in that country.

Greece and Cyprus are linking their energy security to European interconnectivity, while Greece continues to strengthen its cooperation with Egypt and Israel.

For Greece, the essential strategic objectives are:

1. The resolute exercise of its rights under UNCLOS.
2. The implementation of its energy development programmes.
3. The protection and security of maritime infrastructure.
4. The deterrence of destabilizing forces.

In pursuing these objectives, legal, diplomatic, and, where appropriate, military assistance from allied states would be valuable, particularly from countries whose positions are grounded in UNCLOS and which possess significant energy and commercial interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Statements of condemnation are desirable, but they are not always sufficient.

1 November 2026

Hellenic Maritime Power and Strategy Division (HEMAPOSD)

Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (HELLISS)