CESMAR Daily Global Maritime Geopolitical Forecast – November 20 2026 –
CESMAR Daily Global Maritime Geopolitical Forecast
– November 20 2026 –
Summary prepared by the Centre for Geopolitics and Maritime Strategy Studies, compiled on the basis of analyses from third-party sources. While the content does not reflect the Centre’s own positions but is instead drawn from the work of other authors and publications, as indicated in the references, the structuring and interpretation of the data are the result of the Centre’s own synthesis process, aimed at creating a coherent and organic analytical framework. The summary therefore represents a structured reorganisation of the collected and selected information, based on the expertise of our scholars, who have subsequently extrapolated its implications in the geopolitical, strategic, technological, and maritime fields, as well as those related to Mediterranean countries. Reproduction, in whole or in part, is authorised provided that the source is acknowledged.
Geopolitical Scenarios of November 20, 2026
Daily Summary of Global Maritime Geopolitics
Reading time: 15 minutes
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Introduction
On 19 November, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met for the first time in Shenzhen. In the same hours, Washington is defining the command for autonomous warfare and tankers continue to be struck at Hormuz. The thesis is clear: the three major powers negotiate over arsenals and energy, while the material bill is paid by maritime routes and littoral states.
Key Events
Geopolitics: Shenzhen. The summit, on the margins of APEC, lasted approximately ninety minutes and closed with a four-point declaration: UN reform, greater supply of refined petroleum products, limits on the action of the International Criminal Court and dialogue on nuclear risks. ISPI notes the absence of binding agreements, ceilings on arsenals and explicit references to Ukraine and Iran. For Responsible Statecraft, the Chinese opening to nuclear dialogue, following the expiry of New START in February, is the only substantial outcome. Left out from the table was Europe, which Putin then invited to Moscow, as reported by Notizie Geopolitiche. InsideOver stresses that the summit remains an informal format, devoid of durable agreements.
Strategy: AUTOWARCOM. A Congressional Research Service report of 18 November, circulated by USNI News, traces the path towards AUTOWARCOM, a four-star functional combatant command for autonomous warfare, to be established by 1 October 2027. On 30 September, Pete Hegseth entrusted Project Agincourt to the official responsible for unmanned systems. The provision appears in the Senate bill but not in that of the House. The National Interest proposes merging elements of Joint Forces Command and SOCOM, with statutory powers and dedicated funding, leaving local adaptation to theatre commands. The political timeline therefore depends on the congressional calendar.
Maritime affairs: Hormuz e il blocco navale. According to gCaptain and Bloomberg, in November Iranian attacks against tankers in the Strait of Hormuz intensified, with UKMTO reporting roughly one per day, for a total of approximately 14 incidents during the month. Attempts to strike the same vessels repeatedly have also been observed, presumably to deter salvage and rescue operations. Meanwhile, Brent lost roughly one-fifth of its value over the course of November, while flows through the strait declined, falling from approximately 13.4 to 10 million barrels per day between the start of the month and 10 November. USNI News reports that the United States extended the naval blockade to ship-to-ship transfers conducted by vessels loaded at Iranian ports or waters. Since July 2026, the US Navy has reportedly diverted approximately 150 vessels and disabled five hulls. In October, 37 attacks were recorded, the most severe month since the outbreak of the conflict. The IMO has confirmed at least 25 seafarers killed and 130 incidents since the start of the war. Three attacks in the Persian Gulf occurred in November, following the strike on the tanker MT Belma on 15 July.
Consequences of the Events
Geopolitical Consequences
The trilateral summit in Shenzhen between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin assumes primarily symbolic value, yet alters the perception of international balances. According to InsideOver, it reflects an ‘asymmetric tripolarism’: the United States and China carry weight through economy and technology, whereas Russia counts for its nuclear arsenal and energy. The American initiative would also be facilitated by the Republican defeat in the midterm elections, which shifts the administration’s focus towards foreign policy. Xi emerges as the principal political beneficiary: he hosted Trump and Putin in his technological capital, presenting China as a peer power, without assuming binding commitments. Putin, for his part, achieves a visible breach of international isolation, albeit without significant concessions on Ukraine. Geopolitica.info places the American move within a realist tradition, from Nicholas Spykman onwards, aimed at detaching Moscow from Beijing; nevertheless, the Kremlin ought to weigh the cost of abandoning consolidated partnerships with China and Iran for potentially reversible promises. Europe appears weakened by its exclusion from the trilateral table. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz convened in Berlin over 25 European leaders, EU and NATO leadership, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, to coordinate the Western response. Putin invited European representatives to Moscow, but made any continuation of dialogue conditional on the prior presentation of concrete positions. The shift in balances is reflected elsewhere as well. In Caracas, on 18 November, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth signed a technical-military cooperation agreement with Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government, encompassing joint training, intelligence sharing and the provision of defensive capabilities. The Danish Parliament, by contrast, ratified by 109 votes in favour and none against the agreement on Greenland, which provides for new American defence areas at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is pursuing a reduction in dependence on the United States, including through a gradual rapprochement with China and diversification of trade partners. The picture is rounded out by Turkish cultural projection: according to IARI, Turkish television series reach over one billion viewers in more than 170 countries, supported by incentives of up to $100,000 per episode introduced in 2026. Popularity, however, does not translate automatically into political influence, particularly in the Arab world. In the Gulf, Bahrain sentenced to life imprisonment 64 individuals, largely Shia clerics, accused of links with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; five other defendants received 15 years.
Strategic Consequences
AUTOWARCOM marks a doctrinal choice: autonomous systems are no longer an adjunct to the individual armed services, but a domain with its own doctrines, standards, acquisition processes and learning pathways. The RUSI study corrects, however, the expectation of automatic manpower savings: operators, maintainers, logistics and missile and counter-drone defence continue to require qualified personnel. Battalions must also retain mortars, anti-tank weapons and land combat capabilities, accepting high attrition rates for assets employed in ‘last-mile’ resupply. The Ukrainian experience weighs on these conclusions, as it does on The National Interest, which recommends protecting and dispersing bases. The more critical side of automation emerges instead from InsideOver, which draws on Robert Wright and Iain McGilchrist: agents capable of optimising formal objectives without understanding the human context can foster cyberattacks with ambiguous attribution and spirals of escalation. The Council on Foreign Relations links the week’s outages — Microsoft, civil aviation, banks, Apple and the NSA’s internal network — to artificial intelligence as a possible indirect cause. The authorities and companies involved have not, however, found evidence of cyberattacks or links between the incidents, attributing them to technical faults, updates or scheduled maintenance. The National Interest envisages simultaneous attacks on power grids, water, undersea cables and GPS, proposing separable architectures and stress tests. War on the Rocks recalls that Iranian strikes on AWS facilities in Bahrain and the Emirates turned the cloud into a military target. On attrition, Foreign Affairs estimates that nearly ten months of war against Iran have consumed at least half of precision missiles and interceptors, without achieving regime change, suggesting limited objectives and reconstitution of stockpiles to compete with China and Russia. In London, the ten-billion-pound Britannia Shield plan envisages six radar-equipped Protector drones alongside three E-7 Wedgetails for continuous airborne surveillance. The Iranian dossier shows the limits of action. InsideOver reports that Washington postponed any operational decision, owing to Israeli pressure and following the IT outages, awaiting the new Democratic Congress in January, while Putin displayed the nuclear briefcase and dispatched two Tu-95 bombers to Vietnam. The trilateral nuclear dialogue therefore emerges while Moscow displays its deterrence.
Economic, Technological, Financial, and Energy Consequences
In the World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency defines the Hormuz crisis as a historic threat to global energy security. Under a scenario of prolonged disruption to traffic in the strait, oil volumes transiting the waterway would fall from approximately 20 million barrels per day prior to the crisis to 8.5 million in 2030 and to less than 2 million in 2035, thanks to alternative pipelines, new supply sources and demand-reduction measures. Data centre electricity demand will double by 2030, rising from 485 to approximately 950 TWh. In China, roughly half of the power for data centres dedicated to artificial intelligence will come from coal; in the United States, gas will cover roughly 60% of demand. The short-term picture remains contradictory: Brent has fallen by roughly one-fifth, while Saudi Arabia exported 5.38 million barrels per day in September, the highest level since February. According to Responsible Statecraft, Bahrain has brought crude exports to zero and halted aluminium production, against a backdrop of high public debt. Critical raw materials remain a strategic lever. The European Commission approved Porto Marghera as the first European strategic stockpiling hub, with an initial focus on rare earths and tungsten, to strengthen industrial supply resilience. The Council on Foreign Relations recalls the Quad agreements in Manila on critical minerals and the fragility of the Sino-American trade truce, strained between Chinese restrictions on rare earths and US controls on microchip exports. Venezuela grants Washington access to 17 fields and 35% of the operator’s parent company, but does not replace Hormuz; The National Interest also flags risks of price increases and delays along Central Asian Iranian corridors. The defence industry is also growing. Fincantieri is investing approximately €600 million in Next Geosolutions, WSense, Graal Tech and a 49% stake in Defcomm, with transactions still subject to antitrust and Golden Power review. Morocco aims for 40% of military requirements produced domestically by 2035, with an initial 4 billion dirhams. Eni, with Woodside, estimates 200 billion cubic feet of gas at Nasim-1X, in Egypt. For businesses and markets, the Council on Foreign Relations links the outages at Microsoft, banks and aviation to the rush for security patches, after artificial intelligence made it possible to identify vulnerabilities at scale. War on the Rocks proposes a commercial computing reserve with emergency priority and physical standards in government cloud contracts. Canada, according to InsideOver, saw sales to China grow by 40% in the first nine months of the year, following the agreement with Xi on agri-food tariffs and metals.
Maritime Consequences
The maritime picture is characterised by two chokepoints under pressure. At Hormuz, Tehran links reopening the strait to lifting the naval blockade and honouring an agreement with Oman, while Washington struck a missile site on Qeshm, extended the blockade to ship-to-ship transfers and deployed three carrier strike groups: George H.W. Bush, George Washington and Theodore Roosevelt. Kuwait reported to the IMO attacks on eight of its tankers. On the opposite side, on 15 November Yemeni government forces withdrew from positions around Bab el-Mandeb, leaving the Houthis in control of the area and bringing them back to roughly 80 kilometres from Aden. Bases in Djibouti are more exposed; according to Geopolitica.info, however, thanks to supplies linked to China, the movement might avoid a total blockade so as not to provoke an international reaction. Along submerged communications lines, the Polo Nazionale della Dimensione Subacquea and Confindustria signed a protocol in Civitavecchia to protect critical infrastructure. ShipMag cites 189 Italian companies and revenue growth of 216%, from €1.1 billion to €3.5 billion. Fincantieri, with eight companies and roughly 1,500 professionals, seeks to integrate survey, communications, drones and sonar. Naval power is seeking new hulls. The United States is evaluating Rheinmetall’s GMF 140 frigate, never built and with no known price, according to The National Interest; Under Secretary nominee Bill Toti, for USNI News, proposes an American shipyard funded by a foreign shipbuilder. Argentina has signed a letter of intent to acquire three Fincantieri FCX20 corvettes, and Damen presented the concept for a 164-metre, approximately 15,000-tonne Anglo-Dutch amphibious vessel. In the Persian Gulf, fragility is not solely military: Responsible Statecraft recalls that Bahrain suffered hundreds of missile strikes, including against desalination plants, and that the Fifth Fleet remains the primary target. If Hormuz remains insecure and Bab el-Mandeb passes under hostile control, transport and insurance costs, already under strain along Central Asian corridors according to The National Interest, tend to rise along the entire axis.
Consequences for the Southern European Mediterranean countries
For Italy, the implications are direct. The government features among the capitals under consideration for European representation in Moscow, alongside France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom and Union leadership. At the Med Dialogues in Naples, Formiche.net reports, Tajani proposed linking Trieste, Marseille, Naples and Salerno to Egyptian and Gulf ports, employing Egyptian ships for Black Sea grain and supporting Med9 and the Arab League on Hormuz-linked fertilisers; he also claimed Italian leadership of the European mission at Rafah. Mattarella, according to ISPI, called for freedom of navigation and cooperation with the Union at the centre. On the industrial front, Porto Marghera becomes the first European hub for strategic stockpiling of critical raw materials, within a North-Eastern system encompassing Verona, Trieste and Ravenna. Fincantieri strengthens its presence in the underwater domain and naval exports, while Eni, with the Egyptian discovery, consolidates its relationship with Cairo, which according to InsideOver seeks to return as a protagonist in the Mediterranean. For Greece and Spain, the materials provided contain no direct references, and what follows is a deduction from the facts reported. Greece is exposed to growing uncertainty over Suez and Bab el-Mandeb, because Athens lives by maritime trade; the Center for Maritime Strategy’s reference to the Dodecanese campaign, although referring to Taiwan, recalls the vulnerability of peripheral islands without logistical support. Spain, given its Atlantic and Mediterranean position, suffers above all from energy and fertiliser price rises linked to Hormuz, and like Rome and Athens finds itself within a Europe excluded from the Shenzhen table, concerned over NATO’s eastern flank evoked by The Global Eye. Three points remain to be watched. Mario Zanetti, for ShipMag, calls for multi-year public demand to turn Italy’s regulatory advantage in the underwater domain into industrial capacity. The Moroccan Offre Maroc plan, with nearly 50,000 jobs projected by 2035 and priority given to naval systems and drones, adds an industrial competitor on the southern shore. The so-called Finnish model promoted by the White House, applied to icebreakers and Arctic Security Cutters, fuels the debate on shipbuilding with allied capital, an area in which Fincantieri and European shipyards have a direct stake.
Conclusions
Four issues show signs of imminent evolution. The first is the Moscow invitation: European capitals will have to state with what mandate and proposal they intend to appear, and Italy must prepare for a role in that representation. The second is the Red Sea: the Houthis must choose between an assault on Aden and a march on Marib, and every move towards the strait will affect Djibouti and convoys bound for Suez. The third is Hormuz, where extending the blockade to transfers and an average of roughly one attack per day make a further exchange of blows probable; Tehran and Washington appear in any case inclined to freeze the stalemate until the new Congress takes office in January. The fourth is AUTOWARCOM, which depends on reconciling the two defence bills. It is advisable to follow in particular the trilateral nuclear dialogue, which will have its first test at the G20 in Miami. For Italian decision-makers, it is prudent to prepare the negotiating position on Moscow in advance, strengthen monitoring of Bab el-Mandeb and protect undersea cables and infrastructure.
References
This summary has been prepared based on articles from various geopolitical and strategic analysis sources, including: Elisme, Center for Maritime Strategy, CIMSEC, Reuters, ShipMag, Navy Lookout, National Interest, Seapower Magazine, CSIS, RUSI, War on the Rocks, IISS, Responsible Statecraft, Foreign Affairs, Formiche.net, Il Sussidiario, Start Magazine, InsideOver, Notizie Geopolitiche, IARI, Dissipatio, Analisi Difesa, Jamestown Foundation, Atlantic Council, RAND Corporation.
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