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2ND TETHIS BULLETIN (Reporting period: 1–15 November 2026)

2ND TETHIS BULLETIN (Reporting period: 1–15 November 2026)

Hellenic Maritime Power and Strategy Sector (TETHIS) of the Hellenic Institute for Strategic Studies (HELLISS)

 

 2ND TETHIS BULLETIN (Reporting period: 1–15 November 2026)

Strategic Summary

  1. Turkish provocations and claims to maritime jurisdiction during implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) project and the laying of the EMC undersea telecommunications cable between Cyprus and Crete.
  2. Trilateral coordination between Greece, Cyprus and Israel.
  3. Gaza and Lebanon: instability arising from continuing military activity and the humanitarian crisis.
  4. Gradual return of major shipping companies to the Suez Canal.
  5. Greece: strengthened energy position, new shipbuilding and ship-repair capabilities, and pressure on the financial performance of the Port of Piraeus.
  6. Continuing geopolitical risks to navigation.
  7. Greece continues its armaments programme.
  8. Turkish and Egyptian interest in cooperation on warship construction and unmanned systems.
  9. Increased Turkish military activity in the Eastern Mediterranean.
  10. Advances in military technology.

GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

  1. GSI project: Greece issued a NAVTEX for surveys relating to the Crete–Cyprus electricity cable, to be carried out by the French-flagged vessel VB Abeille Marengo. Turkey responded with a counter-NAVTEX asserting jurisdiction. Following the delivery of a relevant note verbale by France to Turkey, the Turkish Foreign Minister adopted a reassuring tone. On 10 November, Turkey issued NAVTEX 1127/26, referring to Turkish consent for the commencement of the surveys. On 11 November, the Heraklion station issued NAVWARN 1441/26, declaring the Turkish notice invalid and reaffirming that the surveys were being conducted under Greek permits.

Assessment: Turkey seeks to establish a de facto right to grant consent for every project undertaken within its arbitrarily proclaimed “Blue Homeland”. Greece must safeguard its vital interests; moreover, such incidents create uncertainty for companies, insurers and financiers of submarine projects.

Sources: Defence Review, 11 November 2026 – Greek response to the Turkish NAVTEX. To Vima International, 8 November 2026 – Greece and Turkey Clash Over Cable Survey. Kathimerini, 8 November 2026 – De-escalation seen in GSI cable dispute. Kathimerini, Vassilis Nedos, 6 November 2026 – Resumption of GSI surveys. Kathimerini, Vassilis Nedos, 12 November 2026 – The high stakes of an undersea connection.

  1. In its report on Turkey (5 November), the European Commission recorded a series of outstanding disputes affecting security in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. These include Turkey’s continued 1995 threat of war (casus belli) should Greece extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean; violations of Greek national airspace; overflights; obstruction of GSI-related activities; disagreements over maritime zones; the unlawful Turkey–Libya memorandum; and Turkey’s non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.

Assessment: Turkish expansionist claims remain a European issue, particularly where they affect projects of common European interest and the sovereign rights of Member States.

Source: Proto Thema English, Vassilis Dalianis, 4 November 2026 – EU warns Turkey over Aegean threats, Libya deal and Cyprus cable.

  1. The Republic of Cyprus issued NAVTEX MA86, valid from 2 to 15 November, for geophysical surveys by KOBI RUEGG in connection with the laying of the EMC telecommunications cable. Turkey reacted by challenging Cypriot maritime jurisdiction. At the same time, a Greek NAVTEX covered submarine cable surveys south-east of Crete between 7 and 11 November.

Assessment: Through coercion, Turkey seeks to impose a series of arbitrary positions, such as the contention that Greek islands are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf. Turkish practice extends beyond energy infrastructure to telecommunications interconnections, which are essential to economic and digital security.

Source: Geopolitiki, November 2026 – EMC cable and competing NAVTEX.

  1. The October 2025 ceasefire has not ended incidents of military violence in the Gaza Strip. Sporadic air strikes and street fighting continue. OCHA reported that no humanitarian aid trucks were unloaded through the Egyptian corridor between 3 and 8 November, while the Israeli authorities had cited concerns about smuggling.

Assessment: The ceasefire remains fragile, and there is difficulty in reconciling military operations with the protection of civilians. The crisis affects Egypt and perpetuates instability along the eastern Mediterranean coast.

Sources: Reuters, 11–12 November 2026 – Israeli strike on Gaza hospital kills six, including surgeon, medics say. UN OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Report, 13 November 2026.

  1. The situation in Lebanon remained fragile because of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah and domestic disagreements over the organisation’s disarmament. On 11 November, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem reiterated his opposition to disarming the organisation under current conditions. Five people allegedly linked to Hezbollah are being held in Lebanon, and the Lebanese army has also seized the contents of a weapons depot.

Assessment: The risk of renewed escalation persists.

Sources: Vigil Consilium, 15 November 2026 – Levant Weekly Brief. CrisisBrief, 15 November 2026 – Israel, Gaza and Lebanon.

  1. According to Reuters, forces aligned with Yemen’s government announced on 15 November that they were withdrawing from positions near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after weeks of clashes with Houthi forces.

Assessment: This development raises further concerns for maritime security. The Houthis’ strengthened position along Yemen’s western coastline, together with their military capabilities, increases the risks to shipping in the area.

Source: Safety4Sea, https://safety4sea.com/yemeni-forces-withdraw-from-positions-near-bab-el-mandeb-strait/

  1. On 5 November 2026, representatives of the Greek, Cypriot and Israeli Ministries of Defence held a trilateral meeting in Athens. According to a statement by the Israeli Ministry of Defence, discussions covered defence and defence-industrial cooperation, protection of sea lanes and critical infrastructure, development of innovative technologies, responses to regional threats, and Cyprus’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The three parties rejected the legal validity of the Turkey–Libya memorandum.

Assessment: Trilateral cooperation is acquiring broader substance through joint exercises. The proposed consideration of a joint defence-industrial working group creates prospects for cooperation in research, production and interoperability. Such cooperation does not automatically entail an obligation of mutual military assistance.

Sources: Israeli Ministry of Defence, 5 November 2026 – Official statement on the trilateral meeting. Kathimerini, 5 November 2026 – Common position on the Turkey–Libya memorandum.

  1. In its October 2026 World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund assesses that the global economy remains resilient but faces mounting pressures from conflicts, energy prices and trade tensions.

Assessment: Greece and Cyprus are exposed to fluctuations in energy costs, freight rates and international tourism demand. Egypt is focused on import costs and revenues from international transport. Turkey is affected by the prices of imported energy products and international financial conditions.

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, 13 October 2026 – Resilience Under Strain, Urgent Choices.

  1. On 3 November 2026, the IEA warned that Europe was entering winter with its lowest natural gas storage levels in more than a decade. The IEA’s report of 13 November confirms that, despite a recovery in oil exports, attacks on ships and energy infrastructure continue to be recorded.

Assessment: This situation enhances Greece’s potential value as a gateway for LNG imports and distribution to South-Eastern Europe, as well as the importance of developing Eastern Mediterranean deposits. Protecting the Greek-owned merchant fleet is of particular interest to Greece.

Source: IEA, 3 November 2026 – Low storage buffers in Europe could prolong global gas market tightness well into 2027.

SHIPPING DEVELOPMENTS AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

  1. The Suez Canal Authority announced on 8 November the transit of EVER EON, marking Evergreen’s return to this sea route following the prolonged Red Sea crisis. According to the Authority, Evergreen was planning further transits.

Assessment: This return strengthens Egypt’s role as the operator of a critical global maritime artery. Reduced use of the route around the Cape of Good Hope could shorten transport times and lower costs, while also restoring transhipment traffic through Greek ports.

Sources: Suez Canal Authority, 8 November 2026. The Loadstar, Charlotte Goldstone, 11 November 2026. Reuters, Antonis Pothitos, 3 November 2026 – Greece’s Piraeus Port posts lower nine-month earnings.

  1. METLEN signed a binding five-year agreement with Shell Global LNG Limited for the supply of six cargoes of liquefied natural gas annually, beginning in 2027. The cargoes will originate primarily from Shell’s US LNG portfolio, with the potential to supply the Greek market and access other European markets via the Vertical Gas Corridor.

Assessment: Greece could strengthen its role as an entry and distribution point for LNG to the Balkans and the wider region. Actual commercial utilisation depends on infrastructure capacity, cross-border charges and demand.

Source: METLEN, official stock-exchange disclosure published in November 2026, ‘Post-period events’ section, event of 2 November 2026. Official METLEN corporate document (PDF).

  1. Maran Gas Amphipolis, operated by Maran Gas Maritime of the Angelicoussis Group, completed dry-docking, repairs and a special survey at Skaramangas Shipyards. This was the first repair of an LNG carrier at a Greek shipyard. The project included specialised work on an LNG cargo tank, including nitrogen inerting, with GTT certification.

Assessment: Developing such capabilities could reduce the need to send Greek-owned LNG carriers to foreign shipyards and generate additional domestic added value.

Source: Roussakis Supplies, 10 November 2026 – First LNG Carrier Repaired in Greece: Maran Gas Amphipolis at Skaramangas.

  1. During the fortnight under review, the LNG dual-fuel tankers Amor, Minerva Helen and Maran Myron were delivered from Chinese shipyards to the Greek-owned companies Capital, Minerva and Maran Tankers, respectively.

Assessment: Greek shipping companies continue to invest in vessels capable of using alternative fuels, seeking greater flexibility in responding to environmental requirements. These orders confirm the strong relationship between Greek shipping interests and the Chinese shipbuilding industry.

Source: Bunker Index – Greece, news items dated 6, 9 and 13 November 2026.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ACTIVITIES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

  1. During November 2026, the Hellenic Navy is completing acceptance of seven MH-60R helicopters. The second FDI HN frigate, NEARCHOS, is also expected to arrive in Greece during 2026. By 2030, all four FDI HN frigates will have been upgraded to the 2+++ standard.

Assessment: The MH-60Rs significantly strengthen anti-submarine warfare, surface-target detection and engagement, maritime surveillance and cooperation with surface vessels. The four FDI HN frigates will considerably enhance the Fleet’s capabilities across all forms of warfare and in network-centric joint operations.

Sources: To Vima, 4 November 2026. Kathimerini, 10 November 2026; and the Hellenic Ministry of National Defence, official announcement.

  1. Naval Group signed ten contracts with Greek companies. Five concern construction of the FDI HN frigates and five their maintenance and support. Two memoranda of understanding on research and development with FEAC and SOTIRIA Technology cover, among other areas, underwater technologies, digital twins and naval sensors.

Assessment: This development is of long-term importance for domestic expertise and production, as well as the autonomy of Fleet support.

Source: Defence Review, 5 November 2026.

  1. An investment of €35 million by the Hellenic Innovation and Infrastructure Fund in the Finnish company ICEYE, which specialises in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite systems, was announced. Plans include establishing a production facility in Greece with a projected capacity of up to 150 satellites annually.

Assessment: SAR technology can support maritime surveillance, ship detection and infrastructure monitoring regardless of lighting conditions and in adverse weather.

Source: Athens-Macedonian News Agency (ANA-MPA), 11 November 2026.

  1. The European Council is extending the Mediterranean naval mission Operation IRINI until the end of March 2029. Its tasks are being expanded to include curbing Russia’s shadow fleet and protecting critical infrastructure.

Assessment: Continuous Greek naval participation in this mission enhances Greece’s role in a particularly sensitive maritime region of the Mediterranean.

Source: ‘EU Extends Operation Irini to 2029, Adds Russian Shadow Fleet Task’, 2 November.

EU Extends Operation Irini to 2029, Adds Russian Shadow Fleet Task

  1. A Turkish–Egyptian air and naval exercise took place in the Eastern Mediterranean from 4 to 9 November. Substantial forces participated, conducting air-defence, counter-unmanned-threat, anti-submarine warfare and boarding exercises. The Commander of the Turkish Navy, Admiral Ercüment Tatlıoğlu, referred to the pursuit of cooperation with Egypt on joint warship construction, following the model of the MILGEM programme with Pakistan. He also mentioned cooperation on UAVs and unmanned naval systems.

Assessment: Turkey is seeking rapprochement with Egypt. The exercise confirms Turkey’s intention to integrate unmanned assets into major naval formations. If Egypt expands cooperation with the Turkish Navy, this could strengthen Turkey’s defence industry and create technological and economic dependencies. Egypt continues to differ from Turkey over maritime delimitation and has not disrupted its strategic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus.

Sources: Defence Turkey, 12 November 2026. Defense News, 13 November 2026. Turkish Directorate of Communications, 30 October 2026 – Advance announcement of the exercise. Ahram Online, 12 November 2026 – Completion of the exercise.

  1. The Turkish air and naval exercise Blue Whale was held from 9 to 15 November, with the participation of Turkish forces, NATO’s SNMG-2 and assets from other countries. The exercise focused on anti-submarine warfare and cooperation between ships, aircraft and submarines.

Assessment: Turkey’s naval presence in the south-eastern Mediterranean is increasing. Demanding anti-submarine training in anticipated operational areas enhances crews’ operational proficiency.

Source: Turkish Ministry of National Defence, 8 November 2026.

  1. Reports described intense activity by Turkish unmanned aircraft and ATR-72 aircraft in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, including 15 violations of Greek national airspace by UAVs. The activity coincided with Turkey’s demands concerning surveys for the Great Sea Interconnector project.

Assessment: This constitutes a show of force outside the bounds of international law, as part of a strategy of coercion.

Source: Defence Review, 6 November 2026.

  1. Continuous advances in military technology can be summarised as follows:

Increased speed and destructive capability of UCAVs.

Development of interceptor drones, mobile laser systems and automated guns.

Enhancement of unmanned surface and underwater assets, as well as capabilities for protecting ships against asymmetric threats.

Exploration of new self-propelled artillery systems, electronic warfare technologies and advanced simulation.

Growing importance of resilient communications, artificial intelligence and the integration of sensors with weapon systems.

Assessment: The effectiveness of modern Armed Forces increasingly depends on the speed with which threats are detected, information is processed and threats are countered, as well as the ability to sustain these functions under electronic interference.

Sources: Institute for the Study of War, 2 November 2026, and analysis of Ukrainian military intelligence. ISW, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 15 November 2026. Inside Defense, 2–3 November 2026. AI & Security Observatory, 3 November 2026. French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 3 November 2026, and Defense News, 4 November 2026. USNI News, 9 November 2026. Safran / MSI-Defence Systems, official announcement, 4 November 2026. Defence Turkey, publication of 12 November 2026. Inside Defense, 3 November 2026. AI & Security Observatory, 3 November 2026, citing Elbit’s announcement. Public NZDF tender notice, as listed on Tendor, November 2026. ELISME, 1st Electronic Technologies Bulletin, 13 November 2026, referring to Baykar’s announcement. ELISME, 13 November 2026, citing ASELSAN. NCIA, 5 November 2026, and NATO, 5 November 2026.

MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

The international economy remains vulnerable to geopolitical and energy disruptions. The Eastern Mediterranean is gaining additional importance as an area of energy interconnections, commercial transport and regional defence cooperation.

There is insufficient evidence of conditions for a generalised military escalation throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Maritime delimitation claims, energy infrastructure and Middle Eastern conflicts remain interconnected factors in regional security.

Greece must manage its overall energy planning in the face of Turkey’s expansionist claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus in a manner that fully safeguards its sovereign rights through credible deterrence, without leading to uncontrolled military escalation unless this becomes necessary.

The gradual restoration of the Suez route creates opportunities for Greek ports and Greek-owned shipping. At the same time, energy agreements and the upgrading of shipbuilding and ship-repair capabilities can strengthen Greece’s role as an international shipping, energy and technology hub in the Eastern Mediterranean, provided that a coherent strategy is pursued and economically viable investments are implemented.

The most important current trend in military technology is the transition from the isolated use of UAVs and USVs to their organised integration into air and naval forces.

For Greece, the timely operational deployment of FDI frigates and MH-60R helicopters must be accompanied by high availability rates, comprehensive training and adequate weapons stocks. Effective detection of, and defence against, UAVs and USVs remains a high priority. Naval Group’s new contracts and the investment in ICEYE can help develop Greek expertise in sensors, space-based surveillance, underwater systems and ship maintenance.

The modernisation of air, naval and land forces must be approached as a unified technological and operational system, with particular emphasis on the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean and the protection of critical national infrastructure.