Blog

– October 23 2026 –

On 22 October 2026, three distinct pressures converge upon Europe simultaneously: an American proposal to reopen Russian gas supplies via Ukrainian pipelines, a record number of merchant vessel attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, and the headlong rush of military apparatuses towards autonomous machine warfare. The underlying thesis is that energy—transported by sea and defended by uncrewed systems—determines the remaining degree of European autonomy.

Geopolitics: The American proposal on Russian gas. Analisi Difesa reports that Washington has allegedly suggested to European and Ukrainian officials that the legacy Russian pipelines, shut down at the end of 2024, be reactivated as part of a peace plan providing cheaper energy to Europe and transit rights for Kyiv to fund reconstruction. This would represent a reversal from the years when the United States pushed Europeans towards American liquefied natural gas (LNG). The National Interest objects that Moscow pursues dominion objectives that cannot be measured in economic convenience, while the ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale) fears a backroom negotiation among great powers, reminiscent of Yalta, that would leave the Union on the sidelines.

Strategy: The American command for autonomous warfare. The National Interest outlines the Autonomous Warfare Command, the structure through which the Pentagon intends to coordinate swarms of uncrewed aerial, ground, and maritime systems. A study by UNIDIR, cited by The Global Eye, anticipates that human intervention will diminish in operational planning and target identification, and calls for binding legal frameworks. According to gCaptain, the time has come to integrate uncrewed surface vessels and submarines into the routine operations of the US Navy, provided that logistics, communications security, and rules of engagement are updated. Decision-making velocity is becoming the primary criterion for force structuring.

Maritime domain: Record attacks in Hormuz. USNI News identifies October as the month with the highest number of attacks on merchant shipping in the Strait of Hormuz since the outbreak of hostilities, executed using drones and light naval craft. Shipmag notes that the majority of these incidents are not reported by shipping companies and shipmasters, meaning official data underestimates the risk. gCaptain adds that two tankers have been damaged in the Gulf, war-risk insurance premiums are rising, and shipowners are demanding naval escorts. US and allied forces remain in the theatre, and USNI highlights the growing attrition of assets and personnel.

Europe’s fragmentation and the test of geopolitical reality The architecture of global power is being redrawn far beyond the formal institutions of the European Union. Three recent developments offer distinct analytical lenses through which to evaluate current energy security management: the proposal to reactivate Russian gas flows through Ukrainian pipelines; the ISPI analysis concerning the prospective configuration of a G3 directorate comprising Washington, Moscow, and Beijing; and French President Emmanuel Macron’s surprise visit to Riyadh, documented by Notizie Geopolitiche, aimed at securing Saudi gas oil in exchange for military commitments. In each instance, nation-states act unilaterally, whilst Brussels bogs down in debate and passively witnesses third-party pacts. Financial stability further compounds this precarious picture. Confronted with a requirement for tens of billions of euros to sustain Kyiv over the coming year, the Union is compelled to knock on the doors of London and Ottawa, lamenting the failure of many allies to disburse previously pledged funds. As highlighted by InsideOver, France—the eurozone’s second-largest economy and a pillar of the community budget—faces rising bond yields and an uncertain fiscal outlook. Deprived of the Franco-German engine, Europe suffers from an inability to act as a point of reference, oscillating between the unilateral tendencies of major states and the rhetorical posturing of other nations devoid of genuine political substance. Technological vulnerability exacerbates this structural weakness. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) interprets restrictions imposed on the use of Starlink as a severe blow to Washington’s credibility, whilst InsideOver links them directly to the imperative of accelerating the European IRIS2 space constellation project and the industrial consolidation of the sector. Whoever owns and controls communications networks holds the leverage to dictate the tempo and modalities of an allied operation. It follows that Europe’s substantive sovereignty rests today upon three indispensable pillars: the capacity to procure energy at sustainable prices, the financial strength to sustain a protracted conflict, and independence in satellite communications. Across each of these fronts, the Old Continent displays a manifest lag. The central core remains the myopia of the Western political class. As War on the Rocks underscores, the West continues to operate within short-term horizons, whereas Moscow prosecutes a long-term strategy of attrition—striking schools, data centres, and critical infrastructure to break Ukrainian society—matched only by an European response confined to episodic interventions. The abyss of confrontation thus shifts away from the battlefield towards national budgets, commercial ports, and digital networks.

In terms of strategic equilibrium, the gas proposal upregulates the previous policy whereby Washington pressured Europeans to sever ties with Moscow’s supplies. Should the pipelines be re-integrated into a peace settlement, Russia would secure commercial validation prior to abandoning its war aims, whilst Ukraine would be reduced to a transit state dependent upon a flow subject to external closure. The National Interest warns that Kyiv would interpret such normalisation as an incentive for renewed aggression. According to Notizie Geopolitiche, the initial cargo of 40,000 tonnes of Russian gas oil bound for the United States indicates that the bilateral channel between the two administrations is already operational. The CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) judges overtures toward Putin as worthy of criticism, yet contends that moral outrage will not halt the war, whilst War on the Rocks advocates for long-term partnerships spanning Ukraine’s economy, education, and technology sectors. Alliances are shifting within the Gulf: IARI observes that the defence pact linking Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan institutionalises a convergence on deterrence and the defence-industrial base—with parliamentary ratifications pending—whilst France offers Riyadh military contingents and air defence systems, thereby diversifying away from Washington’s traditional security guarantees. In Central Asia, RUSI notes that Kazakhstan has adhered to both American and Chinese artificial intelligence initiatives, whilst The Global Eye recalls that Astana has renewed its oil transit accords with Moscow. Middle powers are cultivating multiple partners whilst retaining all options. For Europe, the most immediate repercussion concerns negotiating leverage: the risk articulated by ISPI is that Brussels will be relegated to the periphery of a directorate that bypasses multilateral fora.

The defence sector is undergoing a profound paradigm shift in military doctrine, driven by the integration of Artificial Intelligence and emergent global threats. The United States has established the Autonomous Warfare Command, a new four-star command designed to coordinate swarms of drones and uncrewed systems. This architecture necessitates ultra-resilient computing infrastructure, capable of withstanding cyber warfare and electronic jamming. This technological acceleration nevertheless generates severe ethical dilemmas: the UN agency UNIDIR warns that human operators risk being progressively marginalised from operational planning and target engagement. Extreme automation raises pressing questions regarding accountability in the event of violations of international humanitarian law and the hazard of precipitating warfare through algorithmic error. Concurrently, maritime strategy is undergoing transformation. To counter the threat of low-cost drones, the Center for Maritime Strategy proposes a renaissance of ‘coastal warfare’, shielding ports and forward bases through advanced sensors, artificial intelligence, and highly flexible mobile units. Further north, a US congressional report (highlighted by USNI News) raises the alarm over massive Russian militarization in the Arctic, encompassing reactivated bases, long-range radar networks, and nuclear icebreakers. NATO’s response relies upon forward deterrence, deploying aircraft carriers and attack submarines to European waters under Exercise Neptune Strike. The threats, however, transcend the boundaries of the traditional battlefield. Internally, Britain’s MI5 security service reports a surge in sabotage, cyber attacks, and AI-amplified disinformation campaigns. According to the RUSI think tank, European defence remains critically exposed across its most vital sector: the funding of social cohesion as the primary bulwark against hybrid warfare. Nonetheless, Responsible Statecraft cautions against overestimating Moscow, highlighting the severe structural limitations governing its operations. In Italy, polling published by Formiche reveals a striking contradiction: citizens express strong trust in the Armed Forces yet reject increases in military expenditure or overseas deployments, thereby imposing a strict political constraint upon governmental decision-making. Finally, the grim portrait of Ukraine depicted by War on the Rocks illustrates how the conflict profoundly strikes at the heart of civil society; Kyiv’s defence no longer merely safeguards trench networks, but has been forced to reorganise to fortify schools, logistical nodes, and data centres.

Europe enters the winter with gas storage levels trailing historical averages, notes Analisi Difesa, and confronting a binary choice between Russian gas and industrial uncompetitiveness. The National Interest discounts Africa’s capacity to bridge the shortfall: Nigeria, Angola, and Libya suffer from a deficit of refineries and capital investment, forcing producers to export crude and re-import refined products. Notizie Geopolitiche reports that Macron has requested extraordinary gas oil supplies from Riyadh, signalling a domestic shortage of refined products. Financial indicators reflect this strain: rising French bond yields revive debates surrounding eurozone debt sustainability precisely as tens of billions are demanded for Kyiv. On the technological front, the Starlink precedent accelerates IRIS2, whilst Analisi Difesa records that SpaceX closed the third quarter with revenues and profits exceeding forecasts, propelled by cloud computing and artificial intelligence, even as Musk initiates feasibility committees regarding a merger with Tesla; the European alternative must measure itself against an expanding competitor. The National Interest notes an additional $99 million in cost overruns for a US Navy stealth destroyer. Along trade corridors, the Union is financing Caspian ports, railways, and customs infrastructure along the Middle Corridor to circumvent Russian transit, yet The Global Eye reminds us that Kazakh crude continues to traverse Russian terminals. A UN report issues an explicit warning: failure to contain global warming within the critical 1.5-degree threshold will entail a severe economic “double blow” for European enterprises. European corporations face a profound competitive disadvantage: on the one hand, they must absorb taxation and capital expenditure to adapt to a changing climate; on the other, they will experience surging operational costs for energy and maritime logistics.

Maritime security constitutes the most pressing operational concern. In the Strait of Hormuz, the specialised publication USNI News recorded the highest monthly peak of merchant vessel attacks since the commencement of the US-Iran war. Furthermore, the gCaptain portal emphasizes that these raids are no longer isolated incidents, but affect vast maritime expanses far beyond traditional Persian Gulf shipping lanes. Amidst this tense environment, Iran is reportedly contemplating the introduction of a transit tariff (toll) for shipping. As analysed by Responsible Statecraft, this demand infringes upon the principle of ‘innocent passage’ guaranteed under the international law of the sea: the tangible risk is that an economic exaction will escalate into open military engagement with international warships operating within the region. The global maritime security architecture is increasingly critical and fragmented. In the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (the approaches to the Suez Canal), Houthi insurgents maintain intense military pressure employing low-cost drones and anti-ship missiles. This instability generates acute opacity for shipping lines which—as underscored by Shipmag—cannot accurately calculate operational risks whilst confronting soaring war-risk insurance premiums. Shifting to the Mediterranean, strategic equilibria are evolving rapidly: Turkey is consolidating its influence in Libya by redrawing commercial maritime boundaries, whilst Chinese control (via Cosco) over the Greek port of Piraeus obstructs the IMEC economic corridor project (the transcontinental alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative). The Arctic also remains a focal point of friction, with Russia pursuing commercial dominance along the Northern Sea Route; to mitigate personnel and vessel fatigue, an expanding reliance is placed on uncrewed maritime drones. Within this environment, Italy seeks to safeguard its interests: the SAVER system installed aboard the Italian Navy ship Tritone provides submarine rescue capabilities whilst protecting strategic underwater data and energy infrastructure. The impact of this crisis upon Italy is severe. Relying entirely upon Suez and Hormuz for energy and merchandise imports, the nation absorbs the direct cost of inflated insurance tariffs. Moreover, recurring shipowner appeals for naval escorts strain an Italian Navy already heavily attrited by protracted deployments in high-threat theatres.

Italy is the European nation most exposed and vulnerable to this crisis. The national economy depends upon the maritime chokepoints of Suez and Hormuz for energy and refined products; concurrently, France—our ally—acts unilaterally, forging direct accords in Riyadh to secure national supplies. In Libya, expanding Turkish influence is constricting the historical operational space available to Italian enterprises across both the oil-and-gas sector and commercial trade routes, within a region that simultaneously controls migration flows. On the wider geopolitical stage, should Europe resolve to reopen gas pipelines with Russia, Rome would find itself squeezed between aligning with or resisting a strategic line formulated in Washington. Domestic political dynamics are further complicated by polling (conducted by academics Coticchia and Mazziotti di Celso) revealing a stark paradox: Italian citizens hold the Armed Forces in high esteem whilst displaying vehement opposition to increased military expenditure, the reinstatement of conscription, and foreign deployments. This sentiment reduces the government’s political latitude to fund new naval missions, precisely as escalating maritime insurance costs weigh heavily upon national energy imports. The sole technological bright spot is the integration of the SAVER rescue system aboard the Tritone, enhancing national capabilities to protect vital submarine cables and pipelines. Greece likewise must balance competing interests. On one hand, it bears the weight of Chinese presence at the port of Piraeus (managed by Cosco), which hampers the western IMEC corridor project; on the other, it is penalised by international sanctions against Iran, severely impacting the Greek merchant fleet, historically a global leader in petroleum transport. International oversight is intensifying precisely upon Hellenic-flagged tankers, compelling Athens into a difficult compromise between the commercial profitability of private shipowners and the stringent security demands of NATO and the United States. For Spain, official documentation denotes no specific events. Nevertheless, editorial assessment underscores that Madrid shares identical systemic risks with the broader Southern European bloc: sub-seasonal gas storage reserves, elevated energy tariffs, and the persistent threat of disruption along the Suez route.

Four dossiers exhibit indicators of imminent evolution. The first is gas: a formal response is required from Brussels, Kyiv, and the governments most acutely exposed to the American proposal, alongside updated European storage metrics. The second is Hormuz, necessitating close tracking of actual transits, war-risk premiums, and any Iranian implementation of transit tolls. The third is Libya, focusing on the text and implementation of Turkish understandings with Tripoli alongside the reactions of Italian industrial stakeholders. The fourth is the sovereign debt market, specifically the spread of French sovereign bonds relative to German bunds. For Rome, it is recommended to formulate a cohesive national position on gas prior to the dossier reaching the European table, to demand verified data concerning unreported attacks in Hormuz, and to reinforce bilateral coordination with Athens regarding Piraeus and international sanctions. The UN climate report and its ensuing summit append an urgent deadline to the calendar of coming days.

This summary has been prepared based on articles from various geopolitical and strategic analysis sources, including: Elisme, Center for Maritime Strategy, CIMSEC, Reuters, ShipMag, Navy Lookout, National Interest, Seapower Magazine, CSIS, RUSI, War on the Rocks, IISS, Responsible Statecraft, Foreign Affairs, Formiche.net, Il Sussidiario, Start Magazine, InsideOver, Notizie Geopolitiche, IARI, Dissipatio, Analisi Difesa, Jamestown Foundation, Atlantic Council, RAND Corporation.

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